State of Utah, v. Pino

----ooOoo----

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Eric Pino,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010205-CA

F I L E D
April 11, 2002 2002 UT App 110 -----

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Lynn W. Davis

Attorneys:
Margaret P. Lindsay and Patrick V. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey T. Colemere, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Thorne.

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

Defendant Eric Pino appeals from a conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug-Free Zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001). Defendant's appeal centers on the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

The trial court determined that Officer Robinson's search of Defendant's bag was justified by officer safety. However, we can affirm on any ground presented to the trial court. See State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). We conclude that even if Defendant's detention went beyond that justified by a traffic violation, his detention was supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994).

Defendant does not argue Officer Robinson's initial questions about his prior drug use subjected him to further delay as Officer Hughes was simultaneously completing the paperwork for Defendant's traffic violations. Rather, Defendant argues the request to search his bag, which he removed from his car when Officer Hughes told him he could take his personal possessions before the car was impounded, unlawfully extended the detention. "Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id. "While knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement is not sufficient itself to even rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, it can combine with other factors to support the requisite standard of suspicion." United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000).

In the present case, Officer Robinson observed that Defendant's eyes were glazed and he seemed to be in a stupor. These observations together with Officer Robinson's previous experience with Defendant's drug problems, including finding drugs in Defendant's home after executing a search warrant, gave him reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have contraband in his bag. When combined, the facts allowed Officer Robinson to briefly detain Defendant to request to search his bag. See id.; State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the short detention and request to search Defendant's bag were supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. We therefore affirm.(1)
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 

______________________________
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues his consent was involuntary. "[W]here a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, we do not consider the issue of whether Defendant's consent was voluntarily given.