Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan
Annotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary
Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Wisconsin Supreme Court?
Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More ›
You already receive new opinion summaries from Wisconsin Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's determination that the assessments of Lowe's Home Centers, LLC's property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years by the City of Delvan were not excessive, holding that the assessments were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.
On appeal, Lowe's argued, among other things, that the City's assessments should not have received a presumption of correctness because they were conducted in violation of the dictates of the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of correctness attached to the City's assessments; and (2) Lowe's failed to demonstrate that the assessments were excessive.
Download PDF
2023 WI 8 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: OF WISCONSIN 2019AP1987 COMPLETE TITLE: Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. City of Delavan, Defendant-Respondent. REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 542, 970 N.W.2d 568 (2022 – unpublished) OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: February 16, 2023 September 28, 2022 Circuit Walworth Daniel Steven Johnson JUSTICES: ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined. NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Thomas R. Wilhelmy, Daniel P. Deveny and Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis. There was an oral argument by Daniel P. Deveny. For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by Lori M. Lubinksy, Danielle Baudhuin Tierney, and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Danielle Baudhuin Tierney. An Dustin amicus T. curiae Woehl, and brief was Kasdorf, filed Lewis by & Jason P. Gehring, Swietlick, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Village of Plover, Wisconsin. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy, and Troutman, Pepper, Hamilton, Sanders LLP, Chicago, on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and the WMC Litigation Center, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Amy R. Seibel, Claire Silverman, and Seibel Law Offices, LLC, Mequon, and the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, Monona, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. There was an oral argument by Amy R. Seibel. 2 2023 WI 8 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2019AP1987 (L.C. No. 2016CV589 & 2017CV432) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, FILED v. FEB 16, 2023 City of Delavan, Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court Defendant-Respondent. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. ¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. Affirmed. The petitioner, Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's determination that the City of Delavan's assessments of Lowe's' No. 2019AP1987 property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years were not excessive.1 Lowe's contends that the City's assessments should not have received a presumption of correctness and that the assessments improperly excluded comparable properties for the sole reason that those properties were unoccupied. ¶2 Specifically, assessments should Lowe's contends that have received a not the City's presumption of correctness because, it argues, they were conducted in violation of the dictates of the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (the Manual). Further, it asserts that the vacant big-box retail locations it presented to the circuit court are comparable to the subject property and thus should have been considered in the City's assessments. ¶3 The City argues to the contrary, contending that the presumption assessments. properties of correctness It Lowe's was appropriately additionally presented asserts as that comparable afforded the to its unoccupied properties were properly excluded from the analysis. ¶4 We determine that the assessments in this case were properly afforded a presumption of correctness. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) (2019-20),2 the presumption attaches upon Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan, No. 2019AP1987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2021) (per curiam) (affirming the order of the circuit court for Walworth County, Daniel Steven Johnson, Judge). 1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 2 2 No. the filing of the assessment along with the 2019AP1987 assessor's affidavit. ¶5 We further determine that Lowe's failed to demonstrate that the City's assessments were excessive. Giving deference to the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility determinations, significant we contrary conclude that evidence Lowe's sufficient did to not provide overcome the presumption of correctness. ¶6 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. I ¶7 Lowe's Delavan. is the owner of property in the City of The property consists of 14.525 acres on which sits a 134,574-square-foot Lowe's Home Improvement store. Construction on the building was completed in 2005, and Lowe's has occupied the building since that time. ¶8 In 2013, the City assessor conducted a revaluation of the property, and arrived at an assessed value of $8,922,300. No changes were made to this value for purposes of the 2016 and 2017 assessments. ¶9 2017. Lowe's challenged the City's assessments for 2016 and It sought a waiver of its hearing before the City's Board of Review and the Board granted the waiver, thereby disallowing 3 No. the claim.3 action under 2019AP1987 After its claim was disallowed, Lowe's filed this Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d),4 asserting that the assessments of its property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years were excessive and seeking to recover the excess amount it believed it had paid. ¶10 matter. The circuit court held a three-day bench trial on the At trial, City Assessor Luke Mack testified, as did the City's expert appraiser Scott Chapko. Lowe's offered testimony from two experts, Michael MaRous and Brett Harrington.5 ¶11 Mack testified regarding the method he employed for valuing the property for 2016 and 2017. He described those assessments as "maintenance" assessments, which means that the property was not subject to a full revaluation.6 Mack further See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8m) ("The board may, at the request of the taxpayer or assessor, or at its own discretion, waive the hearing of an objection . . . . For purposes of this subsection, if the board waives the hearing, the waiver disallows the taxpayer's claim on excessive assessment under s. 74.37(3) and, notwithstanding the time period under s. 74.37(3)(d), the taxpayer has 60 days from the notice of the hearing waiver in which to commence an action under s. 74.37(3)(d)."). 3 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d), "[i]f the taxation district or county disallows the claim, the claimant may commence an action in circuit court to recover the amount of the claim not allowed." 4 The circuit court's decision did not focus on Harrington's testimony. Accordingly, although we briefly describe the testimony of the other witnesses, we do not recount that of Harrington. 5 See Wis. Stat. § 70.05(5)(b) ("Each taxation district shall assess property at full value at least once in every 5year period."). 6 4 No. 2019AP1987 testified that the prior assessment of the property, completed in 2013, was done using the cost approach,7 that replacement costs were based on "Marshall and Swift cost data,"8 and that market adjustments were applied for depreciation and additional obsolescence. He also compared the assessments to recent revaluations in other communities. ¶12 Lowe's' expert, MaRous, testified that the property should have been valued at a much lower level than the City had offered. market In MaRous's opinion, the subject property had a fair value of $4.6 million——just over half of the City's assessed value. ¶13 To arrive at this valuation, MaRous used the sales comparison property approach. to determined ¶14 (what six other doing so, recently-sold he compared properties the that Lowe's he had to be "comparable" to the Lowe's property. Three of the six comparable sites MaRous identified MaRous American In TV termed sales locations. one, Two three, of these and six) sites were were former sold to Steinhafel's furniture and one was sold and converted into a go- The "cost approach" to valuation "seeks to measure the cost to replace the property." Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶35, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. 7 Marshall and Swift "publishes materials used by appraisers and state and local taxing authorities." Marshall & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1994). The Marshall and Swift handbook has been described as a "standardized publication in the field of real estate." In Re Thompson, 18 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). 8 5 No. kart racing track, bar, and restaurant. All 2019AP1987 three were in receivership9 when they were sold. ¶15 MaRous's comparable sale number two was a former K- Mart store that, by MaRous's testimony, had been vacant and marketed for "2 to 3 years" prior to being sold. Comparable sale number four was a former Lowe's store in Brown Deer. The property had been built in 2006 and vacated by Lowe's just five years later. It sat vacant for two years before being purchased by Walmart in 2013. MaRous further advanced that the "exposure time," or the length of time it takes a property to sell on the open market, for properties similar to the subject property in the same geographical area is two to three years. ¶16 Finally, MaRous offered comparable sale number five, a vacant former Target store. This property was "vacant before the purchase for about four years." It was ultimately purchased by a developer who "broke it up into two [lots] . . . because that's where the demand was." ¶17 Scott The City countered Lowe's' expert with its own expert, Chapko. slightly higher Chapko than valued the the property assessed value. at $9.2 Like million, MaRous, he arrived at this valuation using the sales comparison approach, although Chapko used different properties as comparables than MaRous used. ¶18 Chapko testified that he did not think it was appropriate to use "dark" stores or "distressed" properties to 9 See Wis. Stat. ch. 128. 6 No. 2019AP1987 compare to the occupied Lowe's property.10 Accordingly, Chapko did analysis. not use any such properties in his All of Chapko's submitted comparable sales were occupied at the time of sale and had market-rate leases in place. "duress," such as a bankruptcy or None was sold under foreclosure. Chapko additionally testified that the exposure time for a property like the subject property is in the "overall range of 2 to 18 months." ¶19 The assessments. circuit court Specifically, ultimately it determined upheld that the "the City's evidence presented by Lowe's in this case is significantly less credible than that presented by the City when it comes to a proper value to be attached to this real estate for the years 2016 and 2017." In discussing MaRous's appraisal, the circuit court discounted The Manual discourages the use of "dark" and "distressed" properties "as comparable sales unless the subject property is similarly dark or distressed." 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 9-12 (2016). Pursuant to the Manual, "[a] vacant store is considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal time period for that commercial real estate marketplace and can vary from one municipality to another." Id. As such, "vacant" and "dark" are not synonyms. For further discussion on the distinction between "vacant" and "dark," see infra, ¶¶45-46. The Manual does not specifically define "distressed," but it counsels that "[a] recent court case stated distressed properties are not seen as meaningfully comparable to operating properties." 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 9-12 (citing Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶¶21, 22, 34, 35, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893). 10 All references to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual are to the 2016 version unless otherwise indicated. 7 No. 2019AP1987 MaRous's claimed comparables two and five in that they "were both vacant apparently beyond the 2-3 year as the normal identifies window that exposure Mr. time MaRous for the Delavan area," classifying those properties as "dark" for this reason. It further explained: In that these two properties are dark they have a major deficiency when compared with the Lowe's store in question. Further, the fact that they were considered comparable sales at all is in apparent direct conflict with the [principles] outlined in the Manual stating not to use dark properties in performing an appraisal unless the subject property is also dark. ¶20 reliance The on circuit what it court also considered found unpersuasive "distressed" MaRous's properties. It observed: [H]alf of the comparable sales used by Mr. MaRous were in receivership. The Court might be able to overlook one comparable sale in receivership or under possible duress as an outlier if it was able to put that outlier in the context of five other properties without significant flaws, not in receivership, with similar adjusted values. However, the Court cannot do so here because of the number of properties in receivership and the flaws of the other nonreceivership comparable sales. ¶21 Due appraisal, the to the "significant circuit court deficiencies" concluded that in Lowe's MaRous's had not provided significant contrary evidence that the City's valuation was excessive. Accordingly, it denied Lowe's' request for a refund of excessive taxes. ¶22 Lowe's appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of 8 No. 2019AP1987 Delavan, No. 2019AP1987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2021) (per curiam). Emphasizing that the circuit court "is the ultimate arbiter of credibility," the court of appeals concluded that "Lowe's has not overcome the presumption of correctness that attached to the City's assessments and that the record supports case." Id., the ¶¶43, circuit 48. court's Lowe's determinations petitioned for this in this court's review. II ¶23 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' determination on an excessive assessment claim brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d). An action filed pursuant to § 74.37 seeks a trial before the circuit court, and is distinct from a certiorari action.11 Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶23, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784. Accordingly, Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the validity of a decision rendered by a municipality, administrative agency, or other quasi-judicial tribunal. State ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold, 2021 WI 6, ¶11, 395 Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323. Such a proceeding is "limited to the record before the board and addresses only whether the board's actions were: (1) within its jurisdiction; (2) according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) supported by evidence such that the board might reasonably make the order or determination in question." State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶19, 399 Wis. 2d 696, 967 N.W.2d 460. In contrast, an excessive assessment action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37 is not confined to the record before the board and new evidence may be presented. Trailwood Ventures, LLC v. Village of Kronenwetter, 2009 WI App 18, ¶7, 315 Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841. 11 9 No. 2019AP1987 we review the circuit court's determination, not that of the assessor or Board of Review. ¶24 Id. In our review, we must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. §§ 70.32 and 70.49 to determine whether the appraisals at issue followed the statutory directives. application present independently of questions the disturbed of determinations court and court of appeals. ¶25 Statutory interpretation and law that rendered by we review the circuit Id., ¶24. Factual findings made by the circuit court will not be unless they are clearly erroneous. Id., ¶25. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Id., ¶62. It is within the province of the factfinder to make determinations of the weight and credibility of evidence. Id., ¶25. III ¶26 We methodology begin that by guide setting property forth tax the principles assessment in and Wisconsin. Subsequently, we discuss the presumption of correctness to which an assessment is entitled. Finally, we address the City's assessments of Lowe's' property. A ¶27 Valuation of real estate for tax assessment purposes is governed by Wis. Stat. § 70.32. State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶23, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1. Pursuant to § 70.32(1), property shall be valued "in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual." Subsection (1) further 10 sets forth a hierarchical No. 2019AP1987 valuation methodology for arriving at a property's fair market value.12 See State ex rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 685-86, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970). ¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1) lists three sources of information that inform tax assessments. The order in which these of sources are listed is indicative information each source provides. ¶24. the quality of Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, This methodology has been described as providing three "tiers" of analysis. ¶29 Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶31. An arm's-length sale of the subject property is the best information of a property's fair market value, and is thus the first source of information to which an assessor should look in conducting an assessment. Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, ¶25. Examination of a recent arm's-length sale is known as a tier 1 analysis. the Id. appraiser 12 If the property has not been recently sold, then moves to a tier 2 analysis, examining recent In full, Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) provides: Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the best information that the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale. In determining the value, the assessor shall consider recent arm's-length sales of the property to be assessed if according to professionally acceptable appraisal practices those sales conform to recent arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable property; recent arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable property; and all factors that, according to professionally acceptable appraisal practices, affect the value of the property to be assessed. 11 No. arm's-length sales of reasonably "sales comparison" approach). comparable Id. 2019AP1987 properties (the It is this tier 2 analysis that is before us in this case. ¶30 an Finally, when both tier 1 and tier 2 are unavailable, assessor moves to tier 3, under which the assessor may consider all the factors collectively that have a bearing on the value of the property. Id., ¶26. These factors include cost, depreciation, replacement value, income, industrial conditions, location and occupancy, sales of like property, book value, amount of insurance carried, value asserted in a prospectus, and appraisals produced by the owner. Id.; State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of Rev. of City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 278, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976). ¶31 Property owners who are dissatisfied with the assessed value of their property may file an objection to the assessment with the municipal board of review. Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7); State ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Rev. for City of Kenosha, 2022 WI 17, ¶9, 401 Wis. 2d 27, 972 N.W.2d 544. The board of review is a quasi-judicial body that hears evidence and decides whether the assessor's valuation is correct. State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶16, 399 assessing body. Wis. 2d 696, Id. 967 N.W.2d 460. It is not an If a property owner remains dissatisfied after the board's decision, the property owner may appeal the 12 No. 2019AP1987 board's decision through one of three statutory avenues.13 ¶17. Id., As relevant here, Lowe's brought an excessive assessment action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37. B ¶32 With this background in hand, we next clarify the operation of the presumption of correctness to which assessments are entitled. As a starting point to the examination of a property owner's challenge to a tax assessment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37, correct. the Wis. Stat. Wis. 2d 141, ¶50. assessor did statutes or evidence. valuation § 70.49(2); is presumed Metro. to Assocs., be 379 Such a presumption may be rebutted if the not if assessor's correctly a Metro. apply challenger Assocs., the presents 379 Manual and significant Wis. 2d 141, ¶50; Wisconsin contrary Allright Props., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶12, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567. ¶33 case are However, Lowe's contends that the assessments in this not entitled to the presumption of correctness. Pointing to this court's statement that "[n]o presumption of correctness may be accorded to an assessment that does not apply the principles in the Property Assessment Manual," Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶17, 311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 The three options for property owners who wish to appeal a board decision are: (1) certiorari review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13), (2) a written complaint with the Department of Revenue to revalue the property under Wis. Stat. § 70.85, and (3) an excessive assessment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37. City of Waukesha, 399 Wis. 2d 696, ¶17. 13 13 No. N.W.2d 687, Lowe's asserts that because the 2019AP1987 assessments here deviated from the Manual (an assertion which we will address below), the presumption does not attach in the first instance. ¶34 Lowe's presumption. misapprehends the application of the Its argument is incorrect as a matter of both statutory law and logic. ¶35 The statutory basis for the presumption, Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), provides: The value of all real and personal property entered into the assessment roll to which such affidavit is attached by the assessor shall, in all actions and proceedings involving such values, be presumptive evidence that all such properties have been justly and equitably assessed in proper relationship to each other. For our purposes, the key passage from the statute sets forth that the assessment becomes "presumptive evidence" when it is "entered into the assessment affidavit . . . attached plain language conclusion: of by this the roll" and assessor." provision thus includes § 70.49(2). compels only "such The one that the presumption of correctness attaches at the filing of the assessment by the assessor along with the required affidavit. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (setting forth that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute, and if the meaning is plain, "we ordinarily stop the inquiry"). ¶36 Further, backward logic. Lowe's' proffered analysis suffers from Rather than apply the presumption and then 14 No. determine if significant contrary evidence 2019AP1987 overcomes the presumption, Lowe's would have us endorse an analysis that would first examine the evidence and make a determination as to whether the assessment complied with the Manual and only then determine whether the presumption applies. ¶37 This is not how a presumption works. If an assessment is conducted contrary to the dictates of the Manual, this does not merely mean that the presumption does not initially attach. If, in the context of a Wis. Stat. § 74.37 action, the failure to follow the Manual results in an excessive assessment, then the presumption is overcome and the assessment must be set aside. ¶38 We acknowledge that this court's cases have indicated that "[n]o presumption of correctness may be accorded to an assessment that does not apply the principles in the Property Assessment Manual." See Walgreen Co., 311 Wis. 2d 158, ¶17; Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶56, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. However, Walgreen Co. did not cite Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) and thus provides no insight into its application. Although § 70.49(2) was cited in Adams Outdoor Advertising, it was referenced only for the premise that the court "must give presumptive weight to the City's assessment." Adams Outdoor Advert., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶25. language of § 70.49(2), we take the court's Given the plain statements in Walgreen Co. and Adams Outdoor Advertising to mean not that the presumption does not initially attach to an assessment that does not follow the Manual's directives, but that the presumption is 15 No. overcome in such a situation. 2019AP1987 Indeed, it is apparent from the plain text of § 70.49(2) that the presumption attaches when the assessment is filed along with the proper affidavit. ¶39 We thus conclude that the assessments in this case were properly afforded a presumption of correctness. to Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), the presumption Pursuant attaches upon the filing of the assessment along with the assessor's affidavit. C ¶40 Having established that the presumption of correctness attaches to the assessments, we turn next to address whether Lowe's presented overcome the significant presumption contrary and evidence demonstrate sufficient that the to City's assessments were excessive. ¶41 Although Lowe's conceded at oral argument that "all the [proposed comparable] stores were vacant at the time they sold," it contends that the assessor deviated from the Manual by categorically excluding "vacant" and "dark" stores from a tier 2 sales comparison analysis. It further contends that it presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption in the form of MaRous's appraisal. ¶42 In evaluating Lowe's' arguments, we examine first the relevant portions of the Manual. This case revolves around the question "comparable" context of of comparison what a constitutes tier approach 2 sales is a comparison "based on the property analysis. premise in The that sales similar properties will sell for similar prices on the open market." Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-24. 16 the 1 No. ¶43 whether The Manual properties "does are not leave reasonably discretion of an appraiser." the 2019AP1987 determination comparable wholly to of the Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City of Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶61, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611. Accordingly, it provides some guidance as to how assessors are to evaluate whether property Specifically, the Manual states: is indeed "comparable." "Comparable sales refer to properties that are similar to the subject property in age, condition, use, type of construction, location, design, physical features and economic characteristics." Assessment Manual 7-24. to the subject, the 1 Wisconsin Property "The more similar the sold property is more reliable is the sale indicator of the value of the subject property." ¶44 price as an Id. Providing further specific guidance in the valuation of commercial properties through the sales comparison approach, the Manual states that "[w]hen valuing properties, the assessor should choose comparable sales exhibiting a similar highest and best use and similar placement in the commercial real estate marketplace." Id. at 9-12. The Manual additionally sets forth language that is critical to the issue presented in this case regarding the use of "vacant" and "dark" properties commercial valuation: The assessor should avoid using sales of improved properties that are vacant ("dark") or distressed as comparable sales unless the subject property is similarly dark or distressed. A vacant store is considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal time period for that commercial real estate marketplace and can vary from one municipality to 17 in No. 2019AP1987 another. A recent court case stated distressed properties are not seen as meaningfully comparable to operating properties. Id. (citing Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶¶21, 22, 34, 35, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893). ¶45 detour Before continuing in our analysis, we take a brief to discuss the terminology that we employ. Some confusion has arisen due to inconsistent usage of the terms "vacant" and "dark." Although the court of appeals in this case seemingly used the terms interchangeably, they have different meanings. ¶46 We acknowledge that the Manual may not be a model of clarity on the subject, but its language does indicate that "vacant" and "dark" are not synonymous. The Manual states that "[a] vacant store is considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal time period for that commercial real estate marketplace and can vary from one municipality to another." Id. Thus, "dark," as used by the Manual, is a subset of "vacant." In other words, all dark stores are vacant, but not all vacant stores are dark. ¶47 After this brief detour, we return to the parties' arguments. Lowe's' main argument before this court is that the circuit court erred in rejecting MaRous's proffered "comparable" properties for purposes of a tier 2 sales comparison analysis. Specifically, it contends that the property's vacancy status should not be considered, and that the property must be valued with respect to the owner's fee 18 simple interest only. To No. support this argument, Lowe's looks to Walgreen 2019AP1987 Co., 311 Wis. 2d 158. ¶48 operated In Walgreen pursuant to Co., a the business business model at issue, under Walgreens, which it would contract with a real estate developer to construct properties at Walgreens' direction. properties from Id., ¶6. the In return, Walgreens leased the developer at above-market compensate for the developer's costs. ¶49 rates to Id. When assessing property values, the City of Madison appraised the "leased fee interest," i.e., it considered the actual above-market contract rents in its analysis. Id., ¶10. In contrast, Walgreens advanced an appraisal that "appraised the fee simple interest in the two properties without consideration of the lease." property tax Id. The court addressed the issue of "whether a assessment of retail property leased at above market rent values should be based on market rents (as Walgreens argue[d]) or if such assessments should be based on the above market rent argue[d])." ¶50 terms of Walgreens' actual leases (as the City Id., ¶2. This court agreed with Walgreens. It determined, "consistent with the nationally recognized principle that '[a] lease never increases the market value of real property rights to the fee simple estate,'" that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) "proscribes assessing real property in excess of market value." Id., ¶3. The Walgreen Co. court also concluded that "an income approach assessment of a leased retail property's fair market value of the fee simple interest [must] be based on market lease 19 No. 2019AP1987 rates, not actual contract rates, as long as encumbrances to the property do not cause its leased fee value to fall below a market rate value." ¶51 Lowe's Id. argues that consideration of the occupancy status of a store in a valuation necessarily means that the value of the business is being taken into account rather than just the fee simple value of the land. It highlights the Walgreen Co. court's statement that "the valuation of the fair market value of property for purposes of property taxes is by its nature different from business, or income tax assessment." Id., ¶65. "[A]n assessor's task is to value the real estate, not the business concern which may be using the property." Id. (quoting Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Kenosha Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 184 Wis. 2d 541, 565, 516 N.W.2d 695 (1994)). Pointing to language in Walgreen Co. indicating that "a property assessor's task is to identify the market value of a fee simple interest," id., ¶20, Lowe's argues that consideration of vacancy status takes the assessor outside of these confines. ¶52 Walgreen Co. does not compel the outcome Lowe's seeks, and its holding is not as broad as Lowe's claims. The court in Walgreen Co. made a narrow determination regarding how abovemarket rent is to be treated for tax assessment purposes. the City here argues, Walgreen Co. does not stand for As the blanket proposition that occupancy or vacancy has no role to play in valuation. ¶53 Lowe's' argument misses the mark when it advances that accounting for the vacant nature of a store necessarily values 20 No. 2019AP1987 the business concern and not just the fee simple interest in the land. Many factors inform the value of land, including the land's viability to house a business. Saying that land is suitable for a successful business, or that the land has a track record of housing a successful business, and assigning a value to that fact is not the same as valuing the business itself. Generally, a site that can sustain a business is more valuable than one that cannot.14 See also 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment This conclusion is echoed by a position paper published by the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO), an organization whose standards are incorporated into the Manual. See 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 1-3 ("Whether or not the IAAO Standards appear in the [Manual], the most current version in effect on January 1 of a given assessment year is incorporated by reference in the manual."); State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶41, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1. 14 The IAAO states: If the subject property is occupied, that fact supports the premise that there is demand for the use for which the property was originally designed. Highest and best use is likely for the continued use of the property in its current use. . . . For retail properties, value is affected by size, age, condition, access, traffic counts, proximity to major employment centers, the concentration of surrounding properties, population size, and household purchasing power, to name just a few considerations. The competitive advantage of a property determines its relative position within the market. A property that has significant advantages over other properties of the same use because of location, demographics, and economic forces will command a higher price and rent. Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers, Commercial Big-Box Retail: Guide to Market-Based Valuation at 16 (Sept. 2017). 21 A No. Manual 7-24 ("Comparable sales refer to 2019AP1987 properties that are similar to the subject property in age, condition, use, type of construction, location, design, physical features and economic characteristics.") (emphasis added); id. at 7-1 ("[T]he assessor must not consider only the physical attributes of the land and improvements but the intangible benefits that are associated with them."). ¶54 Further, a dark property is more likely to have characteristics that would make it less valuable than a property that was on the market for a shorter period of time. For example, if a building has been unoccupied for a long period of time, it is more likely to be in some kind of disrepair and in turn more likely to require significant investment to make it usable again. ¶55 The assessments in this case were consistent with the above provisions of the Manual and thus the circuit court was not obligated to reject the assessments. The circuit court determined that multiple properties on which Lowe's relied were not just vacant, but were dark. As to the dark properties on which counsels Lowe's relies, the Manual against using such properties as comparables to properties that are not similarly dark. avoid Specifically, the Manual states: using sales of improved "The assessor should properties that are vacant ('dark') or distressed as comparable sales unless the subject property is similarly dark or distressed." ¶56 Id. at 9-12. Further buttressing the application of this directive is the court of appeals' decision in Bonstores Realty One, LLC 22 No. v. City of Wauwatosa, 351 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶20-22. 2019AP1987 In Bonstores, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's determination that an expert's disregarded opinion differences was in comparable properties. unreliable the vacancy Id., ¶22. because status the of opinion proffered Here, the circuit court's decision was similar to and consistent with that in Bonstores. ¶57 use of The Manual's directive that assessors "should avoid" vacant and dark properties in assessing occupied properties is consistent with general principles of real estate assessment. Specifically, real estate must be valued at its highest and best use. Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, ¶37. The highest and best use of a store in an area that is conducive to business (and is in fact operating as a business) is different from the highest and best use of a property that contains a failed big-box store. Lowe's' argument treats these different things alike, which is not the "apples to apples" comparison contemplated in a tier 2 analysis. See Bonstores, 351 Wis. 2d 439, ¶21. ¶58 In examining the distressed "comparable properties" in receivership on which Lowe's relies, Lowe's fares no better. Again, the Manual counsels against the use of such properties as comparable, and with good reason. Assessment Manual 9-12. See 1 Wisconsin Property A property in receivership is often sold under vastly different economic conditions and subject to vastly different incentives from receivership. 23 a property that is not in No. ¶59 To explain, "[a] Wis. Stat. ch. 128 2019AP1987 receivership provides a way to liquidate the assets of a business debtor in an orderly and controlled manner." Kristin K. Beilke et al., Collections and Bankruptcy in Wisconsin § 2.16 (3d ed. 2022). "The object and purpose of assignment law is to afford an equal distribution of the assignor's proportion to their claims." estate to all creditors in Linton v. Schmidt, 88 Wis. 2d 183, 198, 277 N.W.2d 136 (1979). ¶60 This court has stated that the assignee, or receiver, is "the trustee for both the debtor and the creditors; with the duty to administer the trust property so as to pay the creditors, as far as possible, their just claims, and then to account to the debtor for the surplus." Id. However, the receiver is "bound to look primarily to the interests of the creditors." Id. Given this responsibility, differing incentives come into play and a sale of receivership property may not reflect the same price as a similar property not in receivership would receive on the open market. For example, a receiver may be motivated to sell the property more quickly so as to secure timely payment of creditors and avoid the building falling into disrepair. ¶61 Receivership can thus result in a "distressed" sale. Although the mere fact of a receivership does not automatically affect a property's market value, a claim that a distressed property is comparable to an operating one should be subjected to a court's keen scrutiny. The circuit court was therefore not 24 No. obligated to accept MaRous's analysis that was 2019AP1987 based on an equivalency between distressed and operating properties. ¶62 Given the above analysis and the circuit court's evaluation of the evidence presented, Lowe's' contention that it presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption unpersuasive. of correctness in this case is ultimately In evaluating comparable properties two and five, the former K-Mart and Target stores, the circuit court made a factual determination that both of these properties were "vacant beyond the 2-3 year window that Mr. MaRous apparently identifies as the normal exposure time for the Delevan area." Accordingly, it concluded that these properties were "dark" and determined that neither property. fall of these stores was comparable to the subject It observed that "[b]oth of these stores appear to within the category of 'dark' properties based on the extensive period of time during which they stood empty and were unable to be sold" given that they were "on the market for sale for a period of time beyond the normal exposure time needed to obtain market value." Thus, the circuit court concluded that these properties "have a major deficiency when compared with the Lowe's store in question." This "deficiency" was, in the circuit court's view, "significant," and "call[ed] into question the value of [MaRous's] appraisal as a whole." ¶63 Likewise, with regard to the distressed properties under receivership (comparables one, three, and six, the former American factual TV properties), determination, the circuit reaching 25 the court similarly "inescapable made a conclusion" No. that "American TV was going out of business, 2019AP1987 subject receivership, and needed to liquidate their assets." to a Under such conditions, the circuit court determined that these properties were not comparable to the subject property as MaRous advanced. ¶64 Lowe's contends that MaRous "exercised exceptional diligence in investigating the circumstances surrounding each sale" of properties in receivership, asserting that "each of the properties were sufficiently exposed to the market with high demand from numerous potential buyers, and that each of the consummated sales was an arm's length full fee simple market value." transaction reflecting However, after evaluating the evidence, the circuit court determined that MaRous's analysis was deficient. ¶65 that The circuit court observed that "there is no testimony any of [the distressed properties] were put on the traditional real estate market for sale for the normal exposure time before they were placed as an asset into a receivership." Without an explanation from MaRous, the circuit court stated that it "simply does not know whether the amount obtained on the traditional non-receivership open market would have been the same or different if no receivership was in place and Mr. MaRous did not adequately explain why the receivership itself doesn't matter or is irrelevant as it relates to that concern." The circuit court further did not accept MaRous's valuation because of the sheer amount of weight distressed sales: 26 his analysis placed on the No. 2019AP1987 The Court might be able to overlook one comparable sale in receivership or under possible duress as an outlier if it was able to put that outlier in the context of five other properties without significant flaws, not in receivership, with similar adjusted values. However, the Court cannot do so here because of the number of properties in receivership and the flaws of the other non-receivership comparable sales. ¶66 the In contrast, the comparable properties presented by City's appraiser, Chapko, were not dark or distressed.15 Instead, all of these properties were occupied at the time of sale. Additionally, Chapko testified that there was no duress involved in bankruptcy, any and of all the were sales, none exposed to were the bank-owned open or market for in a sufficient period of time. ¶67 Although it recognized that "Chapko's analysis also has flaws," such as his "less than ideal" use of multi-tenant shopping centers, the circuit court found that Chapko made adjustments that "are reasonable, sufficient, and credible" to account for differences in the comparable properties and the These properties were all occupied and included Shopko stores in Madison, Monona, and West Bend; a multi-tenant big-box building in Grand Chute; a big-box building in Milwaukee divided into two units, one leased to Pick 'n Save and the other to Kohl's; a multi-tenant shopping center in Racine anchored by Hobby Lobby, DSW, Bed Bath & Beyond, and T.J. Maxx; and a Mills Fleet Farm store in Hudson. 15 Chapko did not use all of the same properties as comparables for his 2017 appraisal as he used for the 2016 appraisal, instead updating the 2017 appraisal with two new sales that occurred in 2016 and discarding the two oldest sales from the 2016 appraisal. This list reflects the properties used in both the 2016 and 2017 appraisals without differentiating between the two. 27 No. subject property. 2019AP1987 Foremost in the circuit court's determination of the credibility of the dueling appraisals was the experts' differing methodologies reliance on dark and and specifically distressed their properties: differing "Maybe most importantly, [Chapko] did not use any properties, much less half of his properties that were subject to a receivership or could otherwise be argued as being distressed. 'dark' properties." Nor did he use any Thus, the circuit court found "[Chapko's] opinion credible under the circumstances." ¶68 trier It is in the province of the circuit court as the of fact to make credibility of evidence. determinations of the weight and Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶61; Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1998) ("When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each witness's testimony."). On review, such a determination will only be overturned if it is clearly erroneous. the circuit Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶62. court made a determination that "the Here, evidence presented by Lowe's in this case is significantly less credible than that presented by the City when it comes to a proper value to be attached to this real estate for the years 2016 and 2017." ¶69 On this record, we cannot conclude that the circuit court's factual determinations, examined were MaRous's determined that findings, clearly erroneous. conclusions the City's including and The methodology proffered 28 its credibility circuit and testimony court ultimately and proposed No. valuation were more credible. "against the evidence." great weight See id. 2019AP1987 Such a determination was not and clear preponderance of the Rather, the circuit court's determination has support in the record as explained above. ¶70 We emphasize that our determination is based on the facts and circumstances presented to the circuit court, and the circuit court's evaluation of those facts and circumstances. At oral argument before this court, the parties agreed that the Manual does not create a categorical bright-line rule against the use of vacant properties in the assessment of properties. Indeed, counsel for the City advanced: think is there "[t]here is this no bright-line bright-line rule categorical that says occupied "I don't exclusion" vacant and properties cannot be used." ¶71 Consistent with the parties' agreement, we do not read the Manual to strictly prohibit the use of vacant properties as comparable to occupied properties. avoid" is not mandatory. The language of "should Cf. Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, ¶23, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121 (explaining that the word "shall" is presumed mandatory). We acknowledge that the Manual does not provide specific guidance on when a vacant, dark, comparable to or an distressed occupied property property. may be However, meaningfully we take the "should avoid" language to mean that the comparability of vacant properties to occupied properties exists along a continuum depending upon how long the property has been vacant as compared to the normal exposure time for a property of that type in the 29 No. same geographic area. We emphasize that the 2019AP1987 Manual urges assessors to use caution in utilizing such comparables, as the economics underlying a vacancy may be indicative of a meaningful difference in the circumstances of the properties. ¶72 Accordingly, we determine that Lowe's failed demonstrate that the City's assessments were excessive. to Giving deference to the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility determinations, we conclude that Lowe's did not provide significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness. IV ¶73 In sum, we determine that the assessments in this case were properly afforded a presumption of correctness. to Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), the presumption attaches Pursuant upon the filing of the assessment along with the assessor's affidavit. ¶74 We further determine that Lowe's failed to demonstrate that the City's assessments were excessive. Giving deference to the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility determinations, significant we conclude contrary that evidence Lowe's sufficient did to not provide overcome the presumption of correctness. ¶75 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. By the Court.—The decision affirmed. 30 of the court of appeals is No. ¶76 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. 2019AP1987.rgb (concurring). The circuit court properly afforded the City of Delavan's 2016 and 2017 property assessments a presumption of correctness under Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), and Lowe's did not demonstrate the City's assessments were excessive under Wis. Stat. § 74.37. Accordingly, the court correctly affirms the decision of the court of appeals. I write separately because the majority melds the circuit court's conclusions of law and findings of fact into nothing more accords deference. independent than a credibility The review of determination standard circuit of review courts' to which instead conclusions of it demands law in cases concerning property tax assessments. ¶77 In challenging assessments, comparison Lowe's the City submitted assessment an conducted of Delavan's alternative by Michael property tier-2 sales- MaRous. That assessment identified six properties MaRous deemed comparable to the Lowe's MaRous's in assessment, comparable deemed store to three the Delavan. The determining none subject distressed, property. two circuit rejected of the properties Of the six, dark, noncomparable to the subject property. court and one the were court generally The court ultimately concluded Lowe's did not present "significant contrary evidence" to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the City's assessment. ¶78 The majority characterizes the conclusion as a "credibility determination." 1 circuit court's Majority op., ¶5. No. 2019AP1987.rgb As a result, the majority gives the circuit court's conclusion blanket deference. The majority's characterization is incorrect and therefore its deference conclusion that Lowe's is grounded correctness did deemed the properties not in credibility determination. in misplaced. The overcome law, rather circuit the than court's presumption a of fact-bound To reach that conclusion, the court MaRous's assessment distressed, or generally noncomparable. to be dark, Whether a property is dark, distressed, or generally noncomparable presents a question of law subject to independent review, and the circuit court's conclusions of law are not entitled to deference on appeal. If appellate courts defer to circuit courts' legal conclusions in property tax assessment cases, taxpayers will lose any avenue for meaningful appeal. ¶79 "When the question on appeal is whether a statutory concept embraces a particular set of factual circumstances, the reviewing court is generally presented with a mixed question of fact and law." Wis. 2d 437, Nottelson v. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 125 444, 373 N.W.2d 680 DILHR, 94 Wis.2d (Ct. 106, App. 115–16, 1985) (citing 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980)); see also Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Loc. 1901 v. Brown Cnty., 146 Wis. 2d 728, 739–40, 432 N.W.2d 571 (1988). Questions of fact address "who did what, when or where, how or why." U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 538 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018). Questions of law ask whether the facts found satisfy the relevant legal standard. Id. 2 We "uphold a circuit court's No. findings of fact independently unless review they are questions of clearly law. 2019AP1987.rgb erroneous," Langlade but County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶¶24–25, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277; see also Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 236, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (explaining when reviewing mixed questions this court clearly will not erroneous upset but findings will of fact review unless they are of law conclusions independently). ¶80 involve Property assessment competing valuations cases like accompanied this by one typically testimony of the assessors in support of their own. "Where there is conflicting testimony the the fact finder is ultimate arbiter of credibility," and this court will therefore defer to the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶27, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. Whether property valuations comport with the law, however, is a question of law, not fact. Wisconsin Statute § 70.32(1) provides that "[r]eal property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual. . . ." Whether the city complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32 "in making its assessment is a question of statutory interpretation that novo." Appellate Adams Outdoor courts Advert., "independently Ltd., review 294 we review de Wis. 2d 441, whether a ¶26. valuation complied with the statutes and the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual." Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶6, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893. 3 Accordingly, No. 2019AP1987.rgb whether an assessor properly deemed a property "dark" within the meaning of the Manual presents a mixed question of fact and law. ¶81 To decide whether a property is dark, a circuit court must make findings of fact regarding how long properties similar to the subject property typically sit vacant and how long the assessed property had been vacant. Assessment Manual 9-12 (2016). 1 Wisconsin Property After making such findings, the court must determine whether the property has sat vacant beyond the period of time similar properties remained vacant. Id. If it has, the relevant property is dark and therefore not likely to be comparable to the subject property. See id. Because factual findings underlie the legal determination of whether a property is "dark," the question is neither purely legal nor purely factual. ¶82 How It presents a mixed question of fact and law. long the assessed property and comparable properties have sat vacant are questions of fact because they address what has happened. We therefore reverse those findings only if clearly erroneous. Whether the period of vacancy for the assessed property renders it "dark" presents a question of law because it entails application of the law to the facts surrounding the vacancy of comparable properties compared with the vacancy of the assessed property. In this case, applying the law to the facts yielded an obvious answer. The circuit court needed to decide only whether four years, the length of time two vacant, comparable is properties longer similar properties than to three the in years, assessed 4 MaRous's the assessment length property of typically sat time sit No. vacant. 2019AP1987.rgb However simple that analysis might be in this case, it should be reviewed independently. ¶83 The majority defers to the circuit court's conclusion that certain properties used by MaRous are dark, even though that conclusion involves the application of law to the facts. Majority op., ¶¶68–69. While having no effect on the outcome of this case——the circuit court was correct that four years is longer than three years——such unfettered deference may deprive a taxpayer of the opportunity for meaningful appeal in a closer or more complex case. ¶84 the A more complex case is bound to arise. Manual, comparable properties are those According to "similar to the subject property in age, condition, use, type of construction, location, design, characteristics." (2016). Even circuit court relied (a that features and economic 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-24 in this deemed former noncomparable. analyzed physical To relatively one of Lowe's reach store's the store that sale straightforward properties on in Deer) Brown conclusion, price, the financial contracts with the City of Brown Deer. case, which the MaRous generally circuit court condition, and In doing so, the circuit court found "financial abnormalities," based on which it deemed the store generally Similar to deciding whether a property noncomparable whether is a with property generally the is subject dark, noncomparable property. determining presents a question of law entailing the application of law to the facts. Such questions of law may be more challenging than deeming a 5 No. property dark. Appellate courts must not 2019AP1987.rgb defer to circuit courts' determinations on such questions. ¶85 Given the rigor of general-comparability circuit courts might err in performing them. majority gives the circuit court's analyses, Nevertheless, the general-comparability analysis deference, misconstruing its conclusions of law to be findings of fact. In cases like this, appellate courts must review such questions of law independently. is the power to destroy,1 taxpayers If the power to tax must have access to meaningful appeal when challenging property tax assessments. ¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 6 No. 1 2019AP1987.rgb
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
