Foster v. DWS & WG Univ.

Foster v. DWS & WG Univ.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Peggy Christensen Foster,

Petitioner,

v.

Department of Workforce Services and Western Governors University,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040311-CA
 

F I L E D
(November 12, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 417

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Peggy Christensen Foster, Salt Lake City, Petitioner Pro Se

Michael R. Medley, Salt Lake City, for Respondents

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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.

PER CURIAM:

    This case is before the court on its own motion for summary disposition on the basis that the issues presented on appeal are so insubstantial as to not merit further consideration by the court. See Utah R. App. P. 10. Respondents filed a response to this court's motion. Rather than a response, Petitioner Foster filed a motion for a change of venue.

    Foster contends that the district court has jurisdiction to review agency decisions. This is incorrect in the present context. The district court has jurisdiction to review informal agency decisions, however, formal agency decisions, including those of the Workforce Appeals Board, are reviewed by the appellate courts. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(1) (1997); Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-508(8)(a) (2001). Foster also argues that the Workforce Appeals Board does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues. However, whether or not the Workforce Appeals Board has such authority does not affect which court has jurisdiction.

    Foster was hired by and worked for Western Governors University from May 8, 2003 to May 13, 2003, approximately two and one-half days, as an administrative assistant. Apparently she left her job because she did not like working for her employer and felt that she had been required to engage in fraudulent activities by her supervisor.

    Foster notified the Vice President of Finance and Administration that she did not like working for her supervisor, that he was disorganized and demanding and asked her to do things that made her uncomfortable, and that she was quitting. The Vice President asked her to stay until a replacement could be found, but Foster refused. She left on May 13, 2003.

    Foster subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. According to the Workforce Appeals Board, Foster made misrepresentations by underreporting her income. The Workforce Appeals Board also determined she failed to notify Workforce Services of the circumstances of her separation from her employment.

    Foster claims that she was either fired or had good cause to quit as a result of the demand that she engage in fraudulent activities. In order to establish good cause, Foster was required to demonstrate that quitting was necessary in order to avoid actual personal or professional harm. Foster must also establish that there was no reasonable alternative but to quit. The Workforce Appeals Board determined that Foster had failed to meet these requirements and Foster has failed to demonstrate that the Board was in error.

    With respect to the determination of fraudulent underreporting of income, the Workforce Appeals Board determined that, due to the underreporting, Foster was not entitled to benefits for the weeks of May 17, 2003, through October 4, 2003, and, with the exception of the week ending June 7, 2003, she was denied benefits for forty-nine additional weeks from December 7, 2003, through November 13, 2004. The Workforce Appeals Board also determined that Foster's separation from her employment should have been reported in order for Workforce Services to determine whether she qualified for continued benefits under the good cause standard.

    The Workforce Appeals Board correctly points out that "the intent to defraud is inherent in the claims themselves which contain false statements and the filing of the claim is itself a manifestation of intent to defraud." Whitney v. Board of Review, 585 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1978). Moreover, this court will overturn the agency's decision "only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). This court will not reverse the agency's application of law to the facts unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec., 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Foster has failed to demonstrate that reversal is warranted under these standards.

    The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is summarily affirmed. The motion for a change of venue is denied.

______________________________

Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge