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2021 Colorado Code
Title 13 - Courts and Court Procedure
Article 40 - Forcible Entry and Detainer - General Provisions
§ 13-40-113. Answer of Defendant - Additional and Amended Pleadings

Universal Citation:
CO Code § 13-40-113 (2021)
Learn more This media-neutral citation is based on the American Association of Law Libraries Universal Citation Guide and is not necessarily the official citation.
  1. The defendant shall file with the court, at or before the day specified for the defendant's appearance in the summons, an answer in writing. The defendant's answer must set forth the grounds on which the defendant bases the defendant's claim for possession, admitting or denying all of the material allegations of the complaint, and presenting every defense which then exists and upon which the defendant intends to rely, either by including the same in the defendant's answer or by simultaneously filing motions setting forth every such defense.
  2. The court for good cause may permit the filing of additional and amended pleadings if it will not result in a delay prejudicial to the defendant.
  3. A defendant does not waive any defense related to proper notice by filing an answer pursuant to this section. A defendant can raise a defense related to proper notice in the defendant's answer or by filing a motion prehearing. A defendant cannot raise this defense for the first time at the hearing if the defendant failed to raise it in the defendant's answer or in a prehearing motion.
  4. After an answer is provided to the court pursuant to this section:
    1. The court shall set a date for trial no sooner than seven, but not more than ten, days after the answer is filed, unless the defendant requests a waiver of this requirement in the defendant's answer or after filing an answer; except that a court may extend beyond ten days if either party demonstrates good cause for an extension or if the court otherwise finds justification for the extension. The requirement set forth in this subsection (4)(a) does not apply to a forcible entry and detainer petition that alleges a substantial violation, as defined in section 13-40-107.5 (3), or terminates a tenancy pursuant to section 38-12-203 (1)(f).
    2. In the time after an answer is filed and before a trial occurs, the court shall order that the landlord or tenant provide any documentation relevant to the current action that either party requests pursuant to section 13-40-111 (6)(b).

History. Source: L. 1885: P. 227, § 12. R.S. 08: § 2612. C.L. § 6378. CSA: C. 70, § 13. CRS 53: § 58-1-13. L. 55: P. 406, § 2. L. 61: P. 392, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 58-1-13. L. 2021: Entire section amended,(SB 21-173), ch. 349, p. 2263, § 2, effective October 1. History. Source: L. 1885: P. 227, § 12. R.S. 08: § 2612. C.L. § 6378. CSA: C. 70, § 13. CRS 53: § 58-1-13. L. 55: P. 406, § 2. L. 61: P. 392, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 58-1-13. L. 2021: Entire section amended,(SB 21-173), ch. 349, p. 2263, § 2, effective October 1.


ANNOTATION

Structure of F.E.D. statute evinces a legislative intent to accelerate trial settings in order to provide expeditious remedy. Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985).

Due process is satisfied so long as F.E.D. statute permits continuances in cases requiring intensive trial preparation. Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985).

Defendant failing to file answer admits allegations of complaint. A defendant, by failing to file an answer to the complaint in an unlawful detainer action, admits the allegations therein contained. Feste v. People, 93 Colo. 206 , 25 P.2d 177 (1933).

A defendant in an unlawful detainer action who fails to answer within the required time thereby admits the allegations set forth in the complaint. Spar Consol. Mining & Dev. Co. v. Aasgaard, 33 Colo. App. 35, 516 P.2d 127 (1973), aff'd, 185 Colo. 157 , 522 P.2d 726 (1974).

Failure to answer results in default judgment. Failure of defendant in a county court proceeding for forcible entry and detainer to file a timely answer in writing properly results in a default judgment against him. Spar Consol. Mining & Dev. Co. v. Aasgaard, 33 Colo. App. 35, 516 P.2d 127 (1973), aff'd, 185 Colo. 157 , 522 P.2d 726 (1974).

If no answer is filed, there is no issue to be tried. In an unlawful detainer action where a written complaint is filed in compliance with § 13-40-110 , if defendant fails to file a written answer, there is no issue to be tried, and defendant is in default in both original and appellate courts, if an appeal be taken from a judgment against him. Fort v. Demmer, 91 Colo. 285 , 14 P.2d 489 (1932).

Where defendant's answer admits possession, plaintiff need not prove it. In an action of forcible entry and detainer, where the defendant in her answer admits possession, it is not necessary for plaintiff to prove possession. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899).

Answers held insufficient. An answer denying that plaintiff gave defendant an option to purchase the premises and that defendant was to pay a specified sum, and denying that defendant had forfeited any rights to the property by virtue of an option to purchase the same, or otherwise, allegations of such facts appearing in the complaint, was held insufficient. Bonnell v. Gill, 41 Colo. 59 , 92 P. 13 (1907).

Answer in a forcible entry and detainer action stating mere conclusions is insufficient under this section. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899); McCrimmon v. Raymond, 77 Colo. 81 , 234 P. 1058 (1925).

An answer merely denying that defendants took possession by force was held not compliance with this section. Kenney v. Daugherty, 67 Colo. 56 , 185 P. 471 (1919).

Motion for bill of particulars is not provided for in this section, and it does not constitute an answer because it fails to admit or deny the material allegations. Spar Consol. Mining & Dev. Co. v. Aasgaard, 33 Colo. App. 35, 516 P.2d 127 (1973), aff'd, 185 Colo. 157 , 522 P.2d 726 (1974).

A defendant as such is not barred from denying a plaintiff's title, but it is a tenant who is not allowed to deny the landlord's title. The latter relation must exist to apply the rule. The plaintiff may allege that the defendant is a tenant and introduce evidence to prove it, but that is not conclusive upon the defendant. The latter may go forward and prove that he never was a tenant, but a purchaser or mortgagor in possession, for instance, and, for that reason, entitled to remain. Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 171 , 125 P. 522 (1912).

Defendant may set up defense that he is a mortgagor. In an action of wrongful detainer by landlord against tenant, the defendant may set up as a defense that he is the owner in equity of the premises, and the plaintiff, though invested with the title, a mere mortgagee. And he may prove such relation of mortgagor and mortgagee, thus disproving the relation of landlord and tenant, averred in the complaint. The rule that the tenant may not deny the landlord's title has no application. Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 171 , 125 P. 522 (1912).

Equitable defenses may be interposed in actions of forcible entry and detainer. Adcock v. Lieber, 51 Colo. 373 , 117 P. 993 (1911); McCrimmon v. Raymond, 77 Colo. 81 , 234 P. 1058 (1925).

Defendant may offer all facts entitling him to possession at law or equity. All the substantial facts upon which a defendant relies, entitling him to the possession of the property, include such facts as will entitle him to the possession at law or in equity. Adcock v. Lieber, 51 Colo. 373 , 117 P. 993 (1911).

Fact that possessor did not know plaintiff's residence is no defense. The allegation in the answer that defendant was not able to surrender and deliver up to plaintiff possession of the premises described in the demand, because she was not acquainted with him, and did not know his place of residence, constitutes no defense at all. No livery of seisin was necessary, and all that was necessary for defendant to have done in order to have complied with the demand was to have vacated the premises. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899).

Section does not require pleading of evidence. The provision of this section that the answer shall set forth “all the substantial facts”, does not require the pleading of evidence. W.H. Swanson Theater Co. v. Pueblo Opera Block Inv. Co., 70 Colo. 83 , 197 P. 762 (1921).


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