2021 Colorado Code
Title 14 - Domestic Matters
Article 11 - Actions Originating in Other Jurisdictions
§ 14-11-101. Foreign Decrees - How Handled

1. Upon the docketing in a court of competent jurisdiction in this state of exemplified copies of all the written pleadings and court orders, judgments, and decrees in a case of divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment, or for support of minor children or a spouse, or for a protection order or other court order issued for the protection of a party or parties, or for a combination of the same entered in any court of competent jurisdiction in any other state or jurisdiction having reciprocal provisions for a like enforcement of orders, judgments, or decrees entered in the state of Colorado and upon obtaining jurisdiction by personal service of process as provided by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, said court in this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the person in like manner as if the original suit or action had been commenced in this state, and is empowered to amend, modify, set aside, and make new orders as the court may find necessary and proper so as to do justice and equity to all parties to the action according to the public policy of this state, and has the same right, power, and authority to enter orders for temporary alimony, support money, and attorney fees as in similar actions originating in this state.
2. The courts of this state in cases of dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or declaration of invalidity of marriage, or for support of minor children or a spouse, or for the protection of a party or parties by means of a protection order, however styled or designated, or for any combination of the same, where the action originated in this state, have the power to enforce the decrees, judgments, and orders of other states or jurisdictions made pursuant to statutes similar to this statute, or to amend the same, or to enter new orders to the same extent and in the same manner as though such decrees, judgments, and orders were entered in the courts of this state.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, a restraining or protection order issued by a court of any state, any Indian tribe, or any United States territory shall be enforced pursuant to section 13-14-110, C.R.S.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, a child-custody determination, as that term is defined in section 14-13-102 (3), issued by a court of another state shall be registered in accordance with section 14-13-305.

History. Source: L. 47: Pp. 398, 399, §§ 1, 2. CSA: C. 56, § 39. CRS 53: § 46-4-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 46-4-1. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 210, § 26, effective July 16. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 2034, § 11, effective July 1. L. 98: (3) added, p. 1235, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4) added, p. 1538, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1012, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3) amended, p. 765, § 23, effective June 1. L. 2013: (3) amended,(HB 13-1259), ch. 218, p. 1016, § 18, effective July 1. History. Source: L. 47: Pp. 398, 399, §§ 1, 2. CSA: C. 56, § 39. CRS 53: § 46-4-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 46-4-1. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 210, § 26, effective July 16. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 2034, § 11, effective July 1. L. 98: (3) added, p. 1235, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (4) added, p. 1538, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1012, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3) amended, p. 765, § 23, effective June 1. L. 2013: (3) amended,(HB 13-1259), ch. 218, p. 1016, § 18, effective July 1.

For procedure in pleading a foreign judgment or decree, see C.R.C.P. 9(e); for enforcement of foreign judgments, see article 53 of title 13; for the “Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act”, see article 13 of this title 14; for enforcement of support orders from another state or foreign country, see the “Uniform Interstate Family Support Act”, article 5 of this title 14.

Law reviews. For article, “Ten Years of Domestic Relations in Colorado -- 1940-1950”, see 27 Dicta 399 (1950). For article, “Constitutional Law”, see 32 Dicta 397 (1955). For “Interstate Modification of Support Decrees”, see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 355 (1956). For article, “Interstate Family Law Jurisdiction: Simplifying Complex Questions”, see 31 Colo. Law. 77 (Sept. 2002).

Annotator's note. Since § 14-11-101 is similar to repealed § 46-4-1, CRS 53, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section. Annotator's note. Since § 14-11-101 is similar to repealed § 46-4-1, CRS 53, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

General assembly, in reenacting section, granted state courts power to modify or alter foreign judgment for child support and such legislation does not offend the full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution. Glickman v. Mesigh, 200 Colo. 320 , 615 P.2d 23 (1980).

This section confers subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the issue of enforcement of the foreign orders of Nebraska for support but in personam jurisdiction can be exercised by the state of Colorado only if defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state. In re Ness, 759 P.2d 844 (Colo. App. 1988).

Colorado court enforcing foreign judgment against Colorado resident must consider not only whether the foreign court had personal jurisdiction under its laws, but also whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign state is consistent with the constitution and laws of the United States. The district court is required to adjudicate whether husband had sufficient minimum contacts with England to render constitutional under United States law the assertion of jurisdiction over him by the English court. In re Lohman, 2015 COA 134 , 361 P.3d 1110.

Subsections (1) and (4) provide a Colorado court with jurisdiction to modify a child custody decree from another state that has been properly registered here as long as the other state has “reciprocal provisions for a like enforcement of orders . . . entered in the state of Colorado.” In the Interest of F.A.G., 148 P.3d 375 (Colo. App. 2006).

Once an out-of-state order is properly docketed, a Colorado court acquires jurisdiction “as if the original suit or action had been commenced in this state” and is “empowered to amend, modify, set aside, and make new orders.” In the Interest of F.A.G., 148 P.3d 375 (Colo. App. 2006).

Section reflects legislative effort to prevent state from becoming haven for parent against whom minimal or no support orders have been entered in the jurisdiction of rendition by granting Colorado courts explicit authority to enter appropriate orders in a manner consistent with the full faith and credit clause. Glickman v. Mesigh, 200 Colo. 320 , 615 P.2d 23 (1980); Gonzales v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1981).

The former § 46-4-1, CRS 53, was held unconstitutional as in violation of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. Minnear v. Minnear, 131 Colo. 319 , 281 P.2d 517 (1955). The former § 46-4-1, CRS 53, was held unconstitutional as in violation of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. Minnear v. Minnear, 131 Colo. 319 , 281 P.2d 517 (1955).

Where the issue of alleged fraud in the procurement of the divorce decree either was, or could have been, litigated in a foreign court where it was raised by the wife, the disposition made of that issue in the sister state was res judicata in Colorado. Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525 , 366 P.2d 667 (1961).

The argument that the divorce decree of a sister state should not have been recognized in Colorado because personal service of process was not made upon the wife in the action was without merit where it was disclosed by the record that she was a resident of the sister state temporarily residing in Colorado at the time of service of process upon her, and service of process upon her was effected by publication and mailing under the practice and procedure of the sister state, and the record showed that she had actual notice of the pendency of the divorce action, but chose not to appear or to contest it. Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525 , 366 P.2d 667 (1961).

The former CSA, C. 56, § 30 disclosed the general intent of the general assembly regarding foreign divorces as being allowed to affect decrees of separate maintenance, it being stated therein that they were not to be admitted in evidence in any proceedings to enforce, or concerning, affecting or involving in any way, such marriage settlement, separate maintenance agreement, or decree of separate maintenance. Johnson v. Johnson, 119 Colo. 551 , 206 P.2d 597 (1949).

“Other jurisdictions” construed. The reference to “other jurisdictions”, in subsection (2), denotes only foreign jurisdictions which, although not states, are empowered to enter orders entitled to full faith and credit under art. IV, § 1, U.S. Const.Gonzales v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1981).

In situations where a child support order was entered in another state, the obligee is a resident of this state, and the obligor is a nonresident, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) controls to the extent the requirements for modification of child support in UIFSA and the remedy allowed by this section differ. In re Hillstrom, 126 P.3d 315 (Colo. App. 2005).

Subsection (2) has no intrastate application. Because “other jurisdictions” do not refer to other judicial districts within the state of Colorado, subsection (2) has no intrastate application and confers no jurisdiction on a district court to try a contempt committed against another district court. Gonzales v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1981).

State courts need not give conclusive effect to foreign decree when that decree is subject to modification by the courts of the rendering state. Glickman v. Mesigh, 200 Colo. 320 , 615 P.2d 23 (1980).

Where California decree expressly provided for modification upon changed circumstances, Colorado courts had as much leeway to modify or alter the California decree as did the California court which rendered it. Glickman v. Mesigh, 200 Colo. 320 , 615 P.2d 23 (1980).

Where Texas court had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, the full faith and credit clause required this state to enforce the Texas order to the extent that it was final and not modifiable. Stevens v. Stevens, 44 Colo. App. 252, 611 P.2d 590 (1980).

Exemplified copies of all written pleadings and court orders on foreign action must be filed with state court in order to come within the purview of this section. Malmgren v. Malmgren, 628 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1981).

Section requires docketing of exemplified copies of all written pleadings and court orders, judgments, and decrees for a court to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign decree. In re Orr, 36 P.3d 194 (Colo. App. 2001).

If an unfulfilled statutory requirement implicates the court's actual subject matter jurisdiction, no attempt to cure the defect will retroactively create jurisdiction, because the court would have been entirely without power to entertain any aspect of the claim until the requirement was fulfilled. In re Orr, 36 P.3d 194 (Colo. App. 2001).

Foreign custody decree could be modified by a Colorado court where the decree has been docketed in Colorado and Colorado is now the home state of the children. In re Whitley, 775 P.2d 95 (Colo. App. 1989).

Even if jurisdiction attaches under this section, if there is a proceeding pending in a foreign court, the trial court has discretion to decline to determine an issue that could easily and efficiently be addressed by a foreign court. Matter of C.G.G., 946 P.2d 603 (Colo. App. 1997).

Court erred in granting wife's motion for summary judgment in declaratory judgment action in which wife challenged validity of Wyoming dissolution decree on grounds of insufficient service of process where court's analysis did not reach husband's equitable defenses. In re Lockwood, 857 P.2d 557 (Colo. App. 1993).

Trial court properly declined to recognize and enforce Mexican decree under doctrine of comity when record failed to establish how service was to be made under the circumstances and failed to demonstrate that the notice allegedly given to wife provided her with an adequate opportunity to litigate and defend the significant issues of maintenance and distribution of property implicated in the termination of the marriage. In re Seewald, 22 P.3d 580 (Colo. App. 2001).

Applied in In re Clark, 616 P.2d 1010 (Colo. App. 1980).