Berkshire School v. Town of Reading

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Berkshire School v. Town of Reading (2000-398); 172 Vt. 440; 781 A.2d 282

[Filed 24-Aug-2001]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2000-398


Berkshire School	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Windsor Superior Court


Town of Reading	                                 June Term, 2001 



Alan W. Cheever, J.

Christopher K. Rice of Wilson & White, P.C., Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kimberly L. Carboneau of Boylan & Richards, P.C., Springfield, for 
  Defendant-Appellant.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Cook, D.J., 
          Specially Assigned


       JOHNSON, J.   For the second time this term, we are confronted with
  the issue of whether  our property tax exemption statute, 32 V.S.A. §
  3802(4), contains a use requirement.  Appellant  Town of Reading appeals
  from a decision of the Windsor Superior Court granting taxpayer  Berkshire
  School an exemption from property taxes under § 3802(4) for a parcel of
  land the school  owns in the Town of Reading.  The court held that under
  the exemption, ownership by a school is the  only requirement.  We reverse.

       The Berkshire School is a non-profit corporation that operates an
  accredited private high  school in Sheffield, Massachusetts.  In November
  1998, a 212 acre parcel of land in Reading, 

 

  Vermont was donated to the school.  The land is undeveloped.  The parties
  agree that  although the school plans to use the property for a student
  mountain program and environmental  science classes, there is no current
  educational use of the land.

       At issue in this case is the status of the land for the purpose of
  property tax assessments.  The  school argues that the property falls
  within the exemption for "lands owned or leased by colleges,  academies or
  other public schools" in § 3802(4).  The Town contends that this statute
  requires the  land to be used by the school for an educational purpose and
  that mere ownership is not enough to  qualify the parcel for the exemption. 
  The case arose when the Town appraised the property at  approximately
  $250,000.  The school grieved the appraisal to the Board of Listers and
  then to the  Board of Civil Authority, on the grounds that the property was
  tax exempt.  After decisions in both  those bodies reduced the taxes, but
  denied the school the tax exemption, the school brought the case  to
  superior court.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that
  there was no  educational use requirement in the statute.  Previous
  discussion of a use requirement for the  exemption, in this Court's cases,
  were dicta, according to the court.  On appeal, the Town argues that  the
  court misread our precedent on this exemption, which establishes a use
  requirement, in addition  to an ownership requirement.  Berkshire School
  counters that the plain language of the statute  indicates that ownership
  alone qualifies a property for the exemption.

       In reviewing a motion for summary judgment we apply the same standard
  as the trial court.   Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
  demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to  material fact, and the
  moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Guiel v. Allstate
  Ins.  Co., 170 Vt. 464, 467, 756 A.2d 777, 780 (2000).

       The statute at issue, 32 V.S.A. § 3802 states in relevant part:

 



         The following property shall be exempt from taxation:

                                 . . .


         (4) Real and personal estate granted, sequestered, or used
    for  public, pious or charitable uses; real property owned by
    churches or  church societies or conferences and used as
    parsonages and personal  property therein . . . ; real and
    personal estate set apart for library uses  and used by the public
    and private circulating libraries . . . ; lands  leased by towns
    or town school districts for educational purposes; and  lands
    owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public schools  .
    . . ; and lands and buildings owned and used by towns for the 
    support of the poor therein . . . .  The exemption of lands owned
    or  leased by colleges, academies or other public schools, shall
    not apply  to lands or buildings rented for general commercial
    purposes . . . ;

  (Emphasis added).  This case concerns the exemption only for "lands owned
  or leased by colleges,  academies or other public schools" (lands owned
  exemption).  Any statutory exemption from  property tax is to be strictly
  construed against the taxpayer.  Stowe Preparatory School, Inc. v. Town  of
  Stowe, 124 Vt. 392, 396, 205 A.2d 544, 546 (1964).

       In a companion case issued today, Burr and Burton Seminary v. Town of
  Manchester, No.  00-294 (Vt. Aug. __, 2001), we interpret § 3802(4) under
  very similar circumstances.  In that case,  we trace the long standing use
  requirement implicit in the statute.  Burr and Burton, slip op. at 5-6.  
  We hold that despite the language of § 3802(4), a use requirement is
  consistent with the legislative  purpose of the exemption statute, which is
  to free from taxation land that is being used to serve some  public
  purpose.  Id. at 4.  We conclude that a school must use its property for an
  educational purpose,  in addition to own it, in order to claim the
  exemption.  Id.at 7.  Necessarily, therefore, we interpret §  3802(4)
  identically in this case.

       Applying this holding to the specific property in this case, we
  conclude that land owned by  the school is not exempt.  The property owned
  by the school currently is simply a plot of land that 

 

  is not being used at all, let alone for any educational purpose.  At such
  time that the school  actually begins to use the property, the issue of
  exemption may be raised again at the next appraisal.

       Reversed.




                                       FOR THE COURT:


                                       
                                       _______________________________________
                                       Associate Justice




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