State of Utah, in the interest of I.C.

State of Utah, in the interest of I.C., a person under eighteen years of age, Case No. 981835-CA, Filed March 2, 2000 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah, in the interest of I.C.,
a person under eighteen years of age.
______________________________

R.C. and J.C.,
Appellants,

v.

State of Utah,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981835-CA

F I L E D
March 2, 2000
  2000 UT App 52 -----

Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Charles D. Behrens

Attorneys:
David C. Blum and Monica Z. Kelley, Salt Lake City, for Appellant R.C.
J.C., Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se
Jan Graham and John Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Martha Pierce and Kristin L. Fadel, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem ----- Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Billings.

BENCH, Judge:

R.C. and J.C. separately appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights.

J.C.'s pro se brief consists of a few pages of simple factual assertions regarding her compliance with the requirements of her service plan. Her brief contains no argument, no citation to the record or any authority, and does not even attempt to marshal the evidence or make any argument concerning the actions of the trial court. In sum, J.C.'s brief wholly fails to meet the briefing requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (providing that argument in brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"). This court "'is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). "[B]ecause we find [J.C.'s] appellate brief wholly fails to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and it [fails to present an] issue for our consideration," we affirm the termination of her parental rights. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Walker v. United States Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996) (declining to address issue when appellant's brief "wholly fail[s] to cite to the record or a single case in support of this contention"); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (sua sponte disregarding appellant's inadequate brief).

R.C. first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings. R.C.'s brief, however, also "sets forth little legal analysis . . . , does not even attempt to marshal the evidence, and presents no citations to the record." Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1109. It is well established that in order "[t]o challenge the sufficiency of a trial court's findings, an appellant '"must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the [juvenile] court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence."'" In re D.G., 938 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted; alteration in original). Instead of properly marshaling the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, R.C. has merely argued the facts he believes support his position. This is clearly inadequate to successfully challenge the trial court's findings. "In light of [R.C.'s] failure to marshal the evidence, we must assume that all the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence." Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998).

R.C. next argues that DCFS "failed to assist [him] in any meaningful way." Assuming for purposes of this appeal that this is true, the argument is unavailing. Token efforts is a ground for termination of parental rights that does not require a finding that the State made any effort to assist R.C. See In re M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "a juvenile court has the statutory authority to order the termination of a parent's rights based on . . . token efforts, regardless of whether the State provided any services, reasonable or not"). Because only one ground is necessary to uphold a termination order, R.C.'s argument for reversal based upon the State's failure to assist him is without merit. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (1996) ("The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to one or both parents if it finds any one of the [enumerated grounds].") (emphasis added); In re J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 411 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

R.C.'s final argument is that the kinship evaluator violated R.C.'s due process rights by failing to properly complete the evaluation. However, R.C. has failed to demonstrate that this argument was preserved below. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) ("To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial court."); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (holding defendant could not assert, as basis of error on appeal, issue not raised before trial court, even though claim involved constitutional right). Accordingly, this argument is also unavailing.

In any event, and notwithstanding the appellants' briefing deficiencies, it is clear that the evidence adduced in the juvenile court amply supports the termination order against both parents. Simply stated, the findings are not "against the clear weight of the evidence." In re M.E.C., 942 P.2d at 960. To the contrary, the evidence strongly supports each of the grounds for termination. Given the findings, which we must assume are supported by the evidence due to appellants' failure to marshal the evidence, see Searcy, 958 P.2d at 233, there is an adequate legal basis for terminating the parental rights of J.C. and R.C.

We therefore affirm the termination order of the juvenile court.
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge ----- WE CONCUR:
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge