Nat'l Advertising v. Murray City

Nat'l Advertising v. Murray City

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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National Advertising Company,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Murray City Corporation, et al.,

Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020717-CA
 

F I L E D
(October 9, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 332

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

Attorneys: Donald L. Dalton, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Steve K. Gordon and R. Stephen Marshall, Salt Lake City, for Crawford Appellees

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Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.

BENCH, Judge:

National Advertising Corporation (NAC) argues that the Crawfords' sign permit was void ab initio because they could not satisfy the condition in their permit, and therefore NAC's permit takes priority. We disagree.

Contrary to NAC's argument, the Crawfords' permit was valid at the outset. On March 29, 1996, the Crawfords were granted a sign permit contingent on the removal of NAC's sign within 180 days. Under paragraph 9 of the lease, the Crawfords could terminate the lease within 90 days upon notification to NAC of their construction plans, well within the 180-day limitation. While there may be some questions as to whether the Crawfords effectively terminated the lease under paragraph 9, these questions are ultimately irrelevant to our decision. What matters is that the Crawfords' permit was not void ab initio because paragraph 9 of the lease allowed the Crawfords to terminate the lease within the 180-day period.

Having determined that the Crawfords' permit was valid, we now examine the validity of the extension. Before their permit expired, the Crawfords asked Murray City for an extension. As Murray City had issued a valid permit, it could also grant the Crawfords a 180-day extension. Nevertheless, NAC argues that since its conditional permit was granted before the Crawfords' extension, the extension moved the Crawfords into a contingent position. We disagree. Because the Crawfords' permit was valid from the outset and the extension was properly granted, NAC's permit remained conditional.

During the extension period, the Crawfords terminated the lease pursuant to paragraph 3 of the lease. Under paragraph 3, the Crawfords could terminate the lease on any lease anniversary with at least 60 days written notice. On November 25, 1996, the Crawfords gave NAC written notice that the lease would be terminated on February 1, 1997, the next lease anniversary date. This gave NAC notice of termination 67 days in advance of the lease anniversary, or 7 days more than the 60-day requirement. Therefore, the lease was properly terminated under paragraph 3 within the extension period.

Because the Crawfords' permit and extension were valid and the NAC lease was terminated as of February 1, 1997, the Crawfords' permit takes priority over NAC's permit. We therefore affirm.

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge