State of Utah v. Haws

State v. Haws

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Steven Cory Haws,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020181-CA
 

F I L E D
(May 15, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 145

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Ann Boyden

Attorneys: Janet Miller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Thorne.

JACKSON, Presiding Judge:

Haws appeals the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress inculpatory statements. He challenges the trial court's findings that (1) Detective Thompson warned him regarding each of the rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and (2) he waived his rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. "We review the trial court['s] factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). Further, we afford "a measure of discretion . . . to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

To show clear error in a trial court's findings, an appellant must first marshal the evidence. See State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). "[T]he challenger must [then] ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince [us] that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Based on the record before us, we cannot say the trial court's findings were against the clear weight of the evidence. Haws points us to Detective Thompson's testimony at a preliminary hearing. At that hearing, Thompson's enumeration of the Miranda rights about which he advised Haws did not include the right to the appointment of an attorney if Haws could not afford one. However, at a subsequent suppression hearing, Thompson was asked to recite the Miranda warning from memory, wherein he properly enumerated all of the rights required by Miranda.

Haws suggests that Thompson's testimony "was, at best, suspect, and at worst, coached or manufactured for purposes of answering [Haws's] Motion to Suppress." However, the trial court stated that it made a credibility determination, finding Thompson's testimony inherently credible. It further explained that Thompson's first testimony omitted reference to the right to a publicly subsidized attorney because of an awkward line of questioning that did not require Thompson to demonstrate his experienced and well-ingrained memory of the Miranda warnings.

Trial courts "are in a better position to assess credibility and determine facts than an appellate court is. [We] therefore owe broad deference to the trial court engaged in a factfinding role." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,¶18, 40 P.3d 611.

When challenging a trial court's factual findings, the appellant "'must show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings.'" Furthermore, we do not disturb credibility determinations unless the trial court exceeded its permitted range of discretion.

State v. Krukowski, 2002 UT App 433,¶15, 62 P.3d 452 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,¶17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (citations and emphasis omitted)); see also Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Utah 1996) (noting that because trial courts "are in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole," appellate courts grant broad discretion to trial courts on such matters).

Given the trial court's credibility determination and Thompson's explanation for his omission, the evidence sufficiently supports the trial court's finding that Thompson gave all of the required warnings. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in its findings based on the inferences Haws wishes us to draw. Further, since we have determined that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Thompson gave all the appropriate warnings, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding Haws's waiver to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 298-99 (Utah 1992) (affirming trial court's finding of voluntary waiver where defendant based his challenge on, inter alia, an incorrect allegation of incomplete Miranda warnings).

Because Haws failed to show clear error in the trial court's findings, we "accept the findings as entered" and affirm the trial court's denial of Haws's motions to suppress. Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 930.

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge