Family Counseling Serv. of No. Utah v. Dept. of Workforce Services et al

Family Counseling Service of Northern Utah v. Department of Workforce Services et al, Case No. 971706-CA, Filed October 1, 1998. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication)


IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ----ooOoo----   Family Counseling Service of Northern Utah, Petitioner, v.   Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Board; and Karen E. Noland, Respondents.   Case No. 971706-CA   F I L E D (October 1, 1998)   -----  

Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Philip C. Patterson, Ogden, for Petitioner

Lorin R. Blauer, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Board -----  

Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Orme.

DAVIS, Presiding Judge:

Family Counseling Service of Northern Utah (Family Counseling) petitions this court for review of the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board (the Board) reversing the administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision denying unemployment benefits to Karen E. Noland. The Board found that Noland severed her employment relationship with good cause and was therefore entitled to unemployment benefits. This court "will not overturn the Board's finding regarding good cause unless we determine the Board has abused its discretion." Robinson v. Department of Employment Sec., 827 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

A claimant for unemployment benefits must establish good cause for a voluntary separation of employment before benefits will be allowed. See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-101 (Supp. Oct. 1, 1997). The rules established by the Board governing what constitutes good cause are as follows:

(1) Good cause is established if continuance of the employment would have had an adverse effect on the claimant which could not be controlled or prevented and necessitated immediate severance of the employment relationship, . . .

(a) Adverse Effect on the Claimant.

The separation must have been motivated by circumstances which made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. . . .

Utah Admin. Code R994-405-102(1)(a) (Supp. Oct. 1, 1997).

The Board based its good cause determination on essentially three factors: (1) "[T]he Executive Director's manner in dealing with the claimant was demeaning to the claimant[;]" (2) Noland's "working conditions were causing her health problems, as well as problems at home[;]" and (3) the Executive Director made Noland use a vacation day when she was absent due to her own or her child's illness, contrary to prior procedures.

Notwithstanding the other reasons the Board gave for reversing the ALJ, a finding of good cause may be made on the basis of health reasons alone. See Box Elder County v. Industrial Comm'n, 632 P.2d 839, 841 (Utah 1981); Pritcher v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 917, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Here, there was sufficient evidence in the record supporting the Board's conclusion that Noland was suffering health problems because of her position with Family Counseling and the Executive Director's treatment of her. Noland presented her own unrebutted testimony that she suffered severe asthma attacks because of the stressful and demeaning work atmosphere. "A claimant who is physically or emotionally unable to continue work need only offer competent testimony that adequate health reasons existed to justify termination. He need not necessarily prove that he was advised by his physician to quit his job." Box Elder County, 632 P.2d at 841; see also Utah Admin. Code R994-405-107(8)(a) (Supp. Oct. 1, 1997) ("[A] contention that health problems required the separation must be established by competent evidence."). Accordingly, we hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion by reversing the decision of the ALJ and awarding Noland unemployment benefits.

Because we may affirm the Board's ruling on the basis of Noland's work-related health problems, we need not address Family Counseling's second issue asserting that the Board erred in determining that the Executive Director inappropriately and arbitrarily applied Family Counseling's policy regarding sick leave, even though the policy and procedural manual clearly gave the Executive Director the discretion to act as he did.

Affirmed.
 
 
 
 

______________________________

James Z. Davis,

Presiding Judge -----  

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________

Gregory K. Orme, Judge