State of Utah v. Anderson

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State v. Anderson. Filed October 15, 1999 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS


State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,


Evan B. Anderson,
Defendant and Appellant.

(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981674-CA

October 15, 1999
     1999 UT App 299 -----

Fifth District, St. George Department
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham

Evan B. Anderson, New Harmony, Appellant Pro Se
Eric A. Ludlow and Wade Farraway, St. George, for Appellee


Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Jackson.


Appellant Evan B. Anderson appeals his convictions of contracting without a license and applying for a building permit without a license, both class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501(1) and (4) (1998).

We first consider the procedural issues raised on appeal. The trial court did not err in refusing to consolidate this case with another case involving licensing status during a separate time period. The court also did not err in denying a bill of particulars based upon its finding that the State had provided adequate access to information. Finally, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the State's case prior to its submission to the jury. There was no basis to dismiss the case as a matter of law and the evidence was substantial enough to require submission to the jury. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o).

The issues related to the testimony of O.J. Peck are either without any basis in fact or law or they were not preserved. Anderson did not object to testimony on the basis that it was an interpretation of licensing law, and it is not clear what testimony he alleges was objectionable. The testimony in support of the State's case set out the dates and facts of licensure and recounted the information obtained during Peck's investigation. Peck did not testify contrary to the other evidence regarding license status. The general contractor's license for C and S Management, Inc. was effective only as of May 29, 1997. The license was not retroactive and was not in effect at any time during the performance of the contract with the Mellens. Finally, it is undisputed that Anderson was provided with a copy of Peck's written summary and was allowed to cross-examine Peck. The trial court did not err in ruling that the summary could be used to refresh recollection. See Utah R. Evid. 612.

Anderson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. "In reviewing a challenge to the jury verdict for insufficiency of the evidence, we 'must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will interfere only when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). Anderson has failed to sustain his burden on appeal to marshal the evidence in support of the jury verdict and demonstrate that it was insufficient to support the verdict. See State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(stating when challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence supporting that verdict and then demonstrate that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction). Anderson first argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate he personally obtained a building permit. The evidence pertaining to the building permit count, including evidence of Anderson's own admissions, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that he applied for the building permit. Similarly, the evidence pertaining to the licensing count established, based upon the public record, that neither Anderson nor C and S Management was licensed as a general contractor at the time of the contract with the Mellens or performance of that contract.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge