Estate of Boniface v. Limoges

Estate of Boniface v. Limoges  (95-663); 165 Vt 632; 687 A.2d 889

[Opinion Filed 15-Oct-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-663

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1996


Estate of James Boniface III, by     }     APPEALED FROM:
Darlene Boniface, Administrator &    }
& Darlene Boniface, Individually     }
                                     }     Windham Superior Court
     v.                              }
                                     }
Stephen Limoges                      }     DOCKET NO. 242-6-93Wmcv


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Darlene Boniface, individually and in her capacity as
  administrator of her son's estate, appeals from a superior court decision
  granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendants.  The case comes
  before the Court prior to entry of final judgment pursuant to V.R.A.P.
  5(a).  The parties have agreed to settle the case based on our decision. 
  The question before the Court is as follows:

     Whether a single "each person" limit of liability under automobile
     policy TFO-12104155, as potentially modified by the policy's out-of-state
     endorsement and 23 V.S.A. section 801, applies to all of plaintiffs' claims
     against defendant collectively, or whether separate "each person" limits of
     liability apply to (i) the estate's claim and (ii) Darlene Boniface's
     individual loss-of-consortium claim.

  We conclude that the "each person" limit applies to all of plaintiffs'
  claims collectively, and consequently affirm.

       Plaintiff's son was killed in an automobile accident in 1991.  The car
  was driven by intervenor Stephen Limoges, a New Hampshire resident, who was
  insured by defendant Maryland Casualty Company.  The policy limited
  liability for bodily injury to $50,000 for each person and $100,000 for
  each occurrence, and further noted that "[t]he limit of bodily injury
  liability . . . as applicable to `each person' is the limit of the
  company's liability for all damages, including damages for care and loss of
  services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person."  Because
  of his prior New Hampshire conviction for driving under the influence,
  however, Limoges' policy contained an out-of-state endorsement that
  potentially expanded Maryland Casualty's liability.  Under the endorsement,
  if Limoges operated a motor vehicle in another state where he was required
  to maintain insurance at a level greater than that provided by the policy,
  "the limits of the company's liability and the kinds of coverage afforded
  by the policy shall be as set forth in such law, in lieu of the insurance
  otherwise provided by the policy."

       Maryland Casualty is willing to pay $50,000, the "each person" limit
  under the policy, to satisfy all of the claims arising out of the death of
  plaintiff's son, including plaintiff's individual claim and the claim made
  by the son's estate.  Plaintiff agrees that under the policy language, any
  compensation for her injury must be included within the $50,000 limit. 
  Plaintiff argues, however, that the out-of-state endorsement in the policy
  requires reference to Vermont's financial responsibility laws.  See 23
  V.S.A. §§ 800-810.  Because of his prior DUI conviction, Limoges was
  required by 23 V.S.A. § 801(a) to have "proof of financial responsibility
  to satisfy any claim for damages, by reason of personal injury to or the
  death of any person, of at least $20,000.00 for one person and $40,000.00
  for two or more persons killed or injured . . . in any one accident."

 

       According to plaintiff, the use of the term "personal injury" in §
  801, rather than the narrower "bodily injury" used in the policy, requires
  Maryland Casualty to consider her claim separately from that of her son's
  estate.  "Personal injury," she argues, includes claims for loss of
  services and consortium that result from a bodily injury to another person,
  while "bodily injury" does not.  Following this reasoning, § 801 would
  require Maryland Casualty to expand the "kinds of coverage" provided to
  include plaintiff's separate claim for loss of consortium. Should plaintiff
  prevail, Maryland Casualty would pay her an additional $10,000, the amount
  left over under the $100,000 limit after the company pays $50,000 to
  plaintiff's son's estate and $40,000 to a third passenger injured in the
  accident.

       Plaintiff's argument fails on two grounds.  First, regardless of the
  meaning of "personal injury," the use of that term in § 801 does not
  require Maryland Casualty in this case to expand the "kinds of coverage"
  provided.  The policy as written does provide coverage for her loss of
  consortium claim.  Although the policy uses the term "bodily injury," that
  term is specifically defined to include "damages for care and loss of
  services."  Despite plaintiff's assertion, Maryland Casualty has not
  refused to make any payment to redress her personal injury; rather, the
  company has refused to pay more than the $50,000 "each person" limit in
  compensation for all damages arising out of the death of plaintiff's son.

       Second, plaintiff's interpretation of § 801 as requiring Maryland
  Casualty to consider her as a separate injured person is not persuasive. 
  The statute requires minimum coverage "of at least $20,000.00 for one
  person and $40,000.00 for two or more persons killed or injured . . . in
  any one accident." 23 V.S.A. § 801(a).  That language is most plausibly
  interpreted to require at least $20,000 in coverage for losses resulting
  from one person's death or injury in an auto accident.  We do not read this
  minimum coverage provision to require plaintiff, who suffered a derivative
  injury of loss of consortium, to be treated as a separate "person[] killed
  or injured in [the] accident."  In fact, we see nothing in § 801(a) that
  prohibits an insurance company from doing what Maryland Casualty did in
  this policy: explicitly including claims for loss of care or services
  within a single-person limit of liability.  The policy exceeds the minimum
  coverage required by § 801(a), and provides coverage for both plaintiff's
  individual claim and the claim of her son's estate.  Plaintiff's attempt to
  use § 801(a) to rewrite other terms of the policy is therefore unavailing.

       Affirmed.


     BY THE COURT:


     _______________________________________
     Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     James L. Morse, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     Theresa S. DiMauro, District Judge
     Specially Assigned