R.J. v. State (In re A.J.)

R.J. v. State (In re A.J.)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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State of Utah, in the interest of A.J. and K.J.,
persons under eighteen years of age.

______________________________

R.J.,

Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20050008-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 24, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 147

 

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Seventh District Juvenile, Price Department

The Honorable Scott N. Johansen

Attorneys: Samuel S. Bailey and Don Torgerson, Price, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Carol L.C. Verdoia, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Martha Pierce and Connie Mower, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem

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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme.

PER CURIAM:

    R.J. appeals a custody order and an order terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

    R.J. contends that the juvenile court erred when it did not allow the minor children to testify at trial. The juvenile court has broad discretion in determining whether to allow a witness to testify, and this court will not reverse such ruling unless it abused that discretion, substantially affecting a parent's rights. See In re A.M.S., 2000 UT App 182,¶16, 4 P.3d 95. The juvenile court ruled that the children would have nothing to say of any relevance because they had not seen their father in many years. R.J. has made no showing that this decision was incorrect, and there is nothing in the record to the contrary. In any event, the children were not in attendance at the trial. There is simply no showing that the trial court abused its discretion.

    R.J. argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when a witness was allowed to testify via telephone. R.J. cites no authority for the proposition that this principle of criminal law applies in the context of a termination proceeding. Moreover, R.J. was allowed to cross-examine the witness.

    R.J. makes general assertions regarding whether the juvenile court made the findings and conclusions required by Utah Code section 78-3a-407(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(1) (2002). R.J. fails to specify the particular error that he alleges. Nevertheless, it is clear that the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions pursuant to multiple grounds set forth in section 78-3a-407(1), and terminated R.J.'s parental rights based upon these findings and conclusions. See In re F.C., 2003 UT App 397,¶6, 81 P.3d 790 ("The statute governing termination of parental rights provides that a juvenile court 'may terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent if it finds any one of' the grounds listed in the statute.") (quoting Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-407(1)). R.J. has certainly failed to show that all the grounds were erroneously decided.

    Finally, R.J. argues that he was deprived of due process when he was not allowed to take part in the shelter hearing. However, the juvenile court found that the Division of Child and Family Services sent R.J. notice of the shelter hearing, but that R.J. was unable to attend due to his incarceration. This finding was not challenged by R.J. Once R.J. notified the court of his location and that he desired counsel, counsel was appointed. After the shelter hearing, R.J. was served with all subsequent documents, including the termination and custody petitions, and R.J. was able to participate in all further proceedings. Thus, R.J. has not shown that his due process rights were violated.

    We hold that R.J.'s remaining arguments are without merit. Many of the arguments set forth in R.J.'s petition on appeal fail to comply with rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 55. Rule 55 states that "issue statements should be concise in nature, setting forth specific legal questions. General, conclusory statements such as 'the juvenile court's ruling is not supported by law or the facts' are not acceptable." Utah R. App. P. 55(d)(5). Further, "[t]he petition should include supporting statutes, case law, and other legal authority for each issue raised, including authority contrary to appellant's case, if known." Utah R. App. P. 55(d)(6).

    In addition, many of R.J.'s arguments are simply too vague to be addressed. See In re P.M., 2005 UT App 46 n.1 (per curiam). For instance, an argument that the juvenile court admitted or considered inadmissible hearsay is simply not reviewable without some reference as to the testimony or witness at issue. Similarly, an objection that the juvenile court erred "by relying on evidence improperly admitted" is insufficient.

    We therefore affirm the order regarding custody and the order terminating R.J.'s parental rights.

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

______________________________

Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge