Rennie v. State
Annotate this Case
Rennie v. State (99-089); 171 Vt. 584; 762 A.2d 1272
[Filed 23-Oct-2000]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-089
JUNE TERM, 2000
Judith G. and Robert Rennie } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } Windham Superior Court
}
}
State of Vermont, et al. } DOCKET NO. 220-5-95 Wmcv
Trial Judge: John P. Wesley
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Plaintiffs Judith and Robert Rennie appeal from a summary judgment of
the Windham Superior Court in favor of defendants, the State of Vermont
and three State employees. Plaintiffs contend the trial court
erroneously: (1) dismissed her wrongful discharge claim on the ground that
Rennie had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (2) dismissed
her other claims as time barred. We affirm.
Rennie worked for the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services
from June 25, 1990, until she left her position for medical reasons on
April 15, 1992. The following May, Rennie filed a grievance with the
Labor Relations Board, alleging that the Department had violated provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement, rendered an unsatisfactory
performance evaluation without just cause, bypassed progressive corrective
action, failed to provide adequate notice of performance deficiencies and
opportunity to remediate, changed standards of performance, and misused the
process of corrective action. The complaint further alleged that the
Department had violated the agreement by subjecting her to a campaign of
harassment in retaliation for her grievances and refusal to resign her
position voluntarily. Rennie sought removal and destruction of the
evaluation and a cease and desist order. On June 1, 1992, shortly after
filing the grievance, Rennie formally resigned her position.
At a hearing on the grievance before the Board in December 1992, the
State agreed to remove and destroy the adverse performance evaluation, and
moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment. Rennie thereupon moved to
amend her grievance to assert a claim for wrongful constructive discharge.
The Board denied the motion to amend, and granted the State's motion to
dismiss. No appeal was taken from the Board's decision.
On May 31, 1995, Rennie and her husband filed a complaint against
defendants in superior
court, alleging wrongful constructive discharge, tortious interference with
contract, violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act under 21
V.S.A. § 495, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of
her civil rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, loss of consortium,
and "prima facie tort." The court granted the State's unopposed motion
for summary judgment, ruling that Rennie had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies on Count I (wrongful discharge), and had failed
to file the complaint within the three-year statute of limitations
applicable to the remaining claims. This appeal followed.
We review a motion for summary judgment using the same standard as the
trial court. See Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 160 Vt. 150, 158, 624 A.2d 1122, 1127 (1992). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
moving party has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See State v. G.S.
Blodgett Co., 163 Vt. 175, 180, 656 A.2d 984, 988 (1995). In determining
whether material facts exist for trial, we must resolve all reasonable
doubts in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at
158-59, 624 A.2d at 1127.
Rennie first asserts that the court erred in dismissing the wrongful
discharge claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This Court
has consistently held that when administrative remedies are established by
statute or regulation, a party must pursue, or "exhaust," all such remedies
before turning to the courts for relief. Jordan v. State, 166 Vt. 509,
511, 702 A.2d 58, 60 (1997). This long settled rule of judicial
administration "serves the dual purposes of protecting the authority of
the administrative agency and promoting judicial efficiency." Id. at 512,
702 A.2d at 60.
Here, there is no dispute that the Board had jurisdiction to decide
the wrongful constructive discharge claim. See In re Baldwin, 158 Vt.
644, 646, 604 A.2d 790, 791 (1992) (affirming Board's finding that
evidence failed to support grievant's claim that working conditions were so
intolerable as to support wrongful constructive discharge claim); In re
Bushey, 142 Vt. 290, 298, 455 A.2d 818, 822 (1982) (reversing Board's
finding of wrongful constructive discharge where evidence failed to
sustain claim that resignation was involuntary); In re Stacey, 138 Vt. 68,
70, 411 A.2d 1359, 1360 (1980) (involuntary termination from employment is
an aspect of grievant's employment and therefore Board had jurisdiction
over grievance). Indeed, Rennie clearly recognized her obligation to
grieve the alleged wrongful termination through the established
administrative process. At the hearing before the Board in December 1992,
she moved to amend her complaint to add a claim of wrongful constructive
discharge. The Board denied the motion, however, explaining in its written
decision that Rennie had offered no justifiable excuse for waiting until
the very day of the hearing, seven months after her resignation in June,
to assert the claim, and that the amendment would prejudice the employer,
trigger an additional round of discovery, and delay resolution of this and
other cases pending before the Board. Rennie did not appeal the Board's
decision.
As noted, where the Board has jurisdiction to determine a grievance,
an employee may not avoid the administrative process by pursuing the
matter directly in court. See Jordan, 166 Vt. at 511, 702 A.2d at 60;
Boynton v. Snelling, 147 Vt. 564, 566, 522 A.2d 232, 233-34 (1987).
Although Rennie failed in her last-minute effort to amend the grievance to
allege a wrongful constructive discharge, failed to appeal the Board's
denial of the motion to amend, and does not contest that
decision here, she asserts that the exhaustion requirement was nevertheless
satisfied. We disagree. The exhaustion doctrine is designed to ensure
that a grievance is fully explored and litigated before the administrative
body possessing the pertinent experience and expertise in the subject area;
the doctrine thus serves to preserve the authority of the administrative
body, and to promote judicial efficiency. See Jordan, 166 Vt. at 512, 702 A.2d at 60. Rennie's belated and unsuccessful motion to amend did not
satisfy the prerequisites, or the purposes, of the exhaustion doctrine.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly entered judgment
for the State on the wrongful discharge claim.
Rennie next contends the trial court incorrectly applied the
three-year statute of limitations to bar the remaining causes of action.
She asserts that the claims accrued only when she resigned on June 1,
1992, and therefore that the complaint, filed on May 31, 1995, was timely.
The statute of limitations runs from the time when a plaintiff can first
sue and recover its demand. See Furlon v. Haystack Mountain Ski Area,
Inc., 136 Vt. 266, 270, 388 A.2d 403, 406 (1978). Here, all of the
essential acts comprising the claims occurred on or before April 15, 1992,
the date her employment terminated. Accordingly, the trial court
correctly concluded that the claims were time barred.
Rennie also contends that the court erred in failing to apply the
six-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 511 to the tortious
interference claim. We have long grappled with the differences between
the three-year statute under 12 V.S.A. § 512 and the provisions of the
six-year statute, codified at 12 V.S.A. § 511. Section 512 enumerates
five types of actions covered by the three-year statute, (FN1) including
generally injuries to person and injuries to personal property, whereas §
511 is a catchall statute that applies to civil actions generally, except
as otherwise provided. (FN2)
Although, as the State notes, this Court has not considered the
statute of limitations applicable to tortious interference claims, other
states have addressed the issue. Those with similarly varying
statute-of-limitation periods have generally applied a shorter limitation
period applicable to injuries to property or personal injuries. See, e.g.
Mazzanti v. Merck & Co., 770 F.2d 34, 36 (3rd Cir. 1985) (applying
Pennsylvania two year "injury to personal property" statute of limitations,
rather than residual six-year statute, to claim for tortious interference
with employment contract); Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Borg-Warner Sec.
Corp., 993 P.2d 436, 445-46 (Alaska 1999) (claim for fraudulent
interference with contract governed by statute of limitations applicable to
"injury to the person or
rights of another"); Omega Industries, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 593 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (App.Div. 1993) (claim for tortious interference with contractual
rights barred by application of New York's three-year statute of
limitations applicable to injuries to personal property); Muckelroy v.
Richardson School Dist., 884 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Texas'
two-year limitations period for injuries to estate or property of another,
rather than residual four-year limitations period, applied to tortious
interference with contract claim).
This Court has long applied the principle that the "nature of the harm
done is the determining factor in construing the two limitations
provisions [§§ 511 and 512], rather than the [party's] characterization of
the action." Fitzgerald v. Congleton, 155 Vt. 283, 288-89, 583 A.2d 595,
598 (1990) (quoting Stevers v. E. T. & H. K. Ide Co., 148 Vt. 12, 13, 527 A.2d 658, 659 (1987)). Thus, to determine the applicable statute of
limitations, we must look to the essence or gravamen of the specific
claim. See id. at 290, 583 A.2d at 599.
Here, Rennie's complaint alleged that, as a result of the claimed
tortious interference with contract, she "suffered severe physical and
emotional health problems and was forced to resign her position, under
duress." As we have previously held, "claims for damages resulting from .
. . mental anguish, emotional distress, and personal humiliation . . .
constitute injuries 'to the person' within the meaning of § 512(4)." Id.
at 291, 583 A.2d at 599-600. Although Rennie also asserted that as a
result of the interference she "lost income, and other [employment]
benefits," the gravamen or essence of the claim was that she was so
physically and emotionally besieged that she had to resign. We thus
conclude that the nature of the harm alleged to have been done in this case
was properly characterized as personal injuries, and the fact that some
economic losses were also alleged did not alter the essence or "underlying
nature" of Rennie's claim. Id. at 290, 583 A.2d at 599. The three-year
statute of limitations thus governed, and the claim was time barred. (FN3)
Rennie also contends that the trial court incorrectly applied the
three year statute of limitations to bar her remaining claims, arguing
that the court should have applied the six-year period under 12 V.S.A. §
511. The State first raised the statute of limitations defense in its
motion to dismiss, asserting that the claims were time barred under the
three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 512. In her opposition
to the motion, Rennie argued that none of the claims had accrued until the
date she resigned, on June 1, 1992, and therefore that the claims were
timely under the three-year statute. In addition, she argued that "[w]ith
respect to count number two [tortious interference with contract], the
applicable statute of limitations is section 511, which permits an action
to be brought within six years." Rennie did not file an opposition to the
State's subsequent motion for summary judgment, which again raised the
three-year statute of limitations defense as to the bulk of the claims.
The record thus discloses that -- with the exception of count two --
Rennie failed to raise or argue the applicability of the six-year statute
of limitations at trial. The court's summary judgment
order merely indicated that all of the claims alleged injuries to the
person, and were barred by § 512. Nothing in the record reveals that
Rennie brought to the court's attention any argument that § 511 applied to
any of her claims other than count two. We have consistently held that
where the court below was not presented with a fair opportunity to
consider and address an issue, the claim of error is waived and we will
not rule on the issue's substance. See Long v. L'Esperance, 166 Vt. 566,
570 n.4, 701 A.2d 1048, 1052 n.4 (1997); Dunning v. Meaney, 161 Vt. 287,
292, 640 A.2d 3, 6 (1993). That was plainly the case here. Accordingly,
we decline to address the applicability of the six-year statute of
limitations to the remaining claims.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Helen Toor, Superior Judge
Specially Assigned
_______________________________________
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
Specially Assigned
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Footnotes
FN1. Section 512 provides: "Actions for the following causes shall be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not
after: (1) Assault and battery; (2) False imprisonment; (3) Slander and
libel; (4) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, injuries to the
person suffered by the act or default of another person, provided that the
cause of action shall be deemed to accrue as of the date of the discovery
of the injury; (5) Damage to personal property suffered by the act or
default of another."
FN2. Section 511 states: "A civil action, except one brought upon the
judgment or decree of a court of record of the United States or of this or
some other state, and except as otherwise provided, shall be commenced
within six years after the cause of action accrues and not thereafter."
FN3. This is not to hold or suggest that the essence of the injuries
alleged in other cases must necessarily be characterized as injuries to
the person under 12 V.S.A. § 512(4), rather than, for example, damage to
personal property under § 512(5).
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