State of Utah v. Jennings

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Christian Jennings,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020787-CA
 

F I L E D
(October 23, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 361

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Robin W. Reese

Attorneys: Catherine E. Lilly, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Christian David Jennings appeals from his conviction of possession of a dangerous weapon by a category I restricted person,(1) a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-503(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). We affirm.

Jennings argues that the trial court erred in finding that the knife Jennings carried when he encountered an officer of Adult Probation and Parole (APP) was dangerous. As the State properly points out, "'"[w]hen reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."'" State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,¶10, 999 P.2d 1252 (citations omitted). Additionally, we accord considerable deference to the fact-finder when findings involve an assessment of the credibility of a witness. See State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

In the instant case, the trial court was called upon to determine whether the knife, carried by Jennings at the time of his encounter with the APP officer, was dangerous under the factors set forth in Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-501(4)(a) (1999). Thus, the court examined "(i) the character of the [knife]; (ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; (iii) the manner in which the [knife] was used; and (iv) the other lawful purposes for which the [knife] may be used." Id.

Based upon the trial court's examination of the knife and the testimony of the APP officer involved in the incident, the court concluded that Jennings carried the knife for reasons likely to cause injury to others, rather than as a utility knife. The court specifically found that the knife's blade was three-and-one-half inches long. The court also found that the knife tapered to a very sharp point and that both edges were sharpened and serrated. The court further found that Jennings twice admitted to the APP officer that he carried the knife for self-defense. Thus, Jennings admitted that he carried and used the knife for reasons that are potentially dangerous. Finally, the trial court discounted any possibility that the knife may have been used or carried for "lawful purposes." Id. Specifically, the court refused to accept Jennings's trial testimony that he had been carrying the knife for a variety of non-dangerous purposes, ranging from cutting drywall to cleaning his fingernails. Instrumental to this finding was the fact that, since being released from prison, Jennings had not been employed to work with drywall, as his testimony seemed to suggest, and he admitted to the APP officer that he carried the knife "to protect himself from people like himself."

From the evidence and testimony presented, we cannot say that the trial court was mistaken in convicting Jennings. The court had an opportunity to examine the knife and was in the optimal position to evaluate and weigh the conflicting testimonies of Jennings and the APP officer. The court acted well within its permitted range of discretion in accepting the testimony of the APP officer over Jennings's testimony. The officer's testimony, when coupled with the characteristics of Jennings's knife, supports the trial court's verdict.

Accordingly, we affirm Jennings's conviction.

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. Jennings stipulated to his status as a category I restricted person.