State v. Matthews

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Justia Opinion Summary

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the circuit court concluding that Defendant's request for a judicial substitution under Wis. Stat. 801.58(1) was untimely filed, holding that Defendant's substitution request was timely.

This case stemmed from proceedings to commit Defendant as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. The morning of the probable cause hearing, Defendant's counsel filed a request under section 801.58(1) to substitute the circuit court judge. The circuit court denied the request, finding it to be untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's substitution request was timely because his motion to adjourn was not a "preliminary contested matter" according to the accepted legal meaning of the phrase and because the circuit court heard no other such matter before Defendant filed his request.

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2021 WI 42 SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN CASE NO.: 2018AP2142 COMPLETE TITLE: In re the commitment of Tavodess Matthews: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Tavodess Matthews, Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 715 946 N.W.2d 200 PDC No:2020 WI App 33 - Published OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: May 14, 2021 February 22, 2021 Circuit Milwaukee Maxine A. White JUSTICES: DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell. For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by Sara Lynn Shaeffer, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Sara Lynn Shaeffer. 2021 WI 42 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2018AP2142 (L.C. No. 2018CI3) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT In re the commitment of Tavodess Matthews: State of Wisconsin, FILED Petitioner-Respondent, May 14, 2021 v. Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court Tavodess Matthews, Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. DALLET, Court. J., delivered the majority opinion for REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. a unanimous Reversed and cause remanded. ¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. This case is about whether Tavodess Matthews timely requested a judicial substitution under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1) (2019-20).1 Section 801.58(1) entitles a party in a civil case to substitute the assigned circuit court judge if, among other things, that party files a written All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 1 No. substitution contested after request before matters." the circuit "the Matthews court hearing filed granted his his of any 2018AP2142 preliminary substitution motion to request adjourn scheduled probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. a We hold that Matthews' substitution request was timely because his motion to adjourn is not a "preliminary contested matter" per that phrase's accepted legal meaning and the circuit court heard no other such matter before Matthews filed his request. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. I ¶2 This case arises from the early stages of proceedings to commit Matthews as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.2 After the State files a petition to commence ch. 980 proceedings, the circuit court must "hold a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person named in the petition § 980.04(2). is The a sexually circuit court violent must person." hold a Wis. Stat. probable cause hearing for a person already in the State's custody "no later than 10 days after the person's scheduled release or discharge date." Id. If the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is sexually violent, then the Department of Health Services evaluates the person to determine Although commitment proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 resemble criminal proceedings in some respects, they are civil actions. See State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). Thus, the civil judicial substitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1), applies. See State v. Brown, 215 Wis. 2d 716, 573 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1997). 2 2 No. whether that is in fact the case. § 980.04(3). circuit court must dismiss the petition. ¶3 2018AP2142 Otherwise, the Id. Here, after the State filed its ch. 980 petition, the circuit court set a probable cause hearing for August 15, 2018 (eight days after Matthews' scheduled release from the Green Bay Correctional Institution), represent Matthews. and appointed two attorneys to Matthews' attorneys met with him for the first time on the morning of the probable cause hearing. That same morning, Matthews' attorneys told the State they intended to ask the circuit court to adjourn the hearing because they needed more time to prepare. As a result, the State told its sole witness not to appear. ¶4 At the circuit court forward with additional objection window of acknowledged the time to outset that hearing."3 to under the cause parties noting the Wis. probable Matthews' prepare, rescheduling required the Stat. were "not counsel that hearing hearing, of going requested Matthews outside the had the § 980.04(2). The no 10-day State objected to the adjournment "for the record," but admitted that it was "in a somewhat difficult position" as it had let go of its witness for the day. circuit Matthews court agreed waived his to Despite its "disappointment," the reschedule statutory the right to hearing a so long probable determination within 10 days of his scheduled release. as cause Matthews The Honorable Michelle A. Havas of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court presided. 3 3 No. did so, and the circuit court rescheduled the 2018AP2142 hearing for August 29. ¶5 The morning of the rescheduled hearing, Matthews' counsel filed a written request under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1) to substitute the circuit court judge. Section 801.58(1) provides that a party in a civil action, such as a ch. 980 commitment proceeding, may request to substitute the circuit court judge before "the hearing of any preliminary contested matters" but "not later than 60 days after the summons and complaint are filed." § 801.58(1). Matthews argued that his motion was timely because he filed it only 33 days after the State filed its ch. 980 petition and, since the circuit court had not actually commenced the probable cause hearing, it had not yet heard a "contested matter." The circuit court disagreed, finding Matthews' request untimely because the State's objection to Matthews' motion to adjourn rendered the matter "contested." The circuit court also noted that it had made the "substantive decision" to accept Matthews' time-limit waiver, so it was too late for Matthews to request a substitution. Upon review,4 Chief Judge Maxine A. White of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court agreed with the circuit court's determination, explaining that Matthews' time waiver constituted matter. 4 See Wis. Stat. § 801.58(2). 4 a preliminary contested No. ¶6 appeal 2018AP2142 The court of appeals accepted Matthews' interlocutory and affirmed Matthews, 2020 WI the App circuit 33, 392 court's ruling.5 Wis. 2d 715, 946 State v. N.W.2d 200. Relying mainly upon Sielen6 and Galaxy Gaming,7 the court of appeals reasoned that the circuit court had heard a preliminary contested matter when it granted Matthews' motion to adjourn the probable cause hearing because the circuit court could have denied Matthews' motion and held the hearing——a decision that would have "obviously implicated the merits." source omitted). Id., ¶19 (quoted The court of appeals explained that both the scheduled probable cause hearing and Matthews' motion to adjourn that hearing were, in a literal sense, "contested": Matthews and the State disagreed about whether there was probable cause to commit Matthews and the State objected to Matthews' motion to adjourn the hearing. See id. The court of appeals therefore held that the circuit court had heard a preliminary contested matter prior to Matthews' judicial rendering that request untimely. substitution request, We granted Matthews' petition for review. A party must receive leave from the court of appeals to appeal a non-final circuit court order. See Wis. Stat. § 808.03. 5 State ex rel. Sielen v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee Cnty., 176 Wis. 2d 101, 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993). 6 DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing Ltd. P'ship, 2003 WI App 190, 267 Wis. 2d 233, 670 N.W.2d 74, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2004 WI 92, 273 Wis. 2d 577, 682 N.W.2d 839. 7 5 No. 2018AP2142 II ¶7 This case turns on our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1), which is a question of law that we review de novo. See Moreschi v. Vill. of Williams Bay, 2020 WI 95, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953 N.W.2d 318. In relevant part, § 801.58(1) provides as follows: Any party to a civil action or proceeding may file a written request . . . for a substitution of a new judge for the judge assigned to the case. The written request shall be filed preceding the hearing of any preliminary contested matters and, if by the plaintiff, not later than 60 days after the summons and complaint are filed . . . . ¶8 hearing Our of focus any here is preliminary specifically contested on the phrase "the matters," which both parties recognize as the crux of the case. Matthews maintains that we have previously held that only substantive issues are preliminary contested matters. According to Matthews, a motion to adjourn a probable cause hearing is not a substantive issue; therefore, it is not a preliminary contested matter. He also argues that a party timely files a substitution request if it does so before the circuit court actually hears a substantive issue. The State counters that the circuit court held a hearing on a preliminary contested matter when it commenced what was scheduled to be a probable cause hearing. The State asserts that because Matthews filed his substitution request after he appeared at that hearing, his substitution request was untimely. ¶9 phrase We resolve "preliminary this dispute contested first matters" 6 by and interpreting then by the analyzing No. 2018AP2142 what it means for there to be "the hearing of" such matters. The goal of statutory interpretation is to give the statutory text its "full, proper, and intended effect." Kalal v. Cir. Wis. 2d 633, Ct. 681 for Dane N.W.2d 110. Cnty., We 2004 State ex rel. WI 58, generally give ¶44, words 271 their common, everyday meaning, "but we give legal terms of art their accepted legal meaning." WI 48 ¶22, 309 § 990.01(1). common law Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 2008 Wis. 2d 311, 749 When the legislature that has a specific N.W.2d 557; Wis. Stat. adopts a phrase from the legal meaning and does not otherwise define it, we presume that the legislature adopts the phrase's specific legal meaning. Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶39, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462; see also Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 (explaining that when the legislature uses a "specific common law phrase," we presume it does so with "full knowledge" of that phrase's meaning). That principle applies with at least equal force when the legislature amends a statute to incorporate language from one of this court's decisions, resulting in a "significant revision to the language in which we are interested." ¶10, 385 See White v. City of Watertown, 2019 WI 9, Wis. 2d 320, 922 N.W.2d 61. Indeed, a statute's background, encompassing its "previously enacted and repealed provisions," analysis. can provide United States helpful v. context Franklin, for 2019 a plain-meaning WI 64, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 259, 928 N.W.2d 545; see also Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581. 7 No. ¶10 Applying these principles to Wis. Stat. reveals two things. 2018AP2142 § 801.58(1) First, that "preliminary contested matters" has a specific legal meaning, which the legislature explicitly adopted when it amended § 801.58(1). And second, that there is no "hearing of" a preliminary contested matter until a court actually hears such a matter. A ¶11 The phrase "preliminary contested matters" has a specific legal meaning referring to pretrial issues that go to the ultimate merits of the case. be traced to the court's century change-of-venue when party a The roots of this meaning can interpretation statute. requested a That change of of a statute venue mid-nineteenth provided because that of the presiding judge's "prejudice," the judge had no discretion to deny the Boyd, 7 request. Wis. 155, Wis. Stat. ch. 51, 157 (1859); § 1 Baldwin (1853); v. Rines v. Marygold, 2 Wis. 419, 420 (1853). ¶12 upon The timeliness of such change of venue requests hinged whether the trial substantive question. Ct. of Waukesha judge had already decided some See, e.g., State ex rel. Winchell v. Cir. Cnty., 116 Wis. 253, 93 N.W. 16 Swineford v. Pomeroy, 16 Wis. 553, 554-55 (1863). (1903); In Swineford, the court explained that, under "a rational construction," the change-of-venue statute was meant to prevent a party from changing the venue after the trial judge "ruled contrary to [that party's] expectations or unfavorably to" at 555. it. 16 Wis. Thus, a party's venue-change request was untimely if 8 No. 2018AP2142 made after the trial judge called the jury or issued a ruling. Id. If, however, a party made such a request after the court placed a matter "on the calendar for trial" but before it ruled on any issues, the request was timely. Wis. 48, 48, 18 N.W. 720 (1884). See Eldred v. Becker, 60 In essence, a party could request a change of venue only if the trial judge had not yet decided a contested matter. ¶13 That reasoning has informed both the development of the judicial substitution statute and our interpretation of it. In the statute's initial form, its text reflected our change-ofvenue jurisprudence in that it allowed a party to request a judicial substitution "before the first day of the term of court at which the case is triable or within 10 days after the case is noticed for trial." left open the Wis. Stat. § 261.08 (1971-72). question of whether a party The statute could request a judicial substitution after a judge had ruled on pretrial issues but before the case had been noticed for trial. ¶14 We took up that question in Pure Milk Products Cooperative v. National Farmers Organization, 64 Wis. 2d 241, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974). There, drawing heavily from our change- of-venue jurisprudence, we held that "the legislature could not have intended by the wording of" the substitution statute to allow a party to substitute a judge after "the hearing of a contested motion [that] implicates the merits of the action." Id. at 249. judicial We explained that other jurisdictions with similar substitution substitution request statutes required before "the 9 a party hearing to of file its contested No. preliminary matters." revealed that, in Id. at 248. the 