2021 Colorado Code
Title 18 - Criminal Code
Article 2 - Inchoate Offenses
Part 1 - Attempts
§ 18-2-101. Criminal Attempt - Repeal

1. A person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of an offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. A substantial step is any conduct, whether act, omission, or possession, which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense. Factual or legal impossibility of committing the offense is not a defense if the offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be, nor is it a defense that the crime attempted was actually perpetrated by the accused.
2. A person who engages in conduct intending to aid another to commit an offense commits criminal attempt if the conduct would establish his complicity under section 18-1-603 were the offense committed by the other person, even if the other is not guilty of committing or attempting the offense.
3. It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the defendant abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting the complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal intent. (3.5) Criminal attempt to commit any crime for which a court is required to sentence a defendant for a crime of violence in accordance with section 18-1.3-406 is itself a crime of violence for the purposes of that section.
4. Criminal attempt to commit a class 1 felony is a class 2 felony; criminal attempt to commit a class 2 felony is a class 3 felony; criminal attempt to commit a class 3 felony is a class 4 felony; criminal attempt to commit a class 4 felony is a class 5 felony; criminal attempt to commit a class 5 or 6 felony is a class 6 felony.
5. Criminal attempt to commit a felony which is defined by any statute other than one contained in this title and for which no penalty is specifically provided is a class 6 felony.
6. [ ] Criminal attempt to commit a class 1 misdemeanor is a class 2 misdemeanor.
7. 1. Criminal attempt to commit a misdemeanor other than a class 1 misdemeanor is a class 3 misdemeanor.
   2. This subsection (7) is repealed, effective March 1, 2022.

8. Criminal attempt to commit a petty offense is a crime of the same class as the offense itself.
9. The provisions of subsections (4) to (8) of this section shall not apply to a person who commits criminal attempt to escape. A person who commits criminal attempt to escape shall be punished as provided in section 18-8-208.1.
10. 1. Except as otherwise provided by law, criminal attempt to commit a level 1 drug felony is a level 2 drug felony; criminal attempt to commit a level 2 drug felony is a level 3 drug felony; criminal attempt to commit a level 3 drug felony is a level 4 drug felony; and criminal attempt to commit a level 4 drug felony is a level 4 drug felony.
    2. Except as otherwise provided by law, criminal attempt to commit a level 1 drug misdemeanor is a level 2 drug misdemeanor; and criminal attempt to commit a level 2 drug misdemeanor is a level 2 drug misdemeanor.

(6) [ ] Criminal attempt to commit a class 1 misdemeanor or class 2 misdemeanor is a class 2 misdemeanor.

History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 414, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-2-101 . L. 75: (4) to (7) amended and (8) added, p. 617, § 3, effective July 21. L. 76, Ex. Sess.: (9) added, p. 10, § 2, effective September 18. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 960, § 4, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (4) and (5) amended, p. 21, § 11, effective July 1. L. 95: (3.5) added, p. 1250, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2002: (3.5) amended, p. 1511, § 182, effective October 1. L. 2013: (10) added,(SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1942, § 66, effective October 1. L. 2014: (10) amended,(SB 14-163), ch. 391, p. 1975, § 14, effective July 1. L. 2021: (6) amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3172, § 190, effective March 1, 2022; (7)(b) added by revision,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, pp. 3172, 3331, §§ 190, 803.

Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

1. For affirmative defenses generally, see §§ 18-1-407, 18-1-710, and 18-1-805.
2. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3.5), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

Law reviews. For article, “Homicides Under the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 49 Den. L. J. 137 (1972). For article, “Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981). For article, “Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal Law”, see 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 879 (2007).

Annotator's note. Since § 18-2-101 is similar to former § 40-25-1 , C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

The attempt provision was drawn from proposed federal criminal code. People v. Darr, 37 Colo. App. 143, 551 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977); People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981).

“Criminal attempt” construed. Criminal attempt is a crime in which the defendant's purpose is to effect a criminal result. People v. Derrera, 667 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1983).

Criminal attempt is not readily understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence in a guilty plea hearing without some further explanation by the court. People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983).

“Purpose” equivalent of “intent”. The word “purpose”, as used in this section, is the equivalent of the common meaning of the word “intent”. People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981).

An attempt merely requires some overt act beyond mere preparation. Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 413 , 484 P.2d 110 (1971).

An attempt means an effort to commit a crime, and a direct, ineffectual act done towards its commission. Lewis v. People, 124 Colo. 62 , 235 P.2d 348 (1951); Martin v. People, 179 Colo. 237 , 499 P.2d 606 (1972).

This section provides that criminal attempt requires that the defendant has the intent to perform any act, and to obtain any result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime, plus some step toward the commission of the crime which would result in its commission, except for the extraneous intervention of another person or factor. Sandoval v. People, 176 Colo. 414 , 490 P.2d 1298 (1971).

Such overt act need not be the last proximate act necessary. People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 57 , 530 P.2d 512 (1974).

A transaction, if complete, must constitute offense. Where a transaction, had it proceeded to its contemplated conclusion, would not have been a completed crime, the incompleted transaction does not rise to the dignity of an attempt to commit such offense. Martin v. People, 179 Colo. 237 , 499 P.2d 606 (1972).

Culpability and conduct required for criminal attempt. In order to be guilty of criminal attempt, an actor must act with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the underlying offense and must engage in conduct which constitutes a substantial step, with the further intent to perform acts which, if completed, would constitute the underlying offense. People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981); People v. Williams, 707 P.2d 1023 (Colo. App. 1985).

Because the jury instructions taken as a whole failed to instruct the jury that the defendant must intend to complete the crime intended, the judgment of conviction of attempted theft is reversed. People v. Williams, 707 P.2d 1023 (Colo. App. 1985).

Commission of a criminal attempt requires the intent to commit a specific crime. Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113 , 485 P.2d 886 (1971).

Specific criminal attempt provision prevails over the general criminal attempt statute. There was no violation of equal protection in defendant's conviction under a specific attempt provision of the second degree assault statute, despite defendant's contention that this section proscribes the same conduct. People v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1984).

First degree murder statutes contain rationally different elements than first degree assault statute, § 18-3-202 , and thus a defendant sentenced under the former and not the latter was not denied equal protection of law. People v. Brewer, 720 P.2d 596 (Colo. App. 1985).

Attempted second degree murder requires a substantial step toward causing death, while attempted first degree assault-extreme indifference requires only a substantial step toward causing serious bodily injury, and thus the statutes do not proscribe the same conduct and a defendant sentenced under the former and not the latter was not denied equal protection of law. People v. Ornelas-Licano, 2020 COA 62 , __ P.3d__.

Attempt to commit aggravated robbery requires same culpability, plus substantial step. Criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery requires that the offender act with the kind of culpability otherwise required for aggravated robbery and engage in a substantial step toward the commission of aggravated robbery. People v. Ledman, 622 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1981).

Conviction of attempted aggravated robbery does not require a showing of specific intent to commit the underlying crime. People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985).

Information reciting elements of attempt, and referring to provision defining ulterior crime, adequate. Where the information recited the elements of the inchoate crime of attempt in the language of this section and included a reference to the section defining the burglary allegedly attempted, and where the defendant claimed no surprise or prejudice resulting from the absence of an allegation specifying the ulterior crime to be relied upon by the prosecution in its proof of the elements of burglary, the information adequately described the offense of attempt. People v. Jiron, 44 Colo. App. 246, 616 P.2d 166 (1980).

This section and § 18-1-504 may be harmonized and do not conflict. People v. Darr, 37 Colo. App. 143, 551 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

Subsection (1) and § 18-3-203 (1)(b) do not proscribe the same conduct, and disparity in applicable punishment does not violate equal protection guarantees. People v. Marez, 916 P.2d 543 (Colo. App. 1995).

Legislative intent in amending subsection (5). It is immaterial that the offense of attempted possession of a narcotic drug is not proscribed by part 3 of article 22 of title 12; the general assembly's manifest intent was to broaden the crime of criminal attempt to include felonies other than those defined in the criminal code when it amended subsection (5) of this section. People v. Maciel, 39 Colo. App. 149, 568 P.2d 68 (1977).

No defense of impossibility available in attempt prosecution. The general assembly intended that the defense of factual or legal impossibility not be available in an attempt prosecution. People v. Darr, 37 Colo. App. 143, 551 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

A person who only thinks he is violating law may not be prosecuted. Exclusion of the defense of impossibility is not intended to permit prosecuting the person who thinks he is violating a law when in fact no such law exists. People v. Darr, 37 Colo. App. 143, 551 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

Attempted criminally negligent homicide logical and legal impossibility. Where the trial court joined criminally negligent homicide and attempt and charged the jury on attempted criminally negligent homicide, the charge was a logical and legal impossibility. People v. Hernandez, 44 Colo. App. 161, 614 P.2d 900 (1980).

Defendant may raise defense of general mistake of fact. A defendant may not rely on the defense of legal impossibility in a prosecution for attempted theft, but may raise the defense of general mistake of fact by alleging that he never believed the goods were stolen. People v. Darr, 37 Colo. App. 143, 551 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

The fact that the items were not in fact stolen does not provide a defense to attempted theft where the defendant believed they were stolen. People v. Darr, 37 Colo. App. 143, 551 P.2d 735 (1975), aff'd, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

Intoxication not defense in criminal attempt action. The legislative intent in amending this section in 1977 was to preclude a defendant from utilizing intoxication as a defense to his ability to form the intent required for criminal attempt. People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981).

Proper instructions on affirmative defense must be given. Where an issue of renunciation and abandonment is before a jury, proper instructions on this affirmative defense must be given. People v. Traubert, 625 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1981).

Effect of voluntary renunciation of criminal intent. Even though the crime of attempt is complete once the actor intentionally takes a substantial step towards the commission of the crime, the affirmative defense of abandonment is present if he thereafter voluntarily renunciates his criminal intent. People v. Johnson, 41 Colo. App. 220, 585 P.2d 306 (1978).

Defense of abandonment may apply at various stages, early and late, in the commission of attempted crimes; however, the abandonment defense does not provide immunity where the actor has put in motion forces that the actor is powerless to stop, because the attempt is deemed to have been completed and cannot be abandoned. People v. Gandiaga, 70 P.3d 523 (Colo. App. 2002).

Defense of abandonment was not available where defendant knew of his accomplice's intent to rob someone, went with the accomplice to the crime scene, waited across the street until the crime was committed, fled with the accomplice, and later returned to conceal or remove evidence. People v. Nicholas, 950 P.2d 634 (Colo. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).

To present an affirmative defense for abandonment to the jury, defendant must present “some credible evidence” on the issue of the claimed defense. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the defense of abandonment is not available once defendant has injured the victim. O'Shaughnessy v. People, 2012 CO 9, 269 P.3d 1233.

Culpable state of knowledge sufficient to support criminal attempt liability. A knowing attempt to attain a proscribed result is sufficient culpable mental state to justify imposition by the legislature of attempt liability. People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985).

Conviction of conspiracy to commit a robbery is totally inconsistent with an acquittal of attempt to commit aggravated robbery. People v. Berry, 191 Colo. 125 , 550 P.2d 332 (1976).

For conviction under subsection (1) of this section or § 18-4-410 (1) , relating to theft by receiving, it is irrelevant whether the goods are recovered stolen goods or have never been stolen. The intent and acts of the defendant, not the surrounding circumstances, are the crucial elements of the attempt offense. Darr v. People, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

The portion of subsection (1) which provides that impossibility “is not a defense if the offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be” in effect substitutes “believing” the goods to be stolen, the element of culpability required in attempted theft by receiving, for “knowing” the goods to be stolen, the element of culpability for a completed theft by receiving. Darr v. People, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

Where the defendant did every act within his power to commit the offense of theft by receiving and would have committed the completed offense had the jewelry been stolen as he believed it to be, these acts evidenced an intent to commit the offense, and the defendant comes within the letter of this section. Darr v. People, 193 Colo. 445 , 568 P.2d 32 (1977).

Proof of intent insufficient. Where testimony of complaining parties negates any intent on the part of defendant to commit attempted theft and sole evidence of intent comes from defendant, requisite independent corroborative evidence of corpus delicti is lacking. Martin v. People, 179 Colo. 237 , 499 P.2d 606 (1972).

Where a defendant engages in only one assaultive act, he or she cannot simultaneously have a specific intent to harm a particular person and universal malice that is not directed at a particular person. People v. Beatty, 80 P.3d 847 (Colo. App. 2003).

Attempt to commit rape is crime. The contention that there is no crime of attempt to commit rape under this section in view of the existence of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape under § 18-3-202 is without merit, for these are separate and distinct offenses. Clark v. People, 176 Colo. 48 , 488 P.2d 1097 (1971).

For attempt to commit an assault with a deadly weapon, see Allen v. People, 175 Colo. 113 , 485 P.2d 886 (1971).

Attempt to commit sexual assault on child is offense under Colorado law. People v. Martinez, 42 Colo. App. 257, 592 P.2d 1358 (1979).

