Hatch v. Sykes

Hatch v. Sykes

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Howard F. Hatch,

Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-appellee,

v.

Dwane J. Sykes, in re the interest of Dwane J. Sykes in three Irrevocable Trust Agreements aka The Dwane Sykes and Patricia Sykes' Children's Trusts and/or The Dwane and Patricia Sykes Trust; Dennis Sykes; Benoy Tamang; Angela Tamang; and William Christiansen,

Defendants/Counter-claimants, Appellees, and the Trusts as Cross-appellants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20000250-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 23, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 280

 

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Fourth District, Provo Department, 950400719

The Honorable Howard H. Maetani

Attorneys: Spencer F. Hatch, Bountiful, for Appellant

A. Samuel Primavera, Riverton, and Justin D. Heideman and Justin R. Elswick, Provo, for Appellees

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Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.

JACKSON, Judge:

    Howard F. Hatch ostensibly appeals a jury's verdict in favor of Dwane J. Sykes, the trial court's dismissal of the claims against William Christiansen, and the trial court's award of attorney fees and sanctions to Christiansen. We affirm.

    Hatch first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Sykes to make statements at trial that Hatch considered "irrelevant and immaterial" and slanderous. We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we will deem a trial court's decision an abuse of its discretion only when it is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, absent a compelling reason presented in a clear argument, we will not second-guess a trial court's evidentiary decision as Hatch requests. Hatch has presented no such compelling reason, and we reject this argument.

    Second, Hatch challenges the trial court's decision to submit an instruction regarding equity to the jury. "We review challenges to jury instructions under a 'correctness' standard." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). "[I]f jury instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been." Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,¶16, 977 P.2d 474 (quotations and citations omitted). Further, we will not overturn a jury verdict where the court gave an instruction in which the error was "sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35,¶18, 977 P.2d 479 (quotations and citations omitted).

    The challenged instruction states: "A remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean hand [sic] in having done equity himself." Hatch does not contend that the instruction actually contains an error of law, and we do not believe that it does. Rather, Hatch argues that the instruction "challenged the integrity of Hatch's cause." On appeal, we give significant deference to a jury's decision. See Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994). It is the purpose of the instructions to give guidance to the jury, and in every case, there is at least one party against whom the jury must decide. Hence, we will not overturn a jury verdict because of a legally correct instruction.

    Third, Hatch argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against Christiansen because: (i) the trial court lacked jurisdiction, (ii) the trial court decided the matter too quickly, and (iii) the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees and sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to Christiansen. Hatch's jurisdiction argument lacks merit because Christiansen willingly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, no service was required. Similarly, a trial court is not obligated to hear oral argument on motions or to permit a particular time period to expire before ruling when both parties have submitted their arguments in writing. Finally, Hatch has not adequately briefed the attorney fee and rule 11 argument. "'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,¶11, 974 P.2d 269 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). Accordingly, we decline to consider this issue.

    We affirm the trial court's decision, award Christiansen attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal, see Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254,¶9, 97 P.3d 722, and remand for the trial court to determine reasonable attorney fees on appeal.

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge