2021 Colorado Code
Title 16 - Criminal Proceedings
Article 4 - Release From Custody Pending Final Adjudication
Part 1 - Release on Bail
§ 16-4-103. Setting and Selection Type of Bond - Criteria

1. At the first appearance of a person in custody before any court or any person designated by the court to set bond, the court or person shall determine the type of bond and conditions of release unless the person is subject to the provisions of section 16-4-101.
2. If an indictment, information, or complaint has been filed and the type of bond and conditions of release have been fixed upon return of the indictment or filing of the information or complaint, the court shall review the propriety of the type of bond and conditions of release upon first appearance of a person in custody.
3. 1. The type of bond and conditions of release shall be sufficient to reasonably ensure the appearance of the person as required and to protect the safety of any person or the community, taking into consideration the individual characteristics of each person in custody, including the person's financial condition.
   2. In determining the type of bond and conditions of release, if practicable and available in the jurisdiction, the court shall use an empirically developed risk assessment instrument designed to improve pretrial release decisions by providing to the court information that classifies a person in custody based upon predicted level of risk of pretrial failure.

4. When the type of bond and conditions of release are determined by the court, the court shall:
   1. Presume that all persons in custody are eligible for release on bond with the appropriate and least-restrictive conditions consistent with provisions in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section unless a person is otherwise ineligible for release pursuant to the provisions of section 16-4-101 and section 19 of article II of the Colorado constitution. A monetary condition of release must be reasonable, and any other condition of conduct not mandated by statute must be tailored to address a specific concern.
   2. To the extent a court uses a bond schedule, the court shall incorporate into the bond schedule conditions of release and factors that consider the individualized risk and circumstances of a person in custody and all other relevant criteria and not solely the level of offense; and
   3. Consider all methods of bond and conditions of release to avoid unnecessary pretrial incarceration and levels of community-based supervision as conditions of pretrial release.

5. The court may also consider the following criteria as appropriate and relevant in making a determination of the type of bond and conditions of release:
   1. The employment status and history of the person in custody;
   2. The nature and extent of family relationships of the person in custody;
   3. Past and present residences of the person in custody;
   4. The character and reputation of the person in custody;
   5. Identity of persons who agree to assist the person in custody in attending court at the proper time;
   6. The likely sentence, considering the nature and the offense presently charged;
   7. The prior criminal record, if any, of the person in custody and any prior failures to appear for court;
   8. Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of the law if the person in custody is released without certain conditions of release;
   9. Any facts indicating that the defendant is likely to intimidate or harass possible witnesses; and
   10. Any other facts tending to indicate that the person in custody has strong ties to the community and is not likely to flee the jurisdiction.

6. When a person is charged with an offense punishable by fine only, any monetary condition of release shall not exceed the amount of the maximum fine penalty.

History. Source: L. 2013: Entire part R&RE,(HB 13-1236), ch. 202, p. 822, § 2, effective May 11. L. 2014: (1) amended,(SB 14-212), ch. 397, p. 1998, § 1, effective July 1.

Law reviews. For article, “One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure”, see 39 Dicta 81 (1962). For comment, “Bail Reform in Colorado: A Presumption of Release”, see 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1067 (2017).

Annotator's note. Since § 16-4-103 is similar to § 16-4-103 as it existed prior to the 2013 repeal and reenactment of this part 1, relevant cases decided under that provision and former provisions similar to that section have been included in the annotations to this section.

The sole purpose and function of a bail bond is to produce the defendant in court then and there to answer unto a certain information herein pending against him. Herbertson v. People, 160 Colo. 139 , 415 P.2d 53 (1966).

Conditions not specified in this section are not binding upon the surety. The condition that the principal “abide the order of the court” is of this character. Tanquary v. People, 25 Colo. App. 531, 139 P. 1118 (1914).

Proper imposition of conditions. The imposition of conditions relating to the defendant's right to remain at liberty on bail that comply with the constitution is in keeping with the recommendations of the standards for criminal justice. Lucero v. District Court, 188 Colo. 67 , 532 P.2d 955 (1975).

However, the trial judge imposed an improper and unconstitutional condition where the bail order included the following condition: “If probable cause shall be shown to this court that any of the above offenses shall have been committed by either defendant, bond for that particular defendant shall be immediately terminated.” However, the right of the court to revoke or modify bail which has been previously granted after notice is given to the defendant was not negated. Lucero v. District Court, 188 Colo. 67 , 532 P.2d 955 (1975).

The trial judge imposed an improper and unconstitutional condition where bail bond included condition that defendant arrested on domestic violence charges and alcohol-related misdemeanors and his agents could have no contact with victim. Although the condition was reasonably related to the statutory criterion that the court protect possible witnesses and victims from intimidation or harassment by the defendant, it also interfered with defendant's right to have his counsel effectively represent him at trial by investigating the facts surrounding the alleged event and preparing for trial. Defendant does not, however, have the right to personally contact the victim, her family, or witnesses. Martell v. County Court of Summit County, 854 P.2d 1327 (Colo. App. 1992).

The trial judge erred in ordering defendant arrested on domestic violence charges and alcohol-related misdemeanors to attend counseling for abusive men as a condition of bond since such counseling may encourage or even require participants to admit their abusive behavior. Such counseling before conviction implicates defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. Martell v. County Court of Summit County, 854 P.2d 1327 (Colo. App. 1992).

Statute provides accelerated docket for defendants held in custody. The plain intent of the statute is to provide for an accelerated docket for those defendants who are being held in jail pending trial as a result of the revocation of their prior release on bond, for certain specified reasons, or as a result of an increase in the amount of bond, which would cause them to remain in custody. People v. Olds, 656 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1983) disapproved in People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1985)).

By this section, the legislature meant to enhance speedy trial rights of those who are kept in jail due to revoked bail or increased bail after the issue of their guilt has been raised by a plea of not guilty. People v. Olds, 656 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1983) disapproved in People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1985)); People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1984).

And is not to benefit one who misses preliminary hearing. The general assembly did not intend that one accused of the commission of an offense should be permitted to profit from his failure to appear at the preliminary hearing and be in a better position than those other defendants who were released on bond and who had not violated the terms of their bond, or those defendants who had been unable to post bail initially and who had remained incarcerated for the entire pretrial period after arrest. People v. Olds, 656 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1983) disapproved in People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1985)).

A second bail bond entered after the defendant was returned to the custody of the court was not an increase of the first bond, which was forfeited and ceased to exist after the defendant failed to appear at his preliminary hearing. Therefore, the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated when he was not brought to trial within ninety days after entry of the second bond. People v. Armendariz, 684 P.2d 252 (Colo. App. 1983).

Defendant whose bail was revoked following finding that proof was evident and presumption great in capital offense case pursuant to Art. II, § 19, Colo. Const., had no right to trial within 90 days of revocation. People v. Avery, 736 P.2d 1233 (Colo. App. 1986).

Defendant on bond may leave jurisdiction unless ordered otherwise. Generally, unless the court orders or the surety stipulates otherwise, nothing prevents a defendant on bond from leaving the jurisdiction so long as he appears at all proceedings in his case. People v. Rincon, 43 Colo. App. 155, 603 P.2d 953 (1979).

Subsection (2) modifications permitted only after arraignment. The bail modifications which are the subject of subsection (2) relate only to those bail proceedings which occur after arraignment. People v. Olds, 656 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1983) disapproved in People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1985)); People v. Armedariz, 684 P.2d 252 (Colo. App. 1983).

The term “supervision” used in subsection (2) does not include mandatory counseling as a condition of bond for defendant arrested on domestic violence charges and alcohol-related misdemeanors. Martell v. County Court of Summit County, 854 P.2d 1327 (Colo. App. 1992).

Applied in Stephenson v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1981); People v. Moye, 635 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1981); People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1984).