Hoopiiaina v. Williams

Hoopiiaina v. Williams

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, personal representative of the Estate of Malualani B. Hoopiiaina; Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, individually; and Marlin M. Forsyth, individually,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.

Steven Williams, Kyle Williams, and J. Richard Williams,

Defendants,

______________________________

Lucille Williams,

Intervenor and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030064-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 17, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 139

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Sandra Peuler

Attorneys: Michael R. Carlston and Jill L. Dunyon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for Appellees

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Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

    Lucille Williams appeals the trial court's denial of her rule 24 motion to intervene. See Utah R. Civ. P. 24. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. We affirm.

    "The first requirement [for intervention under rule 24] is that the intervenor make 'timely application.'" Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989). "Use of the word 'timely' in the [r]ule requires that the timeliness of the application be determined under the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and in the sound discretion of the court." Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983). The facts and circumstances of this matter render the trial court's decision firmly within the bounds of its discretion.

    This matter was initiated by the Hoopiiainas in 1995 to enforce an easement over property believed to be owned by J. Richard Williams, his son Steven Williams, and Steven's wife Kyle Williams (the Defendants). The Defendants claimed fee ownership of the servient estate in their answer to the complaint. In July 2001, the Defendants allegedly transferred title of the property to Lucille Williams as trustee of a Williams family trust.(1) No notice of this transfer was provided to either the Hoopiiainas or the trial court. For various reasons, trial did not take place until April 2002, at which time the trial court indicated from the bench that it was likely to rule in favor of the Hoopiiainas. On October 31, 2004, after completion of trial but prior to issuance of a final judgment, Lucille Williams filed a motion to intervene based on her ownership of the property. The trial court denied Williams's motion as untimely.

    The trial court did not formally enter judgment prior to Williams's motion to intervene. However, the named parties had conducted extensive trial preparation, taken the case to trial, and received a tentative ruling from the trial court some six months prior to Williams's motion. These circumstances implicate many of the same policy considerations raised by postjudgment motions. The general rule is that "intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgment" except "upon a strong showing of entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling circumstances as will justify the failure to seek intervention earlier." Id. at 1074 (footnotes omitted). "Postjudgment intervention is looked upon with disfavor by reason of the tendency thereof to prejudice the rights of existing parties and the undue interference it has upon the orderly processes of the court." Id.

    Williams knew of the easement dispute prior to trial, and presented no reasonable justification for waiting six months after trial to seek to intervene in the case. Further, Williams is closely related to the Defendants and in privity of ownership with them. Williams's rights are derivative of the Defendants', and there is no showing that they failed to properly represent her interests. Finally, Williams's attempt to rely on her ownership interest to obtain a second bite at the apple, after failing to notify the Hoopiiainas of that interest prior to trial, "prejudice[s] the rights of existing parties and [unduly] interfere[s with] the orderly processes of the court." Id. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in denying Williams's motion to intervene as untimely.

    We also agree with the Hoopiiainas that Williams's motion to intervene was improper because it was not accompanied by a substantive pleading. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24 requires that a motion to intervene "be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c). Without such a pleading, both the trial court and the Hoopiiainas were left to speculate as to the reasons for and necessity of Williams's intervention in the case.

    The trial court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion when it denied Williams's motion to intervene. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judg

1. Lucille Williams is J. Richard Williams's wife and Steven Williams's mother.