State of Utah v. Schumacher

State v. Schumacher

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Marc W. Schumacher,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020478-CA
 

F I L E D
(May 22, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 151

 

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Fifth District, Cedar City Department

The Honorable J. Philip Eves

Attorneys: Marc W. Schumacher, Paragonah, Appellant Pro Se

Scott Garrett and David E. Doxey, Cedar City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).

"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed . . . a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999).(1) While "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support reasonable suspicion are most frequently based on an investigating officer's own observations and inferences," we have also recognized that "under certain circumstances [an] officer may rely on other sources of information." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus,

if a [police] flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information.

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S. Ct. 675, 682 (1985) (citations omitted).(2) Accord State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989); Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 ("An investigative stop may survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies on information, bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement sources.") (emphasis in original).

Having personally observed Defendant run a stop sign, Agent Dunlap possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that Defendant committed a public offense. Agent Dunlap transmitted this information via radio to Officer Russell, who was also responding to the suspicious vehicle broadcast involving Defendant. Officer Russell was entitled to rely on Agent Dunlap's radio transmission and was therefore justified in stopping Defendant.

Defendant also contends that "[a]n officer may not stop a vehicle for a traffic violation unless he personally witnessed that violation." The cases Defendant relies on, however, merely state the well-settled rule that "a police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). It does not follow from this rule, and Defendant cites no cases to suggest, that an officer is justified in stopping a
vehicle to investigate a traffic violation only when he personally witnessed that violation.

Affirmed.

______________________________

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

1.   Defendant argues that section 77-7-15 applies "only to criminal infractions" and that running a stop sign is not a criminal infraction. Defendant's argument is entirely without merit. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-72.10(2) (1998) (stating that "every operator of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop"); id. § 41-6-12(1) ("A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor[.]").

2.   "The term 'flyer,' as used in Hensley, has been taken to mean any information intended to prompt investigation that is transmitted through police channels, regardless of method." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).