Person is guilty of attempted second degree kidnapping if he knowingly engaged in conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of his purpose to knowingly seize or carry another person from one place to another without his consent and without lawful justification. People v. Lahr, 200 Colo. 425 , 615 P.2d 707 (1980); Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).

Intent required for attempted first degree murder. Intent required for attempted first degree murder is the intent to commit the underlying offense of first degree murder. Defendant must have acted after deliberation, and must have intended to cause the death of another person. People v. Juvenile Court, 813 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1991).

Attempted first degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder. The elements of attempted first degree murder are a subset of first degree murder. When the defendant in this case aimed at and shot the victim, he intended and attempted to kill the victim, even if he mistakenly believed the victim was someone else. Therefore the particular attempted first degree murder in this case is a lesser included offense of the particular first degree murder in this case, and the defendant cannot be convicted of both. People v. Jackson, 2020 CO 75, 472 P.3d 553.

Double jeopardy prohibits convictions for both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder for the same act. People v. Jackson, 2020 CO 75, 472 P.3d 553.

Attempted reckless manslaughter is a cognizable crime in Colorado. People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).

When one engages in conduct that involves a risk of death that is both substantial and unjustified and is conscious of the nature and extent of the risk, the actor demonstrates such a disregard for the likelihood that another will die as to evince a degree of dangerousness hardly less threatening to society than if the actor had chosen to cause death and, as such, justifies the conclusion that attempt liability may be founded on the substantive offense of reckless manslaughter. People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).

Intent required for attempted reckless manslaughter is the intent to commit the underlying offense of reckless manslaughter, that is, the intent to engage in and complete the risk-producing act or conduct. It does not include an intent that death occur even though the underlying crime, reckless manslaughter, has death as an essential element. People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).

The crime of attempted reckless manslaughter also requires that the risk-producing act or conduct be commenced and sufficiently pursued to constitute a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. That is, the act or conduct must proceed far enough to be strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete those acts that will produce a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another. People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).

Finally, in order to be guilty of attempted reckless manslaughter, the actor must engage in the requisite acts or conduct with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the underlying offense, that is, with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the acts or conduct will cause the death of another person. People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986).

Court's response to jury inquiry on attempted reckless manslaughter, although a comment on the evidence and not a proper instruction on the law, did not constitute plain error. Hypothetical given by the court, when considered in the context of the jury instructions as a whole, neither misled the jury nor cast serious doubt on the verdict. People v. Allen, 43 P.3d 689 (Colo. App. 2001).

Colorado does not recognize the offense of attempted felony murder. Because criminal attempt requires a defendant to possess the culpable mental state for the attempted offense and felony murder does not require a mental state, it is impossible to convict a person of attempting to commit an act that the person was not intending. People v. Meyer, 952 P.2d 774 (Colo. App. 1997).

Third degree criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree criminal trespass. While unlawful entry upon the premises is a necessary element of the completed offense of third degree criminal trespass, it is not a necessary element of attempted first degree criminal trespass. People v. Griffith, 58 P.3d 1111 (Colo. App. 2002).

Section 18-1-105 (9)(a)(V) does not require the imposition of a sentence beyond the presumptive range upon conviction of criminal attempt to commit escape under this section. People v. Lobato, 703 P.2d 623 (Colo. App. 1985).

Attempted extreme indifference murder is a grave and serious crime. People v. Terry, 2019 COA 9 , __ P.3d __.

Substantial step required for conviction of attempted extreme indifference murder is conduct which poses a real and proximate risk of death to the victim. People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983).

In applying this test, the court should consider the nature of the defendant's conduct as well as the extent of the victim's injuries. People v. Ramos, 708 P.2d 1347 (Colo. 1985).

Substantial step. Evidence was sufficient to induce a person of ordinary prudence and caution to a reasonable belief that the defendants engaged in conduct which constituted a substantial step toward the underlying offense of first degree murder. People v. Juvenile Court, 813 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1991).

Evidence sufficiently demonstrated that defendant, by seizing and carrying the victim from the kitchen to the bedroom and unsuccessfully attempting to have sexual relations despite the victim's protests and resistance, engaged in a substantial step toward the commission of sexual assault. People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 154 (Colo. App. 2001).

Submission of attempt and lesser included offenses to jury. Where it was possible for the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt of attempted robbery, and at the same time to be convinced by reason of defendant's admissions that he was guilty of making an assault upon the complaining witness, the evidence justified the giving of an instruction on simple assault as requested in order to submit the lesser included offense to a jury. People v. Velasquez, 178 Colo. 264 , 497 P.2d 12 (1972).

