State of Utah v. Wright
Annotate this CaseIN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Christopher David Wright,
Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981058-CA
F I L E D
March 18, 1999
1999 UT App 086
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Fourth District, Nephi Department
The Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr.
Attorneys:
Ronald W. Perkins, Ogden, for Appellant
Jan Graham, Catherine M. Johnson,
and Barnard N. Madsen, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
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Before Judges Wilkins, Bench, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
¶1
Christopher David Wright challenges the trial court's denial of his motion
to suppress evidence and his subsequent convictions for possessing marijuana
and drug paraphernalia. His
convictions were entered under a
conditional plea agreement reserving the right to appeal the
suppression issue. See State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding
conditional plea valid when court
and prosecutor accept agreed-upon condition). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Wright
has specifically stated in his brief that he accepts the trial court's
factual findings for
purposes of this appeal. We therefore
recite the facts from those findings.
¶3 On
September 5, 1996, Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol saw
a car
driven by Wright weaving across
the highway lane divider at least twice. The car's license plate
was loose and jiggling. After running
a check on the license number, which showed that no
information was on file, Sergeant
Mangelson stopped Wright.
¶4 While asking
Wright routine questions, Sergeant Mangelson detected the odor of raw
marijuana coming from the car. The
sergeant asked Wright for permission to search the car for
marijuana. When Wright refused,
the sergeant ordered him from the car, patted him down, and
told him to open the car trunk.
There, Sergeant Mangelson found a duffel bag containing
twenty-five pounds of marijuana.
The sergeant arrested Wright on drug possession charges.
¶5 Wright
moved to suppress the evidence seized from the trunk. He argued that Sergeant
Mangelson lacked probable cause
to search the trunk, violating his right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.
When the trial court denied his motion, Wright entered a
conditional guilty plea, maintaining
the right to raise the probable cause issue on appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶6 "We
review a trial court's determination of whether a particular set of facts
constitutes
probable cause nondeferentially
for correctness, affording a measure of discretion to the trial
court." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
¶7 The
concept of probable cause is vital to protecting Fourth Amendment rights.(1)See
id. at
225-26. In general, police officers
may not search or seize without a warrant supported by
probable cause.(2)See id. at 226.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable
unless they meet the criteria of
an accepted exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. See id. Two such exceptions
involve searches of mobile vehicles and seizure of
evidence in plain view. See id.
Still, these exceptions are applicable only when supported by
probable cause. See id.
¶8 Probable
cause is present when "'"the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they ha[ve]
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a [person]
of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is
being committed.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Dorsey,
731 P.2d 1085, 1088
(Utah 1986) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302,
1310-11 (1949))). It is "an objective
standard"--a police officer's subjective beliefs are not the
benchmark. Id.
¶9 Even
so, a court may consider an officer's particular experience and education
in
determining whether probable cause
exists. See id. For instance, an officer's special familiarity
with how controlled substances smell
is germane to evaluating whether an officer had probable
cause to search and seize. See id.
Indeed, "'probable cause . . . may arise from an officer's sense
of smell.'" Id. at 227 (quoting
State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Further, "[i]t is well settled that
the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle establishes
probable cause for the warrantless
search of that vehicle." Id. We have held that "'[a] strong,
emanating odor of marijuana comes
within the "plain view" doctrine and need not be ignored by
officers.'" State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Manbeck,
744 F.2d 360, 380 n.34 (4th Cir. 1984)).
¶10 It is
undisputed here that Sergeant Mangelson smelled marijuana before he searched.
That
fact alone gave him probable cause
to search under the principles outlined above. What Wright
questions is whether the probable
cause which clearly existed supported the sergeant's search of
the trunk, as opposed to the passenger
compartment. Wright argues that the smell of marijuana
justifies an officer in searching
only the passenger compartment of the car to corroborate the smell with
evidence before searching the trunk. To support this proposition, Wright
cites United States
v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir.
1993), a case this court described with approval in State v.
Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997).
¶11 In Nielsen,
an officer on a car stop smelled burnt marijuana coming from the defendant's
open window. See Nielsen, 9 F.3d
at 1488. On that basis, the officer asked for and received
permission to search the car's interior
for the source of the odor. See id. The officer's search was
fruitless. See id. Still, he persevered
and, despite the defendant's protests, searched the car trunk, where he
found cocaine and scales. See id. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
found in the trunk, arguing the officer lacked probable cause to search
there.
¶12 The Tenth
Circuit agreed, holding that the smell of burnt marijuana gave the officer
probable cause to search only the
passenger compartment. See id. at 1491. Once the officer was unable to
corroborate the smell with evidence from the passenger compartment, probable
cause
could not support a search of the
trunk. See id. The court noted, "The scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile 'is defined
by the object of the search and the places in which there is
probable cause to believe that it
may be found.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 824, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172
(1982)). The court further reasoned that "[t]he smell of burnt
marijuana would lead a person of
ordinary caution to believe the passenger compartment might
contain marijuana." Id.
¶13 The Tenth
Circuit has since used this language from Nielsen and Ross to support its
holding
in a case directly on point here.
See United States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir.
1998). In Downs, the court recognized
"a commmonsense distinction between the smells of burnt
and raw marijuana based on the imperative
that the scope of a warrantless search 'is defined by
the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found.'" Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2172). In further explanation, the court stated
that:
[t]he smell of burnt marijuana
is generally consistent with personal use of marijuana
in the passenger compartment of
an automobile. In such a case, therefore, there is
no fair probability that the trunk
of the car contains marijuana and an officer must
limit the search to the compartment
absent corroborating evidence of contraband.
When, on the other hand, an officer
encounters, as was the case here, the
overpowering smell of raw marijuana,
there is a fair probability that the car is being
used to transport large quantities
of marijuana and that the marijuana has been
secreted in places other than the
passenger compartment. Accordingly, in such
circumstances, a search of the trunk
is appropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
¶14 We agree
with the Tenth Circuit's rationale and apply it here. In this case, Wright
does not
dispute the trial court's finding
that Sergeant Mangelson smelled the odor of marijuana coming
from his car. The only testimony
on this issue at the hearing was that the odor was that of raw
marijuana. An odor of raw marijuana
strong enough to be smelled from outside a car "would lead
a person of ordinary caution" to
believe that marijuana in bulk may be stored in the car trunk. Id.
The trial court thus correctly determined
that Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to search
the trunk.
¶15 Based
on our analysis, we need not address Wright's other argument that the trunk
search
was not justified as a search incident
to arrest. Affirmed.
______________________________
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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¶16 WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states:
The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
2. "A warrantless automobile search
is not justified by probable cause alone, but must also be
premised upon exigent circumstances."
State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). However, because Wright has
not raised the issue of exigent circumstances, we address
only the existence of probable cause.
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