State v. Putvain

State v. Putvain  (2005-039); 179 Vt. 619; 895 A.2d 200

2006 VT 20

[Filed 22-Feb-2006]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2006 VT 20

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-059

                             DECEMBER TERM, 2005

  State of Vermont               }     APPEALED FROM:
                                 }
                                 }     District Court of Vermont,
       v.                        }     Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit
                                 }     
  Pamela Putvain                 }
                                 }     DOCKET NO. 588-10-03LeCr

                                       Trial Judge: Howard E. Van Benthuysen

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶ 1.     Defendant Pamela Putvain appeals from the district court's
  denial of a motion to expunge her record after successful completion of a
  deferred sentence.  Defendant claims that since she fulfilled the terms of
  probation and of the deferred sentence agreement, her record should be
  expunged upon discharge under 13 V.S.A. § 7041(b).  She argues that the
  district court erred in denying her motion and in requiring an additional
  two-year "good behavior" period under 33 V.S.A. § 5538 before allowing
  expungement.  The State concurs with defendant's position on appeal. 
  Because the district court erred in interpreting § 7041(b) to require a
  two-year waiting period before expungement, we reverse.

       ¶ 2.     Defendant pled guilty to domestic assault on April 6, 2004,
  in exchange for a seven-month deferred sentence.  Defendant fulfilled the
  terms of her deferred sentence agreement, and the district court granted
  her petition for discharge from probation on November 11, 2004.  On
  November 19, 2004, defendant filed a motion to expunge her record under 13
  V.S.A. § 7041(b).(FN1)  The district court denied the motion, finding that
  "section 7041 requires a 2 year 'good behavior' period before the
  probationer can receive an expungement, since it adopts the requirements of
  an application and wait found in 33 V.S.A. § 5538."  Defendant filed a
  petition for reconsideration of her request to expunge on January 25, 2005. 
  The district court denied the petition on January 31, 2005, but shortened
  the waiting period.  Defendant appeals from this denial.

       ¶ 3.     A deferred sentence is "not a sentence at all, but rather a
  postponement of sentence that offers the defendant an opportunity to have
  an adjudication of guilt expunged."  State v. Pierce, 163 Vt. 192, 196, 657 A.2d 192, 195 (1995).  The deferred sentence statute provides:

        
       Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation and of the
       deferred sentence agreement, the court shall strike the
       adjudication of guilt and discharge the respondent.  Upon
       discharge the record of the criminal proceedings shall be
       expunged as if an application pursuant to section 5538 of
       Title 33 had been granted . . . .
       
  13 V.S.A. § 7041(b) (emphasis added).  The issue is whether expungement is
  automatic upon defendant's discharge or whether the eligibility
  requirements of 33 V.S.A. § 5538(a) for the sealing of records of a
  juvenile offender must be met before the record can be expunged.

       ¶ 4.     When interpreting a statute our goal is to give effect to the
  intent of the Legislature.  State v. Baron, 2004 VT 20, § 6, 176 Vt. 314,
  848 A.2d 275.  We first look at the plain, ordinary meaning of the statute. 
  Id.  The language of § 7041(b) states that the record shall be expunged "as
  if an application pursuant to section 5538 of Title 33 had been granted."  
  Section 5538 addresses sealing the records of juvenile offenders.  Section
  5538(a) lists the criteria for granting an application to seal the records,
  including that the court must find that "[t]wo years have elapsed since the
  final discharge of the person."  33 V.S.A. § 5538(a)(1).  The  later
  subsections of § 5538, particularly subsections (c) and (d), describe how
  the expungement is implemented.

       ¶ 5.     The meaning of § 7041(b) is plain in that it incorporates the
  implementation provisions of 33 V.S.A. § 5538, but not the eligibility
  provisions.  The eligibility standards are contained entirely within §
  7041(b) and include no waiting period.

       ¶ 6.     In its denial of defendant's motion, the district court
  explained that as a matter of public policy, first-time juvenile offenders
  should not have to wait two years for expungement while deferred-sentence
  probationers, often not first-time offenders, obtain automatic expungement
  of their convictions. Whatever its merits, the policy choice has clearly
  been made to the contrary by the Legislature as reflected in the wording of
  the relevant statutes. 

       Reversed.                

  BY THE COURT:


  _____________________________________
  Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

  _____________________________________
  John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

  _____________________________________
  Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

  _____________________________________
  Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

  _____________________________________
  Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice

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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Effective July 1, 2005, 13 V.S.A. § 7041(b) was amended so that the
  relevant language of § 7041(b) now falls under § 7041(d), in nearly
  identical form.  2005, No. 63, § 9.  We will refer to the statute in effect
  at the time of the district court's decision.