2021 Colorado Code
Title 16 - Criminal Proceedings
Article 19 - Fugitives and Extradition
§ 16-19-108. Issue of Governor's Warrant

If the governor decides that the demand should be complied with, the governor shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal and be directed to any peace officer or other person whom the governor may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof. The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance. Any electronically or electromagnetically transmitted facsimile of a governor's warrant shall be treated as an original document.

History. Source: L. 53: P. 316, § 7. CSA: C. 72, § 52. CRS 53: § 60-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 60-1-7. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 518, § 8, effective July 1. History. Source: L. 53: P. 316, § 7. CSA: C. 72, § 52. CRS 53: § 60-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 60-1-7. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 518, § 8, effective July 1.

Law reviews. For article, “Report of the Denver Bar Association's Committee on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Colorado”, see 2 Den. B. Ass'n Rec. 2 (Feb. 1925).

Governor may direct execution of arrest warrant. This section provides that if the governor determines that the demand be complied with he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal, and direct some person selected by the chief executive to execute the same. Olson v. People, 138 Colo. 310 , 332 P.2d 486 (1958).

But he cannot proceed without demand. The governor of Colorado has no inherent powers of arrest and surrender. His rights and duties are clearly defined; he cannot proceed as a volunteer but is limited to acting pursuant to a demand or a request from a sister state and then only in strict conformity with law. Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102 , 314 P.2d 906 (1957); Conrad v. McClearn, 166 Colo. 568 , 445 P.2d 222 (1968).

Governor may delegate his authority to review and sign extradition documents. Macurdy v. Leach, 662 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1983).

It is improper for judiciary to tell governor how to delegate his authority in extradition matters. It is no less improper for the judiciary to tell the governor, once he has delegated his authority, how the delegated authority should be exercised. Steinman v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1981).

Presumption that lieutenant governor properly signed warrant. It is defendant's burden of proof to overcome the presumption that the lieutenant governor was acting pursuant to her authority and was properly exercising the incidents of her office when she signed the governor's warrant. Jaques v. Bray, 645 P.2d 22 (Colo. 1982).

The warrant of the governor of the asylum state merely implements the proceedings which are based on the requisition from the demanding state. Self v. People, 133 Colo. 524 , 297 P.2d 887 (1956).

It must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance. Olson v. People, 138 Colo. 310 , 332 P.2d 486 (1958).

It need not include a statement that the defendant was present in the demanding state at the time of commission of the alleged crime. Harding v. People, 161 Colo. 571 , 423 P.2d 847 (1967).

Or set out statutory authority for action. The arrest warrant in extradition proceedings of a fugitive from justice need not clearly define and set out the enabling statutes of the asylum state under which the executive authority of the state purports to act. Olson v. People, 138 Colo. 310 , 332 P.2d 486 (1958).

And defective warrant may be cured by accompanying papers. If the rendition warrant is defective but is accompanied by allied papers, either on the return to the writ of habeas corpus or introduced on the trial, which when taken together with the warrant show that the executive of the asylum state did in fact have before him the necessary jurisdictional matters, namely the documents required for the issuance of the warrant, then the prisoner is not illegally restrained. Self v. People, 133 Colo. 524 , 297 P.2d 887 (1956).

Governor's warrant is prima facie evidence of jurisdiction. The findings of the governor as to the status of a prisoner as a fugitive from justice establishes prima facie that the accused is a fugitive from justice and subject to prosecution in the demanding state. Krutka v. Bryer, 150 Colo. 293 , 372 P.2d 83 (1962).

A governor's extradition warrant is prima facie evidence that all legal requirements have been complied with. Capra v. Ballarby, 158 Colo. 91 , 405 P.2d 205 (1965); Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403 , 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).

In Colorado, as in most jurisdictions, a warrant issued by a governor is prima facie evidence both that a petitioner is substantially charged with a crime and that he is a fugitive from justice. Fox v. People, 161 Colo. 163 , 420 P.2d 412 (1966); Ede v. Bray, 178 Colo. 99 , 495 P.2d 1139 (1972).

Execution of a governor's warrant establishes prima facie evidence that the person who is sought to be extradited is substantially charged with a crime. Nevard v. Conn, 187 Colo. 168 , 529 P.2d 305 (1974).

The issuance of the governor's warrant establishes prima facie that the accused is substantially charged with the commission of a crime in the demanding state, and the burden is upon him to show otherwise. McCoy v. Cronin, 187 Colo. 364 , 531 P.2d 379 (1975).

The warrant of the governor of the asylum state is prima facie evidence of three things only: (1) That the defendant is substantially charged with a crime in the demanding state; (2) that he is a fugitive from the justice of that state; and (3) that a demand has been made for his delivery to the state wherein he is charged with a crime. Harding v. People, 161 Colo. 571 , 423 P.2d 847 (1967).

It is sufficient that the governor's warrant of the asylum state recite that defendant is a fugitive from justice in the demanding state to create a presumption that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the crime. Harding v. People, 161 Colo. 571 , 423 P.2d 847 (1967); Luker v. Koch, 176 Colo. 75 , 489 P.2d 191 (1971); Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288 , 505 P.2d 1 (1973).

The warrant of arrest is prima facie evidence of the recitals therein. Capra v. Miller, 161 Colo. 448 , 422 P.2d 636 (1967).

The governor's warrant of the asylum state is prima facie evidence that the accused was substantially charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding state, and that accused fled from justice after committing a felony in the demanding state. Mote v. Koch, 173 Colo. 82 , 476 P.2d 255 (1970).

And of authority to arrest and deliver defendant. Where the Colorado warrant recites that defendant is a fugitive from justice and that he stands charged with a crime, and it is accompanied by a certified copy of the indictment, it is prima facie sufficient authority for the arrest of the defendant and delivery of him to the agents duly appointed to return him to the demanding state. Capra v. Miller, 161 Colo. 448 , 422 P.2d 636 (1967).

Thus, process of arrest in first instance becomes moot and academic, when replaced by governor's warrant. McClearn v. Jones, 162 Colo. 354 , 426 P.2d 192 (1967); Luker v. Koch, 176 Colo. 75 , 489 P.2d 191 (1971).

The governor's warrant for defendant's arrest for extradition having issued and having been filed, the issue as to whether he was lawfully arrested by an unverified information in the first instance is not just academic but moot. Velazquez v. People, 154 Colo. 284 , 389 P.2d 849 (1964).

Once the governor's warrant is filed in the district court, irregularity in connection with prior proceedings becomes moot. Dressel v. Bianco, 168 Colo. 517 , 452 P.2d 756 (1969).

Alleged illegality of the process of arrest involved in an initial arrest in the asylum state becomes moot upon the issuance of a governor's warrant. Dilworth v. Leach, 183 Colo. 206 , 515 P.2d 1130 (1973).

Once the governor's warrant has been issued, the question of the validity of the initial arrest becomes moot and may not be raised in habeas corpus proceedings which test the validity of the detention under the governor's warrant. McCoy v. Cronin, 187 Colo. 364 , 531 P.2d 379 (1975).

After a valid governor's warrant is issued and served, illegalities and irregularities which relate to the initial arrest of the fugitive become moot. White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62 , 532 P.2d 740 (1975).

It is unnecessary to execute the governor's warrant by rearresting when accused has already been arrested and is free on bond. McClearn v. Jones, 162 Colo. 354 , 426 P.2d 192 (1967); Luker v. Koch, 176 Colo. 75 , 489 P.2d 191 (1971).

But warrant for fugitive ineffective where request concerns nonfugitive. A warrant charging petitioner as a fugitive from the justice of a sister state for failure to support his minor children is not supported by a showing that petitioner's wife left him and removed to the sister state with their children, and that petitioner has never been in that state except to pass through, and hence he cannot be extradited as a fugitive. Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102 , 314 P.2d 906 (1957).

Where demand is made for arrest and delivery pursuant to the constitution and laws of the United States under this section and arrest and surrender are made pursuant to the laws of the state of Colorado, under § 16-19-107 pertaining to extradition of persons not present where crime committed, the warrant issued is not in accordance with the requisition; consequently, it is wholly ineffectual for any purpose. Layher v. Van Cleave, 171 Colo. 465 , 468 P.2d 32 (1970).

Where person claims he is not the fugitive sought, prima facie identity may be established through testimony, photographs, and fingerprints identifying the person is the fugitive being sought. Secrest v. Simonet, 708 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1985).

Misspelling petitioner's name in document supporting governor's warrant immaterial. Where two names are spelled differently but sound alike in their pronunciation, they are regarded as the same under the doctrine of idem sonans, and misspelling of petitioner's name in documents supporting governor's warrant was immaterial. Dilworth v. Leach, 183 Colo. 206 , 515 P.2d 1130 (1973).

Identity between name in extradition documents and name in governor's warrant establishes a prima facie case that the person charged as a fugitive is indeed the fugitive sought by the demanding state. Richardson v. Cronin, 621 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1980); Council v. MacFarlane, 709 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1985).

Presumption of named person's presence in demanding state at time of offense. The issuance of a governor's warrant for a person whose name is identical to that of the person charged in the fugitive information establishes a presumption that he was in the demanding state at the time of the offense. Richardson v. Cronin, 621 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1980).

Inclusion of two surnames in Texas governor's warrant served dual function of adequately identifying the person sought and of authorizing peace officers in Colorado to arrest that person as a fugitive, and was consistent with the governor's statutory extradition authority. Richardson v. Cronin, 621 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1980).

Governor's warrant need not be technically correct in every respect, so that the misspelling of the county in which the crime occurred is irrelevant to the sufficiency of the warrant. Rodriquez v. Sandoval, 680 P.2d 1278 (Colo. 1984).

Seal. No statutory requirement that state seal be affixed on each extradition document. Secrest v. Simonet, 708 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1985).

Issuance of governor's warrant held sufficient. Byers v. Leach, 187 Colo. 312 , 530 P.2d 1276 (1975).

Applied in Mora v. District Court, 177 Colo. 381 , 494 P.2d 596 (1972); People v. Wimer, 43 Colo. App. 237, 604 P.2d 1183 (1979); Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982).