In re Blais
Annotate this Case
In re Blais (2002-086); 174 Vt. 628; 817 A.2d 1266
[Filed 19-Dec-2002]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-086
NOVEMBER TERM, 2002
In re Norman R. Blais } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
} Professional Responsibility Board
}
}
} DOCKET NOS. 1998.033, 1999.043,
and 2000.042
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
¶ 1 Respondent Norman Blais appeals from the recommendation of the
Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five months as a result
of repeated instances of neglect of client matters and misrepresentation.
Respondent puts forth three arguments: (1) the period of suspension
recommended by the Hearing Panel is inconsistent with recent decisions of
this Court involving similar conduct; (2) the sanction agreed between
respondent and disciplinary counsel is more than sufficient to protect the
public; and (3) the Hearing Panel's recommendation of a five-month
suspension is founded on unproved facts and a mischaracterization of the
record. We adopt the Hearing Panel's decision and suspend respondent for
a period of five months.
¶ 2 Respondent has been a licensed attorney in the State of
Vermont since 1976. In June 2001, respondent was charged with misconduct
consisting of five instances of neglecting client matters and three
instances of misrepresentation.(FN1) The parties stipulated to the facts
of the misconduct before the Hearing Panel, and the Hearing Panel also
made additional findings of fact. These facts are summarized below.
¶ 3 PRB File No. 1998.033 In the Fall of 1994, respondent was
hired by Guy and Dianne Henning to pursue a personal injury claim against
the parents of a child who had injured their daughter during a Youth
Soccer Association-sponsored game in October 1994. Respondent was also
hired to file a medical claim under the policy carried by the soccer
association. Respondent neglected to file the medical claim within ninety
days of the injury, as required by the policy. Payment under the policy
was later denied when new counsel took over the case in the summer of 1997
and presented the claim to the soccer association. In July 1996, during a
meeting to review and sign the superior court complaint, respondent told
the Hennings that he would file the complaint with the court, which he
failed to do. During the next year, respondent on several occasions told
the Hennings that the case would take more time and that the court docket
moved slowly. He never filed the claim with the court, however, nor did
he tell the Hennings that he had not filed the claim. In the summer of
1997, the Hennings hired new counsel who eventually brought the personal
injury claim to a successful conclusion. Respondent's neglect and
misrepresentations between the fall of 1994 and the summer of 1997 exposed
his clients to potentially serious injury, but no actual injury resulted
other than his clients' anxiety.
¶ 4 PRB File No. 1999.043 - In the summer of 1994, respondent was
hired to represent Andrew Henry in connection with two charges of DWI. In
February 1995, with respondent's assistance, Mr. Henry pled guilty to the
first DWI, and the second DWI was dismissed. After the term of suspension
for the first DWI ended, the Department of Motor Vehicles failed to
reinstate Mr. Henry's driver's license. Respondent agreed to represent
Mr. Henry in this matter, and accepted a retainer for that purpose.
Respondent failed to take action on the matter, however, and Mr. Henry
eventually hired new counsel who was able to obtain reinstatement of Mr.
Henry's license in January 1999. Respondent returned his retainer. Due
to respondent's inaction from the summer of 1995 through November of
1998, Mr. Henry was without a driver's license from about April 1995 until
January 1999 and suffered a resulting impairment of his employment
opportunities.
¶ 5 PRB File No. 2000.042, Count I - In April 1987, Ulla Anderson
Kauffman hired respondent to represent her in a claim for injuries
resulting from a car accident in 1986. On several occasions , respondent
assured Ms. Kauffman that her claim was proceeding appropriately and gave
her the impression that progress was slow because the court docket was
crowded. Respondent neglected the matter, however, and allowed the
statute of limitations for the claim to expire. Ms. Kauffman ultimately
filed a malpractice action against respondent and received compensation
for her injuries from respondent's malpractice insurance carrier.
Respondent's neglect and misrepresentations from the spring of 1987 until
late 1990 or early 1991 exposed his client to potentially serious injury,
but no actual injury resulted other than delay in the payment of the
claim.
¶ 6 PRB File No. 2000.042, Count II - In 1988, Marjorie Bicknell
hired respondent to represent her in a divorce action in which the
property settlement was the main contested issue. In 1989, respondent
told Ms. Bicknell that he would arrange for an appraisal of the parties'
house but he failed to do so. Respondent eventually obtained a property
settlement for Ms. Bicknell without having gotten an appraisal.
Respondent's neglect exposed his client to potential injury. The Hearing
Panel was unable to determine whether actual injury had occurred because
the client ultimately agreed to proceed without an appraisal in order to
expedite the divorce so she could remarry.
¶ 7 PRB File No. 2000.042, Count III - In 1990, Ms. Bicknell hired
respondent to represent her and her sister in a personal injury claim
arising from a car accident in 1989. Respondent neglected the matter,
failed to return telephone calls to his client, and allowed the statute of
limitations for the claim to expire. On more than one occasion,
respondent falsely assured Ms. Bicknell that her claim was proceeding
appropriately. Ms. Bicknell and her sister later filed a legal
malpractice claim against respondent and received a settlement through
that process. Respondent's neglect and misrepresentations from the fall
of 1990 to December 1992 exposed his client to potentially serious
injury, but no actual injury resulted other than delay in the payment of
her claim.
¶ 8 In addition to the stipulation of facts and a joint
recommendation as to conclusions of law concerning the particular
violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a matter entrusted to the lawyer)
and DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonest, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), respondent and the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel agreed to a sanction recommendation of two months' suspension
followed by a probationary period of eighteen to thirty-six months. The
Hearing Panel accepted the parties' stipulations of fact and adopted the
joint recommendation as to conclusions of law concerning the particular
violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4), but did not adopt the
recommended sanction. Instead, after a hearing at which respondent and
two of his former clients testified, the Panel imposed a suspension of
five months, to be followed by a probationary period of eighteen to
thirty-six months. Respondent now appeals only the duration of the
suspension.
¶ 9 On review, this Court must accept the Panel's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Karpin, 162 Vt. 163, 165, 647 A.2d 700, 701 (1993); A.O. 9, Rule 11(E). The Panel's findings, "whether
purely factual or mixed law and fact, are upheld if they are 'clearly and
reasonably supported by the evidence.' " In re Anderson, 171 Vt. 632,
634, 769 A.2d 1282, 1284 (2000) (mem.) (quoting In re Berk, 157 Vt. 524,
527, 602 A.2d 946, 947 (1991)). This Court makes its own determination as
to which sanctions are appropriate, but we nevertheless give deference to
the recommendation of the Hearing Panel. Id.; see also Karpin, 162 Vt.
at 173, 647 A.2d at 706 ("Although the Board's recommended sanction of
disbarment is not binding upon this Court, it is accorded deference.").
¶ 10 Respondent first argues that the period of suspension
recommended by the Hearing Panel is inconsistent with recent decisions of
this Court involving similar conduct. Respondent contends that facts
similar to those of the present case - the type of conduct, neglect and
misrepresentation; the lack of permanent harm to clients; and the
particular mitigating and aggravating factors - have previously led this
Court to issue only a public reprimand as opposed to a suspension. See In
re Wenk, 165 Vt. 562, 678 A.2d 898 (1996) (mem.); In re Cummings, 164 Vt.
615, 669 A.2d 555 (1995) (mem.); In re Bucknam, 160 Vt. 355, 628 A.2d 932
(1993) (per curiam). We disagree.
¶ 11 The Hearing Panel, considering factors listed in Sections
9.22 and 9.32 of the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (ABA Standards), see In re Warren, 167 Vt. 259,
261, 704 A.2d 789, 791 (1997) (Court looks to ABA Standards for guidance
when sanctioning attorney misconduct), found five aggravating factors and
three mitigating factors established by the evidence. The five
aggravating factors were: (1) two prior disciplinary offenses resulting in
disciplinary orders in 1992 and 1997; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive,
in that the neglect resulted from respondent's concern with bringing in
money for himself and his firm; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple
offenses in this case involving five separate matters; and (5) substantial
experience in the practice of law. The three mitigating factors were: (1)
personal or emotional problems stemming from respondent's divorce and the
breakup of his law firm; (2) a cooperative attitude toward the
disciplinary proceedings; and (3) a delay in disciplinary proceedings
through no fault of respondent.
¶ 12 These aggravating and mitigating factors distinguish the
present case from Cummings and Bucknam, cited by respondent. The
respondent in Cummings had no prior disciplinary history and was
sanctioned for neglect and misrepresentation in two client matters; the
respondent in the present case has two prior disciplinary matters, and the
instant matter involves five separate client matters. The respondent in
Bucknam similarly had no prior disciplinary record, and the matter
involved a fee dispute, not a neglect of client matters.
¶ 13 The Wenk case cited by respondent concerned only the second
of three disciplinary proceedings involving attorney Wenk, all of which
were based upon neglect and misrepresentation. While the first resulted
in a private reprimand, and the second in a public reprimand, the third
led to a six-month suspension that was not appealed. This third
disciplinary proceeding was similar to the one before us. See PCB
Decision No. 14 (Oct. 16, 2000). The misconduct in both involved neglect
of a client matter coupled with misrepresentations that the suit was
proceeding. In Wenk, the misconduct resulted in no serious injury to the
client; in this case, most, but not all, of the misconduct resulted in no
serious client injury. Both respondents had previous disciplinary
history, and both were experiencing personal problems during the period of
the charged conduct. Unlike respondent here, Mr. Wenk did not cooperate
with the proceedings and showed no remorse for his actions. On the other
hand, Mr. Wenk was charged with neglecting only one client matter, while
respondent here was charged with neglecting five.
¶ 14 Also instructive is the recent Hearing Panel disciplinary
decision involving attorney David Sunshine. See PRB Decision No. 28 (Dec.
5, 2001); see also A.O. 9, Rule 11(D)(5)(c) ("If no appeal [of the Hearing
Panel's decision] is . . . filed . . . and the Court does not otherwise
order review on its own motion, the decision shall become final, and
shall have the same force and effect as an order of the Court."). There,
Mr. Sunshine was similarly charged with neglecting two client matters and
making misrepresentations to one of the clients concerning the status of
his case. Like respondent in the present case, Mr. Sunshine had
substantial experience in the practice of law, suffered personal
difficulties stemming from the breakup of his firm, was remorseful for his
conduct, and cooperated with the disciplinary process. Unlike respondent,
however, Mr. Sunshine had no prior disciplinary history and neglected only
two matters. Mr. Sunshine received a four-month suspension and a two-year
period of probation. In light of the sanctions imposed in these recent
disciplinary decisions, we find that the Hearing Panel's imposition of a
five-month suspension is not inappropriate or inconsistent with Vermont
precedent. See also ABA Standards § 4.42 ("Suspension is generally
appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a
client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer
engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a
client.").
¶ 15 Respondent next argues that the two-month suspension agreed
upon by him and disciplinary counsel is more than sufficient to protect
the public. Respondent contends that a five-month suspension would cause
him to lose his secretary, an aspect of his practice that he claims has
improved his handling of client matters, and that returning him to the
practice of law with fewer organizational resources would act to the
detriment, rather than the benefit, of the public. We cannot agree. This
Court has cited approvingly the recommendation of the ABA Standards that a
suspension should generally have a duration of at least six months. See
In re Rosenfeld, 157 Vt. 537, 547, 601 A.2d 972, 978 (1991). "The
rationale is that 'short-term suspensions with automatic reinstatement are
not an effective means of protecting the public' because rehabilitation
cannot be shown in less than six months and a six-month duration is needed
to protect client interests." Id. (quoting ABA Standards 2.3,
Commentary). But see In re McCarty, 164 Vt. 604, 605, 665 A.2d 885, 887
(1995) (mem.) (recognizing that "periods of suspension of less than six
months are appropriate in some circumstances"). Given respondent's
previous disciplinary history, the multiple offenses involved here, and
respondent's admission that he no longer enjoys the practice of law, we
agree with the Hearing Panel that a two-month suspension would be
insufficient to provide respondent with the time to plan a new approach to
his law practice and to consider whether he would be more satisfied
pursuing some other profession. The ability to retain a secretary,
assuming such ability exists based on this record, cannot be
determinative.
¶ 16 Finally, respondent contends that the Hearing Panel's
recommendation of a five-month suspension is founded on unproved facts and
a mischaracterization of the record. Again, the Panel's findings of fact
must be accepted by this Court unless they are clearly erroneous. Karpin,
162 Vt. at 165, 647 A.2d at 701; A.O. 9, Rule 11(E). We find the Hearing
Panel's findings to be clearly and reasonably supported by the evidence,
and thus we will not disturb them.
Norman R. Blais is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five months. The suspension will commence thirty days from the
issuance of this order to allow Mr. Blais to comply with A.O. 9, Rule 23.
Following the period of suspension, Mr. Blais will be on probation in
accordance with the terms set out in PRB Decision No. 31 (January 31,
2002).
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate
Justice
_______________________________________
Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice (Ret.)
Specially Assigned
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 PRB
[14-Feb-2002]
STATE OF VERMONT
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD
In Re: Norman R. Blais, Esq.
PRB File Nos. 1998.033;1999.043;2000.042
DECISION NO. 31 OF HEARING PANEL
This matter came on for hearing on the issue of sanctions on January
14, 2002 at 10:00 A.M. in the District Court Courthouse in White River
Junction, Vermont. Respondent was represented by Paul Jarvis, Esq. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel was represented by Deputy Disciplinary Counsel
Beth DeBernardi.
FINDING OF FACTS in 1998.033
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the following are the facts
relating to PRB File No. 1998.033.
1. Norman R. Blais is an attorney licensed to practice law in the
State of Vermont.
2. He was admitted to practice before the Vermont Supreme Court in
1976.
3. In October of 1994, Guy and Dianne Henning ("Hennings") hired Mr.
Blais to pursue claims on their behalf as parents and next friends of
6-year-old Meghan Henning, who was injured by a fellow participant in a
Youth Soccer Association sponsored soccer game on or about October 15,
1994; the primary claim was to be asserted against the parents of the
fellow participant who attacked and injured Meghan Henning at the soccer
game.
4. In October of 1994, the Youth Soccer Association had in force a
medical insurance policy to provide coverage of up to $ 1,000 for injuries
to participants in Youth Soccer Association sponsored events ("Med-Pay"
coverage); this "no fault" Med-Pay coverage was separate from the
liability insurance that the parents of the fellow participant had in
effect.
5. In October or November of 1994, the Hennings obtained a medical
claim form from the Youth Soccer Association to apply for Med-Pay coverage
for Meghan's injuries.
6. Guy Hennings filled out the "parents" section of the Med-Pay claim
form and then turned the form over to Mr. Blais for handling.
7. Mr. Blais indicated to the Hennings that he would file the medical
insurance claim form with the Youth Soccer Association or its agent on
their behalf.
8. When the Hennings inquired of Mr. Blais as to the status of the
Youth Soccer Association insurance claim from time to time, he assured
them that he was taking care of the matter.
9. Mr. Blais never filed the claim form with the Youth Soccer
Association or its agent or otherwise presented the claim for payment.
10. The Hennings paid medical bills out-of-pocket which otherwise
would have been covered by the Youth Soccer Association Med-Pay policy.
11. Mr. Blais never submitted a demand for settlement of Meghan's
primary claim to the parents of the fellow soccer participant or to their
insurance carrier, nor did he file a complaint with the court asserting
this claim.
12. It is not uncommon to wait for an injured person to finish
medical treatment before presenting a settlement demand or filing a
complaint, and in any event, there is no allegation that Mr. Blais
violated any duty of diligence by not presenting the claim to the
liability insurance carrier sooner.
13. Nevertheless, the Hennings were anxious to pursue their
daughter's claim,, and they called, Mr. Blais often to inquire about the
status of the claim.
14. By the summer of 1996, the Hennings were anxious for the claim to
move forward, and they communicated this to Mr. Blais by telephone.
15. On or about July 12, 1996, Mr. Blais met with the Hennings in his
office, where the Hennings signed a Superior Court complaint prepared by
Mr. Blais.
16. Mr. Blais told the Hennings at the meeting that he would file the
complaint with the court to get Meghan's claim on the court docket.
17. Following the meeting, Mr. Blais did not file the complaint with
the court.
18. At various times over the following year (approximately summer
1996 to summer 1997), the Hennings called Mr. Blais to ask about the
progress of the case.
19. On the occasions of some of those calls, Mr. Blais told the
Hennings that their case would take more time and that the court docket
moves slowly.
20. On the occasions of those calls, Mr. Blais did not tell the
Hennings that the complaint had not been filed with the court.
21. On or about June 17, 1997, the Hennings wrote a letter to Mr.
Blais expressing their discouragement with the lack of progress on the
case.
22. After receiving no response to the June 17, 1997 letter, Guy
Henning wrote a second, undated letter to Mr. Blais asking him to
terminate the attorney-client relationship and to forward the file to
substitute counsel named in the letter. This letter was written between
June 17, 1997 and July 21, 1997.
23. When substitute counsel took over the case, he filed the Youth
Soccer Association medical insurance claim form on behalf of the Hennings,
and he filed the underlying complaint with the Superior Court.
24. The agent for the Youth Soccer Association Med-Pay program denied
coverage for Meghan's medical bills on March 11, 1998, on the grounds that
the claim form had not been filed within ninety (90) days of the injury.
25. Substitute counsel was able to bring the Hennings' claim against
the parents of the fellow soccer player to a successful conclusion after
the complaint was filed with the Superior Court.
26. Mr. Blais neglected the Hennings' Med-Pay claim, missed the
filing deadline for the Med-Pay claim, and made misrepresentations to the
Hennings about the status of the primary claim, causing potentially
serious injury to his clients but no actual injury to them other than his
clients' anxiety.
FINDING OF FACTS in No. 1999.043
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the following are the facts
relating to PRB File No. 1999.043.
27. In the summer of 1994, Andrew Henry ("Henry") was charged with
two counts of DWI.
28. Henry hired Mr. Blais to represent him in District Court on both
charges.
29. Henry entered pleas of not guilty to each charge in August of
1994.
30. In February of 1995, Henry pled guilty to the first DWI, and the
second DWI was dismissed.
31. For unknown reasons, the DMV was never notified that the second
DWI charge had been dismissed.
32. As part of the sentence for the first DWI, Henry's driver's
license was suspended, and he was required to complete one course of
alcohol counseling before his license could be reinstated.
33. Henry completed one course of counseling on or about April 18,
1995.
34. Shortly thereafter, Henry went to the DMV to get his license
reinstated.
35. There, Henry discovered that the DMV thought that Henry stood
convicted of two DWIs, and accordingly they would not reinstate his
license until he showed proof of completion of two courses of alcohol
counseling, rather than the one course that he was actually required to
undergo and which he had successfully completed.
36. Upon being so notified by the DMV, Henry made multiple attempts
from the summer of 1995 through late winter or early spring of 1996 to
contact Mr. Blais by telephone to find out what the problem was, but Mr.
Blais didn't return his calls.
37. Beginning in the early spring of 1996, Henry moved back to
Burlington and thereupon made several appointments to see Mr. Blais to
find out how to resolve the license issue.
38. Henry met with Mr. Blais several times between the spring of 1996
and December of 1997 (a period of about a year and a half).
39. At these meetings, Mr. Blais told Henry that he would take care
of the problem and that Henry need not undergo a second round of
counseling because this was just a mistake at the DMV.
40. In December of 1997, then Henry again met with Mr. Blais. He gave
Mr. Blais a $250 retainer, and Mr. Blais agreed to file a petition on
Henry's behalf to fix the license problem.
41. Henry heard nothing from Mr. Blais after that, his calls were not
returned, and Mr. Blais failed to keep an appointment with Henry in
February 1998.
42. In May of 1998, Henry filed a complaint with the Professional
Responsibility Program alleging that Mr. Blais had neglected his case. As
a result of the complaint, in July of 1998, Mr. Blais attempted to return
the retainer to Henry, but Mr. Blais did not have Henry's then current
address.
43. Mr. Blais later located Henry and returned his retainer.
44. In November of 1998, Henry retained the services of substitute
counsel to assist him in getting his license back.
45. On December 21, 1998, substitute counsel filed a motion to
re-open the civil suspension proceeding and a motion to strike the prior
civil suspension. These motions were granted on or about January 6, 1999,
and Henry's license was reinstated.
46. Due to the inaction and neglect of Mr. Blais, Henry was without a
driver's license from about April 18, 1995, until after January 6, 1999,
and he suffered an impairment of his employment opportunities as a result.
FINDING OF FACTS in No. 2000.042
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the following are the facts
relating to PRB File No. 2000.042.
COUNT ONE
47. A vehicle driven by Ulla Andersen Kauffman ("Kauffman") was
rear-ended at a toll booth on or about December 13, 1986.
48. Ms. Kauffman hired Mr. Blais to represent her in a claim for her
injuries on a contingent fee basis on or about April 29, 1987, and Mr.
Blais agreed to represent her.
49. From time to time, Ms. Kauffman would call Mr. Blais to inquire
into the progress of her claim, and Mr. Blais on those occasions assured
her that the claim was proceeding appropriately; Ms. Kauffman was left
with the impression that progress was slow because the court docket was
crowded.
50. Mr. Blais never settled the claim and never filed a complaint
with the court.
51. The three-year statute of limitations on Ms. Kauffman's claim ran
on or about December 12, 1989.
52. In 1990, Ms. Kauffman planned to move out of state.
53. Before moving out of state, Ms. Kauffman met with Mr. Blais to
review the status of her personal injury claim.
54. At that meeting, Mr. Blais assured Ms. Kauffman that her case was
proceeding appropriately, and Ms. Kauffman was again left with the
impression that progress was slow because the court docket was heavy.
55. After she moved out of state, Ms. Kauffman called Mr. Blais from
time to time to inquire about her case.
56. Mr. Blais did not accept or return most of Ms. Kauffman's calls.
57. When Mr. Blais did speak with Ms. Kauffman, he assured her that
the case was moving forward.
58. In late 1990 or early 1991, Ms. Kauffman made a trip back to
Vermont on unrelated business, and she scheduled an appointment with Mr.
Blais while she was in Vermont to discuss her personal injury claim.
59. When he met with Ms. Kauffman at this time, Mr. Blais informed
her for the first time that he had missed the statute of limitations on
her personal injury case.
60. Mr. Blais told Ms. Kauffman that a legal malpractice suit against
him was now the appropriate way to proceed, and he encouraged her to file
such a suit against him.
61. In late 1991, Ms. Kauffman hired an attorney to represent her in
a legal malpractice action against Mr. Blais.
62. This attorney filed the malpractice claim against Mr. Blais on or
about April 29, 1992.
63. The legal malpractice action was settled with Mr. Blais's
insurance carrier for the amount of the responsible driver's policy
limits.
64. Mr. Blais neglected Ms. Kauffman's personal injury claim, missed
the statute of limitations, and made misrepresentations to her about the
status of the claim; Mr. Blais caused potentially serious injury to his
client but no actual injury other than delay in the payment of his
client's claim.
COUNT TWO
65. In 1988, Marjorie Bicknell ("Bicknell") hired Mr. Blais to
represent her in a divorce action.
66. Mr. Blais filed the divorce action with the Superior Court on or
about October 21, 1988.
67. The parties were in basic agreement on the issues in the divorce
except for that issue of the property settlement.
68. Ms. Bicknell informed Mr. Blais that her position on the property
settlement was that she was entitled to one half of the equity in the
parties' home, and she estimated the value of this one half interest at
$75,000.00.
69. Mr. Blais conveyed to the opposing party an offer to settle the
property issue for that amount, and the offer was rejected.
70. Mr. Blais advised Ms. Bicknell that the next step was to obtain
an appraisal of the parties' house, and Mr. Blais told Ms. Bicknell that
he would arrange for the appraisal.
71. From time to time, Ms. Bicknell would call Mr. Blais to check on
the appraisal and the status of her divorce.
72. Ms. Bicknell estimates that she called Mr. Blais on average one
to two times a month during this time period.
73. On the occasions of most of these calls, Mr. Blais did not take
Bicknell's calls, nor did he return her calls. On the occasions when
Bicknell was able to speak with Mr. Blais, he assured her that he was
making arrangements for the appraisal of the parties' house.
74. Mr. Blais never made arrangements for the appraisal of the
parties' house, and the appraisal never took place.
75. As time continued to pass, Ms. Bicknell became anxious for the
completion of her divorce and frustrated by the delay, in part because she
was contemplating re-marriage when the divorce became final.
76. Due to this time pressure, Ms. Bicknell finally told Mr. Blais
that she could not wait any longer for an appraisal, and she instructed
him to take whatever property settlement he could get for her, so that the
divorce could be completed.
77. Mr. Blais was able to get Ms. Bicknell a property settlement
offer of $25,000.00, which she accepted.
78. A Final Divorce Order and Decree, reflecting this settlement
amount, was entered by the Court on March 20, 1990.
79. Mr. Blais neglected Ms. Bicknell's divorce case, causing injury
or potential injury to his client. It is unknown whether the client
suffered actual injury, as no appraisal of the value of the property as of
1989 was ever done.
COUNT THREE
80. On or about December 10, 1989, Marjorie Bicknell ("Bicknell") and
her sister were involved in an automobile collision in Milton, Vermont.
81. Thereafter, and prior to October 18, 1990, Ms. Bicknell and her
sister hired Mr. Blais to represent them in personal injury claims arising
from the accident.
82. Mr. Blais neglected their personal injury claims.
83. From time to time throughout the representation, Ms. Bicknell
would call Mr. Blais to inquire into the status of her personal injury
claim.
84. Ms. Bicknell often had trouble reaching Mr. Blais on the
telephone, and he would seldom return her calls.
85. On more than one occasion when Ms. Bicknell was able to speak
with Mr. Blais, Mr. Blais assured her that her claim was proceeding
appropriately.
86. Ms. Bicknell's claim was not proceeding appropriately, as Mr.
Blais failed to file the claim with the Superior Court prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations.
87. On or about December 9, 1992, the statute of limitations expired
on the two personal injury claims.
88. Ms. Bicknell and her sister later hired a different lawyer to
represent them in a legal malpractice claim against Mr. Blais arising out
of this matter.
89. Although Mr. Blais hired an attorney to represent him and to
negotiate on his behalf in the legal malpractice actions, he did not
contest liability in the legal malpractice action, and the matter was
settled.
90. Mr. Blais had no malpractice insurance in effect at the time of
the claims of Bicknell and her sister, and he paid compensation to both
clients out of his own pocket.
91. Mr. Blais neglected Bicknell's personal injury claim, missed the
statute of limitations, and made misrepresentations to her about the
status of the claim, causing potentially serious injury to his client but
no actual injury, other than the delay in the payment of her claim.
92. Mr. Blais has substantial experience in the practice of law.
93. Mr. Blais had been sanctioned in two prior proceedings, a public
reprimand for failing to provide an accounting to a client in a timely
fashion and a private admonition for neglecting a client matter.
94. Mr. Blais has cooperated with Disciplinary Counsel in these
disciplinary proceedings.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Vermont Code of Professional Responsibility applies to all
conduct in these proceedings since all of it took place prior to September
1, 1999. Based on the above findings of fact, the Panel accepts the
parties stipulation that the following violations have occurred.
1. In PRB No. 1998.033, Mr. Blais neglected filing the Med-Pay claim
form to apply for interim payment of a portion of his client's medical
bills, pending settlement of the underlying personal injury claim in
violation of DR 1-102(4) (conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation). Further, Mr. Blais misled his clients into believing
that he had filed the Med-Pay claim and a Superior Court complaint which
the clients had signed in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting "a
legal matter entrusted to him").
2. In PRB No. 1999.043, Mr. Blais neglected to take necessary action
to have his client's driver's license reinstated in violation of DR
6-101(A)(3).
3. In PRB No. 2000.042, Count One, Mr. Blais misrepresented the
status of the personal injury claim by falsely giving the client the
impression that the complaint had been filed and that the court docket was
the reason the matter had not come to trial, in violation of DR 1-102(4).
Further, Mr. Blais neglected his client's personal injury claim and
allowed the statute of limitations to run on the claim without filing a
complaint in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).
4. In PRB No. 2000.042, Count Two, Mr. Blais failed to obtain an
appraisal of the marital home as he had told his client he would in
violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).
5. In PRB No. 2000.042, Count Three, Mr. Blais misrepresented to his
client that her personal injury claim was proceeding in court when he had
not filed the complaint in violation DR 1-102(4). Further, Mr. Blais
neglected his client's personal injury claim and allowed the statute of
limitations to run on the claim without filing a complaint in violation of
DR 6-101(A)(3).
SANCTIONS
Additional findings of fact.
Based on the testimony of Andrew Henry, Marjorie Bicknell, and Mr.
Blais at the hearing on January 14, we make the following additional
findings of fact:
1. Mr. Blais's neglect in PRB No. 1999.043 in failing to
have his client's driver's license reinstated resulted in
his client losing his current full-time job as an insurance
agent, and later losing a permanent but part-time job with
Airborne Express. The client further suffered from feelings
of abandonment and depression as a result of Mr. Blais'
neglect.
2. The client in 1999.043 took advantage of the lack of
a driver's license to return to school for a degree which
would further his career in finance. The client's life was
disorganized because he needed to get rides from friends and
family members. He often did not go places he wanted to
because he could not find a ride.
3. Mr. Blais' neglect in PRB No. 2000.042, Count Two,
did not result in financial harm. Although the client
received less than 50% of the equity in the family house,
that did not result from Mr. Blais' failure to obtain a new
appraisal but from the client's desire to finalize the
divorce because she wished to remarry.
4. In 1991, Mr. Blais and his wife were divorced. Their
six and four year-old children continued to live with his
wife. Mr. Blais was very upset over being separated from his
children.
5. As a result of disagreements over firm financial
matters and one partner's desire to become a judge, the law
firm of which Mr. Blais had been a partner was disbanded in
1994. During this period, Mr. Blais focused his efforts on
matters which would generate cash for the firm. As a result,
he neglected what he referred to as "smaller matters." Mr.
Blais recognizes that the matters involved in these
proceedings was of great importance to the clients and that
he should not have taken on the matters but sent the clients
to other lawyers.
6. Mr. Blais became a sole practitioner, sharing a
secretary with another lawyer until 1996 or 1997 when he
hired a full-time secretary for his exclusive use.
7. Mr. Blais candidly stated that he was not enjoying
practicing law in view of the way the practice has changed
over the years although he still enjoys helping his clients.
8. If he is suspended for longer than one month, he will
be unable financially to retain his current secretary.
9. Mr. Blais sincerely regrets having neglected his
clients.
Sanctions imposed
Deputy Disciplinary Counsel and Mr. Blais have jointly recommended a
two month suspension and 18 month probationary period. The Hearing Panel
agrees that a suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case but do
not believe that two months are sufficient to protect the public. American
Bar Association Standards for Lawyer Sanctions, III. A. 1.1. The A.B.A.
Standards list four categories of factors to consider in determining
discipline: the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, actual or
potential injury caused by the misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating and mitigating factors. Standard, III. A. 3.
1. The duties violated
Mr. Blais's conduct in the five matters involves neglect over a
period extending from 1987 (PRB File No. 2000.042, Count One) through
December, 1998 (PRB File No. 1999.043) in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). In
two cases, Mr. Blais allowed the statute of limitations to run on clients'
claims. Mr. Blais's neglect began before Mr. Blais's marital difficulties
and extended well beyond the breakup of the law firm and a reasonable
opportunity to get organized in his own office. Mr. Blais's conduct in at
least three of the matters involved express or implied misrepresentation
that complaints had been filed and/or that a matter was proceeding
properly although little or no action had been taken in violation of DR
1-102(4).
Mr. Blais violated two duties to his clients which go to the heart of
the lawyer-client relationship. If clients cannot rely on lawyers'
statements as to the progress of the matter, it will be impossible to
develop the relationship of trust which lawyers must have to properly
represent clients and for the legal system to function properly.
Similarly, a lawyer's failure to perform the representation is obviously
fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship.
2. The lawyer's mental state
Mr. Blais acted knowingly. This is not a case where a lawyer was
unconsciously neglectful. Mr. Blais's neglect and misrepresentations
resulted from a conscious decision setting law firm priorities. As Mr.
Blais testified, at least through 1994, he made a decision to focus on
matters which would generate funds for his law firm and put "smaller
matters" aside.
3. Actual or potential injury
Mr. Blais's neglect resulted in actual harm to several clients.
Virtually every client was subjected to the stress of being unable to have
their matters handled within an appropriate period of time. Even more
seriously, one client lost two jobs resulting from Mr. Blais's neglect
(PRB File No. 1999.043), in addition to having the rest of his life
disrupted by the delay in having his license reinstated. In two matters
(PRB File No. 2000.042), clients had to file malpractice actions against
Mr. Blais to receive compensation on claims which should have been
resolved much earlier but for Mr. Blais's neglect. Ultimately, Deputy
Disciplinary Counsel has failed to establish that in the end any client
sustained financial harm.
It is difficult to measure the harm resulting from a lawyer's
misrepresentation to clients that matters are properly proceeding.
Certainly this has a serious potential adverse impact on people's faith in
the legal system.
ABA Standard, 4.42 provides that suspension Is generally appropriate
when:
(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a
client and causes injury or potential Injury to a client, or
(b) a lawyer engages In a pattern of neglect and causes
Injury or potential injury to a client.
ABA Standard, 4.62 provides that suspension is generally appropriate "when
a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes Injury or potential
Injury to the client.
The above facts clearly meet both Standards.
4. Aggravating and mitigating factors
Aggravating factors under ABA Standards 9.2
We find that there are five aggravating factors established by the
evidence:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses; and
(e) substantial experience in the practice of law.
Mr. Blais has two prior disciplinary offenses, one in 1992 and one in
1997. One offense, for failing to provide an accounting to a client in a
timely fashion, resulted in a public reprimand and the other offense, for
neglecting a client matter, resulted in a private admonition.
We believe that Mr. Blais acted from a selfish motive, at least in
part. As indicated above, Mr. Blais's testimony established that much of
the neglect in these matters resulted from Mr. Blais's concern with
bringing in money for himself and his firm.
The record also establishes a pattern of misconduct and multiple
offenses. The charges in the three matters before us involve neglect of
five different matters. The neglect and misrepresentations stretched over
eleven years. The neglect continued although Mr. Blais had been sanctioned
for client neglect in 1992.
As the parties have stipulated, Mr. Blais has substantial experience
in the practice of law.
Mitigating factors under ABA Standards 9.2
We find that there are three mitigating factors established by the
evidence:
(a) personal or emotional problems;
(b) cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(c) delay in disciplinary proceedings.
For part of the time covered by these proceedings, Mr. Blais was
suffering marital problems which led to a divorce in 1991. However, Mr.
Blais' acts of neglect and misrepresentation began before the time of
those difficulties and lasted until well after the divorce. At some point
the failure to address personal or emotional problems ceases to be a
mitigating factor. A lawyer has responsibility to seek help with matters
which are impairing his or her practice of law.
As for stress created by the financial problems of the law firm, here
too, Mr. Blais' neglectful actions occurred both before the problem arose
and after it was resolved. While Mr. Blais attributed some of his neglect
to not having a full-time secretary, there is no evidence that matters
improved after Mr. Blais hired a full-time secretary in 1996 or 1997.
Mr. Blais cooperated with Disciplinary Counsel after the complaints
were filed. Although this is listed as a mitigating factor under the
A.B.A. Standards, it is difficult to give it much weight since the failure
to cooperate could constitute an independent violation. That is, Mr. Blais
complied with his ethical obligation to cooperate. DR 1-101(A)(5) and Rule
8.4(d).
There has been some delay in some of the disciplinary proceedings
through no fault of Mr. Blais. The hearing on sanctions originally was
scheduled in 2001 and was postponed as a result of Mr. Blais' counsel's
schedule. The oldest petition was filed in 1998, dealing with neglect in
1997. Thus, there was a delay of three years in the oldest matter.
Mr. Blais and Deputy Disciplinary Counsel stipulated that a two-month
suspension was appropriate. We do not believe that a two-month suspension
is sufficient to protect the public.
The A.B.A. Standards do not provide specific guidelines for
determining the length of a suspension. A.B.A. Standard 2.3 states that
"Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater
than six months". Shorter term suspensions appear more as a punishment
than as a sanction necessary to protect the public. Going back to 1990,
the Vermont Professional Conduct Board and the Vermont Professional
Responsibility Board have recommended and the Supreme Court has imposed or
approved a suspension in 24 cases. Of those, 3 were for three years, 1 was
for two years, 1 was for 18 months, 1 was for one year, and 12 were for
six months, and 6 were for less than six months. Fully half of all
suspensions were for the A.B.A. Standard's recommended six month period.
One quarter of the suspensions were for less than six months. Recently, a
Hearing Panel imposed a four-month suspension stipulated to by the
parties. See, In Re: David Sunshine, Esq., PRB File Nos. 2001.001 &
2001.075.
There is a critical difference between a six month suspension and a
suspension shorter than six months. A lawyer who receives a suspension of
six months or more must go through the process of a reinstatement hearing
at which Mr. Blais must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the lawyer is qualified to practice law. Administrative Order 9, Rule 22
(B) and (D).(FN2) A lawyer suspended for less than six months is
automatically reinstated at the end of the suspension period.
We believe that the length of suspension should be considered in
light of whether provision for probation combined with a short term
suspension can adequately protect the public from future violations by
Mr. Blais. In this case, we are presented with a lawyer who has neglected
clients over a long period of time. Mr. Blais had also been put on notice
through two other disciplinary proceedings in which he was sanctioned,
that he needed to revise his methods of practice. Combined with that,
Mr. Blais has candidly admitted that he no longer enjoys practicing law as
it has evolved during the time he has been a lawyer. A substantial
suspension will provide both the time for him to plan a new approach to
law practice and time to consider whether he would be more satisfied
pursuing some other profession. A two month suspension clearly will not be
sufficient.
The Hearing Panel spent substantial time struggling with the question
of suspension duration. Particularly, the Panel considered whether a six
month suspension was appropriate or whether less than six months would
provide sufficient protection for the public. We have concluded that a
five month suspension, plus a substantial probation period is sufficient
to protect the public in this case.
The parties submitted a stipulation to probation, including a
provision for mentoring. We accept that stipulation with an additional
provision to run from the termination of the probationary period involving
mentoring.
Probation with Period of Mentoring:
1. Mr. Blais shall be placed on probation with mentoring, as provided
in Administrative Order No. 9, Rule 8A(6) and a written Mentoring
Agreement in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, for a minimum term of
eighteen (18) months, which term may be renewed for an additional period
as provided by A.0. 9, Rule 8A(6)(a) or by the provisions of Paragraph 9,
to be followed by a further eighteen months of probation without
mentoring in accordance with paragraph 11.(FN3)
2. At the commencement of probation, Mr. Blais shall undergo a Risk
Management Audit at his expense, conducted by a professional risk
management auditor, encompassing at least calendar management, caseload
management, client communications, and general law office management
practices. Mr. Blais shall obtain a written report from the risk
management auditor and shall promptly review the report with his probation
monitor, as provided in the Mentoring Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit
A and incorporated herein by reference. The Risk Management Audit shall be
completed no later than fourteen (14) days after the commencement of
probation (and may take place prior to the commencement of probation).
3. Disciplinary Counsel and Mr. Blais, through counsel, agreed that
Stephen Blodget was an acceptable mentor and that Mr. Blodget has agreed
to perform as mentor under Exhibit A. The Hearing Panel finds that Mr.
Blodget is an acceptable mentor. Mr. Blais shall send an executed copy of
Exhibit A no later than seven (7) days before the commencement of
probation.
4. Mr. Blais shall meet with his mentor at least two weeks prior to
the date on which his license is reinstated, in order to begin
implementing the recommendations of the risk management auditor and of
the mentor.
5. Within two weeks of this decision, Mr. Blais shall meet with his
mentor to devise a plan to comply with the terms of the suspension, to
protect Mr. Blais's clients and their interests, and to ensure that Mr.
Blais does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law during the
period of any such suspension.
6. Mr. Blais shall not engage in the practice of law during his
probationary period except in compliance with the terms of his probation
and the terms of the Mentoring Agreement. It shall be Mr. Blais'
responsibility to ensure that he has a probation mentor attorney at all
required times.
7. During the period of probation with mentoring, Mr. Blais shall not
take on any new clients or new matters without approval of the mentor,
after the mentor determines that Mr. Blais can take on the new client or
matter without jeopardizing the interests of the new or of existing
clients.
8. Mr. Blais shall promptly and fully respond to requests from the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel that relate to his compliance, or lack
thereof, with the terms of his probation and with the Mentoring
Agreement.
9. Mr. Blais's probation with mentoring shall be for a minimum period
of eighteen (18) months and may be renewed for additional period(s) of six
months each, consistent with A.0. 9, Rule 8(A)(6)(b). Probation shall be
terminated anytime after the initial eighteen month period or any renewal
term thereof upon the filing of an affidavit by Mr. Blais showing
compliance with the conditions of his probation and an affidavit by the
current mentor stating that probation is no longer necessary and
summarizing the basis for that conclusion. Such affidavits shall be filed
with the Administrative Assistant to the Professional Responsibility
Board, with copies to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The absence of
the filing of such affidavits after eighteen (18) months shall be
considered a recommendation of continued probation with mentor by the
current mentor; in accordance with A.0. 9, Rule 8(A)(6), the probation
monitor shall then file a brief written recommendation for continued
probation to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The Office of
Disciplinary Counsel shall then send notice of intent to renew probation
for an additional six month period to Mr. Blais via certified mail, return
receipt requested. If Mr. Blais wishes an opportunity to be heard on
whether his probation should be renewed, Mr. Blais shall file a request
for a hearing and serve a copy of the request on the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, in accordance with A.0.9, Rule 8(A)(6).
10. The costs of probation are hereby assessed against Mr. Blais.
Probation subsequent to period of mentoring:
11. After the mentoring phase of probation ceases and for a period of
18 months thereafter, Mr. Blais shall submit a list of pending cases and
their status to Disciplinary Counsel on a quarterly basis with a
certificate that he has reviewed the status of each case and that the
matters he is handling are being attended to in accord with his
professional responsibilities.
We feel that this additional period is necessary for the protection
of the public. Many of the acts of misconduct in this matter did not
manifest themselves until several years after the representation began.
This period will provide additional protection against a repeat of that
misconduct.
Therefore, we suspend Mr. Blais from the practice of law for five
months beginning on the date this decision becomes final. Mr. Blais shall
comply with A.O. 9, Rule 23. Further, Mr. Blais will be on probation in
accordance with the above terms upon reinstatement at the end of the
suspension.
Executed this 31 st day of January, 2002 by:
FILED 2/14/02
______________________________
Paul S. Ferber Esq., Chair
______________________________
Robert Bent, Esq.
______________________________
Toby Young
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT A
MENTORING AGREEMENT
Norman R. Blais, Esq. (Blais) and Stephen S. Blodgett (probation
monitor and mentor or mentoring attorney) hereby enter into this
agreement, the terms of which are as follows:
1. Risk Assessment. As soon as the risk management auditor's report
becomes available, Blais and the mentor shall meet to review the report
and shall devise a plan for implementing the recommendations set forth
therein. The mentor shall send the Office of Disciplinary Counsel a copy
of the risk management auditor's report along with the date on which Blais
and the mentor met to review the report.
2. Disclosure of Mentoring Arrangement. Blais shall, for the
duration of his probation, use a client engagement letter with all of his
clients in order to disclose the attorney mentoring arrangement, which
shall in substance state:
"I have agreed to represent you in this (lawsuit, claim,
matter, etc.). I will personally handle your case and will
ensure that no client confidences are disclosed without your
specific authorization. However, as I have advised you, I
have established a mentoring relationship with attorney
Stephen S. Blodgett of Burlington, Vermont, to assist me in
ensuring that the highest quality legal services will be
provided on your behalf.
"I have specifically requested and obtained your
permission to discuss generally your claim or legal matter
with my mentor without discussion of the specific substantive
issues of your claim or legal matter. I will limit these
discussions to the general areas of client needs, client
expectations, client communications, deadlines, and
schedules, and my administrative plan for prompt resolution
of your claim or legal matter. If, in my opinion, it
becomes advisable to discuss the substantive basis of your
claim with my mentor, I will request from you specific
permission to do so in writing, and will do so only after
you have given me that permission.
"You will not be billed or charged in any way for the
time I spend in discussion with my mentoring attorney."
The above information may be incorporated into Blais' retainer letter with
the client or may be provided to the client as a separate letter at the
outset of the representation. During the term of his probation, Blais
will not accept or represent any clients who do not receive the letter set
forth in this Paragraph. Blais will ensure that the mentor has no
conflict of interest before discussing any client's case with the mentor.
3. Case Management and Office Management. Blais and the mentor shall
implement office management and case management procedures and safeguards
to ensure the proper handling of all client matters. These procedures and
safeguards shall include recommendations from the Risk Management Audit,
recommendations from the mentor, and the following recommendations:
a. Blais and/or his agent or employee shall create and
maintain a log book of all incoming telephone calls,
indicating the dates of such calls, the identity of the
caller, and the date on which Blais successfully returned
the call (meaning reached the caller or left a message for
the caller). The log book shall be reviewed with the mentor
at the monthly meetings.
b. Blais and the mentor shall create and maintain a
master list of Respondent's open cases, including
identifying information for each case, the date the case was
most recently worked on, and setting forth the statutes of
limitations, as applicable. The list of open cases shall
be reviewed with the mentor at the monthly meetings.
c. Blais shall prepare a plan of action for each of
his open client files, which plan shall be reviewed with the
mentor at the monthly meetings for appropriateness and
timely implementation.
d. Respondent and the mentor shall create and maintain
a main calendaring system and a backup calendaring system
for all deadlines related to the Respondent's practice. The
calendars shall be reviewed with the mentor at the monthly
meetings.
e. Respondent shall not accept new cases or clients
if, in the judgment of the mentor, his caseload is such that
additional cases or clients would pose a risk of
jeopardizing Respondent's current cases and clients.
4. Meetings with Mentor. Throughout the probationary period, Blais
shall meet once a month with his mentor to review case management and
office management issues, including without limitation the following
issues: client needs, client expectations, client communications, status
and progress of pending matters, deadlines, schedules, and statutes of
limitation, billing and payment issues, and any other issues that, in the
mentor's judgment, would benefit from review. Blais and the mentor shall
meet more often than once a month if, in the mentor's judgment, it is
necessary or beneficial to do so.
5. Personal Issues. During the meetings with the mentor referred to
in Paragraph 4 above, if the mentor or Blais believe it would be helpful,
then the mentor and Blais shall also discuss any issues of a personal
nature which might impact upon Blais' practice.
6. Progress Reports. Within three weeks of each monthly meeting
referred to in paragraph 4 above, the mentor shall submit a written report
to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel discussing Blais' progress under and
compliance with the terms of his probation. In the event that Blais and
the mentor meet more often than once a month, it shall not be necessary to
submit interim reports, but the monthly report shall include all important
information not previously reported.
7. Communication. Blais permits and authorizes the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel and the mentor to communicate with each other at all
reasonable times as to Blais'compliance with and progress under the terms
of his probation and this mentoring program, and as to the mentor's
recommendation for any extensions of the term of the probation beyond the
initial eighteen month period. The mentor agrees to provide all pertinent
information to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and to report to the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel any violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that come to the attention of the mentor, as required by Rule 8.3
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
8. Costs and Expenses. Blais shall pay all costs and expenses
associated with his probation and this mentoring agreement, including
without limitation the cost of a Risk Management Audit and all charges of
his mentor, including the mentor's charges, if any, for meeting with Blais
and for preparing reports to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
9. Termination of Mentoring Agreement and Probation. As set forth
in the Stipulation to Terms of Probation, the minimum term of the
probation shall be eighteen months. Blais' probation shall terminate after
eighteen months, provided that Blais submits the affidavit required under
A.O. 9, Rule 8A(6) and provided that the probation monitor/mentoring
attorney submits the affidavit required under A.O. 9, Rule 8A(6). Blais
and the mentor shall send copies of any such affidavits to the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel. If such affidavits are not submitted, then the
probation shall be renewed as set forth in the Stipulation to Terms of
Probation and in A.O. 9, Rule 8.
10. Unavailability of the Mentor. In the event that the mentor is
unable to continue to act as mentor under this agreement, he or she shall
give notice to Blais and to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel as soon as
practicable, to allow Blais sufficient time to find a substitute mentor.
The choice of substitute mentor shall be submitted to the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel for approval before a Mentoring Agreement is entered
into between Blais and the substitute mentor.
DATED this _____ day of January, 2002.
______________________________
Norman R. Blais, Esq.
______________________________
Stephen S. Blodgett, Esq.
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Footnotes
FN1. All of these incidents took place prior to September 1, 1999;
thus the Vermont Code of Professional Responsibility applies.
FN2. While the current provisions of (D) seek to provide expedited
procedures for ensuring that reinstatement proceedings not unduly lengthen
the suspension period, in a six month suspension, the evidence needed to
establish rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence may not be
available after three months. Therefore, a six month suspension is likely
to be longer than six months.
FN3. Anything in the Mentoring Agreement which is inconsistent with
the provisions A.O. 9 is superseded by the A.O. 9 provision.
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