State v. Wooten

Annotate this Case
State v. Wooten (98-553); 170 Vt. 485; 756 A.2d 122

[Opinion Filed 07-Apr-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 10-May-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 98-553


State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont
                                                 Unit No. 3, Essex Circuit

Stephen V. Wootten	                         September Term, 1999


John P. Meaker, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stephen V. Wootten, Pro Se, Island Pond, Defendant-Appellee.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.  In this case, we decide whether Vermont has jurisdiction
  over the crime of  custodial interference where defendant took his children
  from the state of Vermont while he was the  lawful custodian.  The State
  contends that, where the children and defendant were Vermont residents 
  before defendant absconded, the orders of a Vermont court were flouted, and
  the taking of the  children occurred in Vermont, Vermont has jurisdiction
  to prosecute defendant.  We agree,  reverse  the trial court's dismissal,
  and reinstate the charges against defendant.

       Laurie Marrano and Stephen Wootten married and had two boys, Seth and
  Nathaniel.  They  lived with the Community Church in Island Pond, Vermont. 
  In 1987, mother  returned to her home 

 

  in western New York, and the boys stayed in defendant's care in Island
  Pond.  In June 1989, mother  filed for divorce in Vermont, not seeking
  custody of the boys.  On September 5, 1989, she amended  her complaint to
  request custody. 

       On September 5, 1989, the Essex Family Court held a hearing on the
  issue of custody.   Mother testified that she loved her children and wanted
  to raise them.  She explained that in the two  years since she had left
  Island Pond, her visitation with the boys had been extremely limited and 
  always supervised.  She also testified that defendant had warned her he
  would take the children and  "disappear" if she sought custody.  The court
  specifically found that mother had seen the children  only six or seven
  times over two years, visitation had always been supervised, and she had
  sent  letters and presents that she believed defendant had not given to the
  children. The court also found  that defendant had threatened to disappear
  with the children, but said, "hopefully [that is] no longer  a current
  threat."  It concluded that there was no evidence that mother would be a
  negative influence  on the children and that it would be in the best
  interests of the children to have contact with both  parents. 

       The court therefore ordered that defendant should have temporary
  physical custody until  September 27 at 3:00 p.m. and that mother have
  unsupervised, separate visitation with the boys on  September 6 and
  September 26, in Vermont.  The court further ordered, "neither party shall
  remove  the children, Seth and Nathan, from the State of Vermont pending
  further order of this court."  Both  parties had notice that the September
  27 hearing would revisit the issue of custody.

       On September 26, mother went to Island Pond to pick up the boys for
  the court-ordered  visitation and was told by a church member that
  defendant had taken the children away.  Defendant  failed to appear at the
  custody hearing on September 27.  The family court took evidence and made 

 

  findings that defendant had failed to obtain needed medical care for the
  children in the past, and was  not fostering a relationship between the
  children and their mother.  The court also noted that  defendant had failed
  to appear at the hearing and that the location of the children was unknown.  
  The  court therefore awarded temporary custody to mother, which was made
  permanent in 1990. (FN1)  The following day, the state of Vermont charged
  defendant with custodial interference, dating from  September 27. 

       Affidavits from the Wootten children presented to the trial court
  detail their experience of  the seven and a half years between September
  1989 and March 1997.  Defendant took the children  into hiding with him
  when he fled Vermont in September 1989.  Over the years following,
  defendant  moved the family at least eight times.  Defendant adopted a
  false identity and gave the boys false  names.  The boys, aged six and
  eight when abducted, were never enrolled in school for the seven  years
  they lived with their father in hiding.  Nor were they permitted to
  participate in any activities  that required positive identification.  Both
  affidavits state that defendant told the children they were  running and
  hiding from mother, who was trying to locate them.  

       In March 1997, defendant was finally located in Florida, and the boys
  were returned to  mother in Oswego, New York.  He was arrested and waived
  extradition to Vermont.  On October  21, 1997, he filed a motion to dismiss
  for lack of a prima facie case, alleging that the State could not  show he
  "knowingly" kept the children from mother.  The district court denied the
  motion, having 

 

  determined that defendant knowingly kept mother and the authorities from
  discovering the children's  whereabouts.  The court specifically noted
  that, although defendant was "not physically served with  the September 28,
  1989, Order," that factor was not dispositive because there was substantial 
  evidence that defendant actually knew he was interfering with custodial
  rights. 

       On August 31, 1998, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
  jurisdiction.   The State  responded that Vermont had jurisdiction because
  the children were Vermont residents who were  injured by defendant's
  conduct and because defendant violated a superior court order prohibiting
  the  removal of the children.  On December 3, 1998, the court dismissed the
  State's case for lack of  jurisdiction based on our decision in State v.
  Doyen, 165 Vt. 43, 676 A.2d 345 (1996), holding that  Vermont had
  jurisdiction to prosecute custodial interference where the deprived mother
  was a  Vermont resident.

       The State appeals the dismissal of the charges of custodial
  interference for lack of  jurisdiction.  It argues that Vermont may
  properly exercise jurisdiction for three reasons.  One, the  children were
  Vermont residents at the time of their abduction. (FN2)  Two, defendant
  removed the  children from Vermont, thereby committing an act within
  Vermont's territorial borders.  Three,  defendant's removal of the children
  was in direct violation of a Vermont court order prohibiting  either parent
  from removing the children from the state. (FN3)



       Defendant's argument against jurisdiction centers on two themes: (1)
  that jurisdiction for  custodial interference lies only in the state where
  the lawful custodian resides, in this case, New  York; and (2) that Vermont
  cannot exercise jurisdiction where a defendant was never served with  the
  order depriving defendant of custody.   First, we determine whether Vermont
  courts possess  jurisdiction in this case.  Second, we consider defendant's
  argument that his willful evasion of notice  deprives the State of
  jurisdiction. 

                                     I.

       The statute at issue defines custodial interference as "taking,
  enticing or keeping a child from  the child's lawful custodian, knowingly,
  without a legal right to do so, when the person is a relative  of the child
  and the child is less than eighteen years old."  13 V.S.A. § 2451. (FN4) It
  is undisputed  that

 

  defendant is a relative of the boys and that they were less than eighteen
  years old when he removed  them from Vermont.  Thus, the issues in this
  case are whether defendant's actions in "taking,  enticing, or keeping" the
  children permit Vermont jurisdiction, and whether he acted "knowingly, 
  without a legal right to do so."
  	
       Criminal jurisdiction has traditionally rested on one of two grounds. 
  The common law rule  is that "a state has power to make conduct or the
  result of conduct a crime if the conduct takes place  or the result happens
  within its territorial limits." 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive
  Criminal Law  § 2.9(a), at 180 (1986) (emphasis added).  See also Doyen,
  165 Vt. at 49, 676 A.2d  at 348 (collecting  cases in context of custodial
  interference).  This doctrine has been known as the "effects" doctrine, 
  because it holds that a state may exercise jurisdiction when the effects of
  a crime are felt within the  state.  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
  Conflict of Laws § 37 (1971) ("A state has power to  exercise judicial
  jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act
  done  elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from those
  effects. . . .").  

       As we commented in Doyen, the United States Supreme Court has
  "endorsed this view of  a state's criminal jurisdiction."  See Doyen, 165
  Vt. at 49, 676 A.2d  at 348 (citing Strassheim v.  Daily, 221 U.S. 280,
  285-86 (1911)). The Strassheim Court held that "[a]cts done outside a 
  jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects
  within it, justify a state in  punishing the cause of the harm as if
  [defendant] had been present at the effect, if the State should  succeed in
  getting him within its power." Strassheim, 221 U.S.  at 285.  Thus, when we
  first 

 

  addressed a case of custodial interference, we considered our jurisdiction
  in light of the effects  doctrine.  

       Most courts considering custodial interference have viewed it as a
  crime of omission  occurring in the state where the deprived custodian
  resides and therefore based their jurisdiction on  the "effects" doctrine. 
  See, e.g., Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) 
  ("[T]he commission of a crime is consummated in Alaska when the crime is
  defined to require a  result as a necessary element and when that result
  occurs inside the state."); State v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Idaho
  1992) (construing Idaho statute and finding jurisdiction); People v.
  Harvey,  435 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) ("The detrimental
  effects of defendant's intentional  retention of the [child] in violation
  of the Michigan court's custody order occurred within the state,  since it
  was the authority of a Michigan court that was thwarted and it was the
  custodial right of a  Michigan resident that was infringed upon."). These
  states have reasoned that the effects of a  deprivation are felt where the
  injured party lives.

       We turned to this line of cases when we first construed our own
  custodial interference  statute.  In Doyen, a father who had visitation
  rights picked up his daughter in Vermont and left the  state.  The
  visitation period ended two weeks later, but the father did not return the
  child to her  mother.  The father and daughter were eventually located in
  Hawaii, and he was charged with  custodial interference by Vermont.  He
  contended that the "keeping" of the child occurred  exclusively outside of
  Vermont, thereby precluding Vermont jurisdiction.  See Doyen, 165 Vt. at 
  45, 676 A.2d  at 346.  We held that, where the deprived mother was a Vermont
  resident, Vermont  could exercise jurisdiction over the father even for
  out-of-state conduct.  See id. at 50, 676 A.2d  at  348.  As we observed
  there, the custodial interference statute "explicitly contemplates
  application  to a person

 

  who has kept a child outside of Vermont."  Id. at 46, 676 A.2d  at 346
  (interpreting statutory language  of "keeping").   We noted that other
  states dealing with custodial interference crimes have found two  bases for
  jurisdiction: first, that the crime is one of omission occurring in the
  lawful custodian's state  of residence, and second, that states may impose
  criminal sanctions for out-of-state conduct that has  detrimental effects
  within the state.  See id. at 47, 676 A.2d  at 347.  
 
       Although the State in Doyen argued that jurisdiction was appropriate
  because the child and  the lawful custodian were Vermont residents, see id.
  at 45, 676 A.2d  at 345, our opinion considered  first the issue of the
  deprived mother's residence and found that, because she was a Vermont
  resident,  Vermont could exercise jurisdiction.  This holding comported
  with the line of cases cited above  finding jurisdiction in the state where
  the deprived custodian resides.  Doyen did not, therefore,  require us to
  reach the question of whether a child's residence would justify
  jurisdiction.  The instant  case requires us to answer that question.  

       Defendant reads Doyen to say that the deprived custodian's state has
  exclusive jurisdiction  over the crime of custodial interference.  We do
  not agree with this reading.  It is certainly true that  most states have
  concluded that the state where the wrongfully deprived custodian lives may 
  prosecute for custodial interference.  See id. at 46-47, 676 A.2d  at 346-47
  (collecting cases).   It does  not follow, however, that the custodial
  parent's state is the only state that may ever exercise  jurisdiction over
  the crime of custodial interference.  

       The elements of the offense of custodial interference include (1) an
  intentional (2) taking,  enticing away, keeping, or withholding which (3)
  unlawfully deprives the custodian of custody. See  id. at 50, 676 A.2d  at
  348 (citing Doyle, 828 P.2d at 1320).  It is an unnecessarily narrow 
  construction of the statute to view the crime of custodial interference as
  having only one victim.  
 
 

  Parental abductions not only deprive the other parent of the child, but
  also deprive the child of  contact with the other parent, and, in cases
  like this one, deprive the child of an ordinary childhood.  Failing to
  recognize the harm done to children by these abductions is, in some way, to
  excuse the  abducting parent.  Therefore, in examining the effects of
  defendant's actions, we consider the effects  on the children wrongfully
  retained.  

       In this case, Nathan and Seth Wootten were Vermont residents at the
  time that they were  abducted by their father.  They had been living in
  Vermont for at least three years.  In considering  defendant's motion to
  dismiss, the trial court considered that for seven and a half years, the
  children  had been unable to enroll in school or participate in any
  activity that required positive identification.  Defendant told them to lie
  to people about where they were going and forced them to use false  names. 
  Over the years that they were in hiding, defendant moved the family at
  least eight times. The  Vermont family court had determined, at the
  September 27, 1989, hearing, that it was in the best  interests of the boys
  to live with their mother.  Due to defendant's actions, they had no contact
  with  their mother from September 1989 to March 1997.

