Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Robert H. Paul

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2007 WI 11 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: OF WISCONSIN 2006AP2132-D COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Robert H. Paul , Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. Robert H. Paul, Respondent. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PAUL OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: NOT PARTICIPATING: ATTORNEYS: January 23, 2007 2007 WI 11 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2006AP2132-D STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Robert H. Paul, Attorney at Law: FILED Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, JAN 23, 2007 v. A. John Voelker Acting Clerk of Supreme Court Robert H. Paul, Respondent. ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license suspended. ¶1 PER Attorney (OLR) CURIAM. Robert H. pursuant 1 to We review Paul and SCR the 22.121 the Office stipulation of concerning SCR 22.12 states in relevant part: Lawyer filed by Regulation Attorney Paul's Stipulation (1) The director may file with the complaint a stipulation of the director and the respondent to the facts, conclusions of law regarding misconduct, and discipline to be imposed. The supreme court may consider the complaint and stipulation without the appointment of a referee. No. 2006AP2132-D professional misconduct in his handling of personal injury and worker's compensation actions. The parties stipulated that the appropriate discipline to impose is the suspension of Attorney Paul's license to practice law in Wisconsin for 60 days. ¶2 We approve this stipulation and adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law. Attorney license Paul's to misconduct practice law. We agree that the seriousness of warrants We the also suspension accept the of his parties' stipulation that a 60-day suspension is appropriate discipline. We further agree that Attorney Paul should be required to pay the costs of the proceeding, which are $472.20 as of November 6, 2006. ¶3 Attorney Wisconsin in 1998. Paul was admitted to practice law in He currently resides in Chicago, Illinois. His license to practice law has been suspended since June 6, 2005, due to his failure to comply with mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) requirements. ¶4 The parties' eight counts stipulation representation of D.T. all of misconduct arise out detailed of Attorney in the Paul's In March 2000 D.T. retained Attorney Paul to represent her in a personal injury action and a worker's compensation December claim 1999 Wisconsin. from resulting a horse from at injuries Heartland she sustained Stables in in Custer, The stables were owned and operated by William and (2) If the supreme court approves a stipulation, it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law and impose the stipulated discipline. 2 No. Elizabeth Foss. 2006AP2132-D D.T.'s medical expenses exceeded $100,000. The worker's compensation claim was based on the theory that D.T., who was a college student at the time, worked at Heartland Stables in lieu of paying board for her two horses. ¶5 In August 2000 Attorney Paul filed a personal injury suit on D.T.'s behalf against the Fosses and Heartland Stables. Discovery was conducted. she was aware of the At D.T.'s deposition she acknowledged statutory notices regarding an equine owner's liability that were posted at the stables. ¶6 In employer's July 2001 claim Development, Attorney form" Worker's Paul with the Compensation filed D.T.'s Department Division. "uninsured of In Workforce his letter, Attorney Paul stated that a stipulation had been entered in the personal injury suit because the equine statute meant that D.T. did not have a claim against the Fosses for personal injury liability. ¶7 On In fact, no such stipulation had been entered. August 22, 2001, the personal injury suit was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation signed by Attorney Paul, acting on D.T.'s behalf, on August 14, 2001. Attorney Paul did not seek D.T.'s permission prior to signing this stipulation, did not inform her that he had filed the stipulation dismissing her case, and did not provide her with a copy of the stipulation. ¶8 In correspondence dated December 17, 2002, Attorney Paul advised the worker's compensation division that the insurer had denied D.T.'s claims for injuries and he requested a hearing on whether D.T. was employed at the stables and was paid more 3 No. 2006AP2132-D than $500 per quarter at the time of the accident. Attorney Paul did not inform D.T. that the insurer had denied her claim. ¶9 Paul Between December 17, 2002, and June 12, 2003, Attorney provided medical the bills, representing worker's sent the a compensation medical uninsured division authorization employer's fund, with to and D.T.'s the firm provided the worker's compensation division with a breakdown of medical costs related to D.T.'s injuries. representing the uninsured In May and June 2003 the firm employer's fund wrote to Attorney Paul requesting that D.T. sign a consent and authorization of disclosure of confidential information form, provide a list of medical providers Attorney failed form Paul failed to timely and to an employment timely provide D.T. respond with to the authorization those forms form. letters and she was to complete. The firm representing the fund wrote to Attorney Paul again September in and October 2003 requesting information. Attorney Paul failed to respond. ¶10 wrote to On November 7, 2003, the firm representing the fund the worker's compensation division asking that the matter be dismissed due to D.T.'s failure to cooperate with the fund's investigation. On November 19, 2003, the administrative law judge (ALJ) advised Attorney Paul to respond or he would assume that Attorney Paul did not object to the dismissal of the case. Attorney Paul responded to the request on December 3, 2003. ¶11 Due to D.T.'s inability to communicate with Attorney Paul, D.T. scheduled a meeting with Attorney Paul and her uncle, 4 No. W.G. 2006AP2132-D At the meeting Attorney Paul discussed with D.T. and W.G. the need to prove D.T. had received sufficient compensation to qualify for provided worker's Attorney During the compensation Paul meeting with Attorney benefits. names Paul D.T. and contact informed W.G. and W.G. information. that he "was working on getting the worker's comp case approved and hoped that would be faster than the PI case." Attorney Paul did not inform personal injury the dated D.T. or W.G. that the suit had been dismissed. ¶12 In correspondence to OLR June 20, 2005, Attorney Paul denied that he discussed the personal injury case with W.G. during the 2003 meeting. Attorney Paul also informed the OLR he did not hear from either W.G. or D.T. after leaving a message for W.G. following the 2003 meeting. However, after the meeting W.G. made six or eight phone calls to Attorney Paul, leaving messages with D.T.'s phone number and asking Attorney Paul to contact D.T. Attorney Paul failed to contact D.T. after receiving those messages. Between April and August 2004 D.T. attempted to contact Attorney Paul on numerous occasions and left him numerous detailed phone messages but could never reach him. ¶13 assist D.T. her in contacted attempting Attorney to Christopher reach Attorney Van Wagner Paul. to Between September 27, 2004, and October 6, 2004, Attorney Van Wagner attempted to contact Attorney received a return phone call. Paul by telephone but never On September 30, 2004, Attorney Van Wagner e-mailed Attorney Paul at the e-mail address listed 5 No. 2006AP2132-D for him in the 2004 State of Wisconsin bar directory. Attorney Paul responded by telephone to Attorney Van Wagner by stating that "he had closed up shop, and that he was now living in Illinois during the week to assist his ailing father." Attorney Paul had not informed D.T. that he had moved to Illinois. ¶14 D.T.'s Attorney Paul informed Attorney Van Wagner that after deposition injury action. the circuit court threw out her personal At first Attorney Paul indicated the dismissal had been involuntary but he later retracted that statement and said the case had been voluntarily dismissed. This was the first time D.T. learned that her personal injury suit had been dismissed. ¶15 In an October 7, 2004 e-mail to D.T., Attorney Van Wagner recounted his conversation with Attorney Paul, saying Attorney Paul asserted that the worker's compensation claim had been denied due to questions about whether or not D.T. was working at the stables at the time of the injury; that Attorney Paul said he decision; and Van Wagner he rehearing. had appealed that had to the Attorney lost the Paul appeal State and later and was was awaiting informed going to a Attorney seek a Attorney Paul never advised D.T. that the worker's compensation claim had been denied, that he appealed and lost, or that he was seeking a rehearing. ¶16 In November 2004 D.T. sent Attorney Paul a certified letter requesting her file. The letter was returned because Attorney Paul did not sign for it. 6 No. ¶17 2006AP2132-D The worker's compensation division scheduled a hearing in D.T.'s case for January 18, 2005. By letter dated November 12, 2004, the division notified Attorney Paul and D.T. of the hearing date. Attorney Paul took no action on D.T.'s worker's compensation claim between December 3, 2003, and December 17, 2004. On December 17, 2004, the ALJ assigned to D.T.'s case dismissed it without prejudice due to lack of prosecution and the department's inability to contact either D.T. or Attorney Paul. Attorney Paul failed to notify D.T. of the dismissal. ¶18 D.T.'s On December 20, 2004, Attorney Lisa Pierobon Mays, as successor compensation counsel, division, D.T.'s file. sent signed by a letter D.T., to the requesting a worker's copy of On December 21, 2004, Attorney Paul faxed a copy of an e-mail to the ALJ which he asserted he had sent to the ALJ on December 7, 2004. In the letter Attorney Paul apologized for the to ALJ's inability reach him, indicated his father had suffered a medical emergency, and provided his Illinois contact information. ¶19 2004 On January 3, 2005, the ALJ rescinded the December 17, order, dismissing the worker's compensation nonprosecution and reinstated D.T.'s application. case for In January 2005 Attorney Mays e-mailed Attorney Paul notifying him about D.T.'s decision to hire Attorney Mays. D.T.'s file. Attorney Mays requested Attorney Paul failed to contact either D.T. or Attorney Mays. ¶20 On March 18, 2005, D.T. sent Attorney Paul a certified letter again requesting her file. 7 Attorney Paul again failed to No. respond. 2006AP2132-D On April 21, 2005, after receiving correspondence from the OLR, Attorney Paul forwarded D.T.'s file to Attorney Mays. Due to Attorney Paul's failure to pursue D.T.'s claims, Attorney Paul caused a delay resulting in D.T.'s medical providers filing suit against her for her medical bills, which resulted in the possibility of D.T. filing for bankruptcy, as well as a delay in her ability to obtain additional surgery for her injuries. ¶21 misconduct The parties' stipulation sets forth eight counts of with respect to Attorney Paul's representation of D.T.: COUNT ONE: [Attorney] Paul failed to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued, in violation of SCR 20:1.2(a).2 COUNT TWO: [Attorney] Paul failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).3 2 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides: Scope of representation (a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall inform a client of all offers of settlement and abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case or any proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 3 SCR 20:1.4(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." 8 No. 2006AP2132-D COUNT THREE: [Attorney] Paul failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a). COUNT FOUR: matter to the the client to representation, [Attorney] Paul failed to explain a extent reasonably necessary to permit make informed decisions regarding the in violation of SCR [20:]1.4(b).4 COUNT FIVE: [Attorney] Paul failed, upon termination of representation, to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).5 COUNT SIX: [Attorney] Paul knowingly made a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, in violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).6 COUNT SEVEN: [Attorney] Paul engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 7 misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 4 SCR 20:1.4(b) states that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 5 SCR 20:1.16(d) representation provides: Declining or terminating (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 6 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly "make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal." 9 No. 2006AP2132-D COUNT EIGHT: [Attorney] Paul in the course of the investigation, made a misrepresentation in a 8 disclosure, in violation of SCRs 20:8.4(f) and 22.03(6).9 ¶22 As noted above, the stipulation states that the parties agree that an appropriate level of discipline is a 60day suspension of Attorney Paul's license to practice law in Wisconsin. The stipulation states that its terms bargained for or negotiated between the parties. were not Attorney Paul represents that he fully understands the misconduct allegations, he fully understands the ramifications should the court impose the stipulated level of discipline, he fully understands his right to contest the matter, he fully understands his right to consult with and retain counsel, and his entry into the stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily. ¶23 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law to which the parties have stipulated concerning Attorney Paul's professional misconduct. We determine that the seriousness of the the misconduct warrants suspension of Attorney Paul's 7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 8 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers." 9 SCR 22.03(6) provides the "[i]n the course of the investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in the grievance." 10 No. license to practice law for 60 days. Attorney Paul should be required 2006AP2132-D We also conclude that to pay the costs of the proceeding. ¶24 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Robert H. Paul to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, effective the date of this order. This stipulation has no effect on Attorney Paul's administrative suspension arising out of his failure to comply with mandatory CLE requirements. ¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Robert H. Paul comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. ¶26 of this IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date order Robert H. Paul pay to Regulation the costs of this proceeding. the Office of Lawyer If the costs are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the license of Robert H. Paul to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the court. 11 No. 1 2006AP2132-D

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