Jami L. Van Boxtel v. Brent F. Van Boxtel
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2001 WI 40 SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN Case No.: 99-0341 Complete Title of Case: In re the Marriage of: Jami L. Van Boxtel, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-RespondentPetitioner, v. Brent F. Van Boxtel, Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at: 235 Wis. 2d 275, 616 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) Opinion Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Oral Argument: Source of APPEAL COURT: COUNTY: JUDGE: May 2, 2001 February 7, 2001 Circuit Outagamie John A. Des Jardins JUSTICES: Concurred: Dissented: Not Participating: ATTORNEYS: For the petitioner-appellant-cross-respondent- petitioner there were briefs by John Miller Carroll and John Miller Carroll, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by John Miller Carroll. For the respondent-respondent-cross-appellant there was a brief by David J. Van Lieshout and Menn, Teetaert & Beisenstein, Ltd., Little Chute, and oral argument by David J. Van Lieshout. 2 2001 WI 40 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 99-0341 STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT In re the Marriage of: Jami L. Van Boxtel, FILED Petitioner-Appellant-CrossRespondent-Petitioner, v. MAY 2, 2001 Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI Brent F. Van Boxtel, Respondent-Respondent-CrossAppellant. REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. ¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Affirmed) In this divorce action, the petitioner, Jami L. Van Boxtel, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals upholding the circuit court's refusal to enforce a written property division agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, Brent F. Van Boxtel.1 The petitioner asserts that the terms of the agreement are binding 1 Van Boxtel v. Van Boxtel, No. 99-0341, unpublished slip opinion (Wis. Ct. App. April 11, 2000) (affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for Outagamie County, John A. Des Jardins, Judge). No. 99-0341 on the respondent and the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(L) (1995-96)2 and that the circuit court erred in refusing to incorporate the agreement into its judgment. We disagree. ¶2 We conclude that because the agreement was entered into after divorce proceedings commenced, it is a stipulation under Wis. respondent Stat. § 767.10(1). repudiated his We consent also to conclude that that stipulation the and, therefore, we uphold the circuit court's refusal to incorporate it into the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. ¶3 and The relevant facts are not in dispute. respondent married in petitioner July owned The petitioner 1994. At the a on Walter home time of the marriage, the Appleton. The respondent also owned property in Appleton, which was sold shortly after the marriage. Avenue in With the proceeds of this sale, the couple then built a new home. The Walter Avenue property was subsequently sold in April 1996. ¶4 One month later, in May 1996, the petitioner filed for divorce. home. Shortly thereafter, she sought to purchase her own To obtain the necessary financing, the petitioner's lender required that the petitioner secure certain proceeds from the sale of the Walter Avenue 2 property. In meeting this Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version. 2 No. requirement, the petitioner asked the respondent to 99-0341 sign an agreement foregoing his interest in the Walter Avenue proceeds as well as any interest in the petitioner's new home. ¶5 were The agreement "currently in specifically the middle of stated a that court the parties proceeding for divorce," and further provided: Now, Therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants of this Agreement, the parties agree as follows: 1. That the [Walter Avenue property] and the net proceeds from the sale of such residence has [sic] always been and shall continue to be the individual property of [the petitioner]. 2. That a certain parcel of real estate located at 213 West Parkway Boulevard . . . or any other property purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the above mentioned real estate shall be classified as the individual property of [the petitioner]. 3. That [the respondent] waives and releases all claims or rights he might otherwise have pursuant to Chapters 766 and 767 of the Wisconsin Statutes to [the Walter Avenue property], the proceeds from the sale of the same and any replacement residence purchased with such sale proceeds. The parties signed the agreement on January 27, 1997. ¶6 signed, Approximately the six petitioner months moved for after the partial agreement summary was judgment seeking to enforce the agreement and preclude the respondent from making any claims to the proceeds from the sale of the Walter Avenue property. In response, the respondent submitted an affidavit contesting the agreement. respondent set forth facts challenging 3 In his affidavit, the the validity of the No. agreement and concerning asserted the that property "no agreement division." The has been record 99-0341 reached contains no ruling on the petitioner's motion and the matter was left to be resolved at trial. ¶7 At the following June 1998 trial, the petitioner pursued enforcement of the agreement and incorporation of it into the divorce judgment. The respondent challenge the validity of the agreement. continued to He presented evidence to support his position that he was