Allmaras v. Mudge
Annotate this Case
Allmaras v. Mudge
1991 WY 139
820 P.2d 533
Case Number: 90-275
Decided: 11/08/1991
Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH ALLMARAS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN DAVID ALLMARAS, DECEASED,
APPELLANT
(PLAINTIFF),
v.
LISA
FERN MUDGE; 71 CONSTRUCTION, A WYOMING CORPORATION; AND KLOEFKORN-BALLARD
CONSTRUCTION/DEVELOPMENT, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION,
APPELLEES
(DEFENDANTS).
Appeal from the District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler,
J.
Joseph E.
Darrah, Powell, for
appellant.
Anthony
A. Johnson of Retherford, Mullen, Rector&Johnson,
Colorado Springs, Colo., for appellee 71
Construction.
Ann M.
Rochelle of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellee Kloefkorn-Ballard
Constr./Development, Inc.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,
and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, Ret. J.
URBIGKIT,
Chief
Justice.
[¶1.] Appellant, Joseph
Allmaras (Allmaras), father and personal representative of the estate of John
David Allmaras, by suit for wrongful death, appeals from a summary judgment
granted to Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc. (Kloefkorn-Ballard)
and 71 Construction. We affirm the judgment favoring 71 Construction and reverse
as to Kloefkorn-Ballard.
I.
ISSUE
[¶2.] Allmaras raises one
issue:
Did the
trial court improperly exonerate the Appellee-contractors from their negligence;
or at least concurrent negligence, in violating their duty to warn the traveling
public of the construction hazards created by them which resulted in the death
of Appellant's decedent under the circumstances?
II.
FACTS
[¶3.] For purposes of summary
judgment, the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and exhibits established the
following as generally undisputed facts.
[¶4.] On February 23, 1987,
Paradise Valley Waste and Sewer District entered into an agreement with
contractor Kloefkorn-Ballard to do utility system improvement construction. Work
was to be done on three different areas, but Schedule C was the area in which
the accident occurred at the intersection of Dahlia Street and Valley Drive.
Kloefkorn-Ballard, as contractor, entered into an agreement with Jackman-Jackman
as a general subcontractor. When Jackman-Jackman had finished its work, the
back-filled road surface was passable through the area, although unfinished and
subject to settlement before asphalt repaving. The street was then unbarricaded
and opened to traffic usage.
[¶5.] On June 23, 1987,
Boatright-Smith signed a subcontract agreement with Kloefkorn-Ballard to install
the asphalt, which required Boatright-Smith to begin work after Jackman-Jackman
had finished. Because Boatright-Smith had become preoccupied in moving their
asphalt plant, 71 Construction was asked to do this work.
[¶6.] On August 18, 1987,
John David Allmaras was killed while riding in a car driven by nineteen-year-old
Lisa Fern Mudge (Mudge). Mudge lost control of the car as she approached the
Dahlia
Street and Valley Drive intersection. John David
Allmaras was thrown from the car and the vehicle rolled over him. The Mudge
vehicle was travelling south and the construction work had only occurred in the
northbound lane.
[¶7.] On May 12, 1988,
Allmaras filed suit against Mudge arguing that Mudge's negligence in driving at
an excessive speed and while intoxicated was the direct and proximate cause of
the death of his son. On January 9, 1989, Allmaras amended the complaint to
include Kloefkorn-Ballard and 71 Construction. In that amended complaint,
Allmaras claimed Kloefkorn-Ballard was the contractor and 71 Construction was a
subcontractor at all relevant times for improvements to the Paradise Valley
Water and Sewer District. The amended complaint claimed that both contractors
had a duty, imposed both by contract and by law, to erect warning signs. In
response, Kloefkorn-Ballard answered the amended complaint and brought
Boatright-Smith and Jackman-Jackman into the litigation by cross-claim. During
litigation, Allmaras settled with Mudge resulting in dismissal of the complaint
against her.1
[¶8.] On September 28, 1990,
the trial court, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact and that
all defending parties were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law,
granted summary judgment to Kloefkorn-Ballard, 71 Construction, Boatright-Smith
and Jackman-Jackman. The trial court found as a matter of law that none of those
contractor parties had a duty to warn southbound traffic of construction located
in the northbound lane.
III.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
[¶9.] Summary judgment is
proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v.
Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987). A material fact is one which would
establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense
asserted by the parties. Albrecht v.
Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988); Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566
(Wyo. 1988).
We review a summary judgment in the same light as the trial court, using the
same materials and following the same standards. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989). We examine the record from the
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the
record. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette,
769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989). The character and classification
of Wyoming summary judgment law is
comprehensively analyzed in Cordova v.
Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986). See Davenport
v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987). "Although summary judgments are
not favored in negligence actions, where the record fails to establish an issue
of material fact [and when the movant is entitled to the judgment as a matter of
law], the entry of summary judgment is proper." MacKrell v. BellH[2]S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990). See also W.R.C.P. 56(c). Applying our
standard of review, we examine the record to determine whether summary judgment
in favor of 71 Construction and Kloefkorn-Ballard was appropriate. We must
decide whether, as a matter of law, 71 Construction owed Allmaras a duty and
whether a factual issue exists as to Kloefkorn-Ballard's liability. Cordova, 719 P.2d 625.
IV.
ISSUES
OF LIABILITY - 71 CONSTRUCTION
[¶10.] Under Wyoming law, the tort of negligence must be
based upon the breach of a duty where that breach proximately caused an injury
to the plaintiff. Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo.
1980). Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law. Thomas by Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and
Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303 (Wyo. 1985). Because we hold that 71
Construction had no duty to Allmaras for signs and road conditions at the
construction site, summary judgment in favor of 71 Construction is
appropriate.
[¶11.] While the control over the construction
site could be a material fact, there was nothing beyond the allegation by
Allmaras that 71 Construction controlled the site. Its repaving function was
performed on oral order from Boatright-Smith and the re-paver had not commenced
work at the accident site before the accident happened, although it did start
preparation for repaving early the next morning. In Thomas by Thomas, we upheld summary
judgment in favor of the South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District because the
district had no control over the accident's area and therefore owed no duty. We
are faced with a similar situation here with respect to pre-accident
participation at the accident scene by the repaving
subcontractor.
[¶12.] The deposition testimony offered in
support of its motion for summary judgment indicated 71 Construction had not
exercised control of the area by the time of the accident. That evidence was not
factually disputed by Allmaras. "`After the movant establishes a prima facie
case the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party who must show a genuine
issue of material fact * * * or come forward with competent evidence of specific
facts countering the facts presented by the movant.'" Id. at 1304
(quoting Roth v. First Sec. Bank of
Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 (Wyo. 1984)). It is indisputable that 71
Construction never exercised control over the site prior to the
accident.
[¶13.] Although Allmaras claimed 71 Construction
had contractual and legal duties, there was nothing beyond the allegation to
support that claim. Nowhere within the oral work order is the source for the
contractual duty pinpointed. Additionally, Allmaras presents no legal authority
that would create such a duty under the circumstances of this case involving
that oral order with respect to the paving to be done on a day work
basis.
[¶14.] "Liability must be based upon duty." Thomas by Thomas, 702 P.2d at 1307;
accord Medlock v. Van Wagner, 625 P.2d 207 (Wyo.
1981). "If duty has not been established, there is no actionable negligence." Thomas by Thomas, 702 P.2d at 1307.
Because it is unquestionable that 71 Construction exercised no control over the
general job or this specific site prior to the time of the accident, no duty to
Allmaras could have arisen. As a matter of law, summary judgment was appropriate
in favor of 71 Construction because it had no duty to users of the street where
it had not yet commenced its repaving work. Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110. We affirm summary
judgment in favor of 17 Construction.
V.
ISSUES
OF LIABILITY - KLOEFKORN-BALLARD
[¶15.] In considering the issue of liability of
Kloefkorn-Ballard, we analyze the same negligence elements as stated in the
previous section. In granting Kloefkorn-Ballard's motion for summary judgment,
the trial court determined Kloefkorn-Ballard owed no duty to the decedent and,
further, that the acts of Kloefkorn-Ballard were not the proximate cause of John
David Allmaras' death. Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if a duty
exists and if there is a genuine issue whether that duty was breached or whether
that breach caused the injury.
A.
Duty.
[¶16.] Did a duty exist? The trial court found
that there was no duty to warn because the car in which John David Allmaras rode
was travelling southbound and the street had been dug up only in the northbound
lane. The contract between Kloefkorn-Ballard and the Paradise Valley Water and
Sewer District imposed the primary responsibility upon Kloefkorn-Ballard for
"initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs in
connection with the [w]ork."
[¶17.] In addition to the contractually imposed
duty, the duty to place appropriate warning signs was also imposed by law
through city ordinance. The City of Casper has a "Manual of Specifications &
Procedures for the Use of Traffic Control Devices in Construction &
Maintenance Areas." That manual says that "[i]t is essential that signs be
positioned in such a manner that the public has sufficient time to react to the
changes in traffic patterns or other requirements of the work area." No legal
questions exist regarding the duty to provide signs; the factual issue is where.
We hold that a jury could properly find within the evidence provided at the
summary judgment stage that the duty to provide warning signs at this particular
construction zone existed for traffic moving in both directions. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167
(Wyo. 1981); Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146
(1959); Ruhs v. Pacific Power &
Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982). Cf. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc.,
731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987).2
B.
Proximate Cause and Associated Issues of Appeal.
[¶18.] Kloefkorn-Ballard asserts three
contentions to provide an escape from liability, even though complete traffic
warning signs were not provided at the accident site in compliance with either
city ordinance or construction contract. Although this is essentially a
proximate cause-summary judgment issue, each of those contentions will be
examined in conjunction with the proximate cause review.
(1) Protective Delegation to Independent
Contractor Providing Immunity From Liability.
[¶19.] Kloefkorn-Ballard argues, although
without persuasive conviction, that it was not liable for any failure of its
subcontractors to provide proper warning signs. The cited authorities are not
persuasive to justify a decision as a matter of law that a general contractor
like Kloefkorn-Ballard could delegate both ordinance and contractual duty, Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1985);
Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Intern. Order
of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1974), for street repair signs to its
subcontractors and consequently absolve itself from negligently caused injury to
street users at its construction site within city streets. Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941). Following the general law, we hold that the general
contractor had a non-delegable duty under the facts here presented involving a
constructionally created hazardous condition, Thomas v. Harrington, 72 N.H. 45, 54 A. 285 (1902), to assure safety to the driving public during street repair by
providing proper warning signs. Jones v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986); Casper Nat. Bank v. Jones, 79
Wyo. 38, 329 P.2d 1077 (1958); Stockgrowers' Bank of Wheatland v. Gray,
24 Wyo.
18, 154 P. 593 (1916); Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71 (5th ed. 1984);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). See also Lindler v. District of Columbia,
502 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Either site condition which forecloses release by
delegation to an independent contractor (1) inherently dangerous activity or (2)
activity necessitating special precautions can be applied here, which creates a
non-delegable duty. Lindler, 502 F.2d 495; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v.
L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc., 448 A.2d 864 (D.C.App.
1982).
(2) Adequacy of Signs as a Matter of
Law.
[¶20.] The second argument is that signs were in
place for travel on the opposite lane - northbound - and consequently were not
needed for warning to decedent's host driver where the southbound lane had not
been disturbed in construction. Within the context of this case and in the face
of the expert witness whose affidavit was provided by Allmaras, this examination
clearly reaches an issue of fact status. Gilpatrick Const. Co. v. Wind River
Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 473 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1970). The jury, not the trial court,
should decide whether any signs provided were "adequate" and consequently not
negligent in what was or was not done. That argument leaves a factual decision
which is inappropriate for summary judgment disposition. Cohen v. Sahuaro Petroleum & Asphalt
Co., 17 Ariz. App. 215, 496 P.2d 641
(1972); Transcon Lines Corp. v. Cornell
Const. Co., Inc., 539 P.2d 1372 (Okla. 1975). There were no street construction
signs for drivers in the southbound lane which was the direction occupied by
decedent's host driver. Smith v.
Lafortune, 288 Minn. 135, 179 N.W.2d 136 (1970). Considering
the relevant circumstances - the construction contract, city ordinance
requirements, traffic patterns, neighborhood usage, and nonlinear configuration
of the street - there was an appropriate jury issue of negligence from neglect
to provide the warning signs for that street at that repair construction site,
which were called for by both city ordinance and contract. Gilpatrick Const. Co., 473 P.2d 586;
Jackson v. W.A. Norris, Inc., 54 Wyo. 403, 93 P.2d 498 (1939); Ferguson v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 307 F. Supp. 658
(W.D.Ark. 1969); Moore v. Geiger, 6 Ohio App.2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 607 (1966).
(3) Controlling Issue - Existence of Proximate
Cause.
[¶21.] Finally, Kloefkorn-Ballard attempts to
avoid liability in this instance by arguing that its failure to provide traffic
warning signs was not the proximate cause of John David Allmaras' death. The
third and compelling issue of this case is proximate cause. Recognizing at least
a jury decision requirement to determine the obligation to provide warning signs
at the construction site and the factual issue of the adequacy of warning signs
utilized, we are left with the decision of whether failure to provide signs
constituted a proximate cause of this fatal accident.
[¶22.] In fairness to the litigants and to the
trial court, a more detailed recitation of the facts is required. Mudge had
borrowed a car early in the evening and spent the next hours driving, visiting
and drinking alcoholic beverages. During the course of the evening, Mudge and
her female friend became acquainted with the decedent and another young man.
After each of these young people had consumed three to four beers, the time came
when Mudge drove them toward the Dahlia Street and Valley Drive
intersection where the construction work was located.
[¶23.] It is established that the posted speed
limit at the accident site was thirty miles per hour and Mudge, immediately
before the accident, had been accelerating. She was traveling at least
sixty-five miles per hour before she lost control while approaching the area
where a trench had been dug to mid-street for a sewer manhole installation. The
trial court found, and Kloefkorn-Ballard now argues, that the proximate cause of
the accident was the vehicle speed, alcoholic condition of Mudge, and subsequent
loss of control. Mudge, as a result of the occurrence, made a guilty plea to
vehicular homicide. It is contended that warning signs in the southbound lane of
travel would not have deterred driving speed or changed the loss-of-control
result.
[¶24.] The investigative police officer
testified by deposition that the sole cause of the accident was the character of
driving by Mudge. Conversely, Allmaras provided an expert witness who stated in
affidavit that adequate warning signs would have allowed the driver of the
vehicle to slow down and consequently pass the construction site without
danger:
6. That
I am further of the opinion, based upon reasonable professional certainty, under
all of the circumstances here present, that had the construction signage been
installed in compliance with the aforesaid Casper Manual and Uniform Manual at
the time of the accident to advise both north bound and south bound traffic of
the construction activity at the intersection of Valley Drive and Dahlia Street,
such signage would have allowed, even given the excessive speed of upwards of 65
MPH or more of the Mudge vehicle, additional reaction time to the driver of the
Chevrolet Camaro, Lisa Mudge. The fact that Miss Mudge could and would
reasonably be expected to react to the imminent presence of this signage is
shown by the physical facts at the scene in that Mudge did in fact react to the
presence of the construction site once the area came within her view or the view
of her passengers. At that time, her reaction took the form of a swerving motion
to avoid the perceived dug-out area of the construction site within Valley Drive.
Additional signage would have given Miss Mudge advance notice of the presence of
construction activity, and would have timely reminded her of the abnormal and
hazardous nature of the road surface in that intersection
area.
7. That
I am further of the opinion based upon reasonable professional certainty, under
all of the circumstances aforesaid, that proper construction signage placed at
recommended distances prior to the construction activity would have allowed the
Chevrolet Camaro, even with the reported location and excessive speed of Mudge
to slow to a safe passing speed, or even to slow to a stop if necessary, prior
to traversing the area of the intersection of Valley Drive and Dahlia where the
construction activity was taking place. With the evidence aforesaid that Mudge
had a predisposition to react to a known danger, the increased reaction time
created by the proper placement of construction sign, and warning devices alerts
a driver to unusual road surface conditions, unusual activities in, and adjacent
to the road, and to be cautious of roadway conditions [due to] the construction
activity. This, in turn, given the circumstances and speed of the Mudge vehicle,
would allow ample time, and therefore ample distance for Miss Mudge to have
adjusted her driving to a reasonable manner for activities and traffic
conditions that could be expected in a highway construction zone to avoid the
collision.
[¶25.] Complex and conflicting arguments are
made whether warning signs for this lane of travel, where none had been
provided, would have prevented the accident. Since we deal with what Mudge would
have done if signs had been in place, no result assessment with reasoned
certainty can be made. It seems relatively determined from all witnesses that a
safe passage could easily have been negotiated within her proper lane and,
perhaps, even her attained speed if Mudge had slowed down prior to reaching the
area where the street had been dug up in the opposite lane, and had she not
suddenly jerked the wheel to move further to the outside edge of the roadway.
Her fault in negligent driving is not an issue.
[¶26.] For summary judgment consideration in
accepting that adequate warning signs had not been provided, we analyze whether
proximate cause is determinable as a matter of law for this other participant as
announced by the trial court and contended by appellees or remains as a factual
issue for jury decision as Allmaras' argument. Exhaustive evaluation and review
of proximate cause can be found in the literature of the law, which is a subject
considered to be one of the most troubling areas of decision within basic tort
law.
The
most important and challenging questions in tort law for this case involve
issues of proximate cause, such as whether it is proper for jury decision to
submit the question of England's recovery from Simmons for causing the head-on
collision with Barnes. Vandall, Judge
Posner's Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 Emory L.J. 383, 404
(1986). * * * It seems clearly established by the Restatement of Law and general
case law that foreseeability is not a factor of proximate cause but instead an
element of causal negligence.
"The
term `proximate cause' is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined
considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly
established. * * * [`Proximate'] is an unfortunate word, which places an
entirely wrong emphasis upon the factor of physical or mechanical closeness. For
this reason `legal cause' or perhaps even `responsible cause' would be a more
appropriate term. * * *
* * * *
* *
"* * *
[T]wo contrasting theories of legal cause recur throughout the cases and account
for most of the conflict with respect to the choice of a basic theory. One of
these theories is that the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but
not beyond the scope of the `foreseeable risks' - that is, the risks by reason
of which the actor's conduct is held to be negligent. The second, contrasting,
theory is that the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but not beyond
all `direct' (or `directly traceable') consequences and those indirect
consequences that are foreseeable.
"* * *
Another choice of theory concerns the question whether all limitations on the
scope of liability of a negligent defendant - apart from defenses and, in some
instances, requirements regarding the nature of the harm - will be dealt with
under the rubric of `legal cause' (or `proximate cause') or instead some will be
dealt with as issues of `duty.'" Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts,
Ch. 7, § 42 at
273-74.
"* * *
It is simpler, and no doubt more accurate, to state the problem in terms of
legal responsibility: is the defendant legally responsible to protect the
plaintiff against such unforeseeable consequences of the defendant's own
negligent acts? * * * As to this problem, there are two basic, fundamental,
opposing and irreconcilable views, which have been in conflict for more than a
century; and each has developed complications of its own. * *
*
[* *
*]
"The
first of these positions * * * [is] that the same criterion of foreseeability
and risk of harm which determined whether the defendant was negligent in the
first instance should determine the extent of the liability for that negligence;
and that no defendant should ever be held liable for consequences which no
reasonable person would expect to follow from the conduct. * * *" Prosser and
Keeton on The Law of Torts, supra, § 43 at 281. "There remains the opposing
view, which has been urged from time to time by a good many writers, that a
defendant who is negligent must take existing circumstances as they are, and may
be liable for consequence brought about by the defendant's acts, even though
they were not reasonably to be anticipated. * * *" Id. at
290.
England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137,
1150-51 (Wyo.
1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.
[¶27.] Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 45 at 321 (footnotes omitted)
states:
Thus,
in any case where there might be reasonable difference of opinion as to the
foreseeability of a particular risk, the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct with respect to it, or the normal character of an intervening cause, the
question is for the jury, subject of course to suitable instructions from the
court as to the legal conclusion to be drawn as the issue is determined either
way. By far the greater number of the cases which have arisen have been of this
description; and to this extent it may properly be said that "proximate cause is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good
common sense in the consideration of the evidence of each particular
case."
[¶28.] Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, §§ 430, 431, and 435
state:
§ 430.
Necessity of Adequate Causal Relation
In
order that a negligent actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary
not only that the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that
the negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's
harm.
§ 431.
What Constitutes Legal Cause
The
actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another
if
(a) his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,
and
(b)
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner
in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
§ 435.
Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence
(1) If
the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another,
the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being
liable.
(2) The
actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where
after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct,
it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about
the harm.[3]
[¶29.] An illuminating discussion of causation
is also found in Keeton, Causation,
28 S.Tex. L.Rev. 231, 231-32 (1986) (emphasis in original and footnotes
omitted):
There
are four elements in a claimant's prima facie case of negligence. These
generally recognized elements are: (1) a duty of reasonable care, (2) a breach
of that duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. An explanation of the
terms duty and breach of duty is necessary to identify the issues underlying
each of the elements and the problems arising in connection with proximate
cause.
* * * *
* *
Generally,
two elements are required to establish that the negligence of a defendant is the
proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury: factual causation and legal causation.
Factual causation refers to the requirement that the act and the injury be
related. Legal causation refers to the requirement that the act and the injury
be reasonably related.
[¶30.] This appeal presents double concepts
frequently presented in proximate cause examinations. First, foreseeability and
its relationship to legal responsibility, and second, jury participation in
resolution of proximate cause as a factual decision. Justice Blume of this court
provided a basic and well reasoned analysis on the subject in one of his last
opinions which included a quotation from W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
Torts, at 324 (1st ed. 1941):
"If the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's loss, it
follows that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because other
causes, such as the negligence of other persons, have contributed to the
result."
If the
original wrongdoer "could have anticipated that the intervening act of
negligence might, in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act of
negligence, the person first in fault is not released from liability by reason
of the intervening negligence of another." Shearman & Redfield on
Negligence, Rev.Ed., Section 38.
Phelps v. Woodward Const. Co., 66
Wyo. 33, 204 P.2d 179, 187 (1949). In Phelps,
Justice Blume considered similar facts involving the liability of a utility
for a shallow gas line which was hit by a negligent grading contractor.
Proximate cause was justifiably determined by the jury as a factual issue and
the resulting plaintiff's verdict was affirmed on appeal.
[¶31.] In considering the voluminous yet
conflicting evidence about the nature of travel on Valley Drive and the
problem created by the insufficient warnings to alert drivers to the danger
created by the manhole installation, proximate cause becomes an issue of fact to
be resolved by a jury. Bettencourt v.
Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987). See also Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408
(Wyo. 1983); and O'Mally v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, reh'g denied 43 Wyo. 350, 5 P.2d 276
(1931).
[¶32.] In the carefully considered case of Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989), this court
recognized:
Proximate
cause is normally a question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable
minds could not disagree. * * * [T]he ultimate test of proximate cause is the
foreseeability of injury, and we noted that it is not necessary that the
specific injury be foreseen - it is sufficient if a reasonably prudent person
would foresee that the same general type of injury would be likely in the
absence of adequate safeguards.
[¶33.] In Bettencourt, 735 P.2d at 726, a case
considering proximate cause with similar issues and structured nature for
appeal, this court said:
The
concept of proximate cause and how it is to be established in a judicial forum
is the crux of this case. In McClellan v.
Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408, 414 (1983), we said, "[p]roximate
cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable
consequence of the act of negligence." That case involved the sale of
intoxicating liquor to a minor, and we went on to hold that whether the vendor
could foresee an injury to a third person would be the ultimate test. More
recently, in Buckley v. Bell, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1089, 1091-1092 (1985), the following
definition of proximate or legal causation was
espoused:
"* * *
[T]hat conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries
identified in the complaint. * * * [I]f the conduct is `that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause
produces the injury, without which the result would not have occurred,' it must
be identified as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." (Citations
omitted.)
Our
usual disposition is to treat proximate causation as a question of fact to be
resolved by the trier of fact unless, on the evidence demonstrated in the file
reasonable persons could not disagree.
VI.
CONCLUSION
[¶34.] We conclude that this case presents
proximate cause as a factual resolution for jury disposition since reasonable
minds could disagree whether the absence of warning signs was the proximate
cause of the passenger's death in the vehicular accident. Summary judgment is
inappropriate.
[¶35.] Judgment in favor of 71 Construction is
affirmed. Judgment in favor of Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc.
is reversed and remanded.
[¶36.] GOLDEN, Justice, concurring in part;
dissenting in part.
[¶37.] I concur in this court's affirmance of
the summary judgment in favor of 71 Construction; however, I respectfully
dissent from this court's reversal of the summary judgment in favor of
Kloefkorn-Ballard. I would hold as a matter of law that Kloefkorn-Ballard's
failure to sign the construction area was not the proximate cause of this tragic
accident and John Allmaras' senseless death.
[¶38.] I agree with the majority that
Kloefkorn-Ballard, as the road contractor, owed a duty to the motoring public to
take due precautions for the safety of motorists. Gilpatrick Construction v. Wind River
Ready-Mix Concrete Company, 473 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1970); Phelan v. Read Construction Company, 379 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1963); Brasel & Sims
Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co. Inc., 378 P.2d 501 (Wyo. 1963); and
Jackson v. W.A. Norris, Inc., 54 Wyo.
403, 93 P.2d 498 (1939); and see 4
Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice § 164.11, p. 428 (3d ed.
1965).
[¶39.] Before proceeding, I reiterate this
court's definition of proximate cause, that it "means the accident * * * must be
the natural and probable cause of the act of negligence" and "is normally a
question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not
disagree." Century Ready-Mix Company, et
al. v. CampbellCountySchool
District, et al., 816 P.2d 795, 805-06 (Wyo. 1991); Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light
Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989). After carefully reading the
materials submitted by the parties for and against summary judgment, I conclude
that the evidence presented is such that reasonable minds could not disagree.
Therefore, Kloefkorn-Ballard's failure to sign the construction area was not the
proximate cause of this tragedy.
[¶40.] The most pertinent materials submitted by
the parties and on which they relied for purposes of the summary judgment motion
included the depositions of the three surviving occupants of the car, driver
Lisa Mudge and two passengers Jackie Kinder and Troy Nash; the deposition of
Officer Branson, investigating for the city police department; the deposition of
Sgt. Martin, investigating on behalf of the Wyoming Highway Patrol; and the
affidavit and deposition of Arnold G. Wheat, accident reconstructionist hired by
plaintiff Joseph Allmaras.
[¶41.] From the depositions of driver Lisa Mudge
and passenger Jackie Kinder, we learn that they were familiar with the
construction area, having driven through it twice before the accident happened.
They had driven in the northbound lane through the area around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m.
Later that same day, around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., they traveled through the
construction area again. Kinder reminded Mudge of the area's existence before
she got to it, and Mudge successfully passed around the area at a rate of speed
of 30-35 m.p.h. Referring to the construction area as a "dip" in the road, Mudge
testified she was concerned with the dip at this time because she did not "want
to hit it." On this occasion the deceased and Troy Nash, both of whom two hours
later would be unfortunate passengers in the car driven by Mudge when it
crashed, were following Mudge in the deceased's car and also traveled through
the area. About this, Nash testified he saw Mudge brake briefly at the
construction area but go around it at a "pretty fast speed," a lot faster than
the deceased did. He believed she was over the speed limit when she briefly
applied her brakes.
[¶42.] The accident occurred approximately two
hours after Mudge and Kinder had traveled through the area on their way to
Mudge's house for a party. According to the investigating law enforcement
personnel, at the time of the accident Mudge was operating the high performance
Camaro at a rate of speed from 60-70 m.p.h. when these youths approached the
construction area. Mr. Wheat also estimated Mudge's rate of speed at
approximately 60 m.p.h. About this fateful approach to the construction area,
Kinder testified that she told Mudge she was driving too fast, and Mudge
testified that as she traveled southbound on Valley Drive, "It was in my head, I
believe" that the construction area was there. At a distance of about 300 feet
north of the construction area (the length of a football field), in order to be
heard over the blaring car stereo speaker playing the pop hit La Bamba, Kinder
screamed that Mudge should not forget that the construction area was ahead. At
the time of this warning, the Mudge-driven Camaro was about a half block north
of the intersection of Valley Drive and Marigold (Marigold joins Valley Drive
from the east and is not a through street, i.e., it ends at Valley Drive). Mudge
testified she does not recall becoming concerned about the construction area.
Neither Mudge nor Kinder remember what happened from this point on as the
accident unfolded.
[¶43.] Troy Nash remembered the events preceding
the accident. As Mudge turned onto Valley Drive and headed south in the
southbound lane, she "started getting some pretty high speed going." So to Nash,
Mudge seemed to continue picking up speed before the accident. He testified that
where Valley
Drive curves, Mudge was going fast enough that when
they came to the curve Mudge switched from the southbound lane to the oncoming
northbound lane so she would not roll the car. Nash said, "She was going too
fast to stay in the right lane. And it's like a race car driver, where you go
around the corner, you bank high. Well, that's what she was doing." Nash further
testified there was no traffic on Valley Drive as they traveled
southbound.
[¶44.] According to Nash, both he and the
deceased simultaneously told Mudge to slow down. They told her this a couple of
seconds before Kinder told Mudge to "watch out for the hole [construction
area]." Nash testified the car was in the northbound lane on Valley drive for a
few seconds and then moved over into the southbound lane. The car then hit the
west curb on Valley
Drive. When the car hit the curb, the car careened to
the left, sliding toward the construction area.
[¶45.] Officer Branson testified that the
Mudge-driven Camaro struck the west curb of Valley Drive about 190 feet north of the
south curb of Dahlia
Street which intersects Valley Drive south
of Marigold's intersection with Valley Drive. Branson estimated Mudge's
rate of speed at about 60 m.p.h. when she struck the curb. Further, Mudge's
blood alcohol was .14; the level at which a person is considered intoxicated in
Wyoming is .10
or more. W.S. 31-5-233(b)(iii) (Nov. 1984 Repl.)
[¶46.] Sgt. Martin investigated Valley Drive north
of the west curb area. He then called in Lt. Arnold from the highway patrol and
together they investigated Valley
Drive north from the intersection of Marigold and
Valley
Drive. They found tire marks attributed to the
Mudge-driven Camaro which crossed from the southbound lane of Valley Drive into
the northbound lane and onto the east sidewalk approximately 200 feet north of
Marigold. Martin, Arnold and Officer Dye, also of the highway patrol, calculated
Mudge's rate of speed to be approximately 70 m.p.h. at a point about 300 feet
north of the construction area. According to Martin's calculations, the
Mudge-driven Camaro traveled on the sidewalk for about 200 feet before it left
the sidewalk at Marigold and Valley
Drive. Thus, when Mudge was nearly 430 feet north of
the construction area, she had switched from the southbound to the northbound
lane and gone onto the east sidewalk, all the while traveling at a high rate of
speed.
[¶47.] In summary, we have a driver who was
under the influence of alcohol, driving a high performance vehicle at a rate of
speed estimated between 60-70 m.p.h., and traveling on a familiar curving
roadway toward a known construction area.
[¶48.] Against this factual setting, appellant
relies on the deposition and subsequent affidavit of an accident
reconstructionist to create an issue of fact about whether Kloefkorn-Ballard's
failure to sign the construction area was a proximate cause of the accident.
This witness stated that the purpose of signs is to warn motorists of the
presence of the construction site so they may adjust their driving to safely
traverse the area. In Lopez v. American
National Bank of Cheyenne, 389 P.2d 21, 22 (Wyo. 1964), in which this court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant bank and against the bank's
customer who was injured when he walked into and shattered the glass panel next
to a glass double-door entrance to the bank, this court
said:
Even
had there been a duty on the part of the bank to give some type of special
warning to its business invitees that the two, plainly indicated, glass entrance
doors had glass panels on either side of them, plaintiff said he knew the panel
was there. This knowledge on plaintiff's part obviated the need for any warning
being given so far as [plaintiff] was concerned.
[¶49.] Relying on Lopez, this court affirmed a
summary judgment against a lodge patron who had slipped and fallen on a path,
saying
[k]nowledge
of danger on the part of plaintiff obviated any need for warning signs. [citing
Lopez] It would be absurd to put up a
sign saying, "Slippery, Walk Carefully" or "Danger - Ice," when it tells the
plaintiff something he is bound to know because of its presence which he can see
and realize just as well through his own active senses, without prompting. There
was no hidden danger but only a well-known prevailing
condition.
Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 498
(Wyo.
1976).
[¶50.] Appellant's accident reconstruction
witness, both in deposition and in affidavit, speculates that Mudge would have
reacted sooner and adjusted her rate of speed and driving behavior to safely
traverse the construction area with which she was familiar had signs been
properly placed. That opinion and other similar opinions that adorn this
witness's conclusory testimony are rank conjecture, are inadmissible evidence
under W.R.E. 702 and 704, and fail to create a genuine issue of material fact. Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1140
(Wyo. 1990); Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 345
(Wyo. 1989); and see Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60,
66-67 (Wyo.
1989). As this court strongly reminded litigants in Bluejacket:
Mere
conjecture is never sufficient to establish liability: if the walks had been
shoveled, sanded or salted or there had been a warning sign, and the light was
on, the plaintiff might not have been injured. That is not enough. Causal
connection has not been established. There is no liability for injuries from
dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to the person
injured as they are to the owner of the facilities in
question.
Bluejacket, 550 P.2d at
497.
[¶51.] I would affirm the summary judgment for
Kloefkorn-Ballard.
1 During appeal, Boatright-Smith
settled out and Jackman-Jackman was dismissed by this court since its status as
a third-party defendant raised no appellate issue. This left only
Kloefkorn-Ballard and 71 Construction as appellees.
2 The trenching at the point of the
accident extended from the east edge of the north lane of Valley Drive to the
middle of the street where a sewer manhole had been installed. Consequently, no
direct interference by paving tear up had been created for the travel lane used
by the southbound vehicle in which John David Allmaras was riding. The opened-up
pavement to the center of the street for northbound vehicles provided a
back-filled dip since final repair had not been completed. It is a general
argument of Allmaras that a zone of danger was created for the southbound traffic since northbound drivers crossed over into the
opposite lane in order to avoid the dip. Mudge, as the driver, had previously
passed this location and immediately before losing control of the vehicle, was
emphatically warned by another passenger "to watch out for [the] dip." In
reaction to the warning, Mudge swerved to the right from the center of the
street where the vehicle was then traveling, lost control of the vehicle, hit a
curb, skidded and rolled.
Whether
Allmaras' stated concept can ever be sold to a jury may be problematical, but
one explanation for the sudden shock, loss of control and rollover might be
Mudge's suddenly realized nighttime fear in approaching the area that an
oncoming car could be in the wrong lane to avoid the dip and consequently cause
a head-on collision. Within the summary judgment evidentiary status of this
appeal, an oncoming vehicle was never shown to have
existed.
3 A representative listing of
Wyoming cases, inclusive through 1985, can be
found in England, 728 P.2d at 1152 n. 2. A primary case
of more recent date is Stephenson v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989). See also Petersen v. CampbellCounty Memorial Hosp. Dist., 760 P.2d 992
(Wyo. 1988); Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc.,
735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987); and DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643
(Wyo.
1986).
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