State v. Gadreault
Annotate this Case
State v. Gadreault (99-208); 171 Vt. 534; 758 A.2d 781
[Filed 26-Jul-2000]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-208
MARCH TERM, 2000
State of Vermont } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } District Court of Vermont,
} Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit
Raymond R. Gadreault }
} DOCKET NO. 126-2-98Wncr
Trial Judges: Walter M. Morris,
Alan W. Cheever
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant Raymond Gadreault appeals his conviction for cruelty to
animals. He argues that (1) the court erred by ruling that the specific
offenses of the cruelty to animals statute with which he was charged do
not include an intent element; (2) he was denied a speedy trial; (3) the
search warrant used to search his property was obtained through illegal
means; (4) the court's sentence was excessive, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights; (5) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he
was not allowed to assist his attorney and because the State failed to call
a particular witness; and (6) the trial judge should have been recused.
We affirm.
On December 3, 1997, a search of defendant's property revealed three
frozen, dead pigs in an unsheltered pen in six inches of liquid manure,
and a calf tethered to a fence post that appeared weak and to have
difficulty standing. (FN1) On February 5, 1998, defendant was arraigned on
four counts of cruelty to animals in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 352
(previously 13 V.S.A. § 352(a)). Following a two-day jury trial held in
March, 1999, defendant was found guilty on three counts. He was sentenced
to six months to one year on each count, consecutive, all suspended with
probation, and this appeal followed.
First, defendant claims that the court erroneously excluded the intent
element from the crimes with which he was charged. The intent element, or
mens rea, of a crime embodies one of the most fundamental principles in
criminal law: a person cannot be held criminally liable for
causing a bad result without a culpable mental state with respect to that
result. See State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 523, 573 A.2d 286, 290
(1990).
The State charged defendant with violating the following two
provisions of the cruelty to animals statute:
A person commits the crime of cruelty to animals if the person:
. . .
(3) ties, tethers, or restrains an animal, either a pet or
livestock, in a manner that is inhumane or is detrimental to its
welfare. Livestock and poultry husbandry practices are exempted;
(4) deprives an animal which a person owns, possesses or acts as
an agent for, of adequate food, water, shelter, rest or
sanitation, or necessary medical attention, or transports an
animal in overcrowded vehicles.
13 V.S.A. § 352(3), (4). The State filed a motion in limine to preclude
defendant from introducing evidence supporting a diminished capacity
defense, arguing that the relevant subsections of the cruelty to animals
statute do not require intent and thus are strict liability offenses.
After initially denying the motion, the court granted it on
reconsideration, reasoning that the purpose and plain language of the
statute supported the conclusion that intent was not an element of
subsections (3) and (4). We agree.
When statutory crimes are without a common-law antecedent, we resolve
the question of which mental element, if any, is required through
statutory construction. See State v. Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 132, 702 A.2d 105, 113 (1997). Cruelty to animals was not an offense at common law. See
Regaldo v. United States, 572 A.2d 416, 420 (D.C. 1990); In re William G.,
447 A.2d 493, 495 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); State v. Prater, 109 S.W. 1047, 1049 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (acknowledging that if "cruelty to animals
was a criminal offense at common law, which some writers deny, it was
superseded so entirely in England by statutes as to pass out of view.").
In construing statutes, we give effect to the Legislature's intent while
mindful of the law's subject matter, its effects and consequences, and its
reason and spirit. See Dann, 167 Vt. at 132, 702 A.2d at 1113. Our first
step in determining the Legislature's intent is to study the language of
the statute. See Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999).
Neither §352(3) nor (4) expressly provide an element of intent. "When
the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea required of a particular
offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute creates a
strict liability offense." State v. Audette, 149 Vt. 218, 221, 543 A.2d 1315, 1317 (1988) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Sargent, 156 Vt.
463, 465, 594 A.2d 401, 402 (1991)). Rather, we determine the
Legislature's intent through consideration of several factors, the most
pivotal of which is the severity of the punishment provided for the
offense. See id. at 221-22, 543 A.2d at 1317 (quoting 1 W. LaFave & A.
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.8(a) (1986) ("[T]he greater the
possible punishment, the more likely some fault is required;
and, conversely, the lighter the possible punishment, the more likely the
legislature meant to impose liability without fault.")). Cruelty to
animals in violation of § 352(3) and (4) is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine of $2,000 or both, as well
as the possible forfeiture of the abused animal and any other animal and
any future right to own or possess an animal. See 13 V.S.A. § 353. This
is not an overly severe penalty, and imposing it on a strict liability
basis would not create absurd or unjust results. See Audette, 149 Vt. at
222, 543 A.2d at 1317 (concluding that offense carrying possible twenty
five-year jail sentence requires intent element to avoid absurd or unjust
results).
In addition, many of the other enumerated statutory means of
committing cruelty to animals expressly require an intent element.
Subsection (2) prohibits the exposing of an animal to a poison "with
intent that it be taken by the animal." 13 V.S.A. § 352(2). Subsection
(5) prohibits the keeping or training of an animal "with intent that it be
engaged in an exhibition of fighting." Id. § 352(5). Subsection (8)
prohibits one from "intentionally" tormenting or harassing an animal owned
by the police or a state agency. Finally, subsection (9) prohibits the
"knowing" sale of artificially colored poultry. Id. § 352(9). Since the
Legislature expressly included elements of intent in other subsections of
the animal-cruelty statute, "we cannot assume a mere inadvertent omission"
of intent from subsections (3) and (4), nor "find an unexpressed intent by
implication." State v. Kerr, 143 Vt. 597, 605, 470 A.2d 670, 674 (1983).
Because the punishment for a violation of subsection (3) and (4) is not
severe and the subsections do not include an intent element, in contrast to
other subsections, we conclude that the Legislature intended that
offenders of § 352(3) and (4) be held strictly liable.
Our conclusion is bolstered by Vermont's long-standing proscription
against animal cruelty as well as this Court's recognition that intent is
not an element of the crime. The cruel beating or torturing of animals
was criminalized as early as 1854. See 1854, No. 51, § 1 ("Every person
who shall cruelly beat or torture any horse or ox, or other animal,
whether belonging to himself or not, shall be punished by imprisonment . .
. not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars,
or both . . . ."). In 1872, "for the more effectual prevention of cruelty
to animals," the Legislature declared that, "[w]hoever shall . . . fail to
provide with proper food, drink, and shelter . . . any horse, ox, or other
domesticated animal," shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or
fined up to two hundred dollars, or both. See 1872, No. 29, § 1. The
Legislature further defined animal cruelty in 1876:
[W]hoever, having the charge or custody of any animal, either as
owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the same,
or unnecessarily fails to provide the same with proper food,
drink, shelter or other protection from the weather, shall for
every offense be punished by imprisonment in jail not exceeding
one year, or by fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.
1876, No. 14, § 1 (emphasis added). The phrase "unnecessarily fails to
provide" remained on the books until 1989, when it was replaced with the
current statutory scheme. See 13 V.S.A. § 403; 1947 V.S. § 8360; 1933
P.L. § 8500; 1917 G.L. § 6919; 1906 P.S. § 5809; 1894 V.S. § 4993; 1880
R.L. § 3935.
In 1946, we explained that "[t]he words 'unnecessarily' and 'proper'
are to be understood in their ordinary sense, and as here used can only
mean that while the respondent could have provided such food and drink he
failed to do so." State v. Persons, 114 Vt. 435, 437, 46 A.2d 854, 855-56
(1946) (interpreting 1933 P.L. § 8500). This construction supported our
later holding that "the statute shows that neither intent nor malice is an
essential element to be proven to obtain a conviction for a violation of
the statute." State v. Vance, 119 Vt. 268, 274, 125 A.2d 800, 803 (1956)
(construing 1947 V.S. § 8360). Thus, since 1956, Vermont law proscribing
animal cruelty required only that the perpetrator's actions be voluntary.
See id.; Annotation, What Constitutes Offense of Cruelty to Animals-Modern
Cases, 6 A.L.R.5th 733 § 10 (view that offender's actions must be
committed voluntarily). We see no reason to change this approach under the
statute currently in force, particularly in consideration of the fact that
the Legislature has deleted the word "unnecessarily" from § 352(3) and
(4).
We recognize that §352(3) includes the word "inhumane," which itself
implies an element of intent. To "restrain an animal . . . in a manner
that is inhumane" requires the general intent on behalf of the restrainor
to effect restraint in a particular manner, one that is specifically not
humane. The statute, however, imposes liability for restraining an animal
in a manner that is "inhumane or detrimental to its welfare." Thus, the
restraint need only be detrimental to the animal's welfare, which does not
require the general intent that it be inhumane. Because we find that the
Legislature intended that subsections (3) and (4) set forth strict
liability offenses, the court did not err in excluding an intent element
from its instruction.
We note, however, that, as strict liability offenses, §352(3) and (4)
require at least that the restraint or deprivation of food, water, and
shelter be the result of a voluntary act or omission. "While a strict
liability crime does not require a culpable mental state, it does require a
voluntary criminal act." L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping
Strict Liability Crimes, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 431 (1993). A voluntary
act includes an affirmative act or an act of omission. See id. at note
154 (citing Model Penal Code § 2.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
Although intent is not an element, "the act or omission must be 'willful,'
i.e., deliberate and voluntary, in order to violate even a strict
liability provision." 21 Am. Jur.2d Criminal Law § 146. That the omission
was involuntary, therefore, is a defense available to a person who takes a
trip, leaving adequate food and water for his pet, and is unable to return
to replenish the provisions because of a storm or other unanticipated or
uncontrollable event. Such a defense would also be available to a person
who should own an animal that unexpectedly requires medical attention when
he is not present to provide it. A court may, however, as did the court
in the instant case, preclude defendant from referring to, or introducing
any evidence relating to, his mental capacity or orientation to reality.
Next, since his trial did not commence until 14 months after his
arraignment, defendant claims that the court denied him his right to a
speedy trial. Of the factors used to assess this claim - length of delay,
reasons for delay, defendant's efforts to obtain a speedy trial, and the
prejudice to the defendant - it is the prejudice to the defendant which is
most important. See State v. Turgeon, 165 Vt. 28, 35, 676 A.2d 339, 343
(1996). "Where there is no prejudice to the defense at trial, a speedy-
trial claim cannot prevail." Id. Here, defendant has not identified any
prejudice to his defense. Although he has mentioned that he was
restricted from raising his own food, this is not a relevant prejudice to
the defense of his prosecution. Therefore, we find no violation of his
right to a speedy trial.
Defendant next contends that the information upon which the search
warrant was based was illegally obtained and, thus, the warrant was
unlawful. Defendant presented this very contention to the court in a
motion to suppress, which the court denied. The court found that, as to
the observations of police, Humane Society Officers and others of
conditions of the animals at the defendant's property, "the present record
establishes that these observations were all made from constitutionally
permissible vantage points." Defendant has not identified anything in the
record which shows that the court's ruling was clearly erroneous or
unsupported by the record. Therefore, we will not disturb the court's
finding on this matter. See State v. Zaccaro, 154 Vt. 83, 86, 574 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1990) ("We will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact
unless they are unsupported by the evidence or clearly erroneous.").
Defendant next claims that his sentence was excessive in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. There is nothing in the record to show that
defendant preserved this issue for appeal because he failed to file
transcripts of the proceedings below; thus we will not consider it. See
Appliance Acceptance Co. v. Stevens, 121 Vt. 484, 488, 160 A.2d 888, 891
(1960) ("It is the burden of the party challenging a ruling to furnish the
reviewing court a transcript of the proceeding involved . . . . To omit to
incorporate into the record on appeal the transcript of applicable
testimony and proceedings without authorization is to forfeit review of
questions requiring reference to the transcript."); Town of Hinesburg v.
Dunkling, 167 Vt. 514, 523, 711 A.2d 1163, 1169 (1998) (we may not
consider on appeal issues not raised in trial court).
Finally, defendant contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were
violated because he was not allowed to assist his attorney and because the
State failed to call a particular witness who was present at the search of
his house; and the judge, who was acquainted with defendant, should have
been recused. Defendant's failure to file a transcript also precludes us
from reviewing these claims. See Appliance Acceptance, 121 Vt. at 488,
160 A.2d at 891. The lack of transcripts leaves us with insufficient
information with which to address these issues. For example, defendant
claims that he was denied the opportunity to assist his attorney in
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Also, defendant claims that, as
a result of his acquaintance with the trial court judge, the judge should
have recused himself. Without a record, we cannot shed any light on these
claims. We cannot determine how defendant was denied the opportunity to
assist his attorney, if at all. Nor can we assess the nature of the
judge's relationship with defendant, if any, to determine if in fact the
judge should have been recused.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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Footnotes
FN1. Due to defendant's failure to file a transcript with the Court, we
reference the facts contained in the State's affidavit of probable cause.
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