pressured and rushed into signing the agreement and that it was entered prior to review by his attorney. ¶8 circuit In making court its property concluded that the division determination, agreement was invalid refused to incorporate it into the divorce judgment.3 was persuaded that the agreement was not the and The court entered into voluntarily and ultimately concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the agreement was inequitable. The court thus refused to enforce the agreement and divided the proceeds from the Walter Avenue property equally between the parties. ¶9 affirmed. The petitioner She appealed maintained that and the the court agreement of was appeals properly executed under Wis. Stat. § 766.58 and enforceable upon divorce pursuant to § 767.255(3)(L). The court of appeals rejected the petitioner's argument and concluded that because the agreement 3 In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court did not expressly identify the nature of the agreement under the statutes, but termed it a "postnuptial agreement or contract." 4 No. 99-0341 was signed after divorce proceedings had commenced, it was a stipulation subject to court approval under § 767.10(1). Because the circuit court had not approved the agreement and, in fact, found it to be inequitable to the respondent, the court of appeals found that the circuit court did not err in refusing to enforce the agreement. ¶10 The specific issues presented to this court are whether the agreement between the parties is a stipulation under § 767.10(1) or a binding agreement under § 767.255(3)(L) and, in turn, whether the circuit court properly refused to incorporate the agreement challenged into numerous its judgment. aspects of Although the circuit the petitioner court's property division before the court of appeals, she has asked this court to review only the court of appeals' characterization of the agreement and the agreement's enforceability. The respondent concurs that these are the only matters before this court.4 ¶11 statutory This examination construction as presents it us arises with during a the question review of of a circuit court's exercise of discretion. Generally, a division of be property in a divorce action 4 will upheld absent an We have not been asked to review the entirety of the circuit court's determinations regarding the division of the parties' property. Rather, the petition for review and the briefs of both parties state the issue presented for review as follows: "When a husband and wife, during marriage but after the commencement of divorce proceedings, enter into a written marital property agreement classifying a piece of real estate as the individual property of the wife, should that agreement be enforced in making the property division in a divorce proceeding?" 5 No. erroneous exercise of discretion. 166, 171, 560 N.W.2d 246 99-0341 Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d (1997). However, statutory construction is a question of law that we review independently of the determinations court of appeals. ¶9, 234 Wis. 2d rendered by the circuit court and the Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, 587, 610 N.W.2d 467. When interpreting a statute, this court seeks to identify and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. DPI Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). ¶12 We first address whether the court of appeals erred in characterizing Wis. Stat. this written § 767.10(1). agreement The as petitioner a stipulation contends that under the agreement is properly governed by § 767.255(3)(L) and is binding upon the parties and the circuit court. She maintains that because the parties intended to be bound by the agreement, the court should not treat it as a stipulation.5 The respondent, however, argues that the agreement is a § 767.10(1) stipulation subject to the approval of the court. He asserts that any agreement between spouses signed after a filing for divorce is a stipulation. 5 In her briefs to this court, the petitioner argued, much like she did to the court of appeals, that the agreement was a binding marital property agreement under Wis. Stat. § 766.58. However, at oral argument the petitioner acknowledged that the issue in this case is the status of the agreement under chapter 767. We thus do not address any prior contentions regarding chapter 766. 6 No. ¶13 99-0341 The parties dispute the statutory characterization of the agreement because the classification of the agreement as either a § 767.10(1) stipulation or a § 767.255(3)(L) agreement determines the degree of flexibility a circuit court incorporating the agreement into its judgment. has in An agreement under § 767.255(3)(L) is binding upon the court unless the terms of the agreement are "inequitable as to either party." Stat. § 767.255(3)(L). equitable. is only Wis. Such enforceable "subject § are presumptively In contrast, a § 767.10(1) divorce stipulation Id. Stat. agreements Wis. 767.10(1). "recommendation jointly to the Such made by a approval of stipulation [the the is parties in court." merely a a divorce action] to the court suggesting what the judgment, if granted, is to provide." Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 638, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970). ¶14 of We conclude that any agreement regarding the division property entered into between spouses after divorce proceedings have commenced is a stipulation under § 767.10(1) and is therefore subject to the approval of the court. conclusion controlling is dictated precedent, by and the the language public of the policy This statute, considerations implicated when divorcing spouses enter into agreements. ¶15 dispute We turn to the language of the statutes. centers around whether § 767.10(1) applies to the agreement at issue. or The parties' § 767.255(3)(L) Section 767.10(1) enables spouses in an action for divorce to stipulate to certain matters 7 No. 99-0341 relevant to their divorce judgment, subject to the approval of the court. The statute specifically provides: The parties in an action for an annulment, divorce or legal separation may, subject to the approval of the court, stipulate for a division of property, for maintenance payments, for the support of children, for periodic family support payments under s. 767.261 or for legal custody and physical placement, in case a divorce or legal separation is granted or a marriage annulled. Wis. Stat. § 767.10(1). ¶16 Section 767.255 governs the circuit court's division of property upon divorce. The statute directs the court to equally divide between the parties all property that is not a gift or inheritance. Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3). The court may alter this distribution upon considering a variety of factors, including certain written agreements under § 767.255(3)(L). That provision allows the court to consider: Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties. Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(L). ¶17 applies The to petitioner any agreement marriage." We applies agreements to note, for . . . divorce." argues that entered however, entered § 767.255(3)(L) into that into "before or § 767.10(1) by "parties broadly during the specifically in an action Although § 767.255(3)(L) does not expressly 8 No. 99-0341 exclude agreements executed after the filing of divorce, the classification derives from of the a post-filing limitation agreement found in as a stipulation § 767.10(1). Because § 767.10(1) more specifically addresses agreements regarding the division of property entered into after the filing for divorce, it is the applicable statute in this circumstance. See State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 595-96, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996) (specific statutory provisions generally take precedence over general provisions). ¶18 In addition to the statutory language, our conclusion is required by precedent. The court of appeals addressed facts similar to the present case in Evenson v. Evenson, 228 Wis. 2d 676, 598 N.W.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1999). In that case, a divorcing couple entered into an agreement after a petition for divorce had been filed but before the divorce judgment was entered.6 The agreement in Evenson was entitled a Limited Marital Property Agreement and covered each parties' rights as to their marital residence, the husband's financial assets. Prior new to residence, judgment, the and their husband various sought to withdraw from a portion of the agreement, while the wife sought enforcement of the agreement and incorporation of it into the 6 We acknowledge that another recent court of appeals' decision concluded that an agreement entered into prior to the filing for divorce, but made in contemplation of divorce, was a § 767.10(1) stipulation. Ayres v. Ayres, 230 Wis. 2d 431, 602 N.W.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1999). We need not examine the court of appeals' conclusion in that case. Today's decision addresses only agreements entered into after divorce proceedings are commenced. 9 No. divorce judgment. 99-0341 The parties' dispute presented the identical question of law posed by today's case: "whether the document presented to the court was a binding agreement pursuant to § 767.255(3)(L), Stats., or a divorce stipulation pursuant to § 767.10(1)." ¶19 Id. at 681. The court of appeals concluded that because "the agreement was executed after the parties filed for divorce," it was a divorce stipulation governed by § 767.10(1). (emphasis in original). Thus, to adopt Id. at 686 the petitioner's characterization of the agreement before us would essentially require us to overrule Evenson, a case that remains controlling precedent. than While the agreement in Evenson was broader in scope the agreement before us, the scope of the property agreement is not determinative of its classification under the divorce statutes. ¶20 public Much like the court in Evenson, we also examine the policy considerations that inform our decision. In Evenson, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the public policy concerns Wis. 2d 77, enunciated 203 N.W.2d by 724 this court (1973). in We Ray too v. Ray, believe 57 the principles articulated in Ray support the determination that all agreements entered into after the filing for divorce regarding the division of the parties' property are stipulations under § 767.10(1). ¶21 In Ray, this court approval of agreements made proceedings are commenced recognized between due 10 to the spouses the need for after active court divorce third-party No. interests that the state has in divorce cases. 99-0341 Id. at 82. As we emphasized in Ray, once parties invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is given the authority to determine the disposition of property upon divorce, parties cannot then oust the court of this authority. in divorce during cases divorce agreements as and its proceedings Id. at 84. role in are stipulations The court's interest approving safeguarded under agreements by treating § 767.10(1). made such Unlike § 767.255(3)(L), § 767.10(1) provides the circuit court with the flexibility and control necessary to carry out this authority. ¶22 The petitioner maintains that the concerns articulated in Ray are not applicable under the current divorce statutes. When this court decided Ray, § 767.255(3)(L) had not yet been enacted.7 The only statute that contemplated the incorporation of marital agreements into a divorce judgment at that time was Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1969), the predecessor to § 767.10(1).8 petitioner asserts that the subsequent enactment The of § 767.255(3)(L) should be viewed as a limitation on the holding of Ray because the statute requires the court to enforce agreements governed by this statute unless they are inequitable. 7 Wisconsin Stat. § 247.255(11) was enacted in 1977. It was later renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 767.255(11), and is now Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(L). 8 Section 247.10 provided that "the parties may, subject to the approval of the court, stipulate for a division of estate, for alimony, or for the support of children, in case a divorce or legal separation is granted or a marriage annulled." Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1969). 11 No. ¶23 99-0341 Although the divorce statutes have changed since Ray was decided, the policy concerns underlying Ray have not. Ray emphasized the need for judicial approval of agreements that have not been relationship. made in contemplation Id. at 82. of a continued This need for judicial approval of such agreements continues as embodied in § 767.10(1). the statutory recognition since of Ray does not alter described in Ray. marital agreements the under court's interest Moreover, § 767.255(3)(L) and authority Section 767.255(3)(L) agreements implicate different concerns and further different goals. As we explained in Button v. Button, 131 Wis. 2d 84, 94, 388 N.W.2d 546 (1986), § 767.255(3)(L) serves the function of bringing certainty into a marriage. conducive This to certainty marital encourages tranquility expectations of the parties." ¶24 Marital marriage by protecting not furthered and the "may be financial Id. tranquility is by agreements entered into after divorce proceedings have commenced. Once spouses have filed for divorce, they are no longer contemplating a continued martial relationship. As such, additional judicial oversight is necessary to ensure that the needs of the parties are met. Section 767.10(1) embodies these concerns in requiring court approval of agreements made by parties in an action for divorce. ¶25 Having determined from our review of the statutory language, precedent, and public policy that § 767.10(1) governs the agreement at issue, we now turn to the circuit court's refusal to enforce the stipulation and incorporate it into the 12 No. divorce judgment. 99-0341 Such a discretionary determination will be upheld in the absence of an error in law or the failure of the court to base its decision upon facts in the record. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999). at hand, declining the to circuit enforce court the reached King v. In the case correct result in The agreement. the court's refusal to incorporate the stipulation into the judgment was warranted by the respondent's repudiation of his consent to the stipulation. We may sustain a circuit court's decision even though our rationale for doing so may differ from that of the circuit court where controlling legal authority and the record support the Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowners Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 62, decision. 71, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995). ¶26 As previously explained, a stipulation is no more than an understanding of what the parties desire and recommend to the court. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d at 638; see also Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 444, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960) ("A stipulation . . . does not rise to the dignity of a contract."). A party is free to withdraw from this recommendation until it is incorporated into the divorce judgment. Evenson, 228 Wis. 2d at 686; Norman v. Norman, 117 Wis. 2d 80, 82, 342 N.W.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1983). The repudiation of consent to a stipulation by a party may render the stipulation non-existent. incorporate it into the Thereafter a court's refusal to judgment erroneous exercise of discretion. ¶27 In the case at hand, cannot said to be an Norman, 117 Wis. 2d at 82. the disavowed the stipulation at issue. 13 be respondent continuously From the first instance No. 99-0341 that the petitioner sought enforcement of the stipulation, the respondent challenged the agreement, Because this a consent, the constitutes circuit court contesting repudiation did not of its the erroneously validity. respondent's exercise its discretion in refusing to incorporate the stipulation into its judgment. ¶28 In sum, we conclude that because the agreement between the petitioner and respondent was entered into after divorce proceedings § 767.10(1). incorporate commenced, We the thus it is uphold stipulation a stipulation the circuit into its respondent repudiated his consent. under court's judgment, Wis. Stat. refusal because to the Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. By the Court. The decision affirmed. 14 of the court of appeals is No. 1 99-0341
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