A defendant could commit the crime of attempted theft without having first committed the crime of joyriding or attempted joyriding, which are not lesser included offenses of theft. Sandoval v. People, 176 Colo. 414 , 490 P.2d 1298 (1971).

A conviction for attempted second degree murder cannot merge with a conviction for attempted first degree murder with extreme indifference when the offenses had different victims. People v. Torres, 224 P.3d 268 (Colo. App. 2009).

The question of whether felony menacing is a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder is an issue of first impression in Colorado. People v. Torres, 224 P.3d 267 (Colo. App. 2009).

The offense of second degree murder does not establish every element of felony menacing. Attempted second degree murder requires a defendant to knowingly engage in conduct that is a substantial step toward causing the death of a person. There is no requirement that the victim be in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Thus, an attempted second degree murder conviction does not necessarily establish all the elements of menacing. People v. Torres, 224 P.3d 268 (Colo. App. 2009).

Elements constituting the crime of theft must be explained to the jury when that is the ulterior crime in a case alleging a burglary offense. People v. Jiron, 44 Colo. App. 246, 616 P.2d 166 (1980).

Jury instruction that erroneously omitted element for attempted first degree murder was not plain error because jury instructions read as a whole sufficiently communicated to the jury the culpability elements required to convict the defendant of attempted first degree murder. People v. Key, 851 P.2d 228 (Colo. App. 1992).

Jury instruction on attempted first degree murder that omitted the required element of “after deliberation”, when taken together with first degree murder jury instruction that expressly mentioned “after deliberation”, adequately advised the jury of the required mens rea for attempted first degree murder. People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349 (Colo. App. 2002); People v. Petschow, 119 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Rubio, 222 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2009).

Jury instruction that erroneously omitted specific intent element for attempted first degree assault was not plain error. The jury instructions in this case, when read and considered together, clearly instructed the jury regarding the required mens rea for attempted first degree assault. People v. Procasky, 2019 COA 181 , 467 P.3d 1252.

Crimes of violence include attempts of crimes listed in § 18-1.3-406 (2)(a)(II) . People v. Laurson, 70 P.3d 564 (Colo. App. 2002).

The general rule applies that abandonment is not available for completed crimes where the general assembly specifically limited the affirmative defense of abandonment to “a charge under this section” and no other legislative enactment makes abandonment an affirmative defense for tampering with a witness. People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207 (Colo. App. 2002).

Attempted first degree assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder after deliberation. Attempted first degree assault requires that a defendant act with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon. Use of a deadly weapon is not an element of attempted first degree murder after deliberation. People v. Beatty, 80 P.3d 847 (Colo. App. 2003).

Attempted robbery as defined in Colorado law is a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a) of the United States sentencing guidelines. United States v. Mendez, 924 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2019).

Applied in People v. Montoya, 196 Colo. 111 , 582 P.2d 673 (1978); Hudson v. People, 196 Colo. 211 , 585 P.2d 580 (1978); People v. Dowdell, 197 Colo. 76 , 589 P.2d 948 (1979); People v. Blalock, 197 Colo. 320 , 592 P.2d 406 (1979); Pigford v. People, 197 Colo. 358 , 593 P.2d 354 (1979); People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979); People v. Elkhatib, 198 Colo. 287 , 599 P.2d 897 (1979); People v. Miller, 199 Colo. 32 , 604 P.2d 36 (1979); People ex rel. Losavio v. Gentry, 199 Colo. 153 , 606 P.2d 57 (1980); People v. DeLeon, 44 Colo. App. 146, 613 P.2d 639 (1980); Godbold v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1981 ); People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981); People v. Jordan, 630 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1981); People v. Elkhatib, 632 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1981); People v. Walters, 632 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1981); People v. Johnson, 634 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1981); People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1981); People v. Franklin, 640 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1982); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1982); People v. Madonna, 651 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1982); People v. District Court, 652 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1982); People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hoffman, 655 P.2d 393 (Colo. 1982); People v. Simien, 656 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1983); People v. Freiman, 657 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1983); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983); People v. Tate, 657 P.2d 955 (Colo. 1983); People v. Hrapski, 658 P.2d 1367 (Colo. 1983); United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2014); People v. Richardson, 2018 COA 120 , __ P.3d __, aff'd on other grounds, 2020 CO 46, 481 P.3d 1, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, __ S. Ct. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 133 (2021).