Prax v. Hon. Lyle Anderson

Prax v. Hon. Lyle Anderson

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Brian Prax,

Petitioner,

v.

Honorable Lyle Anderson,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040213-CA
 

F I L E D
(May 6, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 157

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for Petitioner

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

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Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Prax was charged in justice court with two misdemeanors. Two codefendants were apparently charged in district court. The evidence against all three was obtained in a single administrative checkpoint. Initially, the district court, in the codefendants' cases, upheld the legality of the checkpoint. As a result, the justice court did the same in this companion case. The district court case was subsequently appealed to this court. The State conceded error. As a result, an unpublished decision issued by this court reversed the district court conviction on the ground that the checkpoint was illegal. Prax then appealed his conviction to the district court where he sought to have his conviction vacated. The district court refused to do so, claiming that the fact that the State conceded error in the companion case had no bearing on the conviction in this case.

Prax petitions this court for extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Respondent argues that extraordinary relief is not available to Prax because he has already been afforded appellate review in the form of a de novo appeal to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002). However, in a trial de novo, the district court is "'not acting in a typical appellate capacity.'" Lucero v. Murray City Justice Court, 2004 UT App 94,¶9 (quoting State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). The district court does not review the record of the justice court, rather, it is a fresh start, as though the case originated in district court. See id. In this instance Prax has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and a petition for extraordinary relief is procedurally appropriate. See Utah R. Civ P. 65B(a).

Respondent next argues that Prax has failed to meet the requirements for a petition pursuant to rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Prax has wholly failed to provide factual or legal support, or substantiation from the record in support of his request for relief. See Utah R. App. P. 19(b). Nor has he analyzed why he is entitled to the relief. Prax merely asserts that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the conviction but, offers nothing to support the conclusion. Prax has, therefore, failed to meet the requirements for a petition for extraordinary relief and, as a result, this court may not engage in meaningful review of the actions of the district court.

The petition for extraordinary relief is, therefore, dismissed.

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

______________________________

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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ORME, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):

I agree with my colleagues that the petition for extraordinary relief is "procedurally appropriate" in this case; I disagree with their assessment that the petition is facially inadequate to state a claim for relief.

The petition, as supplemented, alleges that the petitioner's conviction grows out of a road-block, UHP 01-10, that this court, albeit in an unpublished memorandum decision, has declared to be unconstitutional under the analysis set forth in State v. Abell, 2003 UT 20, 473 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. If so, justice simply will not permit the Petitioner's conviction to stand in the face of a well-taken petition for extraordinary relief.

That having been said, the petition, even as supplemented, is insufficient to demonstrate entitlement to relief (as opposed to stating a claim for relief). Thus, in the interest of justice, I would give petitioner thirty days to further supplement his petition with certified documents and/or affidavits establishing (1) that he was stopped at the very check point at issue in State v. Bonnet, Case No. 20021033-CA and

(2) that the only evidence against him in this prosecution was obtained in the course of a stop made in administering that checkpoint. (If the State knows these facts to be true, I would hope that a simple stipulation to that effect would be forthcoming.) Once such information has been submitted by Petitioner, if there is a good faith basis to question its accuracy, I would give the State fifteen days to refute Petitioner's submission. If the facts claimed by Petitioner are shown to be true, I would then vacate the conviction in the interest of justice.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge