State v. Crannell

Annotate this Case
State v. Crannell (99-407); 171 Vt. 623; 768 A.2d 1260 

[Filed 06-Dec-2000]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 1999-407

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2000


State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 2, Rutland Circuit
Charles A. Crannell	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 1327-10-92 Rdcr

                                                Trial Judge: Francis B. 
                                                             McCaffrey

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Appellant Charles Crannell appeals a decision of the Rutland District
  Court dismissing a  motion for the recovery of property seized by a lawful
  warrant, or in the alternative, for damages for  the value of the property. 
  The court concluded that the State did not have possession of the property 
  and that the court had no jurisdiction to consider damages.  Appellant
  claims that the motion was  properly before the district court and that it
  failed to conduct adequate hearings as to the whereabouts  of his property. 
  We affirm in part and reverse in part.

       Appellant was convicted of murder in October 1995 and sentenced to
  life imprisonment with  no possibility of parole in January 1997.  We
  affirmed his conviction in January 2000.  State v.  Crannell, __ Vt. __,
  750 A.2d 1002 (2000).  At the time of his arrest, appellant was living in
  an  apartment in Pennsylvania that was searched pursuant to a lawful
  warrant.  Certain items of personal  property were seized in conjunction
  with that search.  In November 1997, before his conviction was  finalized,
  appellant filed a motion in the district court for return of the seized
  property pursuant to  V.R.Cr.P. 41(e).  The items he sought were 1) his
  1985 Corvette automobile and all the items inside  the car listed in a
  search warrant inventory; 2) a cellular phone; 3) his wallet; and 4) $250
  in cash, a  wedding ring, and two answer phones.

       After a hearing in May 1998, the court ordered the State to return all
  of appellant's property  except, upon offering sufficient proof, items that
  may have evidentiary value in the event of a retrial.  The State returned
  appellant's wallet but represented that it was not in possession of the
  other items.  Appellant returned to court arguing that the State had not
  complied with the court's order.  Although  the State protested that it was
  unaware of the location of the other items, the court issued another  order
  in April 1999, requiring the State to offer a full accounting, including a
  chain of custody, for  each of the remaining items.  The order specified
  that the State's response was due in fourteen days.   After the State
  failed to respond in that time, appellant moved for an order of contempt.

       Several weeks later, the State filed an extensive affidavit prepared
  by the State's investigator.   The affidavit addressed the State's position
  on the whereabouts of each of the items in appellant's  original motion. 
  The affidavit concluded that aside from the wallet, which 

 

  was returned, the items either had not been seized in the first place or
  were no longer in the State's  possession.  The affidavit included excerpts
  from police reports relating to the search of appellant's  apartment.  In
  response, appellant filed another motion for contempt alleging that the
  State's response  was insufficient under the court's order of April 1999
  and requesting compensation for those items  that could not be returned to
  him.  The court held a final hearing in July 1999, at which it concluded, 
  in one sentence, that the State's response was adequate and that the court
  did not have jurisdiction to  investigate the issue any further.  On
  appeal, appellant argues that the district court does have  jurisdiction
  under V.R.Cr.P. 41(e) to proceed with evidentiary hearings about the
  location of the  items and that the court should award damages for
  unrecoverable items.

       The parties devote much of their briefs to the issue of whether the
  district court has jurisdiction  over appellant's motions.  Specifically,
  the parties disagree as to whether V.R.Cr.P.  41(e) covers  appellant's
  motion because his property was seized lawfully, while the Rule appears to
  apply only to  unlawful seizures. (FN1)  We need not reach this issue,
  however, because the State concedes that the  district court has
  jurisdiction over appellant's motion under its "inherent powers." 
  Furthermore, as  we indicated in State v. Kornell, 169 Vt. 637, 638, 741 A.2d 290, 291  (1999) (mem.), once a district  court has granted a motion
  for return of property, the court retains ancillary jurisdiction to ensure
  the  order is followed.  This conclusion is consistent with that of federal
  courts operating under an older  version of F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) that is nearly
  identical to the current Vermont rule.  See, e.g., United  States v.
  Totaro, 468 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (D. Md. 1979) ("Although Rule 41(e) by its
  terms applies  only to return of illegally seized evidence . . . courts
  have both the jurisdiction and the duty to order  the return of seized
  evidence to its rightful owner . . . once the need for the evidence has 
  terminated.") (emphasis in original).

       Indeed, we read the court's decision in July 1999 that it did not have
  jurisdiction narrowly  to  mean only that it did not have authority to
  order the State to pay compensation for any items that  were lost or
  destroyed by the State.  We agree.  Statutorily, the district court has a
  very limited civil  jurisdiction.  See 4 V.S.A. § 437.  The district
  court's ancillary jurisdiction to order return of property  is based in
  equity, Kornell, 169 Vt. at 638, 741 A.2d  at 291, and should not extend to
  actions for  damages.  Therefore, any motion seeking a remedy at law for
  seized property no longer in the State's  possession properly belongs in
  superior court.  See 4 V.S.A. § 113 (jurisdiction of superior court);  see
  also United States v. Totaro, 472 F. Supp. 726, 730 (D. Md. 1979) (federal
  district court's  ancillary jurisdiction over Rule 41(e) motions does not
  extend to claims for damages).

       Thus, the real question before us is whether the State's affidavit is
  sufficient to comply with the  court's orders of May 1998 and April 1999. 
  Because district courts "generally use caution and  restraint before
  exercising ancillary jurisdiction," Kornell, 169 Vt. at 638, 741 A.2d  


 

  at 291 (internal quotations and citations omitted), and because of the
  largely factual nature of the  inquiry, we will not disturb the court's
  decision absent an abuse of its sound discretion.  See State v.  Ives, 162
  Vt. 131, 142, 648 A.2d 129, 135 (1994) (we will not reverse a trial court's
  evidentiary  rulings unless there was an abuse of discretion); Belock v.
  State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 Vt. 435, 439,  175 A. 19, 21 (1934) (motion
  to set aside verdict as against the evidence reviewed for abuse of 
  discretion).

       The court concluded that for each of the items that appellant listed
  in his motions, the State's  affidavit adequately demonstrated that the
  State either did not have the item in the first place, or  subsequently no
  longer possessed the item.  We take each item in turn.

       Among the items seized in Pennsylvania was a 1985 Corvette in
  appellant's possession.   Appellant claims that the purchase price was
  loaned to him by Transportation Leasing, Inc., but that  he actually owned
  the car.  The State's affidavit states that the car was leased from
  Transportation  Leasing and that the car was returned to the lessor.  While
  appellant disputes the ownership status of  the Corvette, this argument is
  immaterial.  The title to the car is held by Transportation Leasing, Inc., 
  and thus the State acted properly when it returned the car to its lawful
  owner.  Any dispute between  appellant and Transportation Leasing is not
  before this Court.

       Appellant also seeks the return of all the items inside the Corvette
  at the time of its seizure.   The Vermont State Police completed an
  extensive inventory of the car after the seizure.  The  affidavit claims
  that most items were not taken into custody and remained with the car.  
  After the car  was transported to Vermont, however, certain items were
  removed from the car for further  investigation.  The affidavit tersely
  concludes that the state "will not return any such items and will  continue
  to hold them as evidence" (emphasis in original) because they have
  potential evidentiary  value in the event of a retrial.  In its order of
  May 1998, the court specified that:

    [T]he state may file an affidavit specifying any of the seized
    property  which it reasonably believes to have evidentiary value
    in the event of  a retrial, together with the basis for its
    belief.  The defense may  respond within ten days of the state's
    filing.  The court will thereupon  issue a ruling as to the
    state's claim for continued possession of  specified property.

  Even if the state's affidavit satisfies the court's requirement that the
  state justify the evidentiary need  for the item, and we doubt that it
  does, the court did not follow its own mandate that it issue a  specific
  ruling on the State's claim to the item.  There has been no showing by the
  State that the items  in its custody have any evidentiary value and no
  finding by the court to that effect either.  Appellant  should at least be
  entitled to the procedure laid out by the court in its May 1998 order for
  the items  removed from the Corvette.

       Appellant's cell phone is also the subject of controversy.  Appellant
  claims that his cell phone  was seized from his apartment and sent to MCI
  for testing.  The State's affidavit claims that no cell  phone was ever
  seized.  The evidence submitted in support of this claim is an excerpt from
  the police  report from October 22, 1992.  Appellant alleges, however, that
  police returned the next day to his  apartment, seized the phone and
  submitted it to employees from MCI to determine if the phone was  used to
  make certain phone calls.  Although the documents submitted with the briefs
  provide no  support for appellant's claims, other documents in the record
  do.  Examination of the record reveals  at least fifteen pages of material
  concerning the 


 

  investigation of a cell phone.  These documents appear to relate to an
  investigation to determine  whether a phone number could be altered or
  switched to another number.  The documents include:  notations of cell
  phone numbers and chip information; a subpoena to MCI Security requesting 
  information on appellant's phone credit card number; emails among MCI
  employees, including the  one named in appellant's allegations, discussing
  how appellant could have made a call from his cell  phone and make it
  appear as if the call originated from a different number; and a lengthy
  memo to  the MCI employee named in appellant's allegations discussing
  specifically a cell phone observed by  police when they searched his
  apartment.  The number and content of these documents indicate that  the
  cell phone was likely a serious matter of investigation.  Indeed, certain
  phone calls made by  appellant were a significant issue in the criminal
  case.  Crannell, __ Vt. at __, 750 A.2d  at 1016.  We  hold, therefore, that
  appellant's allegations and the corroborating evidence from the record are
  a  sufficient showing that the cell phone may have been seized by police to
  require the State to respond.  The affidavit offered by the State claims
  only that the phone was not seized on October 22, but does  not address the
  possibility that the phone was seized at a later date, nor does it explain
  the  investigatory materials found in the record.  Because appellant has
  raised a significant question as to  whether the police seized his phone,
  the court abused its discretion in accepting the State's affidavit  on this
  point.

       As for the remaining items, appellant states only that two answer
  phones, a wedding ring, and  $250 in cash were missing from his apartment
  after the initial search and seizure.  Unlike the  allegations regarding
  the cell phone, however, appellant offers no specific claims regarding the
  items'  location.  In fact, appellant can offer no evidence that these
  items were ever in the State's possession,  or that they existed at all. 
  The threshold burden remains on appellant to prove that the State at some 
  time seized the items before the State must offer an explanation as to the
  items' whereabouts.  Given  that appellant failed to meet this evidentiary
  hurdle, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion  in finding the
  State's affidavit offered an adequate explanation as to the location of
  these items.

       We therefore remand the court's decision for further proceedings
  consistent with this opinion.

       Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.



                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice



------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Footnotes


FN1.   V.R.Cr.P. 41(e) provides:

    A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the 
    court to which the warrant was returned or the court in the county
    or  territorial unit where property has been seized without
    warrant for the  return of the property on the ground that he is
    entitled to lawful  possession of the property which was illegally
    seized.



Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.