Owens v. Labor Comm'n.

Owens v. Labor Comm'n.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Douglas J. Owens,

Petitioner,

v.

Labor Commission, Beckstrom Body Shop and/or Workers' Compensation Fund,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040087-CA
 

F I L E D
(October 7, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 352

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Michael Gary Belnap, Ogden, for Petitioner

James R. Black, and Lori Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Respondents

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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood.

PER CURIAM:

    Douglas Owens petitions this court for review of the Labor Commission's (Commission) order denying his motion for review of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision denying him additional workers' compensation benefits.

    In 2001, Owens filed for additional workers' compensation benefits, alleging that a 1998 accident at Beckstrom Body Shop (Beckstrom) was the cause of a herniated disc in his neck. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ submitted preliminary findings of fact to a medical panel convened to evaluate Owens's medical claims. The facts, undisputed by either party, included reports of various injuries between the time Owens left his employment at Beckstrom and the time of his diagnosis of a herniated disc. In 1999 and 2000, Owens had fallen down stairs in nonwork-related accidents. Owens required medical attention after both accidents.

    The medical panel reviewed two doctors' reports, Owens's complete medical history, and performed its own examination of Owens. The medical panel provided a report to the ALJ, concluding that the 1998 accident did not cause Owens's neck injury. The ALJ adopted the panel's conclusion, and denied Owens additional benefits. Upon review, the Commission adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, and denied Owens's motion for review.

    Owens argues that the Commission erred by failing to liberally construe the Workers' Compensation Act (Act), see Utah Code Annotated section 34A-2-101 to -803 (2001 & Supp. 2003), requiring resolution of all doubts in his favor, and by adopting the ALJ's findings and conclusions without independently making additional findings. Neither argument has merit.

    In asserting that, under the Act, all doubts must be resolved in favor of compensation, Owens attempts to shift the burden of proof, but to no avail. A claimant bears the burden of proof to establish the right to compensation. To be entitled to benefits under the Act, a claimant must show, "by a preponderance of evidence," that a workplace accident occurred and that the accident was the legal and medical cause of the injury. McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 10,¶15, 41 P.3d 468. The requirement to establish medical causation "ensure[s] that there is a medically demonstrable causal link between the work-related exertions" and the injuries claimed. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). If the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, "compensation should be denied." Id. Owens failed to establish that the 1998 accident was the medical cause of his neck injury. The liberal construction of the Act does not relieve him of his burden.

    Owens's argument that the Commission inappropriately adopted the ALJ's findings without additional independent fact finding also fails. It is well established that the Commission has the discretion to adopt findings generated by an ALJ. See Jones v. Ogden Auto Body, 646 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1982) (holding the Commission may adopt the findings of the administrative law judge). Upon a claimant's request for review, "the commission will then review the administrative law judge's findings and order and may, at its discretion, choose to adopt them without further hearing." Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Utah 1990).

    Owens also attacks the sufficiency of the medical panel report. In essence, this attack is a challenge to the Commission's findings, particularly the determination that the 1998 accident was not the cause of Owens's neck injury. Appellate courts will overturn the Commission's findings of fact only if they are "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1997); see also Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quotations and citation omitted).

    The Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Commission's key finding that Owens's neck injury was not caused by the incident at Beckstrom is supported by the opinions of both Beckstrom's appointed physician and the medical panel; Owens's report of no neck pain at the time of the 1998 accident; his undisputed ability to stoop, bend, stand, and sit after the accident and before he left employment at Beckstrom; his two subsequent falls down stairs, directly impacting his back and neck and requiring medical attention; and the "excessive" length of time between the 1998 accident and Owens's first report of neck and back symptoms. In contrast, Owens's treating neurosurgeon opined that the Beckstrom incident caused Owens's neck injury, but it is not clear that Owens's physician had reviewed Owens's complete medical history including subsequent falls. In sum, on the record as a whole, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable mind to conclude that the 1998 accident at Beckstrom did not cause Owens's neck injury.

    Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

______________________________

Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge