2021 Colorado Code
Title 18 - Criminal Code
Article 1.3 - Sentencing in Criminal Cases
Part 9 - Sentencing of Sex Offenders
§ 18-1.3-912. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

1. After the evidentiary hearing, the court shall, within seven days, make oral or written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
2. If the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, the court shall commit the defendant pursuant to section 18-1.3-904.
3. If the court does not find as provided in subsection (2) of this section, it shall terminate proceedings under this part 9 and proceed with sentencing as otherwise provided by law.
4. If the findings and conclusions are oral, they shall be reduced to writing and filed within fourteen days, and the defendant shall not be committed to the custody of the department pursuant to section 18-1.3-904 until the findings and conclusions are filed.

History. Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1433, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2012: (1) and (4) amended,(SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 868, § 118, effective July 1.

This section is similar to former § 16-13-211 as it existed prior to 2002.

Annotator's note. Since § 18-1.3-912 is similar to § 16-13-211 as it existed prior to the 2002 relocation of certain criminal sentencing provisions, repealed § 39-19-1 , C.R.S. 1963, and § 39-19-1 , CRS 53, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Constitutionality of classification and findings. Where classification of sex offenders under § 16-13-203 is based upon reasonable and natural distinctions to accomplish a legitimate purpose under the police power, and where the trial court makes a finding of fact to determine whether a defendant comes within the classification, such findings and classification do not offend against equal protection principles of the constitution. Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147 , 380 P.2d 903 (1963).

Power to sentence vested in court. The court is vested with power, after the psychiatric examination has been made and the report thereof filed, to determine whether sentence should be imposed under this part 2. Trueblood v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1963).

The trial court is the one imposing sentence and not the psychiatrist. After being apprised of the information it is the trial court which finally makes the determination whether a person, if at large, would constitute a threat of bodily harm to a member of the public. Ray v. People, 160 Colo. 173 , 415 P.2d 328 (1966).

Section limits discretion of court. The trial court is empowered only to impose sentence under and in accord with the statute. In so doing the court performs a ministerial function with discretion confined to the limits permitted by this section. Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503 , 366 P.2d 655 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 929, 82 S. Ct. 1570, 8 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1962).

Proceeding requires new finding of fact. This section does not make the commission of a specified crime the basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for commencing another proceeding under this act to determine whether a person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill. That is a new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S. Ct. 1209, 18 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1967).

And due process requires that there be findings adequate to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S. Ct. 1209, 18 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1967).

Procedure did not abuse trial court's discretion. Jordan v. People, 161 Colo. 54 , 419 P.2d 656 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992, 87 S. Ct. 1308, 18 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1967).

Finding of threat to public not automatic right to commitment. The effect the general assembly has given to a finding of a threat to the public under subsection (2) is not an automatic right to commitment. People. v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112 , 521 P.2d 1265 (1974).

A finding by the court “that the defendant, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public” does not require a person to be sentenced under the act if the court makes such a finding. People v. Breazeale, 190 Colo. 17 , 544 P.2d 970 (1975).

The general assembly permits the court to terminate proceedings, irrespective of this finding. People v. Breazeale, 190 Colo. 17 , 544 P.2d 970 (1975).

Defendant cannot be given sentence of commitment and sentence of imprisonment. Section 16-13-203 , read together with subsection (2), established that the district courts could not give a defendant, who was found to constitute a threat of bodily harm to the public, a sentence of commitment and a sentence of imprisonment but have the option to either sentence to imprisonment or sentence to commitment. People v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112 , 521 P.2d 1265 (1974).

Only if the court finds that the defendant is a threat to the public has the court the power to commit the defendant for an indeterminate term. People v. Sanchez, 184 Colo. 379 , 520 P.2d 751 (1974).

If it elects to exercise this option, it must do so “in lieu of the sentence otherwise provided by law”. People v. Sanchez, 184 Colo. 379 , 520 P.2d 751 (1974).

Second court found defendant not threat to public contrary to first court's determination. Even though a district court, in prosecution under § 18-3-408 , determined that the defendant constituted “a threat of bodily harm to members of the public” under subsection (2) and ordered him committed pursuant to § 16-13-203 , a different district court, in a subsequent prosecution of defendant under § 18-3-401 , arising out of different acts by the defendant, was not required under the doctrine of collateral estoppel to accept the first court's determination but could find that defendant was not a threat to the public and could sentence him to imprisonment. People v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112 , 521 P.2d 1265 (1974).

Applied in People v. White, 656 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1983).