State of Utah in the interest of W.A., S.D., and M.D.

----ooOoo----

State of Utah, in the interest of W.A., S.D., and M.D.,
persons under eighteen years of age.
______________________________

D.D. and S.A.,
Appellants,

v.

State of Utah,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990237-CA

F I L E D
January 13, 2000
  2000 Utah Ct. App. 3 -----

Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Charles D. Behrens

Attorneys:
John E. Laherty, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Jan Graham and John Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem

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Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant D.D., the natural mother of W.A., S.D., and M.D., appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to all three children. S.A., the natural father of W.A., appeals the same order terminating his parental rights. A.D., the natural father of S.D. and M.D., did not appeal the termination of his parental rights.

D.D.'s attorney filed an Anders-type brief pursuant to L.C. v. State, 963 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) and abided by the requirements of that case including giving proper notice to D.D. and incorporating her suggestions. Counsel raised the following issues on D.D.'s behalf: 1) DCFS failed to provide reasonable reunification services; 2) the juvenile court's findings that she would not have benefitted from reasonable reunification services were not supported by the evidence; and 3) fundamental fairness dictates that her parental rights be restored. However, after engaging "in sufficient analysis of the record and case law," counsel concluded that these issues are frivolous. Id. at 765 (citation omitted). Our independent analysis of the issues and the record lead us to the same conclusion. There was sufficient evidence, including testimony about D.D.'s emotional and mental illness, mental deficiencies, lack of judgment, inappropriate expectations of her children, and inability to parent, to support the juvenile court's decision to terminate her parental rights.

S.A.'s attorney makes the same arguments, in a non-Anders-type brief, on behalf of S.A. as were made for D.D., namely, he was given insufficient reunification services. In spite of having some general concerns about the AVATAR program, in which S.A. and D.D. participated for a short time, the juvenile court concluded the State provided adequate services to D.D. and S.A. The evidence further suggested that regardless of the type of the reunification services provided, D.D.'s and S.A.'s mental deficiencies and illnesses, lack of judgment and impulse control made it impossible for them to make significant, lasting changes that would allow them to adequately parent. There was evidence to suggest that S.A. was more of a nurturer than D.D., but it was insufficient to overcome the significant evidence supporting termination of his parental rights. Moreover, "[r]eunification services are a gratuity provided to parents by the Legislature, and appellants thus have no constitutional right to receive these services." In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating D.D.'s and S.A.'s parental rights and allow D.D.'s counsel to withdraw.
 
 

______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson, Judge