2018AP2142 Our survey of the case law judicial substitution context, a preliminary contested matter is more than just a preliminary issue over which "contest"). the parties disagree (or, literally, Rather, the phrase carries a particular common law meaning referring to a substantive pretrial matter that relates to the "ultimate issues" of the case. v. Galonski, ultimately meaning of 80 Wis. 2d 72, accepted that "preliminary 87, 257 specific See id. at 248-50; Bahr N.W.2d 869 common contested law matters" (1977). meaning in the as We the judicial substitution statute. ¶15 Shortly thereafter, the legislature codified our decision in Pure Milk Products via an amendment to the judicial substitution statute (now Wis. Stat. § 801.58).8 rel. Sielen v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee See State ex Cnty., 176 Wis. 2d 101, 113, 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993) (explaining that this amendment "is a codification" of the court's decision in Pure Milk Products) (quoting State ex rel. Carkel, Inc. v. Cir. Ct. for Lincoln Cnty., 141 Wis. 2d 257, 265, 414 N.W.2d 640 (1987)).9 As amended——and as it reads today——the statute requires a party to file its substitution request before "the hearing of any In 1975, this court renumbered Wis. Stat. § 261.08 as § 801.58. 8 See also See State v. Norwood, 2005 WI App 218, ¶12, 287 Wis. 2d 679, 706 N.W.2d 683; City of LaCrosse v. Jiracek Cos., 108 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 324 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1982); Kroll v. Bartell, 101 Wis. 2d 296, 302, 304 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1981). 9 10 No. preliminary of 1977; contested Wis. Stat. matters." See § 801.58(1). The § 15, 2018AP2142 ch. 135, legislature's Laws adoption verbatim of the phrase "preliminary contested matters" instructs that the phrase means the same thing in § 801.58(1) as it did in Pure Milk Products.10 (explaining which we that are "a See White, significant interested" 385 revision assists in Wis. 2d 320, to the determining language a ¶10 in statute's plain meaning); Strenke, 279 Wis. 2d 52, ¶¶30-31, 39 (holding that when the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to include the common law phrase "disregard of rights," that phrase retained its "specific" common-law meaning). ¶16 In the 41 years since the legislature codified Pure Milk Products, Wisconsin courts have interpreted "preliminary contested matters" consistent with its accepted legal meaning. Pretrial motions that directly implicate the merits of a case, such as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Carkel, 141 Wis. 2d at 261, and a motion to compel discovery, Sielen, 176 Wis. 2d at 113-14, are preliminary contested Indeed, the Judicial Council's note to the 1977 statutes plainly confirms that conclusion: 10 Section 801.58 of the statutes has been changed in a number of significant ways. The statute states that a substitution of judge request in a civil action or proceeding is timely only if made before the hearing of a preliminary contested matter, codifying Pure Milk Products Coop. v. NFO. Judicial Council Note, 1977, Wis. Stat. § 801.58 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Sands v. Whitnall Sch. Dist., 2008 WI 89, ¶27, 312 Wis. 2d 1, 754 N.W.2d 439. 11 No. matters. 2018AP2142 The former implicates a case's merits because, if the circuit court grants the motion, it has decided that there is no claim for it to hear. E.g., PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶¶26-27, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559. The latter implicates the merits because the circuit court could "impose a sanction that precludes a party from submitting any evidence," thus making it impossible for that party to prove the merits of its claim. See Sielen, 176 Wis. 2d at 114. initial commitment regarding proceeding commitment under Similarly, because an decides ch. 51, the ultimate that merits proceeding is a preliminary contested matter for the purposes of a commitment extension proceeding. State ex rel. Serocki v. Cir. Ct. for Clark Cnty., 163 Wis. 2d 152, 159-60, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991). ¶17 Conversely, this court, as well as the court of appeals, has held that procedural issues that have no direct effect on the merits of a case are not preliminary contested matters. to For example, a circuit court judge's decision whether accept a family court commissioner's proposed alimony- modification order, although "not perfunctory" and requiring the judge to "ascertain" the merits of the proposed order, is not a preliminary contested matter under § 801.58(1). State ex rel. Tarney v. McCormack, 99 Wis. 2d 220, 234, 298 N.W.2d 552 (1980). Motions to join additional parties and to intervene are also not preliminary contested matters. Cos., 108 App. 1982) motions to Wis. 2d 684, (allowing join and See City of La Crosse v. Jiracek 688-89, 694-95, substitution intervene). 12 324 requests To be N.W.2d 440 after sure, (Ct. deciding these are No. preliminary matters that parties routinely contest. 2018AP2142 But as our jurisprudence makes clear, they fall outside the accepted legal meaning of "preliminary contested matters." ¶18 Because "preliminary contested matters" has a specific legal meaning, there is no need to parse the phrase's individual words in search of each word's non-technical meaning. Boyer Constr., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶52. See S.J. For the same reason, it matters not whether either party in fact contested a preliminary matter. Instead, we treat the phrase "preliminary contested matters" as one unit with a specific legal meaning: a substantive issue that goes to the ultimate merits of a case. B ¶19 We next analyze what it means for there to be "the hearing of" preliminary contested matters. The State urges that Matthews' substitution request is untimely because he filed it after appearing at what was set as a contested probable cause hearing. According to the State, it is irrelevant whether the circuit court actually reached the substance of the merits issue at that hearing. ¶20 favor Our decisions in Tarney and Serocki, however, strongly Matthews' argument that there is no "hearing of" a preliminary contested matter until the circuit court in fact hears such a matter. In Tarney, we explained that § 801.58(1) requires a party to file its substitution request "before the judge has heard" a preliminary contested matter. at 234 Serocki, (emphasis added). concluding that We a reiterated party 13 must that request 99 Wis. 2d position in substitution No. 2018AP2142 "before the circuit court reaches a substantive issue." Wis. 2d at 156 substantive issue. (emphasis issue added). without first A judge "hearing" cannot 163 "reach" arguments on a that Merely scheduling a hearing about a substantive issue is insufficient. ¶21 See Eldred, 60 Wis. at 48. Our conclusion underlying § 801.58(1). policy is to "handling" a prevent is consistent with the policy As we stated in Carkel, the statute's a party preliminary unhappy contested with matter how from a judge requesting is a different judge "simply because the litigant believes things are going badly." 141 Wis. 2d at 265 (quoted source omitted). That is, a party may not "'test the waters' with a particular judge before requesting substitution." (quoting Carkel, Wis. at 555. 141 Wis. 2d Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 156 at 265); see also Swineford, 16 But a judge must first hear a substantive issue—— not just schedule to hear one——before a party has tested the proverbial waters. ¶22 The bottom line is that whether a party has timely filed its judicial substitution request turns on what issues a circuit court has already heard. judge schedules whether a Accordingly, to party we hear a preliminary actually hold that It is irrelevant whether a contests a party's a contested matter preliminary substitution or issue. request is timely if it is made before a judge in fact hears a substantive issue that goes to the ultimate merits of the case. 14 No. 2018AP2142 C ¶23 Turning to the facts in this case, we conclude that the circuit court heard no preliminary contested matter prior to Matthews' filing his judicial substitution request. By the time Matthews filed his request on August 29, the circuit court had addressed only his motion to adjourn the August 15 hearing. At that hearing, although it was "set as a contested probable cause hearing," no party "presented its views" on whether the State had probable cause to commit Matthews. at 265. Cf. Carkel, 141 Wis. 2d Rather, the entire discussion revolved around Matthews' motion to adjourn. The circuit court's decision to grant the motion had no effect on the ultimate merits of whether Matthews is a subject for commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Matthews' waiver of his right to have a probable cause hearing within 10 days of his release from prison was part and parcel of his motion to adjourn. conclusion, a It was not, contrary to the circuit court's standalone substantive issue affected the presentation" of his case. that "directly Accordingly, Matthews timely requested a judicial substitution. III ¶24 judicial Under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1), a party timely files a substitution request if, prior to that filing, circuit court has heard no preliminary contested matter. phrase "preliminary contested matter" has an accepted the The legal meaning that refers to a substantive issue that goes to the ultimate merits of the case. heard no such matter prior Here, because the circuit court to 15 Matthews filing his judicial substitution request, his request was timely. No. 2018AP2142 We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause for further proceedings. By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 16 is No. 1 2018AP2142
Primary Holding

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the ruling of the circuit court concluding that Defendant's request for a judicial substitution under Wis. Stat. 801.58(1) was untimely filed, holding that Defendant's substitution request was timely.


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