State v. Robinson

State v. Robinson  (95-556); 165 Vt 351; 683 A.2d 1005

[Opinion Filed 26-Jul-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-556


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

Todd M. Robinson                                  April Term, 1996


Alan W. Cook, J.


       John W. Vorder Bruegge, Windsor County Deputy State's Attorney, White
  River Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

       Robert Appel, Defender General and Judith A. Ianelli, Montpelier,
  Appellate Attorney, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



       MORSE, J.  Following denial of his motion to suppress, defendant
  entered into a conditional plea for possession of marijuana and a
  switchblade, reserving the right to appeal the denial.  The contraband had
  been found during a search incident to incarceration for summary criminal
  contempt.  Defendant argues that the court's order of summary contempt was
  an abuse of discretion, requiring suppression of the contraband.  He did
  not appeal the contempt order directly.  Because we decline to extend the
  applicability of the exclusionary rule to these circumstances, we affirm
  without reaching the issue of the legality of the contempt order.

       On March 16, 1995, defendant and his estranged wife, Stacey Robinson,
  and her attorney, met at family court to resolve custody and visitation
  issues relating to their minor child.  Defendant appeared pro se.

       During the proceedings, Stacey Robinson was asked whether defendant's
  temper caused her concern in regard to his visitation with their daughter.
  Before she could respond, defendant

 

  interrupted, declaring, "Might as well say yes, sweetie, because I'm not
  going to see you or her," and the following exchange ensued:


    Court: "You might as well keep your mouth shut, sir.  You're in a
    court of law. And if you say anything again without being asked to speak,
    you'll be held in contempt and you'll be placed in custody status.  Do you
    understand that?"

    Defendant: "Then, you can hold me in contempt, sir.  You can have
    whatever you want, as far as visitations."

  Defendant then stood up and, disregarding the court's order to remain
  seated, began to walk out of the courtroom.  The court officer attempted to
  restrain him by holding his arm.

    Defendant: "Let go of me you fucking bitch.  Let go of me.  I want my
    fucking arm. I can't deal with this."

       . . . .

    Court: " --no, we're going to stay here."

    Defendant: "Sir, let me tell you something.  Let go of me.  I haven't
    threatened you. I haven't done anything to you.  I need to take a walk."

  The court again ordered defendant to sit down, and a struggle followed as
  the court officer pushed defendant against the wall, then to the floor and,
  with the help of a second officer, handcuffed him.  During the scuffle,
  defendant referred to the court officer as a "goon."

       The proceedings were disrupted for about three minutes.  After
  defendant had been fully restrained, the court made findings on the record:

    The record will reflect that Mr. Robinson . . . has engaged in
    uncontrolled behaviors and resisted the efforts of the security officers to
    control his behaviors in the presence of the court.

       He's adjudged in willful contempt of the court's orders.  And
     consequence of his contemptuous behavior is disruptive of the orderly
     proceedings of this court.  He will be sentenced to serve 10 days in jail.
     It's a contempt -- a summary contempt committed in the presence of the
     court.  And consequence of these behaviors, a mittimus shall issue for the
     incarceration of Todd M. Robinson for a period of 10 days.  Summary
     contempt of court.


       Under the order, defendant was taken to a holding cell in the
  courthouse.  There he was searched, whereupon the switchblade and marijuana
  were found.

 

                                     I.

       Defendant claims that the judge's abuse of discretion requires
  suppression of the fruits of the search.  He is correct that a search
  incident to an illegal arrest requires suppression of the evidence
  obtained.  State v. Laflin, 160 Vt. 198, 201, 627 A.2d 344, 346 (1993).  
  Because of the unique nature of summary contempt, however, the policies
  behind the exclusionary rule do not require suppression of evidence found
  incident to incarceration for summary contempt.

       V.R.Cr.P. 42(a) provides that criminal contempts may be punished
  summarily where contemptuous conduct occurs in the presence of the court
  and the judge certifies to having witnessed the conduct.  The primary
  distinction between summary contempt and other forms of criminal contempt
  is the lack of due process afforded the contemnor once the order is made.
  "Summary contempt power permits the judge citing for contempt to also
  adjudicate the case and find the offender guilty without notice, a hearing
  or the other rudimentary features which constitute due process of law." 
  Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary Contempt
  Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 948, (1975).  The charge
  and determination of guilt are collapsed into a single act, and the
  offended judge "acts as victim, prosecutor, judge and jury."  R. Goldfarb,
  The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 283 (1962).  Guilt
  is established in one fell swoop, prompting Justice Hugo Black to call
  summary contempt "an anomaly in the law."  Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).  While the contemnor may challenge
  the grounds for the order in a subsequent appeal, the effect of the order,
  when made, is a finding of guilty and the imposition of a sentence.  Thus,
  properly viewed, the search in this case is analogous to a post-conviction
  inventory search prior to incarceration.   Evidence found during such an
  inventory search is not subject to suppression even if the conviction is
  ultimately overturned on appeal.

       This outcome is consistent with the policies underlying the
  exclusionary rule.

 


     "The primary justification for the exclusionary rule [ ] is the
     deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.
     [Supreme Court] decisions have established that the rule is not a personal
     constitutional right. . . .  Instead, `the rule is a judicially created
     remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
     deterrent effect . . . .'"

  In re Saunders, 138 Vt. 259, 262-263, 415 A.2d 199, 201 (1980) (quoting
  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)) (emphasis added) (quoting United
  States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

       The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the "arresting"
  official under the circumstances of this case is nonexistent.  Extension of
  the exclusionary rule here cannot be justified on that ground.

       Moreover, even if one purpose of the exclusionary rule were to deter
  judicial error in the criminal adjudication process, its application here
  would make no sense.  The purpose of summary contempt is to restore order. 
  Evidence discovered when the contemnor is searched in preparation for his
  incarceration is immaterial to the judge's determination that an order of
  summary contempt had been warranted.  That decision is made on the spot,
  and its purpose is achieved independent of the search.  By the time the
  search occurs, the summary contempt proceedings have concluded, the
  contemnor has been removed from the courtroom, and presumably, courtroom
  order and dignity have been restored.  The contempt order has no
  evidence-gathering purpose.  Furthermore, it is not contended, nor do the
  facts suggest, that summary contempt was a pretext for the search. 
  Therefore, application of the exclusionary rule under these circumstances
  is inconsistent with the policies behind it.

       Our holding today is consistent with State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119 (1991). In Oakes, this Court declined to adopt the "good faith"
  exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 173, 598 A.2d  at 121.   In
  Oakes, we were concerned that the good faith exception would shield judges
  and magistrates from subsequent judicial review of their probable-cause
  determination, and this would reduce the level of care taken in preparing
  warrants.  Id. at 181,

 

  598 A.2d  at 125.  This would in turn result in less guidance to judicial
  officers as to what constitutes sufficient probable cause.  Id.  Refusing
  to apply the exclusionary rule in the present case would not erode the
  ability of this Court to offer guidance on Fourth Amendment issues because
  here we are asked to review a contempt order, not the merits of a search
  warrant.  No suppression issue was triggered by the contempt.  There simply
  are no benefits associated with improvements to police work or the
  adjudicative process that would be achieved by application of the
  exclusionary rule to the facts of this case.
   
       Affirmed.
  

                              FOR THE COURT:



                              _______________________________________
                              Associate Justice