       It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the two boys who were
  spirited out of Vermont  and lived on the run for seven and a half years
  were also victims of defendant's custodial  interference.   They were
  deprived of a normal childhood as well as any chance to know their  mother,
  and denied an education.  Several states have recognized that both children
  and parents are  victims of custodial interference. An Alaska commission
  working on revising the criminal code  "specified that the victim of the
  crime is not only the child but also the custodian who has been  deprived
  of the child's custody."  See Strother v. State, 891 P.2d 214, 220 (Alaska
  Ct. App. 1995)  (emphasis added).  An Oregon appeals court noted,
  "[c]learly, the primary focus of the statute is the 

 

  protection of the rights and interests of the two victims of the offense:
  the child and the lawful  custodian from whom the child is taken, enticed
  or kept." State v. West, 688 P.2d 406, 408 (Or. Ct.  App. 1984) (internal
  quotation marks omitted).  

       Another state has recognized that the child's residence forms part of
  the basis for jurisdiction  in cases involving children.  In In re Vasquez,
  705 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1999), the Supreme Judicial  Court of Massachusetts
  considered a defendant arrested in Massachusetts for criminal nonsupport 
  of his children, who lived in Oregon with their mother.  Discussing the
  effects doctrine, the court  observed that in nonsupport and custodial
  interference cases, the defendant's actions caused  "detrimental effect[s]
  occurr[ing] where the child reside[s] with his or her guardian."  Id. at
  611. The  court evidently did not consider the situation presented by this
  case, where the children have a  different home state than their custodial
  mother, due to the very change in custody that defendant  seeks to defeat
  by absconding.  Nonetheless, the court's recognition that the child's
  residence may  be the situs of the crime of nonsupport comports with our
  conclusion that the child's residence may  be a secondary situs of the
  crime of custodial interference. 

       In considering whether Vermont may exercise jurisdiction, we are
  mindful that, under both  the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
  the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Vermont  was the "home state" of
  the Wootten children.  See 15 V.S.A. § 1031(5), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (b)(4) 
  (home state means state in which child lived with his parent(s) for six
  consecutive months  immediately preceding the litigation).  Therefore,
  Vermont was the only state which could properly  have exercised
  jurisdiction over the custody of these two boys at the time that mother
  filed for  divorce and requested custody of the boys.  As we noted in State
  v. Petruccelli, ___ Vt. ___, ___,  743 A.2d 1062, 106 (1999), custodial
  interference statutes "were intended to respond to the 

 

  increasing occurrence of parental abduction of children as a means to
  settle a custody dispute or to  permanently alter custody."  Obviously,
  this crime most frequently arises in the context of an on-going custody
  dispute and, as a practical matter, the state deciding custody will have
  the greatest  interest in enforcing its orders and ensuring compliance. 
  (FN5) Because Vermont was the home  state of the children and was the state
  adjudicating the custody, Vermont had the greatest interest in  compliance
  with its custody orders.  In addition, the state adjudicating custody will
  already have  familiarity with the case and the family when a parent
  commits custodial interference.  In the rare  situation, as here, that a
  deprived custodian does not live in the state adjudicating custody, that
  state  may have a greater justification for exercising jurisdiction than
  the custodian's home state.

       This reasoning is supported by the text of both the UCCJA and the
  PKPA, which gives  weight to factors such as significant connections
  between the family and one state, see  15 V.S.A  § 1032 (2)(A), and where
  significant information about the family may be found, see 15 V.S.A.  §
  1032 (2)(B).  In this case, both of these factors support Vermont's
  jurisdiction.  Defendant and the  two children were all Vermont residents. 
  Vermont was the only proper home state to adjudicate the  custody issues,
  and in fact had been adjudicating them, thereby creating a record that is
  integrally  connected to the criminal prosecution in this case.  These
  facts demonstrate a significant connection  between this family and the
  state of Vermont.  In addition to the family court records, the people 
  with knowledge of defendant's actions relevant to his alleged crime, such
  as the members of his  church, are located in Vermont.  

 

  In the instant case, defendant's actions injured the children first and
  foremost.  Those  children were Vermont residents, and a Vermont court was
  adjudicating their custody.  Vermont  therefore may exercise jurisdiction
  to prosecute defendant for kidnaping his children.  This result  advances
  the purposes of the statutes intended to limit and penalize parental
  abductions - it  facilitates the prosecution of defendants in the states
  where information about their actions exists and  where the detrimental
  effects were felt, either by the deprived custodian or, in certain cases,
  by the  children abducted. 

       Defendant's argument against jurisdiction relies very heavily on our
  holding in Doyen.  But,  as explained above, Doyen presented different
  facts, and this case presents us with a strong  justification for Vermont's
  jurisdiction.  The Doyen rule is appropriate and necessary as a general 
  rule.  It is true that the state where the lawful custodian resides
  experiences the effects of that  custodian's deprivation of his or her
  children.   Doyen did not, however, hold that the deprived  custodian's
  state has exclusive jurisdiction over custodial interference.  Nor have the
  other courts  addressing custodial interference charges.  These courts have
  merely held that the custodian's  residence in the state can confer
  jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Strother, 891 P.2d  at 220; State v. Aussie,  854 P.2d 158, 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Evans, 442 S.E.2d 287, 289
  (Ga. Ct. App. 1994);  Doyle, 828 P.2d  at 1321; People v. McLaughlin, 606
  N.E.2d, 1357, 1358-59 (N.Y. 1992);.  Thus,  defendant's reliance on these
  cases, finding jurisdiction in the deprived custodian's home-state, is 
  inapposite once we have decided that the children are victims also and
  their residence in Vermont  justifies jurisdiction.  

       Where, as here, the children taken from their mother were residents of
  Vermont, and where  the Vermont family court was in the midst of properly
  exercising jurisdiction over a custody 

 

  determination under the UCCJA and the PKPA "home state" test, and where the
  information about  the situation and the parties is primarily located in
  Vermont, Vermont's jurisdiction over the  custodial interference charges is
  proper. 

                                     II

       Defendant nonetheless contends that because he fled the state and
  disappeared under a false  identity for over seven years, preventing
  service of the September 27, 1989, custody order on him,  Vermont cannot
  exercise jurisdiction over his crime.  We reject this argument.  The claim
  depends  on two assertions, neither of which is true.  First, defendant
  asserts that he cannot be prosecuted for  custodial interference because he
  was the children's lawful custodian at the moment of the taking.  We have
  recently rejected this very argument in Petruccelli, ___ Vt. at ___, 743 A.2d  at 1069.   Second, defendant argues that, because he did not receive
  notice of the order changing custody, he  was not "knowingly" retaining the
  boys.  The weight of authority is to the contrary. (FN6)

       Even assuming defendant's arguments were meritorious, they are not
  jurisdictional in nature.  They are more properly framed as arguments that
  the State cannot make out a prima facie case  against defendant.  In fact,
  defendant made these same arguments in his motions to dismiss in June

 

  and October 1997.  The trial court denied the motions and observed that,
  although defendant was  "not physically served with the September 28, 1989,
  Order," that factor was not dispositive because  there was substantial
  evidence that defendant actually knew he was interfering with custodial
  rights.  Having failed to appeal the order denying his motions, defendant
  cannot raise those issues in this  Court, claiming that they are bars to
  jurisdiction.  The factual question of defendant's "knowledge"  may be
  litigated at trial on the merits.  

       Reversed.  The charges against defendant are reinstated and the matter
  remanded for further  proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.



                                       FOR THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Associate Justice


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Footnotes

	
FN1.  Defendant did not challenge the custody decision until May 1998, some
  seven and a half years  later.  The Essex Family Court dismissed
  defendant's motion for relief, noting that defendant had  notice that he
  was not to remove the children, had notice of September 27 hearing that he
  failed to  attend, and never attempted to participate in that hearing or
  any later aspect of the custody  proceedings.  The court specifically found
  that defendant may have removed the children prior to  September 27, which
  would have been a clear violation of the September 5 order.

FN2.  Because we find the first reason is sufficient to support jurisdiction
  in this case, we need not  reach the other grounds suggested by the State.

