Personal Restraint Petition Of Jared Arthur Harrison (Majority)

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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON April 13, 2021 DIVISION II In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of No. 54889-5-II JARED ARTHUR HARRISON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner. GLASGOW, J.—Jared Arthur Harrison seeks relief from personal restraint imposed as a result of his 2005 plea of guilty to one count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and three counts of felony financial fraud. He was sentenced to 45 months of confinement and 45 months of community custody under a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) sentence. In 2012, while serving his DOSA term of community custody, Harrison absconded to New York. The Department of Corrections issued an arrest warrant for him on June 26, 2012. The warrant initially limited extradition from only Idaho and Oregon based on Harrison’s risk level and the State’s financial considerations. Based on a tip that Harrison was engaged in criminal activities, on January 24, 2020, the Department expanded its warrant to nationwide status. On March 29, 2020, Harrison was arrested in Florida on the warrant. After waiving his extradition rights, Harrison was extradited to Washington on May 8, 2020. On May 19, 2020, the Department revoked his DOSA sentence, requiring him to serve the remainder of his DOSA term in prison. The Department’s response reflects that Harrison’s earned early release date was in February 2021, but he would serve additional community custody after early release. The fact that he has been released into community custody does not render his entire petition moot because he No. 54889-5-II is still under restraint. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Crowder, 97 Wn. App. 598, 600, 985 P.2d 944 (1999) (addressing personal restraint petition even after the petitioner was released into community custody and noting that community custody is intense monitoring that is still in the nature of punishment). First, Harrison argues that his right to due process was denied and his restraint is unlawful because the Department waited eight years to extradite him to Washington.1 But the Washington Supreme Court has declined to impose a duty on the State to promptly extradite every defendant from another state. State v. Hudson, 130 Wn.2d 48, 57, 921 P.2d 538 (1996); State v. Stewart, 130 Wn.2d 351, 363-65, 922 P.2d 1356 (1996). The Illinois and Eighth Circuit cases upon which Harrison relies are factually dissimilar and otherwise unpersuasive in light of the Washington Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue. See People ex rel. Bowman v. Woods, 46 Ill. 2d 572, 575, 264 N.E.2d 151 (1970), Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1967), and Mathes v. Pierpont, 725 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1984). The Department did not waive, relinquish, or abandon its right to seek the extradition of Harrison when it initially limited the reach of the warrant to Oregon and Idaho for financial reasons. Harrison was not denied due process in his extradition. Second, Harrison argues that his arrest in Florida was unlawful because it lacked probable cause. But even if his arrest was unlawful, it would not entitle him to relief from restraint now that he is in Washington because the Department has valid custody over him under his Washington judgment and sentence. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007); Hunt v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 384, 384 (9th Cir. 1968). 1 Harrison also argues that the delay in extraditing him violates the doctrine of laches. But laches is an affirmative defense to a civil action; thus, it is inapplicable here. Davidson v. State, 116 Wn.2d 13, 25, 802 P.2d 1374 (1991). 2 No. 54889-5-II Third, Harrison argues that the Department is unlawfully restraining him because its treatment of his medical needs amid the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 To establish a constitutional violation, Harrison must show that the Department has been deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to his health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). While Harrison is critical of the care he has been provided regarding his human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status and colon health, he does not show that the Department has been deliberately indifferent to his conditions. The Department has provided HIV treatment in the form of a single pill regimen with a small tablet, which Harrison said he preferred, and the Department has arranged an appointment for additional colon cancer screening that is available even if Harrison is in community custody. Finally, Harrison’s Eighth Amendment argument regarding his conditions of confinement in Florida and Washington during the COVID-19 pandemic is likely moot given his release into community custody. But even if it were not, the Department’s response to COVID-19 has been held not to constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 901, 467 P.3d 953 (2020); In re Pers. Restraint of Pauley, 13 Wn. App. 2d 292, 31618, 466 P.3d 245 (2020), review denied, No. 985863 (Wash. Aug. 6, 2020). Harrison does not provide any grounds for relief from personal restraint. We therefore deny his petition and his request for appointment of counsel. 2 While Harrison cites to article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution, he does not present argument as to why that section would provide him greater protection than does the Eighth Amendment. Thus, we review his claim only under the Eighth Amendment. State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472-73, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). 3 No. 54889-5-II A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Glasgow, J. We concur: Lee, C.J. Worswick, J. 4
Case Commentary

This Personal Restraint Petition (“PRP”) presented several novel issues for the Court to decide as it was not a collateral attack of the original conviction and sentence that was entered in 2005. Rather, the PRP challenged a post-conviction decision and order by Respondent, the Washington Department of Corrections, to revoke Petitioner's 2005 sentence and that he complete the unexpired term of that sentence in total confinement. The main issues presented were: 1) Whether the decision of the Respondent to not extradite Petitioner, who was the subject of a fugitive’s warrant, for nearly 8 years the application of the equitable doctrine of Laches. During that time, Respondent not only knew where Petitioner was located, but also, was presented with several opportunities to have out of state authorities arrest and hold Petitioner for return to Washington State. That included filing a detainer with the Corrections Department of a sister state. The Responded declined to extradite in each of those instances, citing budgetary constraints as its reason. The question before the Court in the PRP proceeding was whether the Respondent's multiple refusals to extradite over the course of nearly 8 years constituted a waiver of its extradition rights, warranting the application of the Laches defense, especially where re-incarceration of the Petitioner would be purpose and all but certain outcome of extradition. The Court answered that question in the negative upon the ground that Laches only applies to civil cases . However, the PRP did not seek to vacate the original judgment and conviction of the Superior Court, but rather, the Washington DOC's decision to revoke that part of Petitioner’s original alternative sentence that allowed him to serve one half of the entire term (90 months) in community custody. After an administrative hearing conducted by the DOC, Petitioner’s sentence was revoked and he was reclassified to serve the unexpired term of his original sentence in total confinement. It was that Order that the PRP challenged. Under Washington law. an administrative hearing, notwithstanding the fact that it arose out of a criminal judgment and conviction, is considered a civil matter. Therefore, Petitioner argued that the equitable defense of laches was not barred The Court, however, did not address that key distinction; 2) Whether the arrest of Petitioner in Florida on the fugitive's warrant and subsequent in-concert actions by local law enforcement and the Washington DOC violated Petitioner's state and federal due process rights. Prior to his extradition, Petitioner file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Broward County, Fla where Petitioner argued that he was the the object of an unlawful investigatory stop by a local police officer who did not have a reasonable basis to believe that Petitioner had committed a crime, was in the process of committing a crime or was about to commit a crime. The stop was random and done without a warrant. After a records check incident to the stop, the arresting officer discovered the WA DOC warrant. That was the sole basis for Petitioner's arrest and subsequent 45 day hold pending the arrival of a o WA DOC transport team to return the Petitioner to WA State. The Court granted the Writ subject to a response from the Broward County's Sheriff's Office (BSO) within ten days, demonstrating the legality of the arrest and subsequent detention. The Writ application also requested a stay with regard to any interim attempts or actions to transfer custody of Petitioner to the WA DOC which would render the matter moot. Notwithstanding, on the eve of the return date of the Writ, the BSO surrendered custody of Petitioner to the WA DOC transport team. While Petitioner advised both the BSO and WA DOC officers involved of the pending Habeas proceeding, he was removed from Florida and flown back to WA. The WA COA did not address the issue of whether the manner in which the extradition was carried out violated Petitioner's due process rights even though the Fla court had made an preliminary finding in favor of Petitioner; 3) The third notable issue presented was whether the PRP would be mooted upon Petitioner's release from confinement to community supervision as asserted by the DOC. The Court rejected the DOC's argument stating that community supervision is a form of restraint. Therefore, the PRP was properly before the Court for decision even though Petitioner had been released two months earlier.


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