Conservation Law Foundation v. Burke
Annotate this Case
CONSERVATION_LAW_FOUNDATION_V_BURKE.92-358; 162 Vt. 115; 645 A.2d 495
[Opinion Filed September 17, 1993]
[Motion for Reargument Denied May 27, 1994]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 92-358
FEBRUARY TERM, 1993
Conservation Law Foundation, } APPEALED FROM:
et al. }
}
v. } Chittenden Superior Court
}
}
Timothy Burke, Secretary of }
Agency of Natural Resources, } DOCKET NO. S1709-90CnC
et al. }
In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:
The superior court's decision that the Environmental Protection
Regulations do not contain a de minimis exception or allow offset analysis
is affirmed; the remainder of the decision is reversed and remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
FOR THE COURT:
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
Concurring:
---------------------------------------
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice
---------------------------------------
Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
No. 92-358
Conservation Law Foundation, et al. Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Chittenden Superior Court
Timothy Burke, Secretary of Agency February Term, 1993
of Natural Resources, et al.
Alden T. Bryan, J.
Lewis Milford and Jeanne Sole, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
Conservation Law Foundation
William M. O'Brien of O'Brien Law Offices, Winooski, for intervenor-
appellee City of Winooski
Dennis R. Pearson and Charles T. Shea of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for
defendant-appellant Safety Medical Systems, Inc.
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and John H. Hasen, Assistant Attorney
General, Montpelier, for amicus curiae Agency of Natural Resources
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
DOOLEY, J. Safety Medical Systems, Inc. (SMS) appeals from a
decision of the Chittenden Superior Court denying it an air pollution
control permit to operate a medical waste incinerator because the operation
will emit excessive levels of certain toxic substances. The parties
opposing the permit are Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), Raymond Gonda,
Timothy Kasten, Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New England, Inc., Seventh
Generation, Inc., Little Red Wagon Daycare, Inc. and the City of Winooski.(FN1)
Safety Medical Systems argues that the action of the Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources (ANR), which granted the permit, was supported by the
record and the applicable regulations and should have been affirmed.(FN2)
Specifically, SMS argues that the ANR decision must be affirmed on theories
of "de minimis" impact or offsetting benefits. (FN3) We affirm in part, and
reverse in part.
In September 1989, Safety Medical Systems applied for an air pollution
control permit to operate a medical waste incineration facility in
Colchester. The facility includes two incinerators, each capable of
incinerating 1,000 pounds of medical waste per hour. After further
submissions, the application was deemed complete in July 1990. After a
public hearing, ANR granted Safety Medical Systems' application and issued a
permit.
The ANR decision was subsequently appealed to the superior court.
While the appeal was pending, Safety Medical Systems completed the facility
and gained all other required approvals. Because the permit contained a
ninety-day waiting period between the time the facility was ready to operate
and the date of first operation, Safety Medical Systems requested a remand
to ANR to seek a permit modification. The remand was granted, and ANR held
another public hearing, primarily on modifications to the permit. ANR
reaffirmed its original decision but made three amendments to the permit,
including elimination of the ninety day waiting period. The matter again
went to superior court, which, on Conservation Law Foundation's motion for
summary judgment, held that ANR acted in violation of the applicable
regulations in granting the permit.
I.
A.
The case is controlled by air pollution control regulations adopted by
ANR pursuant to 10 V.S.A. { 554(2).(FN4) These regulations employ a three step
process to determine whether the emission of hazardous air contaminants will
be authorized. For each hazardous air contaminant, ANR must first determine
whether the emission rate will exceed the action level specified in the
regulations for that contaminant. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,
Environmental Protection Regulations (EPR) { 5-261(1). If the emission does
not exceed the action level, there is no further regulation of that
contaminant. Id. If the emission does exceed the action level, the second
regulatory step requires the source, in this case Safety Medical Systems, to
use control technologies "to achieve the hazardous most stringent emission
rate (HMSER)." Id. { 5-261(2). Finally, even if the second step is met,
ANR may not issue a permit allowing the discharge of hazardous air
contaminants "which cause or contribute to ambient air concentrations in
excess of any Hazard Limiting Value." Id. { 5-261(3). The regulations
contain hazard limiting values for each of the hazardous air contaminants.
Id. Ch. 5 Appendix C.
B.
According to the data supplied by Safety Medical Systems, the medical
waste incinerator will emit cadmium, chromium, dioxin and nitric oxide at a
rate that exceeds the action level for each contaminant. For example, the
action level for chromium is 0.0000071 pounds per eight-hour period; the SMS
incinerator will emit 0.000018 pounds of chromium in the same period.
Because the SMS incinerator met the first step for regulation, ANR then
found that Safety Medical Systems must use control technologies to achieve
the most stringent emission rate (HMSER) for each of the contaminants. It
further found that Safety Medical Systems proposed to use sufficient control
technologies to meet this requirement.
C.
The issue in this case arises with respect to ANR's handling of the
final regulatory step dealing with the impact of the SMS incinerator output
on ambient air concentrations of cadmium, chromium, dioxin and nitric oxide.
As authorized by its regulations, ANR gave Safety Medical Systems the option
of determining the actual ambient air concentrations at the site through a
year of testing or of using preexisting data generated off-site for the four
contaminants. Safety Medical Systems chose the latter option.
The only data for cadmium and chromium were collected at Randolph,
Vermont between 1980 and 1985. For each contaminant, the data showed that
the average level in the air exceeded the applicable hazard limiting value
(HLV). No data were available for levels of dioxin or nitric oxide in the
air in Vermont. The nearest place surveyed to determine ambient air levels
of dioxin was in Connecticut. The Connecticut data registered levels of
dioxin above the Vermont hazard limiting value. As for the lack of data on
nitric oxide, ANR assumed that nitric oxide converts rapidly to nitrogen
dioxide, so that existing levels of nitric oxide should be considered to be
negligible.
ANR discounted the ambient air level findings for the four contaminants
and issued the permit to Safety Medical Systems despite indications from the
available data that the SMS incinerator would emit contaminants in excess of
ANR's hazard limiting values. ANR did so because it found the amount of the
emissions to be de minimis and because the addition of contaminants from the
SMS incinerator would be offset by a greater reduction in emissions of those
contaminants in other incinerator facilities. On remand, it added that the
Randolph and Connecticut data were unreliable. The superior court rejected
each reason. We agree with respect to the first two reasons but conclude
that analysis of the third reason is flawed because of inadequacies in the
record. We now treat these three points of contention in succession.
II.
A.
The superior court first found fault with ANR's application of a "de
minimis" test when judging the impact of the increased ambient air
concentration of the four contaminants against each contaminant's hazard
limiting value. As part of the permitting process, ANR required Safety
Medical Systems to show the extent to which its discharge would increase the
ambient air level for each of the pollutants within 200 meters of the point
of discharge. The results showed that the SMS incinerator discharges would
increase the ambient air level of cadmium 3.3%; of chromium, 1.4%; of
dioxin, 3.6%; and of nitric oxide, 0.6%. As noted previously, these
increases were over and above existing concentrations which the data used
showed to be in excess of the hazard limiting values. Nonetheless, based on
the discharge test findings, ANR concluded that Safety Medical Systems's
contribution to concentrations of contaminants would be de minimis so that
"human health and safety is adequately protected." Then, as a first basis
for its decision to grant the permit, ANR ruled that a de minimis violation
of the prohibition on contributing to ambient air concentrations above a
hazard limiting value was allowable.
Conservation Law Foundation argues, and the superior court accepted,
that EPR 5-261 can not be read to allow a de minimis violation. The crux of
this position is that in the first step of the analysis, the comparison of
the proposed discharge amounts to predetermined action levels, the
regulations already determine when a discharge is significant enough to be
considered. The superior court agreed and held that the regulations do not
contain such a "de minimis" exception and that ANR therefore could not
sustain granting the permit on this basis.
This issue involves a question of the proper interpretation of an
agency's regulations. In interpreting regulations, our overall goal is to
discern the intent of the drafters. In re Verburg, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 616 A.2d 237, 239 (1992). We employ a deferential standard of review of an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. See id. Its interpretation
may be overcome only by compelling indications of error. Id. (quoting
Rogers v. Watson, 156 Vt. 483, 489, 594 A.2d 409, 412 (1991)).
We must view the hazardous air contaminant regulations as a whole.
Id. at ___, 616 A.2d at 239. If they require that no discharge of a
hazardous air contaminant shall cause or contribute to ambient air levels
above a hazard limiting value, the ANR position would not be sustainable.
To consider whether an emission is de minimis after it is known that the
level of a contaminant in the ambient air exceeds a hazard limiting value is
inconsistent with the structure and obvious intent of the regulation.
Similarly, we have declined to read a de minimis exception into a zoning
ordinance or the zoning enabling statute. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc.,
151 Vt. 59, 64, 557 A.2d 486, 489 (1989). If the Agency wishes to include
an additional de minimis exception, it must do so explicitly.
B.
The superior court also found fault with ANR's reasoning that the
discharge from the SMS incinerator was more than offset by reductions in
emissions from existing uncontrolled incinerators that would send their
waste to the Safety Medical Systems facility. ANR determined, again from
studies SMS supplied, that the replacement of older medical waste
incinerators in Vermont with the SMS facility would cause a net reduction in
the amount of chromium, cadmium and dioxin emitted into Vermont air. On
that basis, it concluded that the SMS emissions would not "cause or
contribute to an exceedence of any HLV." The superior court held that the
ANR regulations do not allow for this type of offset analysis.
This issue is again matter of proper interpretation of the ANR
regulations. Despite our deference to the Agency's interpretation of this
regulation, the structure of the whole regulation again precludes us from
accepting it. The hazardous air contaminant regulation is silent on the
subject of offset authorization. By contrast, the Agency's nonhazardous air
contaminant regulations contain a specific authorization for considering
"binding offsetting emission reductions." EPR { 5-502(6)(a). The effect of
considering offsets may be to trade a degradation of air quality in one
place in order to achieve an improvement in another. We decline to read an
offset authorization into a silent rule, particularly when ANR has been
explicit in authorizing this analysis for other air pollution standards.
The superior court was correct in rejecting this basis.
C.
Finally, the superior court found that ANR had granted the permit on
the basis of an inadequate record. Upon remand from the superior court, ANR
added a third reason that justified its decision to grant the SMS permit
even though the available data showed an increase in ambient air
concentrations above the hazard limiting values. ANR stated that the data
from the Randolph, Vermont study was flawed because the instruments were
incapable of measuring at the low discharge rates of the hazard limiting
value. ANR reasoned that whenever the level was below that measurable by
the instruments, the lowest level readable was recorded, artificially
increasing the average. Apparently, ANR believed that the Connecticut data
on dioxin were not the most accurate. Essentially ANR's reasoning is that
no valid data showed the amount of chromium, cadmium or dioxin in the air to
be above the relevant hazard limiting value.
The superior court rejected this reasoning because ANR specifically
stated, even after the remand, that the decision to award the permit was
made on the record created before the remand. Because the court found that
this record contained none of the technical analysis to support rejection of
the Randolph and Connecticut data, it held that ANR could not grant the
permit on this basis. The court concluded that the rejection of the data
was a post hoc justification for the ANR decision. It held that ANR's
decision to award the permit was "void as a matter of law" and that the only
way Safety Medical Systems could obtain a permit was through a variance.
See 10 V.S.A. { 561.
Although this issue was decided by the superior court based primarily
on its determination of the content of the record, a determination we
examine in detail below, there is an underlying conflict about the
requirements of the regulation. CLF's position is that the permit applicant
has the burden to show the level of contaminants in the ambient air and that
these levels do not exceed the relevant hazard limiting values. Safety
Medical Systems' position is that the hazard limiting values for chromium,
cadmium and dioxin are so low that it is impossible to determine through
existing technology whether the levels currently existing in the air exceed
them. From this, SMS argues that it cannot be assigned the burden to prove
something that is technologically impossible to prove.
The hazardous air contaminant rules prohibit the discharge of any
contaminant that causes or contributes to ambient air concentrations above
the relevant hazard limiting value, EPR { 5-261(3), but the Secretary is
allowed discretion in the administration of this requirement. The
regulation states that the Secretary "may require . . . an air quality
impact evaluation, id. (emphasis added), and the use of the term "may"
allows the Secretary to dispense with such an evaluation in appropriate
circumstances.(FN5) Thus, we do not accept the rigid burden of proof argument
made by CLF. The permit may be sustainable if Safety Medical Systems
prevails on the record deficiency issue decided by the superior court.
An analysis of the superior court's decision requires further
background about the nature of this proceeding in superior court and the
state of the record. As stated above, ANR found the Randolph and
Connecticut data flawed but the superior court rejected this rationale as
unsupported by the record. Specifically, the court held:
This "explanation" of the ANR's decision to grant SMS
a permit does not harmonize with its findings of fact in
the original permit which the ANR expressly affirmed on
remand without reopening the record. It was SMS'
responsibility in the permit process to provide ambient
air quality data applicable to the proposed site. SMS
chose to rely on the Randolph and Connecticut incin-
erator studies to develop this data. The ANR recites
the data in its findings of fact as the impact of the
proposed facility, but then out of hand refutes them as
unreliable with no further explanation.
We recognize that it is possible that the Randolph and
Connecticut data submitted by SMS may be unreliable for
sound scientific reasons with respect to its applica-
bility to the SMS facility. The record appears to be
void of any such scientific rationale for the agency's
discarding the data that SMS chose to rely on.
ANR's decision on remand, to which the court refers, came after a hearing in
which members of the public, including CLF and those represented by it,
could comment orally and in writing on the SMS permit. SMS was not expected
to, and did not, present any evidence at that hearing. Following the
hearing, the Secretary of ANR stated in her decision:
After carefully reviewing the prior record in this
matter and considering the public written and oral
arguments, the Agency has concluded that its original
September 14, 1990 decision to issue the permit was
proper and based on adequate evidence in the record.
For purposes of clarification, the Agency has responded
to the comments received at and after the May 3 public
hearing. However, the Agency has decided not to reopen
the record in this matter or to take additional evidence
on the issues. Information presented at the May 3
hearing, and subsequently, was either available to and
considered by the Agency in its permit decision or is
not significant enough to warrant reconsideration of the
decision to issue the permit. The Agency has decided to
reaffirm and reissue the permit with the findings of
fact and conclusions of law as stated in the September
14, 1990 decision.
The Secretary attached two documents that respond to claims made at the
hearing to her decision; in one is the explanation about the unreliability
of the underlying data.
Early in the case, the superior court made two important and correct
rulings, that place critical significance on the record developed in the
Agency. The first is that this proceeding is governed by Rule 74 of the
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs appeals from governmental
agencies when the right to appeal is given by statute. As originally
adopted, Rule 74 applied only in appeals from decisions in "contested cases"
governed by the Vermont Administrative Procedures Act. Reporter's Notes to
1981 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 74. A contested case is a proceeding "in which the
legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." 3 V.S.A. {
801(b)(2). A proceeding is not a contested case if there is no legal
obligation to hold a hearing, even if the agency chooses to do so. See In
re Marble Sav. Bank, 137 Vt. 123, 125, 400 A.2d 1022, 1023 (1979). The
proceeding in ANR was not a contested case because there is no legal
obligation to hold a contested case hearing, although ANR twice chose to
hold a form of a hearing. (FN6)
In 1981, Rule 74 was amended to extend its coverage to all cases when
review of agency action is provided by law in the superior court, whether or
not involving a contested case. See Reporter's Notes to 1981 Amendment,
V.R.C.P. 74. The main effect was to apply appellate procedures to such
cases, including the use of the notice of appeal to commence the action in
superior court, even though only informal adjudication (FN7) occurred in the
administrative agency. See id. The 1981 amendment to Rule 74 covers this
case because review is specifically authorized by statute, 10 V.S.A. {
562(c), although a contested case is not involved.
The court's second ruling was that review of an agency decision would
occur based on the record in the Agency, with some deference given to the
Agency's determination. Although Rule 74 is structured with the expectation
that review will proceed on the record, see V.R.C.P. 74(d), the rule can be
applicable if review is de novo. See V.R.C.P. 74(e) (jury trial available
when there is right to have question determined by jury). The nature of
review is determined by the Legislature, but we presume that review will be
on the record and not de novo. See Department of Taxes v. Tri-State Indus.
Laundries, Inc., 138 Vt. 292, 296, 415 A.2d 216, 219 (1980). Although we
have applied this principle in contested cases, based partially on the
ability of parties to develop facts before the agency, id. at 295, 415 A.2d
at 219, it is rooted in the separation of powers between the executive
branch agencies and the judiciary. Id. at 294-95, 415 A.2d at 218-19. The
superior court has only a narrow role in ensuring that the decisions of ANR
are made in accordance with law. In particular, the superior court is not a
higher environmental agency entrusted with the power to make environmental
law and policy de novo or with the power to apply the policy it develops to
the facts it finds. Id. at 297, 415 A.2d at 220; see also Chioffi v.
Winooski Zoning Bd., 151 Vt. 9, 13, 556 A.2d 103, 106 (1989) (in zoning
appeals, "court must resist the impulse to view itself as a super planning
commission").
The statute under which review proceeded in this case, 10 V.S.A. {
562(c), does not specifically state that review would proceed de novo. In
fact, it describes review as occurring "by appeal," indicating that the
Legislature intended that on-the-record review would be used. Id. The
trial court was correct in holding that review in this case would be based
on the record below.
To facilitate on-the-record review, Rule 74(d) specifies that the
record on appeal, when no contested case is involved, consists of "all
writings and exhibits in the agency proceeding" and a transcript of any oral
proceedings. The rule requires the Agency to transmit this record to the
superior court clerk within thirty days of the filing of the notice of
appeal. V.R.C.P. 74(d).
We are not clear on the extent to which Rule 74(d) was followed in this
case, although ANR did purport to file a record in superior court. Our
attempt to establish the content of the record in this case is described in
Appendix A to this opinion. In any event, in response to motions by the
parties, the superior court designated the record for purposes of review.
It designated the record filed by ANR, the ANR remand decision with the
attachments responding to the public hearing comments, the ANR regulations,
and an internal memorandum to the ANR Secretary on the proper interpretation
of the regulations. Although the court included the record filed by ANR,
the only documents considered were the permit, including the findings of
fact, and a technical analysis prepared by an ANR staff member.
In order for judicial review to proceed on the record, it is critical
that the court have before it the full agency record "that was before the
Secretary at the time he made his decision." Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), overruled on other grounds by
Califano v. Saunders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) ("focal point of judicial review should be the
administrative record already in existence"). The record for review is not
necessarily limited to that submitted by the agency; it "'consists of all
documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by agency
decision-makers.'" See Thompson v. Department of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555
(9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D. 26,
32 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (emphasis in original)). Thus, "if the agency
decisionmaker's decision is based on the work and recommendations of
subordinates, the record should include all documents considered by the
agency employees whose input reached the decisionmaker." (FN8) McMillan &
Peterson, The Permissible Scope of Hearings, Discovery, and Additional Fact-
finding During Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action, 1982 Duke L.J.
333, 342.
We find that the record before the court in this case was incomplete.
It appears that the "record" supplied by ANR contains no document earlier
than the proposed permit. For example, it does not include the permit
application or any of the information Safety Medical Systems submitted in
support of the application. More important, it does not contain the
Randolph or Connecticut studies or the data derived from them.
The trial court has a number of remedies when the record supplied is
inadequate. For example, it may call for the missing documents or it may
have the agency supply the needed material through testimony or other
evidentiary methods. See Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 1991). Here, the trial court
used the inadequacy of the record to reverse the ANR decision as
unsupported by the record supplied. Although such action might be
appropriate in extreme cases, it should be accompanied by a remand to allow
the agency to cure the deficiency. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,
470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) ("if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the
challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation"). Here, the initial remedy should
have been to deny summary judgment and to seek the full record.
Alternatively, the trial court rejected ANR's rationale because the
unreliability of the Randolph and Connecticut data appeared to be a post hoc
justification and could not be considered in light of ANR's refusal to
reopen the record. We concur that the Agency decision must stand or fall on
the reasons given contemporaneously with the decision and not a later
revision of those reasons. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 143. The
documents in the record supplied to this Court, however, see Appendix A,
indicate that the Agency always harbored concerns about the Randolph and
Connecticut data. The Secretary's decision not to reopen the record (FN9) is
not inconsistent with this rationale because the underlying data were already
before the Agency. Thus, it does not appear this is an after-the-fact
reason.
Even if we concluded that the measurement and data quality rationale
was added too late and could not support the permit, we do not agree that
the remedy is for the court to deny the permit. As the United States
Supreme Court has held, the proper remedy is to vacate the Secretary's
decision and remand the matter for further consideration." Id.
Because of its nature, it will be true that the rationale for agency
action based on informal adjudication will often be inadequately explained.
Thus, the "court may require the administrative officials who participated
in the decision to give testimony explaining their action." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. The purpose of this evidence is to
determine whether the agency considered "all relevant factors or fully
explicated its course of conduct or grounds of decision." Friends of the
Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1986). Such an exploration of
agency reasoning might have been beneficial here.
The superior court's decision that the Environmental Protection
Regulations do not contain a de minimis exception or allow offset analysis
is affirmed; the remainder of the decision is reversed and remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
APPENDIX A -- THE RECORD
Our experience in attempting to determine the record before the
superior court requires some explanation. Conservation Law Foundation filed
both a Rule 75 action, by filing a complaint with the superior court, and a
Rule 74 appeal, by filing a notice with the Agency. The Agency transmitted
the notice of appeal to the clerk of the superior court, and Safety Medical
Systems has included this document in its printed case. There is no docket
entry reflecting that the notice was filed by the clerk; nor does the notice
appear in the file as we received it from the court. ANR took the position
that Rule 74 represented the appropriate route for judicial review and filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint. The superior court agreed, and the
complaint was dismissed by stipulation.
After receiving the notice of appeal, ANR transmitted the "record" to
the superior court. Again, there is no docket entry showing its receipt and
filing; what was transmitted to the superior court was not transmitted to
this Court in accordance with V.R.A.P. 11. We know it was received and
considered by the superior court because it is described in the court's
opinion as "the contents of two folders filed with the court by the Vermont
Department of Environmental Conservation."
We asked the parties to supply us with the two folders referenced in
the superior court's decision, and the Agency sent us what purported to be a
copy of the contents of those folders. Over 90% of the documents trans-
mitted dealt with interactions between ANR and Safety Medical Systems after
the permit was issued and after the record was transmitted to the superior
court. These documents are obviously not part of the "two folders"
transmitted to the superior court; we have sent them back to ANR and not
considered them.
The documents sent to us include a number that were generated before
November 9, 1990, the date the "record" was sent to the Chittenden Superior
Court. Most deal with staff answers to those who complained about issuance
of the permit. The only documents that precede the issuance of the permit
are proposed permit conditions, and the letter of transmittal of these
conditions to Safety Medical Systems (but no response from Safety Medical
Systems); a notice of a public hearing (but no indication of what occurred
at that hearing); a proposed permit with a transmittal letter to Safety
Medical Systems; correspondence from Conservation Law Foundation opposing
the proposed permit and seeking information; and a response to the CLF
position by Safety Medical Systems. The SMS response states, "The issues
[CLF] . . . raise[s] were all debated at length and fully resolved during
the long application review process." Obviously, none of the documents
generated in the long application review process made it into the record
considered by the trial court or transmitted to us.
We have assumed for purposes of this opinion that all parts of the
"record" in the two folders were made available to us. Nothing in the
superior court decision indicates that it had access to additional
information.
The present case illustrates the difficulty of establishing the
"record" in appeals from complex regulatory decisions under Rule 74. The
frequency and importance of these cases is likely to increase in Vermont, as
similar appeals have done under federal regulatory schemes over the last two
decades or more. Private, administrative and judicial resources will be
used most efficiently if parties, agencies, and judges focus on the question
the record at the earliest moment and emulate as far as possible the care
reflected in creating the record in contested cases.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
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Footnotes
FN1. CLF, Raymond Gonda and Timothy Kasten filed a joint brief. None of
the other appellees actively participated in the appeal.
FN2. ANR participated in the superior court as amicus curiae in support
of the grant of the permit. It filed an amicus curiae brief in this Court
solely "to correct an error in the trial court's analysis of the
relationship between the state and federal governments in terms of the
state's air pollution control regulations."
FN3. SMS also briefed a claim that the action in superior court should
have been dismissed because CLF and plaintiffs Gonda and Kasten lacked
standing to appeal to superior court. SMS abandoned this claim at oral
argument, and we have not considered it.
FN4. The regulations applied in this action were in effect through March
4, 1989. The regulations have since been modified.
FN5. The regulations also do not restrict the Secretary's authority
because she first required data submission, and in response the applicant
chose to use the Randolph and Connecticut data. The Secretary could decide
that the data were flawed and, on that basis and the lack of a reasonable
alternative, relieve the applicant of the burden of showing that ambient air
levels of contaminants do not exceed hazard limiting values. See generally
EPR { 5-261(3).
FN6. ANR regulations require it to prepare an analysis of the application
to construct an "air contaminant source," to notify the public of its
availability, to accept comments, and to hold a public hearing if requested.
EPR { 5-501(4). Apparently, this process was implemented in this case. The
hearing contemplated by the regulations -- that is, the opportunity for the
public to comment on a proposed permit -- is not the contested case hearing
contemplated by the Administrative Procedures Act. For example, a contested
case decision must be based on the evidence in the hearing. See 3 V.S.A. {
809(g). None of the information on which ANR issued the permit was
presented as "evidence" at the public hearing.
FN7. We use the term "informal adjudication" to mean an agency
determination of rights, duties or privileges, with or without a hearing,
in other than a contested case. See 1 C. Koch, Administrative Law &
Practice { 2.5 (1985).
FN8. Here, ANR appears to have equated the "record" with its staff
technical analysis, probably because its rules require the production of
such an analysis for public comment. EPR { 5-501(4)(a). There is no
dispute that the technical analysis is part of the record. Thus, we do not
have to decide whether such analyses should routinely be included, where
they reflect a part of the internal deliberation process of the agency. See
National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229, 1241-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (privilege against disclosure exists for analysis and
recommendations embodying deliberative process of agency staff members). It
is sufficient to say that the staff analysis is not itself the record for
review.
FN9. It is clear that the term "record" is being used in various ways in
this case, confusing the issue. ANR "reopened the record" when it held the
second public hearing and listened to members of the public, most of whom
opposed the permit. The Secretary's statement that the record was not
reopened was really a conclusion that none of the evidence submitted changed
the decision to issue the permit, or the grounds for that decision.
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