2021 Colorado Code
Title 18 - Criminal Code
Article 1 - Provisions Applicable to Offenses Generally
Part 6 - Parties to Offenses - Accountability
§ 18-1-605. Liability Based on Behavior of Another - No Defense

In any prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability is based upon the behavior of another pursuant to sections 18-1-601 to 18-1-604 , it is no defense that the other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the behavior in question or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or the defendant belongs to a class of persons who by definition of the offense are legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.

History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 406, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-705 .

Annotator's note. Since § 18-1-605 is similar to former § 40-1-12 , C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

At common law a conviction of the principal was required to precede or accompany that of one charged as an accessory and the accessory was subject to the same punishment as the principal. Howard v. People, 97 Colo. 550 , 51 P.2d 594 (1935).

The conviction of the principal is not a condition precedent to the conviction of an accessory after the fact, before, or during the fact. Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561 , 424 P.2d 115 (1967).

An accessory is subject to independent prosecution and can be convicted even though principal actor has been neither charged nor convicted of an offense. Oaks v. Patterson, 278 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo.), aff'd on other grounds, 400 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968).

He may be convicted of a greater crime than the principal, who pled guilty to a lesser included crime, and according to the state, acted under influence of accessory when shooting decedent; such conviction does not deny accessory due process. Oaks v. Patterson, 278 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo.), aff'd on other grounds, 400 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968).

Dismissal of information as to principal does not justify discharge of accessory by court. The dismissal of an information as to a principal, and his discharge, does not justify the discharge of the accessory by the court of its own motion, against the protests of the district attorney. People v. Zobel, 54 Colo. 284 , 130 P. 837 (1913).

Applied in People v. Fletcher, 37 Colo. App. 173, 546 P.2d 980 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Colo. 314 , 566 P.2d 345 (1977).