James Bruno v. Milwaukee County
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2003 WI 28 SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: OF WISCONSIN 01-1970 COMPLETE TITLE: James Bruno, James Schindler, Edgar Wesling, Fred Antonich, William J. Beam, Lyle H. Bonnin, George A. Bowman, Martha Clark, Rosario Consiglio, Robert G. Francis, John Glowacki, Herbert A. Goetsch, Dorothy Haynes, Kenneth Henrics, George Kozik, Pearl Kulinski, Mary Landis, William Moser, Virginia E. O'Connell, William O. Polley, Rosemary Pulito, Chester Sobush, William Stead, Shirley Whittow, and Bernard Wood, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, v. Milwaukee County, Milwaukee County Employees Retirement System, and Milwaukee County Pension Board, Defendants-Respondents. REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at: 255 Wis. 2d 833, 646 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) OPINION FILED: SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: January 16, 2003 SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: Circuit Milwaukee David Hansher JUSTICES: CONCURRED: DISSENTED: NOT PARTICIPATING: May 1, 2003 BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence. WILCOX, J., did not participate. ATTORNEYS: For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Lynne A. Layber, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lynne A. Layber. For the defendants-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by John F. Jorgensen, principal assistant corporation counsel. 2 2003 WI 28 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 01-1970 (L.C. No. 00 CV 4004) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT James Bruno, James Schindler, Edgar Wesling, Fred Antonich, William J. Beam, Lyle H. Bonnin, George A. Bowman, Martha Clark, Rosario Consiglio, Robert G. Francis, John Glowacki, Herbert A. Goetsch, Dorothy Haynes, Kenneth Henrics, George Kozik, Pearl Kulinski, Mary Landis, William Moser, Virginia E. O'Connell, William O. Polley, Rosemary Pulito, Chester Sobush, William Stead, Shirley Whittow, and Bernard Wood, FILED MAY 1, 2003 Plaintiffs-AppellantsPetitioners, Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court v. Milwaukee County, Milwaukee County Employees Retirement System, and Milwaukee County Pension Board, Defendants-Respondents. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. ¶1 certain DIANE S. SYKES, J. former Milwaukee Reversed. The issue in this case is whether County employees who qualified for "deferred vested pensions" at the time they terminated their county employment have "retired from the county" within the No. 01-1970 meaning of the Milwaukee County Code for purposes of receiving a military service pension credit. Applying the plain language of the applicable ordinance provisions, we conclude that the former employees were "retired from the county" and are therefore eligible for the military service pension credit. ¶2 In November of 1996, the Milwaukee County Board enacted an ordinance granting a military service pension credit to certain members of the Milwaukee County Employees' Retirement System ("retirement during specified system") timeframes.1 prospectively only, on retirees who who retired served The January from had the 1, in ordinance 1997, county and before the military took effect, applies July to 1, "all 1985." Milwaukee County General Ordinances § 201.24(2.10). ¶3 After applying for the credit and being denied, 25 former Milwaukee County employees filed this action in Milwaukee County Circuit Court requesting a declaration of entitlement to the military service pension credit.2 Each former employee is a member of the retirement system, left county employment before July 1, 1985, with a "deferred vested pension," and later (although still prior to July 1, 1985) began receiving payment 1 The credit applies only to retirees who were employed by the county for a certain number of years, and who had also performed military service during the period January 1, 1938, through December 31, 1974. See Milwaukee County General Ordinances § 201.24(2.10). 2 In some cases, a member is represented by a spouse who is receiving survivor benefits. 2 No. on the deferred vested pension. 01-1970 See M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(4.5) and 201.24(2.5). ¶4 Judge David A. Hansher, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, concluded that the plaintiffs were not eligible for the military service credit, and the court of appeals affirmed. Bruno v. Milwaukee County, No. 01-1970, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002). Both the circuit court and the court of appeals concluded that in order to have "retired from the county" for retirement purposes system member of the must military have service been old credit, enough a to immediately begin drawing a pension at the time he or she left county employment. According to this interpretation of the applicable ordinance provisions, retirement system members who left county service with deferred vested pensions had not "retired from the county." ¶5 We granted the retirees' petition for review, and now reverse. Although none of these retirement system members began collecting a pension immediately upon leaving county employment, each one qualified for a deferred vested pension at the time of termination, and this meets the definition of "retirement" in the Milwaukee Retirement deferred County system vested See members pensions who have M.C.G.O leave Code. county "retired from § 201.24(2.19). employment the county" with for purposes of the military service credit. ¶6 This case involves the interpretation and application of an ordinance to an undisputed set of facts. "The rules for the construction of statutes and municipal ordinances are the 3 No. same." 01-1970 County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 169 n.7, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980). The interpretation and application of an ordinance to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law, which this court decides de novo. County of Adams v. Romeo, 191 Wis. 2d 379, 383, 528 N.W.2d 418 (1995). ¶7 We ordinances. begin with the language of the applicable "If the plain meaning of the [ordinance] is clear, a court need not look to rules of statutory construction or other extrinsic aids. Instead, a court should simply apply the clear meaning of the [ordinance] to the facts before it." Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-282, 548 N.W.2d UFE 57 (1996)(internal citations omitted). ¶8 an We have "long recognized that when a court construes ordinance meaning." or statute, words must be given their common Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 224, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997) (citing State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) (citations omitted in original)). It is also "well established that technical words or phrases with a peculiar meaning in the law must be construed according to such meaning." ¶9 Id. The Milwaukee County Code establishes several categories of retirement and sets forth the various requirements a retirement system member must meet in order to qualify for a pension. See generally M.C.G.O. § 201.24(4.1) ("normal retirement"); § 201.24(4.2) ("early retirement"); § 201.24(4.3) ("accidental disability retirement"); § 201.24(4.4) ("ordinary 4 No. disability retirement"); and § 201.24(4.5) ("deferred 01-1970 vested retirement").3 ¶10 Section 201.24(4.5) sets forth the requirements for "deferred vested retirement," also referred to in the code as a "deferred vested pension." See M.C.G.O. § 201.24(4.1).4 Section 201.24(2.19) defines "retirement": Retirement shall mean termination of employment after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a pension. Retirement shall be considered as commencing on the day immediately following a member's last day of employment (or authorized leave of absence, if later), and terminating upon date of death of retiree or beneficiary under option. M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19). ¶11 Section 201.24(2.10) states that the military service pension credit "shall apply to all retirees who retired from the county before July 1, 1985." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.10). It is undisputed that each of the retirement system members here met all of the requirements for a deferred vested pension and terminated county service prior to July 1, 1985. 3 "Pension" is defined as "a series of periodic payments which are payable to a person who is entitled to receive benefits under the ordinance." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.6). 4 "A member shall be eligible for a deferred vested pension if his employment is terminated for any cause, other than fault or delinquency on his part, provided that he elects not to withdraw any part of his membership account and that his pension at age sixty (60) is at least ten dollars ($10.00) per month." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(4.5). The ordinance sets forth some exceptions to its general applicability, but none of them are relevant to this case. 5 No. ¶12 01-1970 Whether these retirement system members are entitled to receive the military service pension credit provided for in section 201.24(2.10) of the Milwaukee County Code depends upon whether they "retired from the county" within the meaning of that section and the related definitional sections of the code. As noted above, "retirement" is a defined term in the code: it means "termination of employment after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a pension." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19). "deferred "pension" vested pension" is a M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(2.6) and (4.5). under the A code. Indeed, section 201.24(4.5), which sets forth the criteria for deferred vested pensions, is entitled "Deferred § 201.24(4.5)(emphasis vested M.C.G.O. retirement." added). The code's definition of "retirement" also states that retirement commences "on the day immediately following a member's last day of employment." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19). ¶13 These ambiguous. terms, phrases, and definitions are not A retirement system member who leaves county service having qualified for a deferred vested pension has "retired from 6 No. the county" within the meaning of the code.5 01-1970 Although an employee leaving county service with a deferred vested pension does not immediately begin to collect payments on that pension, he or she has "fulfilled all requirements for a pension" at the time of termination, which satisfies the definition of "retirement" in the code. ¶14 Milwaukee County argues that in order to be "retired from the county" a retirement system member must leave county service and begin drawing pension payments immediately. interpretation The code adds does words not to define the definition "retirement" as of This "retirement." "termination of employment after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a pension and is old enough to immediately begin receiving pension payments." It defines "retirement" as "termination of employment after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a 5 The court of appeals cited Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary as support for its conclusion that "retirement" requires an employee to leave employment and immediately begin collecting a pension. Bruno v. Milwaukee County, No. 01-1970, unpublished slip op. at ¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002) (citing Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 1939 (1998)). However, the court of appeals failed to supply any definition from Webster's, or any other dictionary definition for that matter. In fact, the Webster's definition of the verb "retire" supports the retirees, not the county: "retire" means "to withdraw from office, public station, business, occupation, or active duty." Webster's at 1939. Webster's defines "retirement" as "withdrawal from office, active service, or business." Id. Though our decision here rests on an application of the definition in the code itself (because "retirement" is a defined term in the code), we can find nothing in the dictionary definition of "retire" or "retirement" that would support the county's or the court of appeals' interpretation. 7 No. pension." 01-1970 The definition does not mention receipt of pension payments. ¶15 The ordinance does not confine the term "retirement" to terminations of county service with immediate eligibility to begin drawing a pension. It requires only that the terminating employee has fulfilled the requirements for a pension. Each of the employees in this case terminated employment after having fulfilled all pension." requirements for a pension a "deferred vested M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(2.19) and 201.24(4.5). "[r]etirement immediately shall be following considered a member's as commencing last day of Because on the day employment," M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19), these deferred vested retirement system members "retired purposes of the deferred vested from the pension before service military county credit. did not begin July until 1, 1985" Payment each of for the member's "normal retirement date,"6 although this, too, occurred before July 1, 1985, for each of these retirement system members. 6 The ordinance provides that upon timely application, "[p]ayment of a deferred vested pension shall commence as of the member's normal retirement date" and shall continue until "the date of death of the retired member." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(4.5). "Normal retirement date shall be the first day of the month following the date on which the member reaches the minimum ages for normal retirement." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.17). "Normal retirement age shall be fifty-seven (57) for deputy sheriffs and sixty (60) for all other members." M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.18). Each of these retirement system members reached the "normal retirement age" and began receiving payment for their deferred vested pensions prior to July 1, 1985. 8 No. ¶16 The Milwaukee County ordinance extending 01-1970 military service pension credit to all those who "retired from the county before July definition 1, of 1985" is clear "retirement" and the in unambiguous, Milwaukee as is County the Code. Together, they plainly state that all those who retired from the county before that date that is, terminated county employment having "fulfilled entitled all the to the credit. requirements The county's for a pension" are interpretation of the applicable ordinance provisions ignores their plain language and adds words that are not there. Because these retirement system members terminated county employment before July 1, 1985 and had fulfilled all the requirements for a deferred vested pension at the time of termination, they are entitled to the military service pension credit provided for in M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.10). ¶17 In closing, a few words about the concurrence. The concurrence concludes that the ordinance is ambiguous because we have interpreted its "plain meaning" differently than the lower courts did, and interpretations process." worries "undermine[] Concurrence, that the ¶32. competing integrity The "plain of concurrence the meaning" appellate refers to the "oft-quoted maxim" of statutory ambiguity that states that a statute is considered ambiguous "when it is capable of being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably wellinformed persons." Concurrence, ¶31. The concurrence then suggests that "[i]f judges and courts are considered reasonably well-informed construction persons, when they then under differ 9 this about an . . . ordinance's rule of 'plain' No. meaning, the ambiguous." ¶18 focus ordinance should generally be 01-1970 considered Concurrence, ¶32. This distorts the test for ambiguity by placing the on the interpretation interpretation "reasonably reasonableness of rather than the offered. Of being well-informed persons." the person offering reasonableness course So do judges the of the qualify as lawyers. But a disagreement between judges and lawyers about the plain meaning of a statute or ordinance does not always or even generally mean that the statute or ordinance is ambiguous. If it did, then no statute or ordinance disputed in the courts could ever be given its plain meaning, because all statutory or ordinance language would be considered ambiguous. ¶19 This is not the law. The ambiguity maxim or canon of construction invoked by the concurrence is more completely stated as follows: Test of Ambiguity This court has consistently used the same test for ambiguity: "A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably wellinformed persons in either of two or more senses." State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 425, citing State ex rel. West Allis v. Dieringer (1957), 275 Wis. 208, 218, 81 N.W. 2d 533. Whenever a case such as this one is before the court, however, it is obvious that people disagree as to the meaning to be given to a statute. This alone cannot be controlling. The court should look to the language of the statute itself to determine if 'well-informed persons' should have become confused. 10 No. 01-1970 ". . . In construing or 'interpreting' a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute." State v. Pratt (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18. Nat'l Amusement Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 41 Wis. 2d 261, 267-68, 163 N.W.2d 625 (1969) (emphasis in original). See also Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 585, 592, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995); State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 534-35, 348 N.W.2d 159 (1984); Standard Theatres v. State Dep't of Transp., 118 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984); Town of Ringle v. Marathon County, 104 Wis. 2d 297, 308, 311 N.W.2d 595 (1981). ¶20 Accordingly, the test for statutory ambiguity focuses first (as it must) on the language of the statute, not the competing interpretations of it offered by lawyers or judges. The statutory language is given its common and ordinary meaning, and technical or specially-defined terms are given the technical or special definitional meaning assigned to them. Wis. 2d at 224. Weber, 209 If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning. ¶21 The presence interpretations court to by skip lawyers this of different or judges process, does "plain meaning" authorize ambiguity, assume not and searching for extrinsic sources of legislative intent. the begin Rather, as the cases cited above hold, the court examines the statutory or ordinance persons' language should have to become determine whether confused," 11 that "'well-informed is, whether the No. statutory or ordinance different meanings. statute is language reasonably gives 01-1970 rise to Nat'l Amusement Co., 41 Wis. 2d at 267. ambiguous if it is susceptible "equally sensible interpretations." of two or A more State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 122, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997). ¶22 Thus, the court examines the reasonableness of the interpretation, not the general reputation for reasonableness of the person offering the interpretation. than one reasonable interpretation Only if there is more interpretation offered by (not persons reasonable), is there ambiguity. more generally than one regarded as It is the interpretation's reasonableness that counts, not the interpreter's status as a reasonable person. ¶23 Here, as we have noted, the circuit court apparently overlooked the determining whether county" within credit. The definition ordinance's the court of these definition employees meaning of of appeals "retirement," of were the "retirement" "retired military cited instead but from service did not referencing in the pension apply a the dictionary definition (without quotation or explanation) that contradicted the conclusion that the court reached. In addition, as we have noted, both words the to interpretation the concurrence, ordinance, as ¶34, thus interpretation. reasonable adopted and the by concurrence is not a lower also courts adds recognizes, "plain meaning" This, therefore, is not a case of conflicting, "plain meaning" interpretations; lower court error. 12 it is a case of No. ¶24 01-1970 The concurrence also concludes that the ordinance is ambiguous because the phrase "from the county" is redundant or "unexplained retirement surplusage," ordinance Concurrence, ¶35. ordinances to "unexplained applicable avoid only surplusages, surplusage" unnecessary as this to is county a county employees. While we attempt to construe statutes and declaration of ambiguity. been inasmuch here does a not statutory redundancy necessarily require or a The phrase "from the county" may have (because this is a county retirement ordinance), but that does not render either the definition of "retirement" ambiguous. or the military service pension provision The phrase makes explicit what is already implicit in the ordinance, concurrence, ¶35; that is, it reinforces its meaning rather than creates ambiguity. That this reinforcement may have been unnecessary does not require us to search for some alternate meaning other than the obvious. ¶25 It is odd that the concurrence would suggest that we are reading the ordinance as if it said "retired from the county from the county." involves the ambiguity.7 Concurrence, ¶36. ascertainment The concurrence of Statutory interpretation meaning, adopts the not latter a search for construct and takes it to a new level, manufacturing ambiguity where it does not exist. 7 Wisconsin courts do not "torture ordinary words until they confess to ambiguity." W. States Ins. Co. v. Wis. Wholesale Tire, Inc., 184 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1999). 13 No. ¶26 01-1970 A phrase that makes explicit that which is implicit (i.e., states the obvious) is not the same as a phrase that is repeated twice in a row. If it were, the concurrence might be correct in its assertion that there would be a "need to delete a few words for clarity." Concurrence, ¶38. "from not the county" is and our ordinance, interpretation does in fact As it is, the phrase repeated straightforward not import such twice "plain a in this meaning" repetition into the ordinance, so there is no need to delete anything in order to arrive at clarity. ¶27 For example, if my law clerk gets up from his desk at around lunchtime and says, "I am going out to eat," I readily understand this to mean he is going out to eat lunch. If instead he says, "I am going out to eat lunch," his statement is not rendered ambiguous because he has explicitly unnecessarily) identified the meal he is about to eat. "lunch" certainly may no be surplusage, need to look but there for some is no The word ambiguity alternate (if meaning and or explanation for his inclusion of the word "lunch" where it is otherwise unnecessary. implicit in the He shorter is only making statement. A explicit "plain what is meaning" interpretation of "I am going out to eat lunch" does not "in essence" read "I am going out to eat lunch lunch," as suggested by the concurrence, merely because "lunch" was already implicit. Concurrence, ¶36. 14 No. ¶28 In unambiguous.8 short, the applicable ordinance 01-1970 provisions are These former county employees left county service having qualified for deferred vested pensions and within the applicable time frame specified in the military service pension credit. Deferred vested meaning of the code. in the code. from the pensions are "pensions" within the This meets the definition of "retirement" Accordingly, the former employees are "retired county" within the meaning of the military service pension credit, and are entitled to receive it. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. ¶29 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 8 The concurrence concludes by referring to the "obvious purpose of the ordinance," and asserts that "there is no apparent reason" for the exclusion of deferred vested pensioners from the military service credit. Concurrence, ¶40. The concurrence also concludes that "the language of the ordinance supports the petitioners' interpretation more strongly than the county's interpretation." Concurrence, ¶39. If the "obvious purpose" and the "language of the ordinance" support one interpretation, and there is "no apparent reason" for any alternate interpretation, then the ordinance is unambiguous. 15 No. ¶30 ANN separately WALSH to BRADLEY, express my J. 01-1970.awb I (concurring). disagreement with the write majority opinion's reliance on the plain meaning canon to interpret this Milwaukee County ambiguous. ordinance. Nevertheless, I I find concur in the ordinance to be the majority's result because I find it to be the more reasonable interpretation in light of the language and purpose of the ordinance. ¶31 The majority begins and ends its analysis by relying on the plain meaning maxim of statutory/ordinance construction: "if the plain meaning of the [ordinance] is clear, a court need not look to rules of statutory construction or other extrinsic aids." Majority op., ¶¶7, 16. What the majority fails to acknowledge in this cursory approach is another oft-quoted maxim of statutory/ordinance interpretation: a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-informed persons. Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 222, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996); Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 472, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991); State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 687, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990). ¶32 Here, the circuit court and all three judges of the court of appeals, examining the same language, also found the meaning of this ordinance to be "plain" but came to the opposite interpretation of what the majority today deems to be "plain." If judges and courts are considered reasonably well- informed persons, then under this latter rule of construction 1 No. when they differ about an ordinance's "plain" meaning, ordinance should generally be considered ambiguous. war between courts over opposite plain 01-1970.awb meaning the The tug of constructions undermines the integrity of the appellate process. ¶33 Our task is to discern the intent of the legislature. Here, I find the language of the ordinance to be ambiguous, not only because of the opposite plain meaning interpretations but also because I conclude that both interpretations are reasonable. ¶34 The phrase in the ordinance that is the subject of interpretation is: "shall apply to all retirees who retire from the county." The circuit court and the judges of the court of appeals reasonably interpreted it to mean that it applies to members who leave county service and begin immediately drawing pension payments. The majority correctly notes that such an interpretation adds words to the definition of "retirement." ¶35 The majority s problems. The interpretation, majority sets forth however, the has phrase in its own question, "shall apply to all retirees who retire from the county," but then only focuses on the second part of the phrase. Since this is implicitly a county means that Thus, the retirement it applies additional surplusage. When plan, to words an the those word who "retirees" retire from "from the county" is ordinance is redundant the county. unexplained or contains surplusage, it is not "clear and unambiguous." ¶36 The incorporates majority surplusage explains as away serving 2 its merely construction to which reinforce its No. meaning rather than creating any ambiguity. 01-1970.awb Majority op., ¶24. One could argue that its construction which in essence reads "retired from the county from the county" is not reasonable. I, however, do not advance that position. ¶37 The majority's effort to explain away the surplusage is undermined by the fact that the "from the county" phrase was not included in parallel language within the very same section. The parallel eligibility language of describes post-1985 the retirees retirees at issue before us. military rather service than the credit pre-1985 The section reads: The provisions of this section shall apply to all retirees who retired between July 1, 1985 and January 26, 1989 and to retirees who retired after January 26, 1989 and were not represented by a collective bargaining unit immediately prior to their retirement. . . . . Effective solely with respect to pension payments payable on and after January 1, 1997, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply to all retirees who retired from the county before July 1, 1985. M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.10). It is unclear why the County Board would to find it necessary reinforce the meaning of this language by adding "from the county" in one instance and not the other. that A reasonable inference is that the County Board intended its effect. selective use of the phrase have some meaningful The majority's opinion fails to acknowledge or explain this inconsistent treatment. ¶38 Nevertheless, reasonable, but not I find without each its interpretation own problems. to be One interpretation is burdened with the need to add a few words for 3 No. 01-1970.awb clarity and the other suffers from the need to delete a few words for clarity. ¶39 Although I conclude that the ordinance is ambiguous, this does not mean that the language of the ordinance does not favor one interpretation over the other. For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, I agree that the language of the ordinance supports the petitioners' interpretation more strongly than the county's interpretation. ¶40 In addition, given the obvious purpose of the ordinance to recognize the valuable military service provided by county employees, there is no apparent reason why the county board would single out and exclude deferred vested pensioners from this recognition. These factors lead to the conclusion that the ordinance was intended to make the petitioners eligible for the military service credit. ¶41 Accordingly, I concur. I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this concurrence. 4 No. 1 01-1970.awb
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