Eddy v. Autoliv

Eddy v. Autoliv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Christina M. Eddy,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Autoliv ASP, Inc.; et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20011018-CA

F I L E D
(April 3, 2003)

2003 UT App 97

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Second District, Ogden Department

The Honorable Michael J. Glasmann

The Honorable Roger S. Dutson

Attorneys: Christina M. Eddy, Hooper, Appellant Pro Se

Janet Hugie Smith and Frederick R. Thaler, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood.

BENCH, Judge:

Plaintiff conceded below that her "state law claim concerns only [issues] from [her] termination date forward." Accordingly, we consider only those issues that involve facts on or after September 16, 1997, the date Plaintiff's employment was terminated.

The trial court granted summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's defamation and false light claims. "We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal determinations." Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94,¶9, 16 P.3d 555.

Plaintiff's defamation claims fail as a matter of law because the communications set forth by Plaintiff that were allegedly defamatory were all conditionally and/or absolutely privileged. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997) ("An absolute privilege is granted to participants in judicial proceedings."); Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a "'qualified privilege protects an employer's communication to employees and to other interested parties concerning the reasons for an employee's discharge'" (citation omitted)). Furthermore, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts to show that any such privilege was abused. See id.

In similar fashion, Plaintiff's false light claim fails because Plaintiff has not set forth facts to establish the necessary element of public disclosure. See Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94 at ¶12 ("Public disclosure 'means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.'" (citation omitted)); see also Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (setting forth the elements of a false light claim, which include "'publicity [of] a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light'" (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). After viewing "'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff],'" we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94 at ¶9 (citation omitted).

Finally, Plaintiff's procedural claims are without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992) (permitting appellate courts to decline to analyze and address in writing every issue raised).

We therefore affirm.

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Judith M. Billings,

Associate Presiding Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge