Linnell v. Linnell

Annotate this Case
Linnell v. Linnell, Case No. 990861-CA, Filed October 26, 2000 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

----ooOoo----

Carolyn Hammond Linnell,
Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

Dennis D. Linnell,
Respondent and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990861-CA

F I L E D
October 26, 2000 2000 UT App 294 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable David S. Young

Attorneys:
David W. Steffensen and Richard L. King, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Heather S. White, Harold G. Christensen, and Rodney R. Parker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

-----

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Thorne.

JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

Appellant first argues the trial court abused its discretion by imputing income to him. Whether a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, thus meriting an imputation of income, is a question of fact. See Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that he was underemployed. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12,¶24, 973 P.2d 431. Instead, Appellant merely points to evidence in the record that weighs against the trial court's finding. Thus, we "'"assume[] that the record supports the findings of the trial court."'" Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original).

Appellant also challenges the amount of income imputed to him. Appellant states that there is no evidence in the record supporting the trial court's $40,000 figure, and he should thus not be required to marshal the evidence. We disagree. The evidence supports the trial court's finding. See Hill, 869 P.2d at 964-65 (stating court may impute income "if it has first examined a parent's historical and current earnings to determine that underemployment . . . exists"). Thus, we reject this argument, both because Appellant failed to marshal and because the record supports the trial court's finding.

Next, Appellant contends the trial court's finding regarding alimony is deficient as a matter of law. We disagree. When taken as a whole, the findings are sufficiently detailed to allow us to meaningfully review the trial court's reasoning. See Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219,¶9, 983 P.2d 1103. Appellant also argues the trial court failed to consider both Appellee's ability to produce income for herself and Appellant's ability to provide support. Again, the record does not bear out this contention. Findings of fact fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen all address Appellee's ability to produce income for herself. Findings ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen all bear on Appellant's ability to provide support.

Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court's property distribution. In his reply brief and at oral argument Appellant acknowledged that the November 17, 1999 Satisfaction of Judgment rendered these issues moot. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58B(d); Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Similarly, Appellant conceded at oral argument that his obligation of child support could not be extinguished by the satisfaction of judgment.

Affirmed.
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

-----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 
 

______________________________
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.