OLR v. Stanley Woodard

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2012 WI 41 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: COMPLETE TITLE: OF WISCONSIN 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stanley v. Woodard, Attorney At Law. Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, Complainant, v. Stanley V. Woodard, Respondent. In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stanley V. Woodard, Attorney at Law. Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. Stanley V. Woodard, Respondent. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WOODARD OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: April 27, 2012 2012 WI 41 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stanley V. Woodard, Attorney At Law. Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, Complainant, FILED APR 27, 2012 v. Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Supreme Court Stanley V. Woodard, Respondent. In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stanley V. Woodard, Attorney at Law. Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. Stanley V. Woodard, Respondent. ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding. upon conditions. Reinstatement granted Nos. ¶1 PER CURIAM. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D We review the report and recommendation of the referee, Lisa C. Goldman, that the license of Attorney Stanley V. reinstated Woodard with to practice certain law specified in Wisconsin conditions.1 should After be fully reviewing this matter, we agree with the referee that Attorney Woodard's license should be reinstated and that conditions should be placed upon his practice of law in this state. We conclude, however, that the referee's suggested conditions on Attorney Woodard's return to strengthened and clarified. Woodard should be the practice of law must be We also determine that Attorney required to pay the costs of this reinstatement proceeding, which were $5,263.16 as of October 17, 2011. ¶2 The standards that apply to all petitions seeking reinstatement after a disciplinary suspension or revocation are set forth in SCR 22.31(1).2 In particular, the petitioning 1 Because neither party appealed from the referee's report and recommendation, our review proceeds under SCR 22.33(3), which provides that "[i]f no appeal is timely filed, the supreme court shall review the referee's report, order reinstatement, with or without conditions, deny reinstatement, or order the parties to file briefs in the matter." 2 SCR 22.31(1) states: The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating, by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, all of the following: (a) That he or she has the moral character to practice law in Wisconsin. 2 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D attorney must demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he or she has the moral character necessary to practice law in this state, that his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of the public interest, and that the attorney has complied fully with the terms of the suspension or revocation addition, petition order SCR for and the 22.31(1)(c) requirements incorporates reinstatement SCR 22.29(4)(a)-[(4m)].3 must Thus, the of the SCR 22.26. statements contain petitioning In that a pursuant to attorney must (b) That his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of the public interest. (c) That his or her representations in the petition, including the representations required by SCR 22.29(4)(a) to [(4m)] and 22.29(5), are substantiated. (d) That he or she has complied fully with the terms of the order of suspension or revocation and with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 3 SCR 22.29(4)(a) through (4m) provides that a petition for reinstatement shall show all of the following: (a) The petitioner desires petitioner's license reinstated. to have the (b) The petitioner has not practiced law during the period of suspension or revocation. (c) The petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the order of suspension or revocation and will continue to comply with them until the petitioner's license is reinstated. 3 Nos. demonstrate that the 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D required representations in the reinstatement petition are substantiated. ¶3 report. The following facts are taken from the referee's No party has alleged that any of these factual findings are erroneous. (d) The petitioner has maintained competence and learning in the law by attendance at identified educational activities. (e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. (f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards. (g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the courts. (h) The petitioner has fully complied requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. with the (j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license if reinstated. (k) A full description of all of the petitioner's business activities during the period of suspension or revocation. (4m) The petitioner has made restitution to or settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by petitioner's misconduct, including reimbursement to the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection for all payments made from that fund, or, if not, the petitioner's explanation of the failure or inability to do so. 4 Nos. ¶4 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D Attorney Woodard was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 1977. He held a number of different positions during the time that he possessed an active license to practice law. He was a staff attorney for Legal Action of Wisconsin, a staff attorney with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and an assistant district attorney in Milwaukee County. After a two-year stint in private practice, Attorney Woodard spent eight years in the Madison office of the State Public Defender. He then worked in his own firm for approximately three years. ¶5 Attorney Woodard has an extensive disciplinary history that includes six separate impositions of public discipline over an 11-year period. ¶6 Attorney Woodard's first disciplinary matters resulted in public reprimands in 1985 and 1986 for neglecting client matters, failing to respond promptly to requests for information from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), the predecessor failing to to deposit the Office client of funds Lawyer in a Regulation trust (OLR); account; and misrepresenting the location of those client funds. ¶7 In 1989 Attorney Woodard's license was suspended for a period of 60 days due to his failure to file income tax returns and his failure to respond Department of Revenue. to inquiries from BAPR and the In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 150 Wis. 2d 594, 441 N.W.2d 750 (1989). ¶8 In 1994 this license for three years. five separate clients court suspended Attorney Woodard's His misconduct in that case involved and stemmed 5 from (1) assisting the Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D girlfriend of a client to violate the terms of the girlfriend's probation by delivering two packages from the girlfriend to the client in jail, one of which contained dangerous, banned material; (2) failing to attend to client matters; (3) failing to prepare for trial; (4) failing to act with diligence; (5) failing return to a keep a client's client file properly upon informed; request; (7) (6) failing failing to to refund unearned fees; (8) failing to appear at scheduled court hearings in three criminal matters; and (9) failing to cooperate with BAPR's investigations. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 183 Wis. 2d 575, 515 N.W.2d 700 (1994). In this 1994 proceeding, Attorney Woodard submitted a psychiatrist's report that stated that Attorney Woodard suffered from major depression and dysthymia.4 The referee found that Attorney Woodard did suffer from those conditions, but concluded that they did not cause his that the incapacity misconduct and disciplinary proceeding proceeding. recommendation that rejected the The Attorney be court reinstatement Woodard's converted to adopted the referee's Attorney Woodard's of a request medical license should be conditioned on Attorney Woodard establishing that he no longer suffers from the medical incapacity that he had asserted in the proceeding. Id., 183 Wis. 2d at 585-86. Attorney Woodard's license has not been reinstated since the time of this order. 4 Dysthymia has been defined as "morbid anxiety and depression accompanied by obsession." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary Unabridged 712 (1981). 6 Nos. ¶9 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D This court imposed another one-year suspension in 1995 for Attorney Woodard's misconduct in two more representations. His misconduct in those matters included failing to return a client's file, communicate failing with a to refund client unearned about not fees, failing pursuing a to criminal sentencing matter and not refunding a portion of the fees, and failing to communicate investigations. with BAPR in response to its In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 190 Wis. 2d 487, 526 N.W.2d 510 (1995). ¶10 After successfully Attorney defend Woodard against stated BAPR's that he allegations could not of additional misconduct, this court granted Attorney Woodard's petition for the consensual revocation of his Wisconsin Disciplinary in 1996. In re license to practice Proceedings Woodard, 200 Wis. 2d 66, 546 N.W.2d 162 (1996). misconduct in that proceeding included law in Against His admitted using client trust account funds to pay for personal expenses, failing to maintain required trust account records, failing to document the purpose of trust account checks made payable to himself, and failing to account to a client for funds that Attorney Woodard had received and disbursed on the client's behalf. ¶11 Since the revocation of his law Woodard has worked in a number of jobs. license, Attorney He has taught at a local college, worked for the Boys and Girls Club, and worked for the position University was with of the Wisconsin. University His of Wisconsin program, where he worked for three years. 7 second most-recent Family Voices His current position Nos. is the program director Center in Madison. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D for the Lussier Community Education He has also volunteered with a number of community organizations. ¶12 concerns The referee's report discussed a number of issues and regarding Attorney Woodard's practice of law in this state. to practice law is a reinstatement to the She noted that having a license privilege that demands behavior above reproach so that an attorney can be trusted and respected by members of the community. She pointed out that Attorney Woodard's prior conduct had not met that standard, as he had engaged in "dishonest, arrogant and criminal behavior." Specifically, she noted that Attorney Woodard had on multiple occasions taken money that did not belong to him and had refused to have meaningful financial issues. discussions with his clients regarding Moreover, Attorney Woodard had abused his special status as an attorney to gain access to inmates in the jail when he had carried dangerous, banned items into the jail, which could have led to catastrophic results. ¶13 The referee contrasted the conduct that resulted in Attorney Woodard's multiple suspensions and revocation with his conduct since the revocation of his law license in 1996. She stated that since that time Attorney Woodard "has engaged in many activities demonstrated by that good show a genuine conduct." He desire has to maintained employment to contribute to his family's income. excelled as a volunteer for various causes. live a life steady He has also Indeed, the referee noted that Attorney Woodard had received awards from a number of 8 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D volunteer and community organizations, including, among others, the American Red Cross, the Madison Urban Ministry, the NAACP, and the Boys and Girls Club of Dane County. In addition, Attorney Woodard submitted a host of letters from other lawyers and members of the community that spoke highly of his legal abilities and his volunteer contributions. ¶14 by The referee also addressed a couple of concerns raised the Office of Lawyer of the matter. Woodard had faced consideration Attorney Regulation First, the need (OLR) the to and repay own noted referee her that multiple debts stemming from his actions prior to the revocation of his law license and otherwise. ¶15 Although this court's prior disciplinary orders did not expressly require Attorney Woodard to pay restitution, there were three former clients to whom Attorney Woodard owed money. The referee found that two of the clients had forgiven Attorney Woodard's hearing debts. in favor One of such the client even reinstatement spoke of at the Attorney public Woodard's license. ¶16 The third former client, R.F., had apparently not forgiven Attorney Woodard's debt nor had Attorney Woodard repaid the debt to R.F. prior to seeking reinstatement. The referee indicated that she was wary of Attorney Woodard's handling of this matter. Rather than fully repay the debt, which the referee believed was at least $1,500, or make arrangements to repay the debt over time, Attorney Woodard had recently sent a check for $500 to R.F. with a notation on the check and in a 9 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D letter that the check would be a full and final settlement. R.F. cashed the check but also sent a letter disputing that the $500 payment had constituted a final settlement of the debt. R.F. did not appear at the reinstatement hearing or send a letter to the referee, however, to contend that Attorney Woodard still owed him any money. Ultimately, although the referee questioned whether Attorney Woodard's attempt to have a partial payment constitute a final settlement of a debt to a client missed the need to demonstrate good conduct, the referee did not believe that this situation required that Attorney Woodard's reinstatement petition be denied. ¶17 The referee also discussed the condition on Attorney Woodard's reinstatement suspension order. to have his that incapacity" he forth in this court's 1994 Specifically, this court ruled that in order license "establish set he reinstated, Attorney Woodard no suffers from longer asserted in (depression and dysthymia). that needed the disciplinary to medical proceeding The referee properly stated that Attorney Woodard bore the burden to prove this fact by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. ¶18 The referee noted that Attorney Woodard had presented only a single letter from a social worker, which stated that Attorney Woodard no longer suffers from depression or dysthymia to a degree which would render him incapable of performing the duties of an attorney. The referee concluded that Attorney Woodard really needed to show that he was "fit" to resume the practice of law. Although the referee acknowledged that this 10 Nos. was not a medical 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D incapacity reinstatement proceeding, she pointed to SCR 22.36, which relates to reinstatement following a medical incapacity suspension, as a basis to conclude that "fit" is "sufficiently broad to imply render competent legal services; a state that of to is, preparedness be to prepared to provide the measure of expertise to ensure the attorney may be safely recommended to the community as a person to be consulted by and to represent others in legal matters." In re Medical Incapacity Proceedings Against Schlieve, 2010 WI 22, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 654, 780 N.W.2d 516. The referee concluded that an opinion from a psychiatrist or a psychologist regarding the lack of any medical incapacity was not required to show such a state of preparedness, especially where the OLR had not disputed the current lack of a medical incapacity or objected to the referee relying on the opinion of the social worker. The referee emphasized that the OLR had agreed that if Attorney Woodard had been suffering from a major clinical depression, he would not have been able to hold the employment positions he has held in recent years. Consequently, the referee concluded that Attorney Woodard had sufficiently demonstrated that he no longer suffers from a medical incapacity related to a major depression or dysthymia. ¶19 Ultimately, after considering the documentary materials in the reinstatement file and the testimony submitted at the reinstatement hearing, the referee concluded that Attorney Woodard had complied with each of this court's prior disciplinary orders and the requirements imposed by SCR 22.26 on 11 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D individuals whose licenses to practice law in Wisconsin have been suspended or revoked. Attorney Woodard had The referee further concluded that satisfied all of the criteria for reinstatement set forth in SCR 22.29. ¶20 Although the referee recommended that Attorney Woodard's license to practice law in this state be reinstated, she also recommended that three conditions be imposed on his return to the practice of law. Attorney Woodard Wisconsin be Lawyers First, she recommended that required Assistance to contact Program the (WisLAP) State and Bar's obtain a mentor attorney to assist him for the first two years following reinstatement. ¶21 Second, she suggested that Attorney Woodard be required to obtain further continuing legal education regarding appropriate fee agreements and the requirements for maintaining a client trust account. She noted that many of the trust account rules have changed significantly since Attorney Woodard last practiced law. Since this was an area in which Attorney Woodard previously failed to meet his requirements, she believed that such required education would be appropriate to protect the public from "negligent office management mistakes." ¶22 be Finally, the referee recommended that Attorney Woodard required to provide quarterly trust account and business accounting records to the OLR for a period of two years. records should received and show where what such advance client fees funds Attorney were These Woodard deposited. has The records to be provided should also include copies of Attorney 12 Nos. Woodard's fee 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D agreements with all standards for of our his privately retained clients. ¶23 The review of reinstatement proceedings are similar to the standards we use for reviewing referee reports in disciplinary proceedings. We do not overturn a referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. On the other hand, we review a referee's legal conclusions, including whether the attorney has satisfied the criteria for reinstatement, on a de novo basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jennings, 2011 WI 45, ¶39, 334 Wis. 2d 335, 801 N.W.2d 304; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gral, 2010 WI 14, ¶22, 323 Wis. 2d 280, 779 N.W.2d 168. ¶24 As referee's noted above, factual recommendation. neither party findings, After thoroughly has legal conclusions, reviewing accept the referee's findings of fact. challenged this matter, the or we There is no dispute regarding generally what has occurred since the revocation of Attorney Woodard's license to practice law in Wisconsin in 1996. The evidence submitted shows that Attorney Woodard has been a productive member of the community and has engaged in extensive volunteer work. ¶25 We do find it necessary, portions of the referee's report. however, to address two First, in our 1994 decision suspending Attorney Woodard's license for three years, we did not transform that disciplinary proceeding into a medical incapacity proceeding, but we did condition the reinstatement of Attorney Woodard's license to practice law in Wisconsin on his 13 Nos. demonstration incapacity that he no (depression proceeding. longer and Attorney 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D suffers dysthymia) Woodard's from he the medical alleged license that never has in been reinstated since the time of that 1994 decision. Thus, he was required reinstatement to satisfy that condition in this proceeding. ¶26 The referee questioned evidence was sufficient to whether satisfy Attorney this Woodard's condition since, although he offered evidence from community members and other lawyers that he currently was capable of practicing law, the only evidence he presented depression or dysthymia was worker. The psychologist or referee that a he letter concluded psychiatrist no longer from that regarding a an the suffers clinical opinion existence from social from or a non- existence of a medical incapacity was not required, and that the social worker's opinion was sufficient. ¶27 We need not decide whether a social worker is qualified to render an opinion regarding the presence or absence of medical/psychological conditions such as depression or dysthymia, and the impact of such conditions on an individual's ability to practice law. Here, the OLR did not object to the referee's reliance on the social worker's opinion and conceded that Attorney Woodard had satisfied the condition, in part by the evidence since the of time his of holding his responsible suspension and employment subsequent positions revocation. Moreover, the OLR did not appeal from the referee's report and recommendation. Thus, given the OLR's concession, we conclude 14 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D that Attorney Woodard has sufficiently demonstrated that he no longer suffers raised as a from the medical/psychological potential basis for conditions incapacity in the he 1994 disciplinary proceeding. ¶28 to his The second item we address is Attorney Woodard's debt former client R.F. R.F. was a grievant in Attorney Woodard's prior disciplinary proceedings. one of See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 190 Wis. 2d at 490-92. In that proceeding, Attorney Woodard and BAPR stipulated that R.F. had paid $3,000 to Attorney Woodard. There was, however, a disagreement as to what the $3,000 was supposed to cover. believed that the $3,000 was a flat fee that R.F. covered representation for both his sentencing hearing and any appeal. The stipulation states that Attorney Woodard sent a letter to R.F. stating that the $3,000 covered only the sentencing hearing and his review of the trial transcripts for any appellate issues, but not the actual prosecution of any appeal. In any event, it is undisputed that Attorney Woodard did not go forward with any appeal on R.F.'s behalf. the court concluded that Attorney Based on this stipulation, Woodard had, among other things, failed to communicate with his client, failed to give notice that he was not pursuing an appeal on R.F.'s behalf, and failed to refund an unearned advance payment of fees. At that time, however, this court did not impose a specific restitution obligation on Attorney Woodard. ¶29 imposed Whether or not a restitution obligation is explicitly in a disciplinary opinion 15 and order, SCR 22.29(4m) Nos. requires that an attorney 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D petitioning for reinstatement must show by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney has made restitution to or settled the claims of all persons who were injured or harmed by the attorney's misconduct, or to provide an explanation for the failure to do so. ¶30 Here the referee found that there was a minimum debt of $1,500 owed by Attorney Woodard to R.F. This is supported by Attorney Woodard's acknowledgement at the reinstatement hearing that he did receive $1,500 from R.F., that he never pursued an appeal on R.F.'s behalf, and that he owed R.F. $1,500. other hand, Attorney Woodard testified at the On the reinstatement hearing that he disputed R.F.'s claims that Attorney Woodard had received more than $1,500 to $2,500. $1,500 and still owed him anywhere from Attorney Woodard claimed that he had received only $1,500 as a flat fee and that R.F. was supposed to pay an additional $3,000 for the cost of obtaining trial transcripts, but never did so. ¶31 In any event, rather than return even the $1,500 that he had admittedly received from R.F. and owed to him or make arrangements to pay that amount over time, Attorney Woodard attempted to avoid paying a large portion of the debt by sending a $500 partial payment to R.F. with a notation on the check and in a separate letter stating that the payment constituted a full and final settlement of the matter. R.F. cashed the check sent by Attorney Woodard, but also responded in a subsequent letter that he disputed that the $500 settlement of the full debt. 16 payment constituted a final Nos. ¶32 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D Attorney Woodard claimed at the reinstatement hearing that he viewed R.F.'s cashing of his $500 check as an accord and satisfaction, which would appear to constitute a "settlement" of the claim of a person harmed by Attorney Woodard's misconduct under SCR 22.29(4m). We choose not to decide in this reinstatement proceeding, however, whether the cashing of the check constituted a valid accord and satisfaction, and thus a "settlement" for purposes of SCR 22.29(4m). ¶33 Even if Attorney Woodard's partial payment legally constitutes an accord and satisfaction, we are troubled by this attempt after more than 15 years of non-action and on the eve of a reinstatement proceeding to avoid making full restitution through sending a check to an unrepresented former client with a notation of a full and final settlement in order to claim an accord and satisfaction in the reinstatement proceeding. All attorneys have a professional obligation, in exchange for being granted the privilege to practice law in this state, to put the interests of their clients above their own interests. This includes putting the client's interest in receiving a refund of an unearned fee above the lawyer's own financial interests. This is a precept that Attorney Woodard will have to follow as he returns to the practice of law. ¶34 Although obligation in the require Attorney payment to stipulation R.F. in this court original Woodard as the a to did impose disciplinary make condition original not of an his restitution proceeding, additional disciplinary 17 a we now restitution reinstatement. proceeding The provided Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D that Attorney Woodard had received $3,000 and had provided some services to R.F. by representing him at his sentencing hearing. On the other hand, Attorney Woodard now essentially claims that he agreed to the stipulation in the original disciplinary case only due to his depressed state at the time and that he actually received only $1,500 from R.F. receive only $1,500 from Even if Attorney Woodard did R.F. and did represent him at the sentencing hearing, we now conclude that Attorney Woodard should return that entire amount as a condition of his reinstatement. Because he has already sent a $500 payment to R.F., we will require him to make an additional payment of $1,000 to R.F. consider this additional restitution payment as We satisfying Attorney Woodard's obligation under SCR 22.29(4m). ¶35 Having resolved these two matters, we conclude that the facts as found by the referee support the legal conclusion that Attorney Woodard has satisfied the criteria for the reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin by clear and convincing evidence. ¶36 Although we determine that Attorney Woodard has now satisfied the criteria for reinstatement, we agree with the referee that some additional conditions on Attorney Woodard's return to the practice of law are appropriate. We are particularly concerned about Attorney Woodard's stated intention to practice by himself in his own law firm or in conjunction with just his wife. As the referee noted, the rules regarding the handling of client trust funds and advance fees have changed considerably in the more than 15 years that have passed since 18 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D Attorney Woodard last practiced law. Moreover, much of Attorney Woodard's misconduct involved violations of the rules governing client trust accounts and the financial side of attorney/client relationships. We are not convinced that allowing Attorney Woodard to practice by himself in his own firm with only an outside mentor attorney ensures Attorney or with Woodard's practice of law. just successful his wife sufficiently reintegration into the Consequently, we determine that in order to ensure that Attorney Woodard does not lapse into a repetition of the misconduct that led to his suspension and revocation, his first three years of practice following reinstatement should be in a law firm or organization where he is subject to the direct supervision of another attorney. the temptation between of spouses merely rather Further, in order to eliminate relying than on providing the trust direct that exists supervision, we further direct that the supervising attorney must be someone other than Attorney Woodard's spouse. We also agree with the referee that continuing legal education regarding fee agreements and client Attorney trust Woodard accounts must is appropriate. complete seven (7) We hours clarify of that classes dealing with those topics, as well as the subject of law office management. We also clarify the items that Attorney Woodard must disclose to the OLR. ¶37 Finally, we turn to the issue of the costs of this reinstatement proceeding. Attorney Woodard has not filed an objection to the OLR's statement of costs, and we do not find a basis to depart from our general practice of imposing full costs 19 Nos. in both disciplinary 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D and reinstatement proceedings. Consequently, we impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Woodard. ¶38 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for reinstatement of the license of Stanley V. Woodard to practice law in Wisconsin is granted, effective the date of this order. ¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the reinstatement of Stanley V. Woodard's license to practice law is subject to the following conditions: A. During the first three-year period after his reinstatement, Attorney Woodard shall practice law in Wisconsin only in a law firm or organizational setting and shall be subject to the direct supervisory authority of a supervising attorney, who shall not be his spouse, pursuant to the requirements of SCR 20:5.1(b). B. Within six months following reinstatement, Attorney Woodard shall attend a minimum of seven (7) hours of continuing legal client education trust concerning account the subjects management, and of law fee agreements, office management. Attorney Woodard shall provide certificates of attendance for such seminars to the Office of Lawyer Regulation. C. For a period of two years following reinstatement, Attorney Woodard shall, on a quarterly basis, provide or open for inspection account and to the Office business of accounting Woodard's practice of law. Lawyer records Regulation related to all trust Attorney Such records shall show, among other things, what advance fees or client funds have been received by 20 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D Attorney Woodard, where such advance fees or client funds have been deposited, and whether such advance fees or client funds have been disbursed and to whom they have been disbursed. records shall include copies of all client retainer or Such fee agreements negotiated or executed by Attorney Woodard. ¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 90 days of the date of this order, Stanley V. Woodard shall pay restitution to R.F. in the additional amount of $1,000 and shall provide evidence of such payment additional to the restitution Office of payment Lawyer is not Regulation. paid within If this the time specified, the Office of Lawyer Regulation is authorized to move this court for a further suspension of the license of Stanley V. Woodard to practice law in Wisconsin. ¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 120 days of the date of this order, Stanley V. Woodard shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. If the costs are not paid within the time specified and Stanley V. Woodard has not negotiated a resolution as to the payment of the costs over time with the Office of Lawyer Regulation, the Office of Lawyer Regulation is authorized to move this court for a further suspension of the license of Stanley V. Woodard to practice law in Wisconsin. ¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the $1,000 additional restitution payment to R.F. shall be paid prior to the payment of the costs of this proceeding. 21 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D 22 Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D 1