State of Utah v. Oliver

State v. Oliver

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Michael Oliver,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030286-CA
 

F I L E D
(August 26, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 288

 

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Second District, Farmington Department

The Honorable Thomas L. Kay

Attorneys: D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

    Michael Oliver appeals his sentence on one second degree felony and three third degree felonies after pleading guilty to the charges. He asserts his due process rights were violated because the trial court considered an improper factor in sentencing and that the sentence is unduly rigorous.

    Trial courts necessarily have broad discretion in sentencing. See State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980). "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432,¶14, 82 P.3d 1167 (quotations and citation omitted). An appellate court may find abuse of discretion in a sentence only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See id.

    Upon conviction of a defendant on a felony charge, the trial court "may sentence" a defendant to, among other things, imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (2003). A person convicted of a felony "may be sentenced to imprisonment" for indeterminate terms of one to fifteen years for a second degree felony and zero to five years for a third degree felony. Id. § 76-3-203 (2003). Persons sentenced to imprisonment for felony convictions "shall" be committed to the Utah State Prison. Id. § 76-3-208(1)(a) (2003).

    Oliver was sentenced to the statutorily provided indeterminate terms for second and third degree felonies. The trial court clearly operated within its statutory discretion in imposing imprisonment, based on pleas to multiple felonies, Oliver's criminal history, and the severity and number of the charges from his one-week crime spree. Because the terms were in the statutory range, the sentence was not clearly excessive. Furthermore, given pleas to four felonies out of eleven charges, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would take the view of the trial court that prison was appropriate. There was no abuse of discretion in sentencing Oliver to a lawful sentence, and, as the sentence was statutorily provided for the crimes pleaded, the sentence was not unduly rigorous.

    Oliver's claim that his due process rights were violated because he was sentenced to prison based on a shortage of bed space in the county jail is unsupported. Although Oliver maintains that a comment by the trial court regarding interpretation of Adult Probation and Parole recommendations constituted the determinative factor in his sentence, the record shows that the trial court believed prison was warranted based on Oliver's criminal history and current crimes. At the January 16, 2003 sentencing hearing, the January 16, 2003 post-sentencing hearing, and the May 27, 2003 post-judgment motions hearing, the trial court consistently identified the factors supporting Oliver's prison sentence as his criminal history, the number and severity of the current charges, and the contents of the presentence report. Oliver has not shown that the trial court relied on any inappropriate factor. As a result, he has shown no due process violation.

    The trial court did not impose an unduly rigorous sentence, nor did it violate Oliver's due process rights by relying on inappropriate factors. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge