2021 Colorado Code
Title 18 - Criminal Code
Article 1 - Provisions Applicable to Offenses Generally
Part 6 - Parties to Offenses - Accountability
§ 18-1-603. Complicity

A person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the offense.

History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 406, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-703 . L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1540, § 3, effective July 1.

Analysis

• I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
• II. TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT.
  • A. In General.
  • B. Indictment or Information.
  • C. Evidence.
  • D. Instructions.

• III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

Law reviews. For article, “One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure”, see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 89 (1963). For article, “Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981).

Annotator's note. Since § 18-1-603 is similar to former § 40-1-12 , C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Common law. At common law an accessory before the fact is he who, being absent at the time of the actual perpetration of the offense, procures, counsels, commands, assists, or abets another to commit it. One who is present aiding and abetting the fact to be committed was considered a principal in the second degree. Komrs v. People, 31 Colo. 212 , 73 P. 25 (1903).

If general assembly has power to forbid anything, it has power to forbid incitement thereto. People v. UMW, Dist. 15, 70 Colo. 269 , 201 P. 54 (1921).

Purpose of section. Essence of accessory statute establishing guilt equal to that of principal is to punish for participation in the criminal act. People v. Grass, 180 Colo. 346 , 505 P.2d 1301 (1973).

Complicity and conspiracy are not separate offenses with essentially identical elements. People v. Medina, 72 P.3d 405 (Colo. App. 2003).

Conspiracy distinguished. Under this section, a defendant is held accountable for a criminal offense committed by another if the defendant participates in the criminal act by intentionally aiding, abetting, or advising the other person in planning or committing the offense. In contrast, the essence of the crime of conspiracy is an illegal agreement or combination, plus an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. People v. Hood, 878 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1994).

Complicity is not a separate and distinct crime or offense. People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).

Complicity is not a separate and distinct crime or offense under the criminal code and it is not necessary to specifically charge complicity. People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1982); People v. Thurman, 948 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1997).

Complicity is merely a theory by which a defendant becomes accountable for a criminal offense committed by another. People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1982); People v. Thurman, 948 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1997); People v. Medina, 72 P.3d 405 (Colo. App. 2003).

No fine or imprisonment may be imposed for complicity since it is merely a theory of law by which a defendant becomes accountable for a criminal offense committed through the conduct of another, the punishment is imposed for the underlying crime and not for complicity. People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).

Conviction of defendant upheld on theory of complicity to criminally negligent homicide on basis that jury could find defendant guilty if it believed that defendant knew that the principal was about to engage in conduct that was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, even though the principal was not charged with criminally negligent homicide. Such knowledge on the part of the alleged complicitor is sufficient to meet the requirement that the complicitor had knowledge that the principal intended to commit the crime. People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989).

Accomplice liability tracks that degree of knowledge that the complicitor's actions of aiding and abetting evince, and, where the complicitor is engaged in a common enterprise with the principal, he or she may be held liable as a complicitor for reckless crimes. Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280 (Colo. 2005).

Conviction as a complicitor, under the complicity statute, requires that: (1) the principal committed the crime; (2) the complicitor had knowledge that the principal intended to commit the crime; and (3) the complicitor aided or encouraged, with specific intent to aid or encourage, the principal's commission of the crime. People v. Wilson, 791 P.2d 1247 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Fisher, 904 P.2d 1326 (Colo. App. 1994).

A complicitor can be held strictly liable for the sentence enhancer when the complicitor is unaware that an at-risk victim is present if the complicitor intended to aid in the theft and was aware of the circumstances constituting the elements of the underlying offense. People in Interest of B.D., 2020 CO 87, 477 P.3d 143.

A complicitor is liable for a principal's act of money laundering if the prosecution can prove that (1) the principal committed an act of money laundering; (2) the complicitor aided, abetted, advised, or encouraged that specific act of money laundering; (3) the complicitor intended to do so; (4) the complicitor was aware that the principal knew or believed that the property involved in the specific money laundering transaction represented the proceeds of a criminal offense; and (5) the complicitor was aware that the principal knew or believed that the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the criminal offense. Butler v. People, 2019 CO 87, 450 P.3d 714.

A criminal defendant may be a complicitor to the crime of accessory by rendering assistance to another who is engaged in destroying evidence of a crime, even though the crime underlying the accessory charge may have been committed by the defendant. People v. Ager, 928 P.2d 784 (Colo. App. 1996).

Requirement that a defendant knew another person intended to commit a crime for purposes of being convicted as a complicitor is met where the principal consciously caused the prohibited sexual contact with the child. People v. Moore, 877 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1994).

Section distinguished from solicitation statute. Although encouragement of a criminal offense is prohibited under both § 18-2-301 and this section, the solicitation statute concerns incomplete acts, and the complicity statute covers consummated criminal offenses. Because the provisions proscribe distinguishable behavior, there is no violation of equal protection. Alonzi v. People, 198 Colo. 160 , 597 P.2d 560 (1979).

Liability of accessory and associates governed by same principle. Where one is an accessory he of necessity must act in concert with some other or others and whether charged jointly or separately the legal consequences arising from his conduct and that of his associates are measured by the same principle. Bacino v. People, 104 Colo. 229 , 90 P.2d 5 (1939).

There is no statutory distinction between accessories before the fact and principals. Noble v. People, 23 Colo. 9 , 45 P. 376 (1896); Pacheco v. People, 96 Colo. 401 , 43 P.2d 165 (1935); Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959); Martinez v. People, 166 Colo. 524 , 444 P.2d 641 (1968).

Thus, one who is an accessory to a crime is guilty of the same degree of crime as the principal. Atwood v. People, 176 Colo. 183 , 489 P.2d 1305 (1971).

One who comes under this section is equivalent to a principal. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).

An accessory who stands by and aids, abets, or assists in the perpetration of a crime is deemed and considered as a principal and punished accordingly. Medina v. People, 168 Colo. 255 , 450 P.2d 662 (1969).

An accessory standing by, aiding, abetting, or assisting in a kidnapping is guilty as a principal. Brady v. People, 175 Colo. 252 , 486 P.2d 436 (1971).

An accessory to a crime of violence as defined by § 16-11-309 (2) may be charged, tried, and punished as a principal. People v. Swanson, 638 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1981).

A person who intends to aid the principal in committing murder and who possesses the intent to murder a person is criminally liable for the killing of an unintended third party by the principal. To decide otherwise would defeat the purpose of the complicity statute, which provides that a complicitor is “legally accountable as principal”. People v. Candelaria, 107 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006).

No transferred intent where a shooter meant to kill the very person he did kill, and that person was not someone the indirect participant wanted to kill. When the direct perpetrator deliberately changes the object of the offense, the doctrine of transferred malice does not apply to the indirect participant despite the fact that from his point of view the displacement of harm was accidental. People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93 , 412 P.3d 838.

It is not true that if one is not a conspirator he cannot be an accessory. Jacobs v. People, 174 Colo. 403 , 484 P.2d 107 (1971).

One who merely aids and advises another in a legitimate matter is not an accessory within the meaning of this section. French v. People, 6 Colo. App. 311, 40 P. 463 (1895).

Definition of “abets” encompasses “encourages”. Alonzi v. People, 198 Colo. 160 , 597 P.2d 560 (1979).

A bystander is not required to endanger his own safety by interfering and giving help to prevent the commission of a crime, in order to avoid being held an accessory under this section. Farrell v. People, 8 Colo. App. 524, 46 P. 841 (1896).

Defendant's involvement as a conspirator and as a complicitor was tied to separate and distinct crimes, and the doctrine of merger did not apply. People v. Shannon, 189 Colo. 287 , 539 P.2d 480 (1975).

Section applies to felony murder. A complicitor, being a principal, is included in the felony murder statute as one who commits or attempts to commit the underlying felony. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).

Complicitor liability can apply to strict liability crimes. A person is legally accountable as a principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing that offense, and he or she does so with: (1) the intent to aid, abet, advise, or encourage the other person in his or her criminal act or conduct, and (2) an awareness of circumstances attending the act or conduct he or she seeks to further, including a required mental state, if any, that are necessary for commission of the offense in question. People v. Childress, 2015 CO 65M, 363 P.3d 155; People v. Butler, 2017 COA 98 , 454 P.3d 280, aff'd on other grounds, 2019 CO 87, 450 P.3d 714.

There is no temporal element imputed to the dual mental state determined by the above test. People v. Sandoval, 2018 COA 156 , __ P.3d __.

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 134 S. Ct. 1240, 188 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2014), does not apply to crimes charged under this section. People v. Sandoval, 2018 COA 156 , __ P.3d __.

Colorado courts have recognized that complicity liability applies to attempt offenses. Thus, attempted murder is not an inchoate crime. People v. Candelaria, 107 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006).

Applied in Polochio v. People, 76 Colo. 574 , 233 P. 833 (1925); Stewart v. People, 83 Colo. 289 , 264 P. 720 (1928); De Salvo v. People, 98 Colo. 368 , 56 P.2d 28 (1936); Thompson v. People, 139 Colo. 15 , 336 P.2d 93 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 972, 80 S. Ct. 606, 4 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1960); Kelley v. People, 166 Colo. 322 , 443 P.2d 734 (1968); Mingo v. People, 171 Colo. 474 , 468 P.2d 849 (1970); Brady v. People, 175 Colo. 252 , 486 P.2d 436 (1971); People v. Cox, 190 Colo. 326 , 546 P.2d 956 (1976); People v. Brionez, 39 Colo. App. 396, 570 P.2d 1296 (1977); People v. Simien, 656 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1983).

In order for a defendant to be accountable as a principal under this section, it must be shown (1) that the principal actually committed the robbery; (2) that defendant had knowledge that the principal intended to commit the crime; and (3) that defendant aided, abetted, or advised the principal in planning or committing the offense. People v. Martin, 192 Colo. 491 , 561 P.2d 776 (1977); People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1982).

It is immaterial whether the principal was identified by name in the complicity count against the defendant. People v. Martin, 192 Colo. 491 , 561 P.2d 776 (1977).

Formal agreement is not required. It is not necessary that persons implicated in crime shall have reached a formal or distinct agreement either orally or in writing as to the exact procedure in the accomplishment thereof. Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959).

Defendant need not perform all acts necessary to offense. Where two or more are involved in the commission of a criminal offense and one helps the other, though not actually performing all the acts necessary to the commission of the offense, all are, nevertheless, principal offenders and are punishable as though all have committed the necessary acts. Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970).

Absence from state at time of crime does not prevent conviction. That defendant charged as accessory in a criminal case was at all times during the happening of the events involved in the crime in another state does not invalidate conviction. Newton v. People, 96 Colo. 246 , 41 P.2d 300 (1935).

No election required as to which defendant was accessory. There was no error in the trial court's refusing to compel the district attorney to elect, before the evidence was presented, as to which defendant was principal and which accessory. Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36 , 240 P.2d 512 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978, 72 S. Ct. 1076, 96 L. Ed. 1370, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 848, 73 S. Ct. 6, 97 L. Ed. 659 (1952).

An accessory who stands by and aids in the perpetration of a crime may properly be charged as a principal, and in the case of codefendants it is unnecessary to spell out which one is the principal and which the accessory, nor is it necessary to characterize and classify the specific acts of each. Schreiner v. People, 146 Colo. 19 , 360 P.2d 443, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 856, 82 S. Ct. 94, 7 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1961).

In the case of codefendants it is unnecessary to spell out which one is the principal and which the accessory. McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309 , 490 P.2d 287 (1971).

When two persons are charged with the same crime, the prosecution is not required to spell out which one is the principal and which is the accessory. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

Applied in People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294 , 584 P.2d 622 (1978); People v. Alonzi, 40 Colo. App. 507, 580 P.2d 1263 (1978).

An accessory may be charged as principal. Voris v. People, 75 Colo. 574 , 227 P. 551 (1924); Newton v. People, 96 Colo. 246 , 41 P.2d 300 (1935); Pacheco v. People, 96 Colo. 401 , 43 P.2d 165 (1935); Bacino v. People, 104 Colo. 229 , 90 P.2d 5 (1939); Erwin v. People, 126 Colo. 28 , 245 P.2d 1171 (1952); Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959); Martinez v. People, 166 Colo. 524 , 444 P.2d 641 (1968).

An accessory may be indicted and punished as a principal. People v. Zobel, 54 Colo. 284 , 130 P. 837 (1913); Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17 , 189 P. 5 (1920); Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959).

If accessories are under the law deemed and considered as principals, then they are principals insofar as the indictment, trial, and punishment are concerned. Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17 , 189 P. 5 (1920); Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959).

The acts of the principal are the acts of the accessory, and the accessory may be charged and punished accordingly as a principal. Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561 , 424 P.2d 115 (1967).

A person who aids, abets, or assists in the perpetration of a criminal offense becomes an accessory to that offense and is chargeable and punishable as a principal. Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970).

An accessory who stands by and aids in the perpetration of a crime may properly be charged as a principal. McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309 , 490 P.2d 287 (1971).

An accessory charged as a principal for an accessory is deemed and considered a principal, punishable as a principal, and plainly shall be charged as a principal. Fernandez v. People, 176 Colo. 346 , 490 P.2d 690 (1971).

Nothing substantial was added to the charge by adding the charge that defendants had aided, counseled, and procured the burning, since, in Colorado, one who aids and abets or advises or encourages is deemed and considered a principal, and may be charged as a principal. People v. Buckner, 180 Colo. 65 , 504 P.2d 669 (1972).

A defendant may be charged as the principal in a criminal transaction and subsequently tried as an accessory. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

One charged as a principal may be tried and convicted as a complicitor. People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982).

Proper charge satisfies constitution. All participants in the crime are made guilty of the crime under the statute, and therefore when properly charged with the crime, they are sufficiently advised of the accusation against them, within the requirement of the constitutional provision that accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17 , 189 P. 5 (1920); Fernandez v. People, 176 Colo. 346 , 490 P.2d 690 (1971).

Particulars in which he aided need not be recited. The particulars in which an accessory aided and abetted or advised and encouraged the principal need not be recited. Newton v. People, 96 Colo. 246 , 41 P.2d 300 (1935); Martinez v. People, 166 Colo. 524 , 444 P.2d 641 (1968).

In the case of codefendants it is unnecessary to characterize and classify the specific acts of the principal and the accessory. McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309 , 490 P.2d 287 (1971).

It is ultimately the jury's responsibility to determine the specific role a defendant plays. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

Elements may be established by reasonable inference. That one charged as accessory to crime had knowledge of the principal's intention, coincided therewith, and cooperated in his efforts may be established by reasonable inference from other established facts and circumstances. Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959).

In the trial of an alleged accessory, the state must show by some substantial proof, either directly or by conclusive circumstances, that the accessory had some knowledge of the principal's offense. Dressel v. People, 178 Colo. 115 , 495 P.2d 544 (1972).

An admission by alleged principal may be introduced as evidence of the principal's guilt so long as all references to the defendant-accessory are effectively deleted. People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280 , 505 P.2d 7 (1973).

Defendants' statements were admissible in prosecution for attempted theft where those statements were not offered to prove conspiracy, but rather to show each defendant's complicity in offense, and court made it clear that it considered any statement offered only as evidence against the defendant who made it. People v. Adams, 678 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1984).

Prosecutor at defendant-accessory's trial permitted to introduce evidence establishing principal's guilt. Before a defendant may be convicted as an accessory, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that his accomplice, as the principal, is also guilty of the crime, and in order to satisfy that burden of proof, the prosecution is allowed to introduce evidence otherwise inadmissible at the defendant-accessory's trial for the limited purpose of establishing the guilt of the principal. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

Principal's mental state not relevant. Only the defendant's mental state is relevant in proving a charge of complicity. Accordingly, it is no defense that the person with whom the defendant acted is legally not responsible for the crime. People v. McCoy, 944 P.2d 577 (Colo. App. 1996).

Evidence established intent. Where the evidence discloses that the defendants, acting in concert with another, inflicted stab wounds upon the complaining witness and other victims of the assault, a claim that a defendant had no specific intent to commit bodily injury on the person of the complaining witness, and therefore is not accountable for injuries to her, is without merit. Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959).

Evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case. Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110 , 420 P.2d 416 (1966).

Evidence warranting instruction on accessory. Erwin v. People, 126 Colo. 28 , 245 P.2d 1171 (1952).

Where two persons are acting in concert, one holding the victims at bay, the other emptying the cash register, an instruction on accessory is in order. Schreiner v. People, 146 Colo. 19 , 360 P.2d 443, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 856, 82 S. Ct. 94, 7 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1961); Cruz v. People, 147 Colo. 528 , 364 P.2d 561 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 978, 82 S. Ct. 483, 7 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1962).

An accomplice or accessory instruction is applicable and proper where the evidence indicates that one of the defendants was standing by and was aiding, abetting, or assisting in the perpetration of the crime. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409 , 444 P.2d 267 (1968).

Where two or more persons jointly engage in the commission of a crime, the giving of an accessory instruction is proper. Tanksley v. People, 171 Colo. 77 , 464 P.2d 862 (1970); McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309 , 490 P.2d 287 (1971).

Complicity instruction given when joint crime. An instruction on complicity may be given when two or more people engage jointly in a crime. People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 11 , 612 P.2d 1106 (1980); People v. Thurman, 948 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1997).

But court is not required to instruct jury that it must reach a unanimous decision as to whether defendant is convicted as a principal or as a complicitor. Committing a crime either as a principal or complicitor are alternative legal theories and two means of committing a single offense, and are not an impermissible definitional distinction pertaining to a party's status. People v. Hall, 60 P.3d 728 (Colo. App. 2002).

Instruction not error simply because possibility of inconsistent verdict. The trial court did not err by instructing on complicity and on sexual assault when the defendant was aided or abetted by others simply because the instructions, when given together, could lead to an inconsistent verdict. People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 11 , 612 P.2d 1106 (1980).

If request made, court required to give limiting instruction. If a request is made for an instruction limiting the use of evidence introduced to establish guilt of principal, the court is required to caution the jury that the evidence can be considered only to show the guilt of the principal and not that of the defendant-accessory. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

If no request made, no duty to limit jury's consideration. Where the defendant failed to request a limiting instruction both at the time the evidence was introduced and at the close of the trial, absent such a request, there was no duty on the trial court to limit the jury's consideration of the testimony. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374 , 513 P.2d 446 (1973).

Instruction on criminal responsibility held not erroneous. An instruction designed to inform the jury regarding the criminal responsibility of the persons engaged in the concerted common purpose of committing a felony, where the accessory, made a principal by statute, is tried under a separate information is not erroneous. Bacino v. People, 104 Colo. 229 , 90 P.2d 5 (1939).

Instruction using phrase has “advised or encouraged” is not erroneous. Under the provisions of this section that an accessory is one who has “advised and encouraged, etc.”, a court instruction using the phrase, has “advised or encouraged”, held not erroneous. Voris v. People, 75 Colo. 574 , 227 P. 551 (1924).

Instruction given was sufficient. Instruction given, which was couched in the language of the statute and which was read together with the courts' general reasonable doubt instruction, was sufficient to instruct jury properly on complicity. People v. Lillie, 707 P.2d 1043 (Colo. App. 1985).

Words “with intent to promote or facilitate” are not words of uncommon meaning which are apt to be misunderstood by a jury and therefore require further definition. People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).

Failure of trial court to give cautionary instruction on accomplices does not constitute reversible error, where there was ample corroboration. Miller v. People, 92 Colo. 481 , 22 P.2d 626 (1933).

Statutory definitions of mens rea not applicable to complicity. Since complicity is not a substantive crime, the statutory definitions of mens rea do not apply, and instructions defining the mens rea elements of “specific intent” and “intentionally or with intent” are not applicable to, or a necessary element of, the definition of complicity. People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1981).

Erroneous instruction including mens rea is harmless error. The statutory definitions of mens rea are not necessary elements of complicity. Where an erroneous instruction on complicity requires the finding of a higher standard of culpability, such failure inures to the benefit of the defendant and constitutes harmless error. People v. Simien, 671 P.2d 1021 (Colo. App. 1983).

Asserted errors are not structural because the plain language of the pattern complicity instruction sufficiently reflects the complicitor's two mental state requirements under the complicity statute: (1) The defendant had the requisite mens rea for the underlying crime committed by the principal; and (2) the defendant intended that his own conduct would promote or facilitate the commission of the crimes committed by the principal. Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1997) disapproved of by Supreme Court in Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001)).

An incorrect jury instruction in a criminal case is not a structural error; instead, such instruction is subject only to harmless or plain error review, following the U.S. supreme court precedent in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Therefore, if a conviction is not attributable to the incorrect instruction, a conviction shall not be overturned and all contrary precedent is disapproved of. Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001) disapproving on this point Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234 (Colo. 1999), Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1997), People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997), People v. Villa-Villa, 983 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1999)).

“All or part of” language in the standard complicity instruction was not plain error, even though the defendant being charged with the underlying crime under a complicity theory did not actually commit any of the essential elements of that crime and one principal alone committed all elements of the crime. Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1997).

Trial court did not err when it included the “all or part of” language in the complicity instruction. The jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant and another committed the essential elements of the crimes related to the complicity charges. People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44 , 370 P.3d 197.

Evidence sufficient to warrant complicity instruction. Evidence led to a reasonable inference that defendant knew of the other man's possession and intent to distribute controlled substances and that defendant facilitated that conduct by allowing the other man to use his apartment for those purposes. People v. Chavez, 190 P.3d 760 (Colo. App. 2007).

Submission of complicity instruction was error and not harmless where there was no evidence with respect to the existence of an accomplice, despite strong evidence of defendant's guilt on the underlying offense. People v. Gonzales, 728 P.2d 384 (Colo. App. 1986).

Trial court erred in giving complicity instruction. Although the jury was instructed on first degree assault and sexual assault charges that, in order to convict, it must find that defendant's wife intended to commit the crime of sexual assault on a child, that defendant must have known that she intended to commit that crime, and that the defendant did not intentionally aid, abet, advise or encourage her in committing this crime, the evidence did not justify that the wife voluntarily committed sexual assault on her daughter or that defendant's actions were designed to aid her in carrying out such an intent. People v. Moore, 860 P.2d 549 (Colo. App. 1993).

But trial court erred in refusing to give complicity instruction where evidence supported theory that defendant and co-defendant had engaged jointly in crimes. Complicity instruction was warranted when there was evidence that defendant had previously confessed to shootings and admitted that co-defendant had driven car, and that neighborhood residents had seen two persons, a shooter and a driver, involved in the crimes. Despite defendant's assertion at trial that he had falsely admitted to the shootings and had switched roles with co-defendant, the evidence was sufficient to support a jury instruction on complicity. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002).

Erroneous instruction on value of stolen property received. Where defendant received property knowing it to have been stolen, and subsequently received from the same parties additional property, fruits of a burglary committed at his suggestion but in which he did not participate, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that in arriving at the value of the property received they were limited to the value of such as was “shown to have been stolen prior to the time any knowledge thereof came to the defendant”. People v. Spinuzza, 99 Colo. 303 , 62 P.2d 471 (1936).

Insufficient evidence to show occupant of automobile was accessory. Where two men were charged with causing death by operating a car in a reckless manner while intoxicated, and the only evidence supporting the charge that defendant was an accessory was that he was in the car and was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident, it could not be successfully contended from the evidence that defendant in any way aided and abetted in that regard. Quintana v. People, 106 Colo. 174 , 102 P.2d 486 (1940).

Participant in robbery during which homicide is committed. If a homicide is committed by one of defendant's associates while engaged in a robbery in furtherance of a common purpose, defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507 , 289 P. 1081 (1930).

To convict defendant of attempted murder as a complicitor, defendant must have had the culpable mental state required for attempted murder and must have intended that his own conduct promote or facilitate the commission of attempted first degree murder committed by the principal. People v. Candelaria, 107 P.3d 1080 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 P.3d 178 (Colo. 2006).

Culpability of participant in assault. Where defendants and another agree to embark upon an enterprise of stealing hubcaps from automobiles, stole a hubcap from a car belonging to one of the victims of their assault, and upon being pursued and overtaken attack their pursuers, severely cutting and beating them, the assault and the use of knives being concerted and participated in by all three thieves, all are guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9 , 335 P.2d 550 (1959).

Where the evidence disclosed that only slight injury was inflicted on deceased in an altercation with defendant, and that thereafter deceased was severely beaten by a third party, resulting in his death, and there was no evidence that defendant participated therein or that there was an express or tacit understanding between defendant and such third party to injure deceased through a common unlawful purpose, defendant was not an accessory to the acts of such third party. Smith v. People, 142 Colo. 523 , 351 P.2d 457 (1960).

Principles of complicity apply to sexual assault in the first degree such that if the actor or an accomplice is armed with and uses a deadly weapon then both may be found to have committed a class 2 felony. People v. Walford, 716 P.2d 137 (Colo. App. 1985).

Proof that the complicitor had some knowledge of the principal's offense may be sufficient. Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant knew that his companion had a knife in his possession and planned to rob the male robbery victim after both men were informed by the woman victim that her husband was in the house. People v. Wilson, 791 P.2d 1247 (Colo. App. 1990).

Record supported jury's determination that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree assault where defendant was a complicitor in the robbery of the victim, and in the course of or in furtherance of that crime, the victim was seriously injured by one of the individuals involved in the robbery. Defendant may be held responsible for that serious bodily injury whether or not he knew that someone else intended to inflict it. People v. Fisher, 904 P.2d 1326 (Colo. App. 1994) (decided under law as it existed prior to 1995 repeal of § 18-3-202 (1)(d) ).

One agreeing in advance to buy stolen property. Under this section if one agrees in advance to buy stolen property, knowing that the property is to be stolen, he thereby encourages the perpetration of the theft, and if the crime is committed he is deemed and considered as principal and punished accordingly. Miller v. People, 92 Colo. 481 , 22 P.2d 626 (1933); People v. Lamirato, 180 Colo. 250 , 504 P.2d 661 (1972).

Where there was evidence presented at trial to the effect that the defendant had stated, prior to the theft, that he would take all the color television sets which could be provided, and there was evidence from which a jury could properly infer that the defendant knew that the television sets would be stolen, the evidence was sufficient to permit submission of the theft by taking count to the jury, it being properly instructed as to an accessory becoming liable as a principal. People v. Lamirato, 180 Colo. 250 , 504 P.2d 661 (1972).

Purchaser from one knowingly unauthorized to sell liquor. Under this section each person presenting himself as a buyer from one knowingly unauthorized to sell liquor, became a participant in the act of selling. Walt v. People, 46 Colo. 136 , 104 P. 89 (1909).

One who knowingly rents premises to be occupied for the purpose of prostitution, and which with his knowledge are conducted as a bawdy house, aids, abets, and assists in keeping and maintaining a house of ill-fame, for the obvious reason that by his affirmative act he knowingly aids another to commit that offense, and as this section makes him a principal, he may be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Griffin v. People, 44 Colo. 533 , 99 P. 321 (1908).

Employee not liable for embezzlement of manager. A conviction for embezzlement by a warehouseman of property must be reversed when there is no evidence to show that the defendant actually took part in the crime and the prosecution failed to establish that the defendant had some knowledge that the manager had perpetrated the crime. Dressel v. People, 178 Colo. 115 , 495 P.2d 544 (1972).

Complicity in arson. Evidence was sufficient to make prima facie case against two defendants as complicitors. People v. Calvaresi, 198 Colo. 321 , 600 P.2d 57 (1979).

Convictions for internet luring of a child and internet sexual exploitation of a child under a complicity theory vacated because prosecution failed to prove that defendant committed the crimes or that defendant acted as an accomplice to a principal who committed the crimes. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57 , 296 P.3d 234.