FN3.  Defendant filed two motions to strike, requesting that we strike the
  following: (1) a  memorandum submitted to the trial court in opposition to
  defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of  jurisdiction; (2) all portions
  of the trial court record in this criminal case prior to the withdrawal of 
  then-State's Attorney Jan Paul on March 23, 1998; (3) transcripts of the
  hearings regarding custody  in the 1989 divorce action; and (4) the docket
  sheets and opinion in the divorce action in the family  court. Item (1),
  defendant argues, was a reply brief that the State was not entitled to file
  and to which  he objected in the trial court.  The court never ruled on his
  objection, however, and the State was  permitted to argue its memorandum at
  the hearing.  The memorandum is therefore one of the original  papers filed
  in the district court in this case and properly before this Court.  See
  V.R.A.P. 10(a).

      Defendant moved to strike all parts of the record formed prior to the
  withdrawal of State's  Attorney Jan Paul because, he alleges, Ms. Paul had
  a conflict of interest.  Whatever the truth of the  alleged conflict,
  striking the record of the court's actions in this judicial proceeding is
  not the proper  remedy.  Cf. State v. Crepeault, 167 Vt. 209, 218, 704 A.2d 778, 784(1997) (requiring disclosure  of potential conflict so that court
  can decide whether attorney is disqualified).  

       Defendant also moved to strike the transcripts of hearings held by the
  family court on the  issue of custody on September 5, 1989, and September
  27, 1989.  The transcripts were presented to  the trial court judge at the
  hearing on December 3, 1998.  Therefore, these transcripts have already 
  been introduced in the criminal proceedings underlying this appeal. 
  Although the trial court failed  to take formal notice of the transcripts,
  the documents themselves were before it and the parties both  referred to
  the content of the transcripts.  Defendant made no objection at that
  hearing to the court's  review of the transcripts and has since relied on
  those transcripts to support some of his own  arguments.  In these
  circumstances, defendant has waived any objection by failing to raise it
  below  and by relying on these materials in his filings in this Court. 

       Finally, defendant objects to the State's inclusion of the family
  court docket sheets and an  opinion by Judge Cohn in its submissions to
  this Court.  As these documents formed no part of our  consideration,
  defendant's motion to strike these items is denied as moot.

       Both motions to strike are denied.


FN4.  Another statutory provision, making specific reference to § 2451,
  clarifies that "the parent with  physical responsibility shall be
  considered the custodial parent." 15 V.S.A. § 665(e).  It would seem, 
  therefore, that the Legislature intended the statutory scheme to mean only
  one parent would be "the  lawful custodian."  This interpretation of the
  statutes is, however, in derogation of the State's  avowed policy of
  encouraging joint custody and therefore we decline to rely on an
  interpretation of  these two statutes that permits the existence of only
  one custodian at any moment.  See also State  v. Petruccelli, ___ Vt. ___,
  ___ 743 A.2d 1062, 1068 (1999) (recognizing that parents of a child may 
  both have a right to physical custody of the child).  

FN5.  In practice, this case demonstrates Vermont's greater interest in the
  matter.  When mother took  the September 27 order to New York to register
  the custody order, New York refused to register it  based on the lack of
  service on defendant.  Thus, defendant's strategy of disappearing succeeded
  in  making his prosecution by New York unlikely.

FN6.  We note numerous decisions of other states holding that actual or
  constructive notice of a  custody order is sufficient to satisfy the
  "knowledge" requirements of a custodial interference statute.  See
  Strother, 891 P.2d  at 224 (inferring defendant's knowledge of his unlawful
  behavior from facts  that he removed child to another state, left a letter
  for wife saying she would never see daughter  again, and kept whereabouts
  hidden from authorities for several weeks); People v. Lortz, 187 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Sampson v. Sampson, 975 P.2d 1211, 1217
  (Kan. 1999); State  v. Arceneaux, 695 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (La. Ct. App. 1997);
  People v. McBride, 516 N.W.2d 148, 150  (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
  Fitouri, 893 P.2d 556, 559 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Lozano v. Lozano,  983 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Ohrt, 862 P.2d 140, 142
  (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).  As the Michigan Court of Appeals commented, "[t]he
  policy underlying the parental kidnaping  statute would be ill served if
  one parent could evade service of process, remove the children from  the
  custodial parent, then successfully claim immunity from prosecution." 
  McBride, 516 N.W.2d   at 151. 



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