State of Utah, v. Clark

----ooOoo----

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Elvin Daniel Clark,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010157-CA

F I L E D
April 11, 2002 2002 UT App 108 -----

Fourth District, Fillmore Department
The Honorable Steven L. Hansen

Attorneys:
James K. Slavens, Fillmore, for Appellant
Brent G. Berkley, Fillmore, for Appellee -----

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Greenwood.
BENCH, Judge:

Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to allow the State to amend the dates of the offense in the information. Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he court may permit an . . . information to be amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." In this case, the amendment came after the trial court ruled, on Defendant's motion, that Defendant's move from a halfway house in Salt Lake City back to Delta did not constitute a change of habitation. After this ruling, the State requested leave to amend the information to change the dates of the offense from between December 1997 and November 1999, to between June 1996 and November 1999, to reflect the date when Defendant first moved from Logan to Delta. This change did not charge a different offense, nor do we see how it prejudiced Defendant or hampered the effective presentation of his defense. Throughout the trial, Defendant's contention was that he did not know he was required to register when he moved. Therefore, the trial court's ruling giving the State leave to amend the information was proper.

Second, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence upon which to base his conviction. "'So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.'" State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,¶67, 27 P.3d 1115 (citation omitted). Although the State did not present its evidence in the most straightforward and concise manner, it did present to the jury some evidence as to each element from which, along with reasonable inferences, the jury could find Defendant guilty of the charged offense. Therefore, we will not second guess the conclusions of the jury.

Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court exceeded its sentencing discretion when Defendant was not given credit for the twenty-three days he had already served in jail on this offense, and was ordered to undergo a sex offender evaluation as a condition of probation. "The trial court has broad discretion in imposing sentence within the statutory scope provided by the legislature." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The sentencing guidelines provide that the maximum sentence should be reduced by the amount of time already served in jail on the offense. See Utah Code Jud. Admin., app. d. Since Defendant was sentenced to less than the maximum penalty, it was within the trial court's discretion whether to give credit for time served. Likewise, the trial court has broad discretion in granting or withholding probation and in determining the conditions of probation so that they are "compatible with the public interest." Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Defendant.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge
 
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge