Donner Crest Condos v. SLC

Donner Crest Condos v. SLC

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Donner Crest Condominium Homeowners' Association and
Oakcrest Condominium Homeowners' Association,

Petitioners and Appellants,

v.

Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation; and the
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan,

Respondents and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030991-CA
 

F I L E D
(April 7, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 163

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable William B. Bohling

Attorneys: Jason K. Nelsen, Gregory M. Simonsen, and Alexander Dushku, Salt Lake City, for Appellants

Lynn H. Pace, Robert E. Mansfield, and Stephen K. Christiansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.

DAVIS, Judge:

    Donner Crest Condominium Homeowners' Association and Oakcrest Condominium Homeowners' Association (collectively, Donner Crest) appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City (City) and the Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (Van Cott). We affirm.

    Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not defer to the legal conclusions of the district court, but review them for correctness. When reviewing a municipality's land use decision, our review is limited to determining 'whether . . . the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.'" Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25,¶22, 979 P.2d 332 (alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)(b) (1996)). Moreover, we "review a local agency's interpretation of ordinances for correctness, but also afford some level of non[]binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the local agency." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98,¶28, 104 P.3d 1208.

    Donner Crest argues that the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and illegally when its Planning Commission approved Van Cott's application for a planned development conditional use permit. More specifically, Donner Crest argues that the Van Cott property and project do not qualify as a planned development; the Planning Commission's use of the planned development process "to essentially grant a variance" was illegal; and, as applied to the facts of this case, the City's planned development provision of the zoning ordinance (the Ordinance) is illegal.

    Donner Crest first argues that the Van Cott property and project do not qualify as a planned development. Because State law does not expressly provide for the creation of planned developments, we must look to the Ordinance. The Ordinance allows the Planning Commission to approve conditional uses, see Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 54.020 (1995), including planned developments and the permitted and conditional uses contained therein, see id. § 21 A. 54.150(B) (2004) ("The [P]lanning [C]ommission may approve planned developments for uses listed in the tables of permitted and conditional uses . . . for each category of zoning district or districts."); see also id. § 21 A. 54.080(K) (1999). "A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use." Id. § 21 A. 54.150(A); see also id. § 21 A. 54.30(B) (2004). The Ordinance defines a planned development as "a lot or contiguous lots of a size sufficient to create its own character where there are multiple principal buildings on a single lot, where not otherwise authorized by [the Ordinance], or where not all of the principal buildings have frontage on a public street." Id. § 21 A. 62.040 (2004). Moreover, a planned development "is controlled by a single landowner or by a group of landowners in common agreement as to control, to be developed as a single entity, the character of which is compatible with adjacent parcels and the intent of the zoning district or districts in which it is located." Id.

    The purpose of a planned development is "to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promoting greater efficiency in public and utility services and encouraging innovation in the planning and building of all types of development." Id. § 21 A. 54.150(A). "Through the flexibility of the planned development technique, the [C]ity seeks to achieve . . . specific objectives," including, "[c]reation of a more desirable environment than would be possible through strict application of other [C]ity land use regulations" and "[p]romotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related physical facilities resulting in better design and development." Id. § 21 A. 54.150(A)(1)-(2).

    In addition to satisfying the codified purposes and objectives of planned developments, each planned development "shall have a minimum net lot area for each zoning district." Id. § 21 A. 54.150(E)(1). The Van Cott property is a 1.2 acre parcel located in a RMF-45 zoning district--a residential district established "to provide an environment suitable for multi-family dwellings of a moderate/high density." Id. § 21 A. 24.140(A) (1995). The minimum size of a planned development in a RMF-45 district is 20,000 square feet, see id. § 21 A. 54.150, less than half the size of the Van Cott property.

    Having reviewed the requirements for a planned development under the Ordinance, we cannot conclude that the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally when it granted a planned development conditional use permit for the Van Cott project, which is compatible with the character of adjacent parcels and the intent of the zoning district and is sufficient in size.

    Donner Crest next argues that the Planning Commission's use of the planned development process was an illegal means of avoiding State and local variance requirements. Donner Crest asserts that Van Cott should have been required to obtain a variance from the City Board of Adjustment because the Van Cott property did not meet the frontage requirements of the Ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-703(1)(C) (2003) (stating that the Board of Adjustment "shall hear and decide . . . variances from the terms of the [Ordinance]"); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 18.020 (1995) (stating that the Board of Adjustment may grant variances from the provisions of the Ordinance); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 24.140(C) (providing the minimum lot area and width requirements for property in a RMF-45 district). According to the Ordinance, the variance procedures "are intended to provide a narrowly circumscribed means by which relief may be granted from unforeseen particular applications of [the Ordinance] that create unreasonable hardships." Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 18.010 (1995). However, "[w]hen such hardships may be more appropriately remedied, if at all, pursuant to other provisions of [the Ordinance], the variance procedure is inappropriate." Id.

    While Van Cott may have chosen to apply to the Board of Adjustment for a variance from the frontage requirements of the Ordinance, Van Cott was, in the alternative, in a position to apply for a planned development conditional use permit to avoid strict application of the Ordinance. Van Cott selected a permissible method of operating within the legal framework properly established by the City.

    The enabling authority for the Ordinance is the Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act (MLUDMA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-101 to -1003 (2003 & Supp. 2004); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 02.020 (1995) (noting that the Ordinance was adopted pursuant to MLUDMA). Under MLUDMA, "municipalities may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development of land within the municipality, . . . unless those ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102 (2003); see also Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401 (2003) ("The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use and development that furthers the intent of [MLUDMA]."). MLUDMA expressly allows cities to adopt ordinances containing provisions that allow for conditional uses. See id. § 10-9-407(1) (2003). In addition, MLUDMA allows the Planning Commission to "administer provisions of the zoning ordinance, where specifically provided for in the zoning ordinance adopted by the legislative body," and "exercise any other powers . . . that are necessary to enable it to perform its function" or that are "delegated to it by the legislative body." Id. § 10-9-204(3), (8)(a)-(b) (2003).

    The Ordinance, in turn, provides that the Planning Commission may "[r]eview, hear[,] and decide applications for conditional uses, including planned developments." Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 06.030 (1995). As part of the Planning Commission's authority to grant planned development conditional use permits, the Planning Commission "may change, alter, modify[,] or waive any provisions of [the Ordinance] or of the [C]ity's subdivision regulations as they apply to the proposed planned development." Id. § 21 A. 54.150(C). This grant of authority from the City to the Planning Commission is a valid exercise of municipal power and is not "expressly prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102.(1)

    Because, as we determined above, the Van Cott project qualified as a planned development, the Planning Commission was authorized to "change, alter, modify[,] or waive," Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 54.150(C), the zoning requirements applicable to the Van Cott project, including the frontage requirements and flag lot restrictions. Van Cott, therefore, was not required to apply for a variance from the Board of Adjustment.

    Finally, Donner Crest argues that, as applied to the facts of this case, the City's planned development provision is illegal. We conclude that the City's planned development provision, as applied to this case, is not illegal. Contrary to Donner Crest's assertions, the Planning Commission's approval of Van Cott's project as a planned development did not result in the creation of a new zoning district, an amendment to the zoning district, or a rezoned district. The Planning Commission simply granted a waiver of selected zoning requirements to the Van Cott project, which project is consistent with the character of the surrounding projects. Furthermore, the Planning Commission's action did not result in illegal spot zoning. Under Utah law,

[s]pot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One type results when the zoning authority improperly limits the use which may be made of a small parcel located in the center of an unrestricted area. The second type of "island" results when most of a large district is devoted to a limited or restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in one or more spots in the district.

Crestview-Holladay Homeowners' Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1151 (Utah 1976). Under the Ordinance, spot zoning means "the process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification materially different and inconsistent with the surrounding area and the adopted [C]ity master plan, for the sole benefit of the owner of that property and to the detriment of the rights of other property owners." Salt Lake City Code § 21 A. 62.040. However, commentators have stated that "[c]ourts have also held that issuance of a special use permit does not present an issue of spot zoning because it involves not a change of zone but rather a permitted use when certain conditions specified in the ordinance are met." Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, Determination Whether Zoning or Rezoning of Particular Parcel Constitutes Illegal Spot Zoning, 73 A.L.R. 5th 223 § 2[b] (1999). In granting Van Cott's permit for a planned development conditional use, the Planning Commission did not single out the Van Cott project for a separate zoning classification or allow Van Cott a use inconsistent with neighboring projects.

    As we explained above, in granting Van Cott the planned development conditional use permit, the Planning Commission acted within the strictures of both State and local law, and its action was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.

Affirmed.

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. While the breadth of authority conferred by the statute and the Ordinance is brought into sharper focus by the facts and circumstances of this case, the relief sought by Donner Crest must be obtained from State and local legislative bodies. "The wisdom of [a] plan, the necessity for zoning, the number and nature of the districts to be created, the boundaries thereof and the uses therein permitted, are matters which lie in the discretion of the governing body of the [C]ity." Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943). Moreover, "[u]nless the action of such body is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends some provision of the constitution or statute, the court must uphold it, if within the grant of power to the municipality." Id.