Ferrin v. McIntyre

Ferrin v. McIntyre

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Ronald A. Ferrin and Marcia Ferrin,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.

James McIntyre and Cynthia McIntyre,
Defendants and Appellants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20020195-CA

F I L E D
(July 17, 2003)

2003 UT App 259

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod

Attorneys: James A. McIntyre, Salt Lake City, for Appellants

Donald F. Dalton, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Greenwood, Orme, and Thorne.

ORME, Judge:

The trial court clearly erred by not holding a hearing on summary judgment. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(3)(C). Even so, a reversal is not in order unless there exists a "reasonable likelihood" that the lack of oral argument affected the outcome. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997). Appellants fail to meet their burden of establishing that the error was prejudicial to their case.

As for the contract interpretation issue, it is well settled that where no ambiguity exists, a contract may be interpreted as a matter of law on summary judgment. See Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89,¶14, 987 P.2d 48. However, if an ambiguity does exist, interpretation becomes a factual matter and extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the intent of the parties. See id.

In the contract before us, the term "homesite" is clearly distinguished from the term "parcel." In the third paragraph, both terms are used distinctly in a single sentence. The term "parcel" is used specifically to describe a 5.7 acre area of land that may be subdivided "into no more than 13 homesites."

The parties' usage of these terms is fully consistent with the terms' generally accepted definitions. See generally Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977). The dictionary defines the term "parcel" as "a continuous tract or plot of land in one possession no part of which is separated from the rest by intervening land in other possession." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1640 (1993). The 5.7 acre plot of land clearly meets these criteria, and there is no contrary indication within the contract that the parties intended this term to have some peculiar meaning, such as being synonymous with "homesite."

Webster's defines the term "homesite" as "a location suitable for a home" or "the location of a home." Id. at 1083. The parties clearly manifested their mutual understanding by referring, in the third paragraph of their contract, to their intention of subdividing the parcel "into no more than 13 homesites."

We conclude that no ambiguity exists. Thus, the contract could properly be interpreted, as a matter of law, on summary judgment. A plain reading of the contract shows that both parties understood a single parcel of land was to be subdivided so that it would include no more than thirteen locations suitable for a home. If the parties additionally intended those homesites to be of a certain minimal size or that no part of the parcel be exempted from the subdivision or conveyed for use other than as a homesite, it would have been easy enough to have said so.

We further note that, despite how the issues were briefed on appeal, it became evident at oral argument that there is no real disagreement about the meaning of the term "homesite" as used in the parties' contract. Mr. McIntyre himself said, "My view of the meaning of the word 'homesite' [is that it] is a piece of property that is suitable to build a home."

However, whether the property sold to the Allreds qualifies as a homesite is an issue separate and apart from how the contract should be interpreted. Due to the conflicting evidence regarding this issue, we conclude that it cannot properly be decided summarily on the record before us.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Appellees filed the affidavit of James D. Allred setting forth the following: (1) his intent at the time of purchasing the parcel from Appellees "was to provide for a larger yard and to create a landscape buffer between neighboring properties"; (2) he has done so; and (3) the parcel in question is unsuitable for development as a homesite, given that it has limited access, "is bordered by Little Cottonwood Creek," and has a steep slope on the west end of the property that limits the plot's "buildable area." In opposition to Appellees' motion, Appellants filed an affidavit. In pertinent part, they averred that Appellants had a conversation during the spring of 1997 with the Allreds, during which the Allreds related that (1) "they had originally purchased the land adjoining their property from [Appellees] with the idea that they would build a home for their parents"; (2) Appellees told the Allreds that an easement could be purchased to provide access to the land; and (3) "as far as [the Allreds] knew there was nothing which would prevent them from building another house" on their enlarged property if they chose to do so.

"[A] motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Here, if the assertions in Appellants' affidavit are true, the parcel in question was a homesite at the time of sale, and, in selling it, Appellees breached their contract with Appellants.(1) The summary judgment is accordingly reversed and the case remanded for trial or such other proceedings as may now be appropriate.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

 

1.     The separate agreement entered into between the Ferrins and Allreds, five years after the initial contract was entered into by the Ferrins and McIntyres, has no bearing on whether there was a breach of the initial contract, although it may well bear on questions of damages and mitigation of damages.