Crafts v. Labor Commission

Crafts v. Labor Commission

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Millard R. Crafts,

Petitioner,

v.

Labor Commission; and Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030712-CA
 

F I L E D
(May 26, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 238

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Virginius Dabney, St. George, for Petitioner

Alan L. Hennebold, Dori K. Petersen, and Kristy L. Bertelsen, Salt Lake City, for Respondents

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Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.

DAVIS, Judge:

    Petitioner Millard R. Crafts seeks review of a decision of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) affirming a decision of a Commission Administrative Law Judge, which denied and dismissed Crafts's Applications for Hearing requesting permanent total disability compensation benefits from Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. (Yellow Freight) for an alleged industrial accident that occurred in 1997 (the 1997 incident). We affirm.

    Crafts argues that the Commission erred in denying his claim because (1) the signed and approved compensation agreement for permanent partial disability compensation (compensation agreement) he entered into with Yellow Freight is entitled to administrative finality status, permitting it to be final, appealable, and entitled to res judicata effect; and (2) he has satisfied the threshold requirement for a tentative finding of permanent total disability--that he was significantly impaired from the 1997 incident.

    We will overturn the Commission's factual findings only if they are "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quotations and citation omitted). "[T]his court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views . . . ." Id. "It is the province of the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the inferences." Id. "When an agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not disturb the agency's application unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted).

    Although, as Crafts notes, the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -803 (2001 & Supp. 2004), is to be construed "liberally and in favor of employee coverage when statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction," Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990), Crafts is not thereby relieved of the burden of proving that his injuries were caused by the 1997 incident. The Act provides that

[t]o establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident . . . ;

(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and

(iii) the industrial accident . . . was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (2001).

    Crafts argues that the executed compensation agreement conclusively establishes that he has a 3% permanent impairment resulting from the 1997 incident, and that Yellow Freight is barred by res judicata and estoppel from denying their previous stipulation to that effect. However, even assuming Crafts is correct on this point, and that the compensation agreement is conclusive as to the 3% impairment rather than merely being some evidence to that effect, with only a 3% permanent partial impairment Crafts has nonetheless failed to demonstrate that he "sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(b)(i) (emphasis added). Crafts, therefore, is not entitled to permanent total disability compensation from Yellow Freight.

    Even if we give the compensation agreement the legal effect Crafts urges, the Commission's determination that Crafts failed to provide sufficient evidence that he was significantly impaired as a result of the 1997 incident is unassailable. We decline to disturb the Commission's dismissal of Crafts's claim.

______________________________

James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge