Weale v. Lund

Weale v. Lund (2005-365); 180 Vt. 551; 904 A.2d 119
2006 VT 66

[Filed 07-Jul-2006]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2006 VT 66

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-365

                              MARCH TERM, 2006


  William Weale                        }         APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.                              }         Orange Superior Court
                                       }  
  David Lund, Isabel Lund,             }
  Security Pacific Financial           }
  Corporation, Arthur Whitcomb, Inc.,  }         DOCKET NO. 213-12-04 Oecv
  Victory in Jesus Ministries and      }
  Occupants                            }
                                                 Trial Judge:  Amy N. Davenport 

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendants, David and Isabel Lund, (FN1) appeal from the superior
  court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, William Weale, to
  foreclose plaintiff's judgment lien against defendants' property. 
  Defendants claim the debt on which plaintiff seeks to recover through
  foreclosure is not a preexisting cause of action, and is thus subject to
  defendants' homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 107, because the debt was
  not in default at the time defendants acquired their homestead.  As such,
  defendants argue that their homestead property is exempt from foreclosure
  under 27 V.S.A. § 101.  The superior court rejected defendants'
  construction of § 107.  We agree and affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  The pertinent facts are undisputed.  On February 14, 1990,
  defendants executed a promissory note in favor of plaintiff's assignor. 
  Defendants made regular monthly payments to plaintiff from March 1990 to
  May 1991, after which no further payments were made.  Defendants purchased
  the property in question, located in Newbury, Vermont, as their home on May
  8, 1991, and recorded the deed on May 22, 1991.  Plaintiff brought suit in
  late 1991 and obtained a writ of attachment, which was recorded on December
  9, 1991.  They obtained judgment in 1993, and it was affirmed by this Court
  on September 6, 1994.  Weale v. Lund, 162 Vt. 622, 649 A.2d 247 (1994)
  (mem.).  Thereafter, plaintiff recorded the judgment in the Newbury land
  records, creating a judgment lien on defendants' residence.  See 12 V.S.A.
  § 2901.  The judgment was never satisfied, and plaintiff brought the action
  below to foreclose the judgment lien on defendants' property pursuant to 12
  V.S.A. § 2903(c).  See V.R.C.P. 80.1.  Defendants responded that their
  Newbury property consisted of  "a dwelling house, outbuildings and the land
  used in connection therewith, not exceeding $75,000.00 in value, and owned
  and used or kept by [them] . . . as a homestead" and, therefore, was not
  subject to the judgment lien under 27 V.S.A. § 101 (homestead exemption). 
  The lower court granted summary judgment in plaintiff's favor, holding that
  the debt underlying the judgment lien preexisted defendants' acquisition of
  their homestead, and, under 27 V.S.A. § 107, the homestead exemption does
  not apply.  Defendants appeal.

       ¶  3.  This Court reviews a summary judgment decision de novo,
  employing the same standard as the trial court.  Anderson v. Cooperative
  Ins. Cos., 2006 VT 1, ¶ 6, 17 Vt. L. Wk. 1, 895 A.2d 155.  To obtain
  summary judgment, the moving party must prove that no genuine issues of
  material fact exist, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
  law.  Id.;V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).

       ¶  4.  Since 1849, the Vermont Legislature has provided an exemption
  from attachment and  execution for family homesteads against certain debts. 
  27 V.S.A. § 101.  Section 101 provides that "[t]he homestead of a natural
  person . . . not exceeding $75,000.00 in value, and owned and used or kept
  by such person as a homestead . . . shall be exempt from attachment and
  execution except as hereinafter provided."  Id.  Homesteads, however,
  remain liable to attachment and levy of execution for certain debts under
  27 V.S.A. § 107.  Section 107 provides that homesteads "shall be subject to
  attachment and levy of execution upon causes of action existing at the time
  of acquiring the homestead."  (Emphasis added).  A homestead is acquired
  for purposes of § 107 when the deed for the homestead is properly recorded. 
  Id.  

       ¶  5.  The question at issue in this case is the meaning of the
  phrase "causes of action existing" as used in § 107.  Plaintiff posits that
  this phrase includes debts existing when the homestead was acquired, as set
  forth in the section's title, "Liability of homestead for debts." 
  Defendants respond that the wording limits debts to those on which the
  creditor can bring suit-that is, debts that have gone into default.  We
  find that plaintiff's interpretation of the statute is correct.

       ¶  6.  When construing a statute, our primary objective is to
  effectuate the intent of the Legislature.  In re S. Burlington Shelburne
  Highway Project, 174 Vt. 604, 605, 817 A.2d 49, 51 (2002) (mem.).  Our
  first step is to look to the language of the statute itself; we presume the
  Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of that statute. 
  Burlington Elec. Dep't. v. Vt. Dep't. of Taxes, 154 Vt. 332, 335, 576 A.2d 450, 452 (1990).  In general, we will not read something into a statute
  that is not there unless it is necessary to make the statute effective. 
  Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 331, 817 A.2d 9, 13 (2002).  In the
  absence of a plain meaning, we must look to the statutory section as a
  whole, "looking to the reason and spirit of the law and its consequences
  and effects to reach a fair and rational result."  In re Margaret Susan P.,
  169 Vt. 252, 262, 733 A.2d 38, 46 (1999); see also Davis v. Hunt, 167 Vt.
  263, 267, 704 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1997) (Court attempts to harmonize
  constituent parts when interpreting statute).  
        
       ¶  7.  What are now sections 101 and 107 were enacted together in
  1849 under the general title:  "An Act to Protect the Homestead."  1849,
  No. 20.  Section 107 has not been amended, except as part of the 1947
  comprehensive revision.  In that revision, it was separated from § 101 and
  was separately titled "Liability for  debts."  See 1947 V.S. § 2616.  The
  phrasing at issue has remained the same from 1849 to present. (FN2) 

       ¶  8.  Furthermore, in 1947, the Legislature added a title to the
  statute that would later become § 107, indicating that it applies to
  "debts."  We consider the title in construing a statute.  See In re Vt.
  Nat'l Bank, 157 Vt. 306, 312, 597 A.2d 317, 320 (1991) (ordinance); State
  v. Lynch, 137 Vt. 607, 613, 409 A.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (statute).  In this
  case, the title was added to § 107 as part of a comprehensive
  recodification of the Vermont statutes. We have often noted that we presume
  that such a recodification is not intended to change the meaning of the
  statutory law.  See State v. Brennan, 172 Vt. 277, 282, 775 A.2d 919, 923
  (2001); Town of Cambridge v. Town of Underhill, 124 Vt. 237, 240, 204 A.2d 155, 157 (1964).  In this case, the Legislature reinforced this rule of
  construction by adding a title that reflected our holdings construing the
  statute with respect to preexisting debts.

       ¶  9.  In isolation, we find the term "causes of action existing" to
  be ambiguous when applied to the circumstances before us.  The title of the
  section, however, "liability of homestead for debts," strongly supports
  plaintiff's position.  More importantly, we have addressed the issue before
  us in earlier decisions.

       ¶  10.  We have consistently construed § 107 in accord with
  plaintiff's position here.  We first addressed the liability of homesteads
  to preexisting debts under § 107 in 1869, in West River Bank v. Gale:

    The object of the legislature in this provision evidently was to
    prevent men, after they had obtained a credit, from putting their
    property into a homestead, and thus preventing their creditors
    from reaching it by attachment, and this object is fully
    accomplished by making it subject to all debts that existed prior
    to the purchase . . . . 

  42 Vt. 27, 31-32 (1869) (emphasis added).  Nowhere in West River Bank did
  we indicate that the statute applied only to debts in default.  To so
  conclude would allow persons to do just what the decision explains the
  Legislature sought to prevent-a debtor could obtain a loan and promptly put
  this new property in a homestead so that the debtor would not have to repay
  the loan and the property would be unreachable.  In Lamb v. Mason, 45 Vt.
  500, 502 (1873), decided four years after West River Bank, we noted that
  "[t]here have been several sessions of the legislature since that decision
  was made and published, and no change has been made in the statutes that
  received that construction, and it must be regarded as settled."     
   
       ¶  11.  Thereafter, we more explicitly addressed the issue at hand in
  Gilson v Parkhurst, 53 Vt. 384, (1881).  In that case, this Court affirmed
  the lower court's finding that a "debt" existed prior to the debtor's
  filing of the homestead deed, even though the action on the note was not
  brought until after the deed was recorded.  We held "[i]t is not necessary,
  under [§ 107], which subjects the homestead to attachment and levy of
  execution upon all causes of action existing at the time of acquiring the
  homestead, that there should then be a present right of action."  Id. at
  388 (emphasis added).  Then again in Robinson v. Leach, 67 Vt. 128, 129, 31 A. 32, 33 (1895), we squarely rejected the contention that "causes of
  action" in the statute were limited to a creditor's suit on the debt:  

    It is contended that the cause of action meant is, the claim that
    the plaintiff makes and declares upon as the ground of his suit,
    and which is  to be litigated on trial. But this construction is
    too strict. The words, "causes of action," are evidently used in a
    sense broad enough to embrace the debt as distinguished from the
    evidence of it. The statute is the same for the purposes of this
    case as though it read, "debts existing," etc.  Hence, if the
    original debt can be said to exist, the case is with the
    plaintiff.
    
  Id.; see also Titus v. Warren, 67 Vt. 242, 245, 31 A. 297, 298 (1895)
  (concluding § 107 "make[s] the right [of the creditor to attach the
  homestead] to depend upon the existence of the cause of action, and not
  upon whether the demand is due" (emphasis added)).

       ¶  12.  Defendants' response to this line of cases is that we more
  narrowly defined "cause of action" in Grafton Bank v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463, 467
  (1847).  Grafton Bank is, however, a statute of limitations case and cannot
  affect our explicit construction of the statute before us.  

       ¶  13.  Largely based on the remedial purpose of the homestead
  exemption, defendants are asking us to overrule our prior decisions to hold
  that the homestead exemption does not protect homestead property from
  collection of preexisting debts only if the debts are in default when the
  homestead is acquired.  To reach the result defendants desire, we would not
  only have to overrule the decisions, but also ignore the codification that
  was intended to include those decisions.  As noted above, we refused in
  Lamb to reexamine our initial holding on this issue in Gale four years
  after the Gale decision because we judged the matter "settled" by
  legislative acquiescence.  Lamb, 45 Vt. at 502.  We conclude that we have
  now reached the situation described in In re Estate of Gaskell, 123 Vt. 57,
  59, 181 A.2d 67, 68 (1962):

    But, since the legislature, over the span of so many years, has
    acquiesced in the view this Court has taken . . . that view has
    become, in effect, part of the statute. . . .  It is to the
    legislature that policy arguments for change should now be
    directed. For this Court to unexpectedly depart from the
    established understanding of the statutory meaning would be unwise
    and inappropriate. 

  We recognize that we can depart from this policy where the prior
  construction of the statute is clearly wrong, Wilk v. Wilk, 173 Vt. 343,
  347, 795 A.2d 1191, 1194 (2002), but we find that our prior construction of
  the statute was correct in this instance.
   
       Affirmed.


                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _________________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice



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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Also named as defendants, but not involved in this appeal, were
  persons and entities holding an interest in the land of defendants. 

FN2.   Section 101 has similarly remained generally unchanged, although a
  limit to the amount to which the homestead exemption applies was added in
  1953 and has been increased throughout the years.  See 1860, No. 35
  (language generally the same); 1953, No. 127, § 1 ($2,500 limit added);
  1967, No. 287 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 ($5,000 limit); 1979, No. 67, § 7 ($30,000
  limit); 1995, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 24a ($75,000 limit).